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PART III 
THE LATER WRITINGS (1933-1942) 
CHAPTER VII 
ANTI-REALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
1. Introduction. 
In Chapter I we noticed that one of the major issues 
of concern to Collingwood's interpreters is his position on 
the realism-idealism controversy. Knox argues that he vacil-
lated from a youthful realism to a mature idealism and then 
back to a dogmatic and sceptical realism in his later writings. 
Donagan maintains that the youthful idealism propounded in 
Speculum Mentis, with its anti-realistic, anti-abstraction 
principle, was superceded by a more mature philosophy of mind 
in which abstraction is recognized as being essential for 
thought; the resulting philosophy of mind, though flawed, is 
compatible with realism and contemporary analytical philosophy. 
Rubinoff denies that Collingwood was ever anything but an 
idealist. And Mink argues that Collingwood's philosophy es-
capes both idealism and realism. 
In Chapter II we found that Collingwood's self-inter-
pretation in the Autobiography also stresses the realism-
idealism controversy, but it stresses mainly his opposition 
to errors of realism, and only incidentally denies that his 
early work (Speculum Mentis) was, as one of his reviewers 
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called it, "the usual idealistic nonsense." On this inter-
pretation we know only that Collingwood was opposed to ·the 
central tenet of realism, as well as to its many pernicious 
consequences, but not what Collingwood's commitment was to 
idealism. We also saw in this chapter that Collingwood framed 
the central tenet of realism in terms of the knower-known re-
lationship, and not in terms of the dependency of matter on 
mind Dr even in terms of an abstraction principle. On the 
basis of the autobiographical interpretation, then, we con-
cluded that an affirmation of the legitimacy of abstraction 
does not necessarily constitute an espousal of the doctrine 
of realism--not, that is, without evidence that Collingwood 
himself drew the inference that the central tenet of realism 
necessarily implies the principle of abstraction. 
However in Chapter III we saw that the evidence of 
Speculum Mentis does seem to point to this inference, since 
throughout that early work Collingwood does attack realism by 
means of a critique of the principle of abstraction. Real-
ism's basic error, according to Speculum Mentis, is the as-
sumption that truth is the result of abstraction, or is con-
tained in the abstract concept, and the correction of this 
error, which is the work of philosophy, is the realization 
that all abstraction is falsification, because "to abstract 
is to consider separately things that are inseparable" (SM, 
160). But both in Chapter III and in Chapter VI we were at 
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pains to show that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of 
terms 1 ike "separate" and "identical" which render the .formu-
lation of the principle of abstraction, as it is expressed in 
Speculum Mentis, equally ambiguous. The ambiguity infects the 
discussion of realism itself, which on the one hand is respon-
sible for all the root errors that consciousness makes about 
itself, and on the other hand is the particular form of dog-
matism associated with historicism. These ambiguities remain 
unresolved in Speculum Mentis, which is not surprising from 
the point of view of the Autobiography, since his rapproche-
ment philosophy was at this point still incomplete (cf. A, 107, 
116). 
But even though Speculum Mentis presumes that an at-
tack on the principle of abstraction is an attack on realism, 
there is evidence that in the same book the principal doctrine 
of realism as described in the Autobiography is itself at-
tacked in an argument employing the same strategy as the later 
work, and the argument does not depend on premises tied to a 
principle of abstraction. Collingwood argued that to ask 
what an object world is or would be apart from a mind which 
knows it, presupposes the false suggestion that we can de-
scribe that which by definition is also unknown (SM, 267-68). 
This argument does not depend on any formulation of a "princi-
ple of abstraction" as essential to realism (cf. CEPC, 9-12). 
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What we require at this point, if the autobiographi-
cal interpretation is to be upheld, is evidence that in his 
later philosophy Collingwood did not, as some of his critics 
have charged, surrender to the realism that he had rejected 
in his early writings. If we can show that throughout his 
later writings Collingwood continued to deny the principal 
doctrine of realism, we shall take it that on this issue, at 
least, the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated. 
Since this is the main concern of this chapter, we shall at-
tempt to adhere as closely as we can to the fundamental formu-
la of realism as Collingwood understood it: that "knowing 
makes no difference to the object known." 1 We shall not at-
tempt to follow up on all the evidence that is available to 
show that he also sought to overcome all the mistaken conse-
quences that follow from this premise--notably those concern-
ing moral philosophy2--although we may make occasional note 
1As we pointed out in Chapter III, the autobiographi-
cal formula for realism is phrased in extremely abstract terms, 
with no differentiation made between various senses or cases 
of "knowing" and "object," and no exact designation of what 
sort of "difference" is made (or not made). Throughout this 
chapter we shall assume that Collingwood is talking about an 
epistemological doctrine, i.e. one which primarily says some-
thing about knowing rather than something about reality. 
2In the bibliography of the Krausz collection of Cri-
tical Essays on the Philosophy of Collingwood there is a note 
that the lectures on ethics, currently being edited by Mrs. K. 
Collingwood in collaboration with Mr. J. Rusk, are going to 
be deposited in the Bodleian Library. Until they are made 
available, Collingwood's views on ethics will probably remain 
only partially revealed in the remarks in The New Leviathan. 
324 
of these consequences in passing. We shall also not be con-
cerned with a detailed discussion of the principle of abstrac-
tion, except as it bears directly on the discussion of the 
central tenet of realism in the passage under discussion--our 
reason being that the connection of these two principles is 
not a direct part of the autobiographical interpretation. 
But does the denial of the principal doctrine of real-
ism necessarily imply the affirmation of an idealist thesis? 
Certainly to deny the proposition that "knowing does not make 
a difference to the object known" logically implies the af-
firmation that "knowing makes a difference to the object 
known," but is that all that it implies, and is this idealism? 
In an intriguing article, John F. Post suggests that Colling-
wood's anti-realism argument in the Autobiography not only 
shows that the central tenet of realism is false, but is just 
as effective against the idealist position that knowing does 
make a difference to the object known, since either premise 
implies the meaningless assertion that one can know what is 
simultaneously declared to be unknown. 3 Taking our cue from 
Since Collingwood's ethics is not what has caused widespread 
interest in his philosophy, or even widespread controversy 
about it, there is little problem with leaving it out of con-
sideration here. We do this knowing full well that for Col-
lingwood, even in the Autobiography, theory and practice can-
not be fully separated from one another. 
3John F. Post, "Does Knowing Make a Difference to What 
Is Known?" Philosophical Quarterly, XV, no. 60 (July, 1965), 
pp. 220-28. 
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this article, we would like to propose a modification of Post's 
argument and use it as an abstract framework for our investi-
gation of the realism-idealism controversy in Collingwood's 
later philosophy. 
In order to be as clear as possible (but only as clear 
as necessary) about what is being affirmed by this negation, 
we propose the following schema: 
A. (1) Knowing makes a difference to the object known. 
(2) (1) is false (realism). 
(3) (2) is false, because the denial of (1) is ab-
surd (anti-realism). 
But does A (3) then imply that A (1) is true? And is this 
idealism? In order to see if this is so, let us propose a 
more complicated version of schema A: 
B. (1) Knowing makes a difference to the object known. 
(2) The object known makes a difference to knowing. 
(3) (1) is false and (2) is true (radical realism): 
(4) (1) is true and (2) is false (radical idealism). 
(5) Both (1) and (2) are false (radical scepticism). 
(6) (3), (4), and (5) are false because (1) and (2) 
are both true. 
Whether or not there are any historically manifested 
representatives for the positions we are calling "radical 
realism," "radical idealism," and "radical scepticism," we 
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wish to know how Collingwood stands with respect to these 
fundamental options. If we can show that in his later phil-
osophy Collingwood held to A (3) we will have shown th~t on 
this issue the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated. 
But we wish to know further if Collingwood held to B (4), B 
(5), orB (6). We do know that Collingwood claimed that he 
could never plead guilty to a charge of scepticism (EPM, 223), 
and that in some sense of the word idealism (but we do not 
know yet if, in the later philosophy, it is in the radical 
sense as we are using that term), he claimed not to be an 
idealist (A, 56-57). 4 But can we really defend B (6)? Does 
Collingwood really hold that B (1) and B (2) are not related 
as disjuncts but as conjuncts? 
Our strategy will be simply to take up the later writ-
ings, beginning with the Essay on Philosophical Method, con-
tinuing with The Principles of Art, and concluding with The 
4In Chapter III we noted that in his early philosophy 
Collingwood rejected "subjective" and "metaphysical" idealism, 
and although he appeared to approve of an epistemological 
idealism, held that "Absolute Knowledge" was humanly possible, 
and ruled out a kind of objective idealism that relied on a 
Divine Mind as a locus for absolute knowledge, we found these 
passages in Speculum Mentis to be plagued with difficulties. 
In the present chapter where "idealism" is used without quali-
fication, the epistemological, non-subjective variety is 
meant. But we must remain alert to the possibility that what 
he says about "idealism" may not be applicable to other forms 
of idealism, particularly objective idealism of an Hegelian 
pedigree. 
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New Leviathan, with side-excursions to the Essay on Metaphy-
sics, The Idea of Nature, and The Idea of History. We.shall 
- -----
try to find out what Collingwood means by the terms "object," 
"knowledge," and the relation of "making a difference." Of 
necessity this involves setting out in some detail Colling-
wood's later philosophy of mind. But in this chapter we will 
only be concerned with so much of it as relates to the ques-
tion of the principal doctrine of realism--and consequently 
the discussion will center on the issue of the perception of 
the "real world" and the modification of the object of per-
ception by thought. In the next chapter we will take up the 
"higher" functions of mind--conceptual, propositional, inter-
rogative, and implicative thinking--and later we will be con-
cerned with the historical imagination and the ultimate mean-
ing of "difference" and "identity" for a rapprochement meta-
physics. We refer the reader to other expositions of the 
levels of practical consciousness in Collingwood's later phil-
osophy of mind: since these are peripheral to our main con-
cern, we shall have little to say about them in this chapter. 
(See, e.g., Mink, MHD, 82-92, 117 figure 2). 
It will help the reader to bear in mind that in this 
chapter we shall try to give Collingwood every opportunity to 
make clear what is the status of objects of perception, and 
whether there is any possibility for the object to make a dif-
ference to the perceptual knowledge of it. We shall therefore 
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ask the reader's forebearance while we examine some "circum-
stantial evidence" to confirm our suspicion that Collingwood 
was trying to escape from the idealism-realism dilemma. 
Finally, it may be helpful if for orientation the 
reader refer occasionally to Tables 7 and 8 . While these 
summaries do not correspond exactly to the sequence of topics 
in the chapter, they will give the reader an overview of the 
essential features of Collingwood's philosophy of mind pre-
supposed in the discussion of this theory of perception. 
2. Empirical Thinking and the Essay on Philosophical Method. 
Critics of Collingwood have dismissed the view of 
philosophy expounded in the Essay on Philosophical Method pri-
marily because they saw it as a specimen of idealistic argu-
ment (cf. LPC, 259-60). The grounds for this assertion are 
primarily (a) the view of predication presented in the essay--
viz. that all philosophical statements are both categorical 
and universal; and (b) the use to which this analysis of pre-
dication is put--viz. the defense of the Anselmian ontological 
arg~ment. 5 We will refrain from a full discussion of both of 
these issues: the former will be examined in the next chap-
ter, insofar as it is best discussed in connection with Q-A 
5c. Ryle, "Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological Argu-
ment," Mind XLIV, 174 (April, 1935), pp. 137-51; reprinted in 
Hick and McGill, eds., op. cit, pp. 246-60. 
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logic and the nature of hypothetical and categorical judg-
ments; and the latter issue will arise again in the chapter 
on metaphysics and rapprochement (Chapter X), since the onto-
logical argument seems to be the ultimate test of whether 
there is an upper limiting case of unity in the scale of forms 
of knowledge. 
The question at this point is whether or not the Essay 
on Philosophical Method contains any statements which would 
substantiate, modify, or disprove the central anti-realistic 
thesis of the Autobiography. But it appears that in this work 
Collingwood intends to dodge all responsibility for dealing 
with such issues. Although the purpose of the essay is to de-
scribe the nature of philosophy, Collingwood announces at the 
outset that he will not expand the essay to include the place 
of philosophy among the other forms of thought, the place of 
thought among the other activities of the mind, and the rela-
tion of mind to the world (EPM, 7-8). For reasons of both ex-
pediency and specificity, he declines to deal with the broader 
issues raised by the essay: "though no doubt the thoughts here 
expressed have implications in metaphysics, logic, and the 
theory of knowledge, these implications will not be discussed" 
(EPM, 8). 
On the other hand, Collingwood confessed at the end of 
the essay that his original contract with the reader (at EPM, 
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45) to treat the proposed characteristics of philosophical 
concepts, judgments, and arguments as only hypothetically or 
provisionally affirmed has been violated throughout the book 
by appeal to "experience"--that is, philosophical experience, 
instances in which the concepts, judgments, and arguments are 
displayed as having these characteristics (EPM, 223-24). 
Therefore the interpreter is put in the difficult position of 
taking the substantive remarks of the essay as in one sense 
true for philosophy (as Collingwood sees it) without qualifi-
cation, and in another sense taking such remarks as only pro-
visionally true. Until the actual standpoint of the essay is 
spelled out (and it will be to the best of our ability in the 
next chapter), we can only look for indirect evidence to add 
probability to our contention that the essay does not repre-
sent a departure from the central theses of the Autobiography. 
When we turn to the Essay on Philosophical Method for 
evidence to determine whether or not Collingwood held to B 
(3), B (4), B (5), or B (6), i.e. whether .the negative pro-
position which denies the realist's principal doctrine logi-
cally entails the positive proposition that knowing does make 
a difference to the object known, the closest we come to such 
evidence is in a passage in which Collingwood is discussing 
the problem of the starting point in philosophy. Philosophy 
can justify its own starting point, he says, "only if the ar-
guments of philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direc-
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tion from principles to conclusion, have a reversible one, the 
principles establishing the conclusions and the conclusions 
reciprocally establishing the principles" (EPM, 160). The es-
cape from the charge of vicious circularity is premised, Col-
lingwood says, on the realization that philosophy, unlike em-
pirical and exact science, does not proceed from the unknown 
to the known: it relies on the ''Socratic principle that phil-
osophical reasoning leads to no conclusion which we did not in 
some sense know already" (EPH, 161). 
Every school of philosophical thought has accepted this 
principle, recognizing that philosophy does not, like ex-
act or empirical science, bring us to know things of which 
we already knew in some way; ... for if the species of 
a philosophical genus overlap, the distinction between the 
known and the unknown, which in a non-philosophical sub-
ject-matter involves a difference between two mutually ex-
clusive classes of truths, in a philosophical subject-
matter implies that we may both know and not know the same 
thing; a paradox which disappears in the light of a no-
tion of a scale of forms ~f knowledge, where coming to 
know means coming to know in a different and better way. 
( EPM, 161). 
Here we see that Collingwood is employing the two most 
central doctrines of the essay--the overlap of classes and the 
scale of forms (the technical meanings of which will be ex-
plored in the next chapter) to justify the philosophical sense 
in which knowing makes a difference to the object known. For 
if philosophical knowledge proceeded in the manner of empiri-
cal knowledge, then it would simply be the case that the ob-
ject made a difference to the subject, or to the knowing of 
332 
;t without any reciprocal co-effect of knowing on the known. 
.... ' 
But Collingwood is here asserting that "every school of phil-
osophy" accepts the principle that in philosophy it is neces-
sary to anticipate its conclusions "by an experience that pos-
sesses them in substance before its reasoning begins," so 
that "in philosophy the conclusions can be checked by compar-
ing them with these anticipations'' (EPM, 163). The object of 
philosophical knowledge, therefore, is not something passively 
given: its initial datum is always being modified in the light 
of its conclusions (cf. EPM, 94-97). 
Collingwood spells out for his readers the ways in 
which this initial datum of philosophy differs from that of 
empirical science. It is different (1) in its relation to the 
process of reasoning (premises and conclusions are irrever-
sibly related in inductive reasoning, whereas in philosophy 
the arguments are reversible); (2) in its own constitution (it 
consists not of empirical facts but of universal propositions 
which form the material or substance out of which the final 
system is constructed); and (3) in the way in which it comes 
to be possessed (it is apprehended not by perception but by 
thought--the experience of a thinkerl (EPM, 166-69). (These 
principles will be more carefully examined in Chapter VIII). 
But the differences do not end there, and Collingwood spells 
out a further difference as (4) the principles that in phil-
osophy knowing makes a difference to what is known: 
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In empirical science we begin by perceiving that the 
facts are so, and go on by forming a theory as to why they 
are so; but in adding this new theory to the old facts we 
do not come to know the facts in a different way, we only 
come to have something new in our minds . . . alongside 
the old knowledge. The process is a special kind of ac-
cumulation. But in philosophy the knowledge . . . why 
things are so makes ~ difference to the knowledge that 
they are so . . . . Our knowledge is not simply accumulat-
ing, it is developing; it is improving as well as increas-
ing; it is widening and strengthening itself at once. 
There is consequently a parallel difference in the result 
of the process, the conclusion which the argument estab-
lishes .... (I)n philosophy, the theory that emerges 
from consideration of the facts is no mere hypothesis, it 
is the facts themselves more thoroughly understood. (EPM, 
169-70; emphasis mine). 
The incautious reader may leap to the conclusion that 
because Collingwood is contrasting empirical and philosophical 
thinking that it is only in philosophy that the proviso holds 
that knowing makes a difference to the object known, and that 
in empirical thinking perception of the facts leaves them un-
altered, the process being a "kind of accumulation" rather than 
a kind of modification. But such a conclusion ignores Colling-
wood's precautionary remark at the beginning of the essay. He 
says there that when he talks about "empirical" or "non-philo-
sophical'' concepts he is referring not to the concepts as they 
are actually used in science or mathematics, but to concepts 
which are mistakenly thought to be philosophical: "what I am 
discussing, when I distinguish philosophical method from that 
of exact science, is not mathematics itself but a certain meth-
od, often mistakenly used in philosophy, which is believed to 
be that of mathematics" (EPM, 9). Collingwood's point is 
~ ~ \ s To v11 ,(:-
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that he is not primarily concerned with making statements 
about empirical or exact sciences, but about philosophy; and 
therefore it is not essential to this point that what he as-
serts as true for the empirical or exact sciences be true or 
not as they are actually employed in those fields, but only 
that what he is asserting as true for philosophy and philoso-
phical concepts--empirical and exact science as alternative 
methods and concepts for philosophy. 6 
But then does the provision that knowing makes a dif-
ference to the object known apply to the whole of the relation 
between knowledge and its object, or just to that relationship 
wherein the "object" is taken as the initial datum of philoso-
phy, and "knowing" is understood as that special relationship 
to an object that is mediated by the sort of thinking called 
philosophy? To answer this question we clearly must broaden 
our discussion from its self-imposed limitations in the Essay 
on Philosophical Method. This broader framework is provided 
by the philosophy of mind he declined to deal with in the es-
say on method. 
6
rt would be a misinterpretation to take the remarks 
in the Essay on Philosophical Method as evidence that at this 
time Collingwood held to the strict autonomy of separate modes 
of thought--science, history, philosophy, etc.--or that he 
held to the existence of a metaphysics of the one, the true, 
and the good. The essay leaves such issues unresolved. 
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3. Sensation, Imagination, and Empirical Thought. 
Since Collingwood declared in the Autobiography· that 
The Principles of Art was the second book in his mature ser-
ies, one would hope for some direct link between its contents 
and those of the Essay on Philosophical Method--the first book 
of the series of those he planned to write as of 1932. A 
promising case of a direct relation of subject matters might 
be the characterization of "empirical thinking" that appears 
in both (cf. PA, 221 and EPM, 164-70), were it not for the 
fact that the essay on method so severely limits the appli-
cability of that characterization. The linkage between the 
two works is there--but it is indirect: it appears in the form 
of their styles of argumentation, the overlapping of concepts 
employed in the theory of art, the scale of forms of experi-
ence and of knowledge that appear in the central chapters of 
the later work, and in the overall relation of conclusions to 
starting point, etc. specified in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method and exemplified in The Principles of Art. 
Even if we had already examined these methodological 
criteria, it is not of direct concern to us in this chapter 
to spell out this indirect relationship~ Nor would it be to 
our purpose to examine in detail Collingwood's philosophy of 
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art. 7 In keeping with our principle of limited objectives, 
we shall be looking only for evidence for or against Co-lling-
wood's judgment on the central tenet of realism. 8 
7The Principles of Art is divided into three major 
sections. Book I deals with the distinction between art and 
pseudo-art, the latter being primarily art-craft and the re-
flection on art based on it, this being the "technical theory 
of art." In this group of arts falsely so-called are all 
forms of what Collingwood calls representation art, amusement 
art, and magical art, all of which presume a distinction be-
tween means and end that is alien to true art. Book I ends 
with two chapters which treat of art in the correct sense of 
the term--as expression and as imagination. For the purpose 
of clarifying the meaning of the terms "expression" and "imag-
ination," Book II begins afresh with an examination of the 
general characterizations of experience as a whole, based on 
the structure of experience as exhibited by reflection on men-
tal functions familiar to anyone who thinks. Book II includes 
chapters on thinking and feeling, on sensation and imagination, 
on imagination and consciousness, and on language. Book III 
outlines a theory of art based on the distinctions and conclu-
sions of Books I and II. The critical chapters in Book III 
are those which discuss art as language and art as truth. 
8Although our concern is not directly with the theory 
of art, it is noteworthy to observe at this point that the 
structure of argument in The Principles of Art makes little 
sense apart from its anti-realistic orientation. The "techni-
cal theory of art," against which the whole of Book I is a 
continuous argument, is based on the realist's separation of 
end (the work of art) from means (the artist's activity), and 
some of Collingwood's most acrimonious comments in this sec-
tion are reserved for the "realistic aestheticians" (who, like 
Sam Alexander, maintain that "beauty" is a subjective feeling 
aroused by direct acquaintance or perception of the art-work--
PA, 149). These are exceeded only by his contempt for the 
psychologizing art-critics (who, like I. A. Richards, attempt 
to account for this subjective feeling on the basis of the 
stimulus-response model--PA, 29-36; cf. PA, 262-64), and for 
the positivistic anthropologists (who, like Freud, Edward Ty-
lor, James Frazer, and Levy-Bruhl, wind up talking like "one 
of Moliere's prize idiots" when they attempt to derive art 
from magical beliefs, while utterly misconceiving the nature 
of myth and magic in the first place--PA, 58-64). The theory 
of art as expression and as imagination which Collingwood 
works out is also fully anti-realistic inasmuch as instead of 
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Interestingly enough it is in the section on empiri-
cal thinking in The Principles of Art that we find the ~lear­
est indication in that work of the stance that Collingwood is 
taking on the central tenet of realism. In developing a 
theory of imagination Collingwood discusses the intermediate 
position of imagination in the region of experience between 
sensation and intellect, and points out that "sensation must 
be regarded as a flux of activity in which . . . as soon as 
the art-object it makes the function of imagination and its 
expression in language primary and even exclusively essential 
to true art. Collingwood goes so far in this direction that 
he asserts that "a work of art may be completely created when 
it has been created as a thing whose only place is in the ar-
tist's mind (PA, 130)--or, as he later puts it, in his head 
(PA, 151). In Book II the anti-realistic orientation (one 
might even call it a bias) is apparent in his final analysis 
of art as language or as the imaginative expression of emo-
tion---mental functions which exist even at the level of the 
logical and symbolic levels of thought as the ''emotions of in-
tellect" (PA, 252-69). Further indications of the anti-
realism of Book II will be analyzed in the text of this sec-
tion of our chapter, and in Chapter VIII. Finally, in Book 
III, while saying little directly against realism (as one 
might expect, since anti-realism is his starting point and 
not his ultimate conclusion), Collingwood counters the real-
istic esthetician's subject-object dichotomy in art by dis-
cussing the truth in art as something not in the art work only 
or in the subject only, but as a knowing of oneself which is 
also a making of oneself (PA, 291-92), and by discussing the 
active role of the artist's audience in the work of art it-
self (PA, 300-24). Even in so short a summary as this, it is 
apparent that to excise the anti-realistic orientation of the 
book is to make nonsense of its argument. That other esthe-
ticians have recognized this is indicated by the fact that 
they point to his "art-only-in-the-head" overstatement as 
representative of Collingwood's supposed over-intellectualiza-
tion of the subject of esthetics as a whole: see e.g. S. Lan-
ger, Feeling and Form, Charles Scribner's Sons (New York, 
1953), p. 382. If this is overstatement, we would like to 
suggest that it is due to his anti-realistic bias. 
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the act is over, the sensum has vanished, never to return. 
Its esse is sentiri" (PA, 198). At this point he paraphrases 
the sort of criticism that someone like G. E. Moore (he cites 
him by name) would raise to such an overstatement, and gives 
his own response to it: 
"Naturally," it may be said, "we cannot see a colour with-
out seeing it. But what could be more absurd than to ar-
gue that, because we have stopped seeing it, the colour 
has ceased to exist? For all we know, colours may per-
fectly well go on existing when we are not looking at 
them." The objection is an excellent example of "metaphy-
sics" in the sense in which that word has at various times 
become a term of merited abuse . . . . The fairy-tale 
about the existence of unsensed sensa, no doubt, is be-
lieved by the people-who indulge in it to be a piece of 
philosophical thinking .... But even if the belief in 
question were true, propositions of this kind would still 
be nonsense unless it were true not merely that ~ sensum 
exists apart from our sensation of it, but that in this 
state of apartness it is open to our inspection; we have 
it before our mind in such a way that we can appreciate 
its qualities, compare them with those of other sensa, 
and so forth. The question is not one of metaphysics, 
whether colours exist or not, when we do not see them; it 
is a question of epistemology, whether we can "have them 
before our mind" in the above sense otherwise than by see-
ing them; and if so, how. If we cannot, propositions of 
the kind in question are all nonsensical .... (PA, 
198-99; emphasis mine. Cf. PA, 170; NL, 5.31-5.39). 
The argument in this passage is an application of the 
refutation of the central doctrine of realism as found in the 
Autobiography. Its thrust is to demonstrate the absurdity of 
the epistemological proposition that "knowing makes no differ-
ence to the object known" by showing that this entails know-
ing what is simultaneously declared to be unknown--in this 
case sensing something that is unsensed. What Collingwood is 
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maintaining in this passage is that either (1) what Moore and 
empiricists in general have been comparing is a sensum and 
something else like a sensum, but different from it--in fact 
an imaginatum9--or (2) they have been talking complete non-
sense--the nonsense of being the assertion of the existence 
10 
of unsensed sensa. 
9collingwood does not use the term "imaginatum" or 
even "phantasm," but on the analogy of his deliberate usage 
of the term "sensation" for the act of sensation and "sensum" 
for what is sensed in that act (PA, 173) we feel it to be 
justified. Collingwood's determination to "speak with the 
vulgar and think with the learned" causes a certain inarticu-
lation and headache for his interpreters, as we shall see when 
we come to the altered terminology of The New Leviathan. Cf. 
PA, 174, and below. --- ---
10This is the argument in support of the thesis that 
the esse of sensa is sentiri that Donagan claims he failed to 
find in Chapter VIII of The Principles of Art (LPC, 32-34, and 
32 n. 1): in Chapter VIII it appears on P.-r/0. These pages 
are predictably the most confusing in all of Donagan's book. 
(a) Donagan first asserts that he could find no such argument, 
and then himself cites the argument quoted above (evidently 
feeling that it is a bad argument, and a bad argument is no 
argument at all). (b) Then Donagan proceeds to argue that 
"what ((Collingwood)) took for an 'obvious truth' is a howler 
.... (I)t is not at all obvious that being sensed may not 
be merely an episode in the history of a sensum, even though 
it is its very essence as a sensum. Collingwood seems to have 
confounded the obvious truth that only while it is sensed does 
a sensum exist as a sensum with the pleasantry that when it is 
not being sensed it cannot exist as anything whatever" (LPC, 
33). But since Collingwood's whole point is the "obvious 
truth" that Donagan grants, and not the different proposition 
that an unsensed object cannot exist as anything whatever when 
it is unsensed, it appears that the howl is on Donagan: he af-
firms what he proposes to refute. (c) Then in addition to 
this supposed refutation of what is not and yet is an argument, 
Donagan proposes what he calls "some positive evidence" for 
maintaining that the esse of a sensum is not sentiri." This 
he finds in the following argument: "The strongest argument 
for asserting that most of our sensa are physical objects, 
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This would seem to let the empiricists off the hook by 
allowing them to opt for (1), but to choose this option is, 
for a radical empiricist, to surrender his empiricism, since 
the radical empiricist is one who maintains that all knowledge 
arises from sensation, where knowledge is not considered to be 
coeval with sensation as originator, but rather subsequent up-
on it--both temporally and logically. 11 What Collingwood is 
proposing instead is a modified empiricism in which thought as 
the deliberate achievement of a thinker is present even at the 
level of sensation. Since radical empiricists assume that 
knowledge arises from the active impression of "sense data" on 
passive organs of sensation, it is clear that Collingwood's 
position would not be taken by them as a supporting modifica-
. 12 t~on. 
and so can exist unsensed, is that every natural language in 
which men speak of what they see, hear, taste, and smell is a 
physical object language" (LPC, 34). But as Donagan himself 
notes (but fails to apply to his own "evidence") on such 
grounds as this one could justify belief in fairy-tales, for 
every natural language is as much a fairy-tale language as it 
is a physical object language. Donagan's "evidence" (or is 
it an argument?) is not as mute as the rock that Dr. Johnson 
kicked to refute Berkeley, but it is just as ineffective. 
11cf. Errol E. Harris, Nature, Mind, and Modern 
Science (New York, 1954), p. 119. 
12Mink writes: "Collingwood is an empiricist, but 
one who belongs to no identifiable school . . . . As an em-
piricist, Collingwood is a radical empiricist, but he is also 
a radical idealist, for whom the originative powers of thought 
are coeval with the most rudimentary forms of experience" 
(MHD, 111). Mink rightly recognizes that Collingwood escapes 
the classification of both realism and idealism, that "the 
traditional opposition of 'empiricism' and 'idealism' is not 
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Nevertheless this is Collingwood's program in Book 
II of The Principles of Art, and the strategy of argument in 
this section makes little sense unless it is viewed as an ex-
tended argument which both (1) rejects the empiricist episte-
mology on which realistic esthetics is based, and (2) attempts 
to save whatever meaning survives this critique. The argu-
ment we have just cited, for example, appears just after a 
rather extensive survey of the British empiricists on the re-
lation of sensation to imagination, during which his main con-
cern was not with a mere refutation that there is a valid ba-
sis for the distinction between real and imaginary sensa, but 
with extracting whatever sense he can from the philosophical 
tradition on the subject. In order to understand the modifi-
cation of empiricism that Collingwood is proposing we must ex-
amine this distinction more closely. 
a fruitful subject for investigation or debate, and that all 
of the interesting problems cluster around what it means to 
be radical" (ibid.). Unfortunately Mink does not address him-
self to this question, and therefore his paradoxical asser-
tions shed no light on how it is possible for a position to 
be both empirical and idealist when both are asserted in their 
radical forms--that is, as positions which exclude their oppo-
sites. An index of his confusion on this issue can be found 
in his use of the term "genetic" as it applies to the scale 
of forms of consciousness: Mink asserts at one point that 
Collingwood avoids the "genetic fallacy" of the pragmatists 
and the non-genetic fallacy of the empiricists (MHD, 111), 
but later he says that for Collingwood feeling and rationality 
are linked genetically (MHD, 262). 
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In Chapter VIII Collingwood sets up "the problem of 
imagination" against the background of the contrast between 
feeling and thought, the "problem" being that imaginary sensa 
seem to be neither feelings nor thoughts. The difference be-
tween these two "features of our experience" is carried out on 
the basis of several contrasting characteristics. ( 1) In 
terms of the acts of feeling and thinking, feeling is simple 
and thought bipolarly complex: thinking carries with it the 
sense of success or failure, truth or falsity, or in general 
a reference to self-imposed standards or criteria by which it 
judges whether what it has tried to do has been done well or 
ill. Feeling may have oppositions and distinctions within 
itself, but the sense of its having been done altogether "de-
liberately" or of its having succeeded or failed is absent 
from it (PA, 157). (2) In terms of what is felt or thought, 
feelings are private, and thought is public: what one feels 
is not open to inspection in the same way as is what one 
thinks (PA, 157-58). (3) Thoughts can corroborate or contra-
dict each other, but feelings cannot (PA, 158), and the main 
reason for this is that (4) feelings are in perpetual flux in 
which nothing remains the same (what we take for permanence 
or recurrence is only a greater or lesser degree of resem-
blance between different feelings), whereas in thinking we 
are concerned with something that lasts, that genuinely re-
curs as a factor in experience (although it is not necessary 
to assert the eternity of all objects of thought as such) 
13 (PA, 159). Finally, (5) feeling has the character of a 
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foundation upon which thinking is erected as a superstruc-
ture--which is why feeling appears to arise in us independ-
ently of thought, in a part of our experience which func-
tions independently of all thinking and seems unaffected by 
it, a level Collingwood calls "psychical" (PA, 163-64). 14 
Within feeling Collingwood distinguishes two "kinds" 
of experience, sensation and emotion--not as a distinction 
between two species of a common genus, but as two aspects of 
one and the same experience (like "a terrifying red") which 
13In the subsequent analysis not all of the disting-
uishing criteria are given equal weight by Collingwood, but 
(4) is taken as essential to feeling--i.e., that it is imper-
manent, or in constant flux, while thought is something that 
recurs and lasts. In section 4 of this chapter we will see 
how crucial this distinction is for the characterization of 
attention--the major function of imagination. On the con-
trast between sensation (or feeling) and thought in his early 
writings, see SM, 188-89. 
14
"I hold that the proper business of psychology is 
to investigate this level of experience," i.e. the psychical 
level, the level of experience at which we merely feel sensa-
tions together with their peculiar emotional charges, "and 
not the level which is characterized by thought" (PA, 164). 
Collingwood refers the reader to a note on p. 171 in which 
he states that "a science of feeling must be 'empirical' (i.e. 
devoted to ascertaining and classifying 'facts' or things 
susceptible of observation)~ but a science of thought must be 
'normative', or (as I perfer to call it) 'criteriological', 
i.e. concerned not only with the 'facts' of thought but also 
with the 'criteria' or standards which thought imposes on it-
self" (PA, 171, note; cf. IH, 230-31). 
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can be distinguished by thought, but always occur together in 
experience. 15 They are combined according to a definite struc-
tural pattern describable by saying that sensation takes pre-
cedence over emotion. The priority is not temporal, causal, 
or logical (as grounds and consequent), but as analyzably dis-
tinct: emotion exists as a kind of charge on a sensation, a 
charge which can be stripped off the sensum--a process Colling-
wood calls "sterilizing" the sensum by ignoring its emotional 
charge (PA, 162). This is accomplished, as he later explains, 
by an act of attention (cf. PA, 162-63, 203-11). 
Thinking is also distinguised in two ways. In its 
primary form thought is exclusively concerned with feeling as 
its sole and universal subject matter. First-order thinking 
is the process by which we become aware, by an act of atten-
tion, of certain feelings and go on to think of these feel-
ings as standing in certain relations to other feelings, re-
membered as past or imagined as possible (PA, 164-65). All 
empirical thought is of this sort: making empirical state-
ments we express our thoughts about the relations between 
15The same distinction between a sensum and its emo-
tional charge, within the experience of feeling, is made in 
The New Leviathan, but (1) Collingwood adds a "diffuse con-
sciousness of feeling" between first-order thought and the 
purely psychical level, and (2) distinguishes feeling as an 
"apanage" of mind rather than a constituent (only forms of 
consciousness are constituents of mind) (NL, 4.1-4.31). Col-
lingwood does not define "apanage," but it refers to the or-
dinary English usage: "Man as mind is consciousness ... ; 
he has feelings .... " (NL, 4. 2) .-
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sensa, actual or possible--relations of attention to, selec-
tion of, comparison with, etc. the sensa under consideration 
(PA, 165-66). 
Thus our experience of the world in space and time, the 
"world of nature" or "external" world, which means not 
the world external to ourselves (for we ourselves are 
part of it, in so far as "we" are our bodies; and if "we" 
are our minds, there is no sense in speaking of anything 
as external to them) but the world of things external to 
one another, the world of things scattered in space and 
time, is an experience partly sensuous (strictly sensuous-
emotional) and partly intellectual: sense being concerned 
with the colours we see, and the sounds we hear, and so 
forth; and thoughti with the relations between these 
things. (PA, 166) 6 
But thought also has a secondary function, and second-order 
thought is thought about thought, thought concerned with the 
relations between one act of thinking and another, or between 
the contents of such acts (PA, 166-67). Collingwood does not 
further characterize second-order thought at this point, other 
than to contrast it with first-order thought as reason to un-
derstanding, or philosophy to science, and to insist that the 
term "experience" be used to cover not only feeling, but first 
and second-order thought as well (PA, 167). 
The stage is now set for Collingwood's discussion of 
the problem of imagination. If sensa are in a state of con-
16To take this passage as a piece of subjective ideal-
ism would be a mistake, since Collingwood's intention is not 
to dissolve the "external" world of nature, but to avoid an 
"inside-outside" dichotomy with no room for bodily overlap. 
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stant flux, it does not seem possible (given the characteriza-
tion of thought and feeling that he had just given) tha~ they 
could be the object of thought of any kind, because relations 
between sensa cannot be fixed if the sensa are constantly be-
ing both "given" and "taken away." The difficulty is epito-
mized in the empiricist formula, "sensa data," where the term 
"data" implies that the sensa are not only given but retained, 
which conflicts essentially with the term "sense" which refers 
to something which neither persists nor recurs (PA, 169). The 
term "sense datum" is therefore either absurd or refers to 
something like a sensum but different from it, and hence the 
act which grasps it is not properly termed sensation (PA, 170-
71). 
In order to see what the distinction actually means, 
Collingwood engages in an examination of the historical phase 
of the problem from Descartes to Kant, centering his discus-
sion on the common-sense distinction between "real" and "imag-
inary" sensa as two classes of a common genus. He disting-
17 
uishes three phases of the problem: (1) the identification 
17Although there is no particular dialectical magic 
to the number three for Collingwood, it is interesting to note 
that the three phases to hii historical discussion of this 
problem correspond to the three ways that the classes "real" 
and "imaginary" as species of the genus "sensa" can be related: 
(1) the classes can be simply identified (17th century ration-
alists); or (2) abstractly distinguished (English empiricists); 
or (3) arranged on a scale of overlapping classes (Kant). For 
evidence that this is not an accidental arrangement, see PA, 
187, n. 1. 
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of sensation with imagination by the 17th century rational-
ists; (2) the defense of the common-sense distinction by the 
English empiricists; and (3) the Kantian solution to the prob-
lem (PA, 187). 
(1) In the 17th century, Descartes, Hobbes, and Spin-
oza found that by direct inspection, real and imaginary sen-
sa could not be distinguished. At bottom both were identical: 
both exhibit a kind of confused disorder, and it is only by 
reasoning that the two can be distinguished (PA, 175-76). But 
although Collingwood ultimately agrees with the conclusions 
(a) that there is no direct or internal test by which the two 
classes of sensa can be distinguished, and (b) that it is only 
on the basis of some kind of thought that the distinction can 
be made (PA, 194), he is not content to merely identify them. 
He therefore goes on to examine the defense of the common-
sense distinction by the English empiricists. 18 
18cF. NL, 4.83-4.89: "For Plato, sensations and emo-
tions cannot be knowledge because they lack the precision which 
knowledge must have. For Leibniz, feeling in general is con-
fusa cognitio. I do not accept either view in its entirety. 
Plato thought that knowledge cannot even rest on a foundation 
of feeling, because feeling is too vague; knowledge must be 
the work of pure thought operating all by itself. But what a 
foundation needs is strength, and strength is what feeling has. 
Leibniz thought feeling was confused knowledge, and to clear 
up the confusion is to purge it of what makes it feeling and 
leave it knowledge. But feeling is not knowledge at all; it 
is feeling; and if you could purge it of what makes it feel-
ing there would be no residue. Yet each was right in saying 
that feeling is confused or indistinct. That is why one should 
not try to define it or any kind or element of it; but only to 
give examples and say: 'This is the sort of thing to which the 
word refers.'" 
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(2) The common-sense distinction was reinstated by the 
English empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Burne, but each 
failed to adequately justify it. As if recognizing soQe in-
adequacy to the distinction, each put forward a pair of cri-
teria for discriminating real from imaginary sensa. Locke's 
"real ideas" are distinguished from "fantastical" ones insofar 
as (a) the latter are related as ectype to the archetypal 
"real ideas"--these being the "original" or "real being" of 
the objects; and (b) by an "introspective" criteria whereby 
imaginary sensa are the result of a voluntary activity, where-
as real sensa are not--the two cases being distinguished by 
simple introspection as to how the ideas arise in us (PA, 176-
77).19 Similarly Berkeley distinguished "ideas of sense" from 
19cf. Donagan: "In his philosophy of mind Collingwood 
was fundamentally anti-Cartesian; for he ... repudiated Des-
cartes' doctrine that acts of consciousness are, as it were, 
self-illuminating. You cannot know your own mind by turning 
an inner eye on its operations, because introspection can do 
no more than to bring to mind something of which you have al-
ready become aware" (LPC, 25). "All that introspection could 
do would be to reproduce your visual field in a second 'inner' 
visual field; and there is no reason to suppose that having a 
second visual field or a second auditory field would make you 
conscious of your first one" (LPC, 41). It is clear that 
Donagan has a different meaning in mind for "introspection" 
than does Collingwood. Collingwood attributes the introspec-
tion theory to the empiricists--Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--
and means it to refer to the distinction between real and im-
aginary sensa on the basis of the degree of control the sub-
ject has over such experiences, the former being relatively 
involuntary (PA, 177-79). However there is a secondary sense 
of the term "introspection" as used by Collingwood, this be-
ing closer to the sense that Donagan has in mind. At PA, 205 
Collingwood writes that introspection as the method of putting 
questions to consciousness cannot tell us anything about the 
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"ideas of imagination" in two ways: (a) by a restatement of 
Locke's introspection theory (the "strength and liveliness" 
criteria which, Collingwood argues, only makes sense as mean-
ing that, e.g. "a real sound is heard whether we will or no, 
whereas an imaginary one can be summoned up, banished, or re-
placed by another at will" (PA, 178-79)); and (b) the "rela-
tion theory" which suggests that ideas of sense are subject 
to the laws of nature, but ideas of imagination are not (PA, 
179-82). Finally, Hume dropped Berkeley's relational theory 
and (a) reinstated the introspection theory: "impressions" 
(real sensa) are distinguished from "ideas" (imaginary sensa) 
by the "degree of force and liveliness with which they strike 
the mind"--which Collingwood once again takes to mean the in-
psychical or purely sentient level of experience; the correct 
method for such knowledge is to be found in a well-grounded 
behavioral psychology. But although Collingwood is rejecting 
introspection here as a method for inquiring about the purely 
psychical level, he is not rejecting it as a method for un-
derstanding the functions of consciousness. Indeed, so far 
from being "anti-Cartesian" in this sense, Collingwood's ma-
ture philosophy of mind is nothing but introspective: it con-
sists entirely of "soundings" at various levels of conscious-
ness (NL, 9.35-9.4), made by putting questions to (conscious 
reflection on) lower levels (cf. PA, 205-06), and with Dona-
gan's "Principle of Order" as a blessing on the project. It 
is therefore hard to see what sense it makes to assert that 
the introspective method was rejected by Collingwood, or how 
in rejecting it Collingwood·was being fundamentally anti-
Cartesian. To be anti-Cartesian Collingwood would have to 
maintain that conscious acts cannot be objects to other con-
scious acts, which is certainly not what Collingwood main-
tained. And if being anti-introspectively anti-Cartesian 
means rejecting that there is an "inner eye" that is something 
other than a conscious act, then it is probable that Des-
cartes himself was not a Cartesian, for certainly his intro-
spective acts were acts of consciousness. 
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ability of our minds to set purpose to, control, excite, sup-
press, or modify our sensory experience (PA, 182-83). (b) But 
Hume also recognized (but yet minimized) the difficulties in-
volved in cases like dreams, hallucinations, and violent emo-
tional upheavals, in which the criterion does not apply, since 
in such cases sensa are not subject to voluntary control, but 
are nonetheless certainly imaginary. In such cases he there-
fore falls back on the relational theory to account for the 
distinction (PA, 183-85). 
Collingwood argues that none of the empiricists' cri-
teria is successful. In Locke's representative theory the 
substitution of the relation of ectype to archetype for the 
relation of imaginary sensa to real sensa is inconsistent with 
his causal theory, which describes real sensa as caused by ob-
jects (PA, 177)--it assumes the untenable identification of 
resemblance and causation which Hume so vigorously refuted. 
If real sensa cannot be accounted for in this way, their dis-
tinction from imaginary sensa collapses. The introspection 
theory similarly fails on the grounds that the exceptional 
cases of hallucinations, dreams, etc. proves not the rule that 
real sensa, but not imaginary sensa, are involuntary, but ra-
ther that will has little to do with the distinction: imagin-
ary sensa are often less subject to control than are real sen-
sa (PA, 179). Finally, the relational theory fails because 
although imaginary sensa may not obey all the laws of nature, 
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they obey some, and are furthermore subject to "psychologi-
cal laws" which cannot be thoroughly disentangled from .laws 
of nature. Furthermore the relational criterion is circular: 
we can only know what the laws of nature are by experience, 
or by studying real sensa--but to distinguish real sensa by 
appeal to these laws presumes the distinction to be estab-
lished (PA, 182). 
Finally, (3) Kant corrects the relational theory by 
showing that first-order laws of nature imply second-order 
"prin:iples of the understanding," and argues effectively that 
while a sensa may be "wild" in the sense of not belonging to 
a "family" of known natural laws of the first order, it can-
not be wild in the sense of failing to belong to laws of the 
second order. 
It is a principle of the understanding that every event 
must have a cause. No event that comes under our notice 
can escape this principle. The furthest length to which 
it can go towards wildness in that direction is a failure 
on our part to discover what, in particular, its cause is. 
Thus Kant's discovery of second-order laws involves the 
discovery that there are no wild sensa. At the same time 
it enables him to explain what we mean when we say that 
wild sensa exist. We are saying that certain sensa, 
though ... we know they must admit of interpretation, 
have not yet been actually interpreted .... Instead of 
trying to conceive real sensa and imaginary sensa as two 
co-ordinate species of the same genus, ... he conceived 
the difference between them as a difference of degree. 
For him, a real sensum can onJy mean one which has under-
~ interpretation £y the un erstanding, which-alone has 
~power to confer~ title real; an imaginary sensum 
will then mean one which has not ~ undergone that pro-
cess. (PA, 186-87); emphasis mine). 
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It is noteworthy that Collingwood takes the Kantian 
position as the concluding phase of the controversy (PA, 187), 
and does not subject it to any criticism as he had the pre-
vious positions. If the reader is left in any doubt that Col-
lingwood wishes to accept this solution to the problem as fi-
nal, his footnote to this passage affixes his final seal of 
approval: he cites the Essay on Philosophical Method to the 
effect that what is involved in Kant's doctrine is an instance 
of the rule for philosophical concepts wherein differences of 
20 degree always imply difference in kind (PA, 187, n. 1). 
20That Collingwood's philosophy of mind would accept 
as final a viewpoint that is ultimately Kantian would not be 
accepted by Lionel Rubinoff, who would argue that a further 
step is required to raise it to the "absolute standpoint" at 
which subject and object are identified. But there is nothing 
in The Principles of Art to indicate that Collingwood accepted 
anything but the Kantian viewpoint as final on the question of 
real and imaginary sensa, and that he looked with anything but 
favor upon Kant's limitation of thought to the bounds of pos-
sible experience. The Hegelian absolute standpoint is nowhere 
in evidence in this work, except insofar as that standpoint is 
implicit in the Kantian philosophy. It is therefore going be-
yond Collingwood's last word to assign The Principles of Art 
to the "third ontological level" at which subject and object 
are identified, as Rubinoff does (CRM, 373). On the other 
hand to classify Collingwood as a Kantian would be equally 
misleading, even if it would be not as misleading as assimila-
ting him to Hegelianism. (While statistical frequency of ci-
tations of authors does not count for much in philosophical 
works, it is interesting to note that Hegel has only one re-
ference in Collingwood's ind_ex to The Prine iples of Art, and 
this an unfavorable one, while Kant has 14, mostly favorable). 
Collingwood never accepted any categorial schema of logical 
relations as final, even though he approved of the Kantian for-
mulation of them: see NL, 5.66-5.67, 7.34. Nor is there any 
hint of a "deduction of the categories" in Collingwood, either 
in the Kantian or the Hegelian sense of the term "deduction." 
And finally, Collingwood never elevated art into one of the 
modes of absolute experience, as Hegel does: cf. IH, 121, 311-
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The Kantian solution also makes it possible to solve 
a long-standing problem in the traditional controversy--the 
problem of illusory sensa, with its two variants, the terms 
"appearance" and "image" as used in false theories of percep-
tion. It would seem like a development of the common-sense 
theory that illusions are imaginary sensa mistaken for real 
ones. But to assign illusion to the class of imaginary sensa 
is misleading, because there is no special quality that sensa 
can have in virtue of which they are illusory. If there were 
it could never be detected, since mistakes of the same general 
kind are made about real sensa, especially in unfamiliar cir-
cumstances (e.g. the child or savage looking at a mirror for 
the first time and thinking the image to be behind the plane 
of the mirror, so attempting to reach at it through or behind 
the glass). It is not a special quality of imaginary sensa, 
it is a mistaken interpretation. 
We were wrong, therefore, to define illusory sensa as im-
aginary sensa which we mistake for real ones. Illusory 
sensa can be defined without referring to the distinction 
between imaginary and real. Any sensum is illusory in so 
far as we make an error about it. This error does not 
consist in mistaking it for a different sensum .... All 
that there can ever be in a sensum is directly present to 
us in the act of sensation. We may be mistaken in believ-
ing that another person in our circumstances would have a 
similar one; but we cannot, in seeing a red patch, mistake 
it for a blue one. The mistakes we make about our sensa 
are mistakes about their relations with other sensa, pos-
sible or expected. (PA, 189). 
14. Cf. also Rubinoff, CRM, 210-11. For Rubinoff's interpre-
tation of Collingwood on perception, see CRM, 107-12. 
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Similarly the term "appearance" is not a quality of a sensum 
(such as the quality that the short man has who is further 
away than this closer tall man, the two being "really" the 
same height). On the contrary the term refers to the inter-
pretation placed on the two sensa, first of all as resembling 
one another (as men) and secondly the judgment that the fur-
ther or future experience of these sensa will or will not con-
tinue to show the same kind of resemblance (when standing next 
to one another they will have the same height) (PA, 190-91). 
And finally, the term "image" is used to describe the 
kind of relation that exists between, for example, a photo-
graph and the scene photographed, both of which are directly 
inspectable and comparable by us in distinct acts of percep-
tion. But if perception itself is explained on this analogy, 
it presumes that we can compare our sensa (the images) with 
their originals (the real objects), a condition of the analogy 
which cannot be fulfilled (PA, 191-92). 
Collingwood's concluding summary of the discussion of 
the common sense distinction between real and imaginary sensa 
is worth quoting: 
Sensa cannot be divided, by any test whatever, into real 
and imaginary; sensations cannot be divided into real sen-
sations and imaginations. That experience which we call 
sensation is of one kind only, and is not amenable to the 
distinction between real and unreal, true and false, viri-
dical and illusory. That which is true or false is thought; 
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and our sensa are called real and illusory insofar as we 
think truly or falsely about them. To think about them is 
to interpret them, which means stating the relations in 
which they stand to other sensa, actual or possible. A 
real sensum means a sensum correctly interpreted; an illu-
sory sensum, one falsely interpreted. And an imaginary 
sensum means one which has not been interpreted at all: 
either because we have tried to interpret it and failed, 
or because we have not tried . . . . They are sensa in re-
spect of which the interpretative work of thought has been 
done well, or done ill, or left undone. (PA, 194). 
4. Attention, Freedom and Corrupt Consciousness. 
How does this discussion of sensation and imagination 
stand with respect to Collingwood's refutation of the princi-
pal doctrine of realism? We stated above that this denial en-
tails the affirmation that knowing makes a difference to the 
object known. We begin to see the way in which this affirma-
tion is made in Collingwood's philosophy of mind. For first-
order thinking, "knowing" is an act of interpretation, and 
the "difference" it makes to the object is the difference be-
tween a sensum uninterpreted, a sensum interpreted, a sensum 
interpreted incorrectly, and a sensum interpreted correctly. 
The "object" for first order thinking is sensory experience 
("feeling" in Collingwood's terminology), the object insofar 
as it is felt. The term "real" in this context is applied or 
withheld as a judgment about sensa, and has a double sensa: a 
rainbow, for example, is "really there" in the sense that I 
see it--but then so is the imaginary beast in the dark corner 
of the room, and the snakes of delirium tremens. But in an-
other sense the rainbow is really there as the rain and the 
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sunshine (which I do not see), or the things in terms of which 
1 interpret my sensa (PA, 192-93). 
And this is Collingwood's ultimate reply to the real-
ists' assertion of an object which is unaffected by the know-
ing of it. Collingwood's answer, as stated in his reply to 
Moore, is that it must be an entity that is imaginary--i.e. 
the assertion of a sensum as already interpreted, or the mere 
assertion of the possibility of repeating the interpretation 
of a sensum as "the same" as a prior one, or as "unchanged" 
between episodes of feeling. "And it is imagination, not sen-
sation," Collingwood writes, "to which appeal is made when em-
piricists appeal to 'experience'" (PA, 203). But what the ra-
dical empiricist wishes to assert by an object unaffected by 
the knowing of it is an object that is an uninterpreted sen-
sum, and about this it would be ridiculous to say that it 
would be just the same as it is if it were not known at all. 
But how does one know, on Collingwood's grounds, when 
a sensum is correctly interpreted? If he cannot answer this, 
the realists' withers remain unwrung. What the realist wishes 
to know is how sense-experience, if it is a pure flux of unre-
lated and fleeting sensa, c3:n give us knowledge of an "exter-
nal world." 21 Merely denying that there is such a thing as 
21This is the epistemological question of perception: 
see E. Harris, Hypothesis and Perception (London, 1970), p. 
237. 
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an external world (as Collingwood seems to be implying in the 
passage at PA, 166) does not solve the problem. It merely 
shifts the locus of the question from epistemology to meta-
physics: for what then are the colors, sounds, etc. that con-
stitute the objects of acts of sensation? We have seen that 
Berkeley's suggestion that they are mere ideas is rejected by 
Collingwood as is the suggestion that it is a metaphysical 
problem rather than an epistemological one (PA, 199). Colling-
wood does not mean to imply that there is no such thing as a 
world of objects, or that "a world of objects external to the 
knower and existing independently of him" is an utterly non-
sensical expression. What he is denying is that "external to" 
and "independent of" are properties of sensa; they are actual-
ly interpretations of imaginata (i.e. what a sensum would be 
like as it exists in an unperceived state). 
The real issue as Collingwood sees it is an episterna-
logical one, and centers on the supposed passivity of sensa-
tion. 
The thesis to be examined is that, in some way not clearly 
defined, imagination contrasts with sensation as something 
active with something passive, something we do with some-
thing we undergo, something under our control with some-
thing we cannot help, a making with a receiving .... 
((But)) it is not a distinction between activity and~­
sivity as such. Sensation is an activity. Even rr-we do 
it only-secause we are stimulated to it by forces outside 
our control, it is still something we do .... Nor is it 
~ distinction among passivities (things that happen to-u~ 
as distinct from things we do) according as they are done 
to us by external bodies impinging on our own, or by chan-
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ges ar~s~ng within our own organism .... For sensation, 
as well as imagination, is on its bodily side a change 
arising within our own organism, and due to the energies 
of that organism itself .... Nor is it a distinction 
among activities (things we do) between~hose we do of our 
own choice and those we cannot help doing. It is in fact 
easier to stop seeing this paper, by shutting one's eyes, 
than to stop imagining the frightful accident which one 
saw yesterday. (PA, 196-97; emphasis mine). 
The conclusion seems to be that if there is any distinction at 
all between imagination and sensation the basis for this dis-
tinction must fall altogether outside the category of activity-
passivity (cf. NL, 5.4-5.49). This category may be at home 
in the mechanical realm of matter, where forces are exerted by 
pushing and pulling; but in the realm of thought it is not 
adequate. Thought is free as matter is not: to be a thought 
is to have an essential freedom to succeed or fail--to be "bi-
polar" as Collingwood says. 
The empiricists' problem of "sense data" is therefore 
poorly conceived, because the assumption of sensa as "given" 
(from the Latin, datur) is false as a presupposition CPA, 196, 
200). The empiricists (including Hume) failed to appreciate 
adequately the intermediating function of imagination in the 
sensation-intellection relation. The freedom of imagination 
falls between the freedom of sensation (which is the freedom 
of a spontaneous, living, sentient organism) and that of in-
tellection (which is the freedom of choice between alterna-
tives consciously conceived) (PA, 197). The freedom of im-
agination consists in the alternatives of recognizing a feel-
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ing as belonging to oneself or in refusing to so recognize it 
(PA, 224). This refusal or the process of "disowning" feel-
ings is what Collingwood calls "corrupt consciousness" (PA, 
217-19). 
But to understand the intermediation of imagination, 
its freedom, and the corruption of consciousness it is neces-
sary to identify and characterize the function of imagination 
which transforms sensa into imaginata. This function is "at-
tention" (alternatively called "awareness" or simply "con-
sciousness"--PA, 206). 
Thought ... detects "relations between sensa" .... 
But in order that we may detect resemblances or any other 
relations between things, we must first identify each of 
them: distinguish each as a thing by itself and appreciate 
its qualities as those qualities we find it to possess, 
even though as yet (not having determined their relations 
to qualities found elsewhere) we are not in a position 
to name them .... This act of appreciating something, 
just as it stands, before I can begin to classify it is 
what we call attending to it. (PA, 203). 
Collingwood is careful to distinguish attention from both in-
tellection and sensation. As distinct from intellection, at-
tention selects and divides, but it does not abstract: abstrac-
tion is a higher function involved in the formation of con-
cepts ("redness" as opposed ·to "this red patch"), whereas at-
tention "appreciates" a sensible quality "as it presents it-
self to us, a concrete individual" (PA, 204). Nonetheless at-
tention is "thought in its absolutely fundamental and original 
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shape" (PA, 216). 22 At the merely psychical level, the dis-
tinction between conscious and unconscious does not exist. 
But the instant there is added the activity of attention, 
"the block of feeling present to the mind is split in two"--
the conscious part being that part of feeling attended to, 
the unconscious part being the ignored remainder of the field, 
the negative counterpart of attention, or its penumbra (PA, 
204-05). 23 
22since attention is both (a) thought in its minimal 
sense, and (b) not abstract, Donagan's contention that Colling-
wood's later philosophy of mind (which starts with The Princi-
ples of Art) is founded on the recognition that "all forms of 
thinking, from the highest to the lowest, are conceptual, and 
... all concepts are abstract" (LPC, 14) is obviously false. 
Since an essentially similar characterization of the function 
of attention is made in The New Leviathan (see NL, 4.18, 4.24, 
4.5-4.6, 7.2-7.39) it is doubtful whether Donagan's conten-
tion holds even for The New Leviathan alone (in section 6 of 
this chapter we shalr-iee that The New Leviathan poses special 
problems for any consistent interpretation of Collingwood's 
philosophy of mind). In The Principles of Art, at least, it 
is clear that "thinking" is a term whose extension is broader 
than Donagan is willing to allow: it includes imagination, 
which is not abstract, but concrete. In a later passage Col-
lingwood contrasts analytic and abstract thought with imagin-
ation, and writes: "These ( (i.e. analytic and abstract 
thought)) are not the only kinds of thought .... They are 
given merely as examples of what ((intellect)) does which im-
agination, never analytic and never abstract, cannot do" (PA, 
254; cf. PA, 287). As we shall shortly see, attention is a 
function of imagination. 
23
collingwood recognized that there is a proper func-
tion for psychology in the study of "unconscious feeling" at 
the psychical level, but insisted that it still rested on a 
more general philosophical principle--this principle being 
that consciousness has a double object including not only sen-
sation but the object of sensation (PA, 206). Collingwood's 
attacks on psychology all have this intent behind them as an 
unspoken premise: empirical psychology cannot absorb the labor 
of philosophical psychology because it depends for its exist-
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On the other side attention is distinguished from feel-
ing in having the bipolarity that is proper to thought: 
Attention . . . has a double object where sentience has a 
single. w~at we hear, for example, is a sound. What we 
attend to is two things at once: a sound, and our act of 
hearing it. The act of sensation is not present to it-
self, but it is present, together with its own sensum, to 
the act of attention. This is, in fact, the special sig-
nificance of the con- in the word consciousness; it indi-
cates the togetherness of the two things, sensation and 
sensum, both of which are present to the conscious mind 
.... Thus the difference between seeing and looking, 
or hearing and listening, is that a person who is said to 
be looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well 
as of the thing he sees. ( PA, 206) . 
We see here a clearer statement of what Collingwood meant in 
Religion and Philosophy when he said that the esse of mind is 
not cogitare simply, but de hac re cogitare (RP, 100; FR, 172). 
What is essential to the act is not only sensation or its ob-
ject, but both taken together. Collingwood's use of the term 
"consciousness" in connection with higher processes of thought 
indicates that the same is true for all the successive levels 
of thought (cf. IH, 291, 306). 24 
ence on the philosophical analysis of consciousness. But Col-
lingwood's insistence on this point should not blind the read-
er to the complimentary affirmation that philosophical psy-
chology cannot absorb empirical psychology, because the psy-
chical level (at which consciousness and unconscious are not 
distinguished) merges with the physiological and is not direct-
ly analyzable by the phenomenological analysis of conscious-
ness. 
24B . ( d. . f ecause sensatlon proper as lStlnct rom percep-
tion, which is sensation attended to) is "not present to it-
self" and has a single object rather than a double, it cannot 
properly be called "consciousness" in the technical sense of 
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Because attention is thought, and because thought is 
bipolar, it is possible for attention to make mistakes--and 
this is the sense in which it is free in the minimal sense of 
that term as applicable to thought. A conscious being is not 
free to decide what feelings he shall have, but he is free to 
decide what feelings he shall place in the focus of his con-
sciousness. This is not a mere response to stimulus (which 
is the level of freedom of a sentient organism), but it is 
also not yet the freedom of choice of alternative plans of 
action. It is intermediate between the two (PA, 207-08). 
The attention to feeling modifies it by "domesticating" it, 
allowing the one who attends (the rudimentary self) to domin-
ate the feeling and to perpetuate it indefinitely (PA, 206-
09). But it does so only at a certain risk--the risk inher-
ent in the freedom it possesses. The risk is the danger of 
becoming a corrupt consciousness: 
As thought ((attention)) must have that bipolarity which 
belongs to thought as such. It is an activity which 
the term as defined at PA, 206. Sensation proper exists at 
the psychical level of pure feeling, at which the distinction 
between conscious and unconscious does not yet exist. The 
objects of sensation are merely feelings present to conscious-
ness; by attending to them, consciousness perpetuates them 
and thus prepares them for further acts of interpretation. 
However as we shall see in s~ction 6, in The New Leviathan 
Collingwood introduces a "diffuse consciousne~of feeling" 
at a level below that of attention proper, and assigns "se-
lective attention" to the second level of thought--thought 
about thought--as one of its practical functions. It is clear 
that "consciousness" is not being used there in its technical 
sense. 
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may be well or ill done; what it thinks may be true or 
false. But this seems paradoxical; for since it is not 
concerned with the relations between things, and hence 
does not think in terms of concepts or generalizations, 
it cannot err, as intellect can, by referring things to 
the wrong concepts .... But the statement "This is how 
I feel" does imply bipolarity. It has an opposite: "This 
is not how I feel;" and to assert it is to deny this op-
posite .... ((Consciousness)) lives by rejecting er-
ror. A true consciousness is the confession to ourselves 
of our feelings; a false consciousness would be disowning 
them, i.e. thinking about one of them "That feeling is not 
mine" .... I call this the "corruption" of conscious-
ness, because consciousness permits itself to be bribed 
or corrupted in the discharge of its functions . . . . 
(PA, 216-17). 
The corruption of consciousness (also called bad-faith, insin-
cerity, self-deception, or in psychological terms, repression, 
projection, dissociation, and fantasy-building) belongs to 
neither of the commonly recognized species of untruths--errors 
or lies; these belong to higher levels of thought (PA, 218-19; 
cf. PA, 115, 283). But it is an example of untruth in its 
minimal sense, and hence of evil; not exactly a crime or vice 
(because not fully a choice) and not exactly a disease (be-
cause not suffered passively), corrupt consciousness is "a 
kind of sheer or undifferentiated evil, evil in itself, as yet 
undifferentiated into evil suffered or misfortune and evil 
done or wickedness" (PA, 219-20). 25 
25 It is not difficult to see why Collingwood regarded 
realists as arch-propagandists of a coming fascism (A, 167). 
Fascism is a celebration of irrationalism and is hence the re-
sult of a kind of corruption of consciousness: it disowns ra-
tionality and its attendant emotions. Realism, by dissociat-
ing theory and practice, and denying that knowledge has any 
effect on its object, and furthermore by treating moral sub-
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We have seen the sense in which Collingwood regards 
the act of attention as intermediate between sensation and 
intellection, the extent of its freedom, and its rule in the 
corruption of consciousness. It remains to determine the way 
in which attention is to be regarded as a function of imagin-
ation. The act of attention, Collingwood has been insisting, 
is the act which converts "impressions" (feelings) into 
"ideas" (imaginata). In so doing it modifies the feelings at-
tended to: feeling is no longer something in complete flux, 
it is dominated and perpetuated by the act of attention. The 
modified feeling is no longer a "bare feeling" it is a feeling 
of which we have become conscious (PA, 209, 213). To say that 
a feeling is attended to is to say that it is an uninterpreted 
sensum that is ready for interpretation, so that "regarded as 
names for a certain kind or level of experience, the words 
consciousness ((or attention)) and imagination are synony-
mous" (PA, 215). But within a single experience they can be 
distinguished. Attention is the act which converts a bare 
sensum into one ready for interpretation, and imagination is 
the result of that conversion. "Imagination is thus the new 
form which feeling takes when transformed by the activity of 
jects in a purely theoretical way, opens a path for disowning 
rationality by denying its applicability--and hence its ex-
pression in moral acts. Whatever moves passions is whatever 
causes acts, and rationality (ex hypothesi) does not move pas-
sions. This paves the way for a political movement which 
plays directly on passions without regard for reason. Cf. EM, 
133-42; NL, 35.43-35.44. 
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consciousness" (PA, 215). 26 
But once again we must raise the empiricist's ques-
tion: if an imaginatum is a sensum that is ready for inter-
pretation, is that readiness something that is found in the 
sensum or something given to it by an act of consciousness? 
It is clear that Collingwood is straining to make conscious-
ness, or thought in its minimum sense, speak with an active 
voice; but it is not clear whether there is any contribution 
to this conversation from the side of the sensa, or from a 
world of nature beyond them. It is also clear that Colling-
wood is maintaining his assertion that imagination is indif-
ferent to the reality or unreality of its objects (PA, 136) 
--an assertion that dates back to Speculum Mentis (SM, 60, 
112). But if feeling is ambiguous with respect to thecate-
26The term, "imagination," like the terms "thought" 
and "consciousness," has a very broad extension in Colling-
wood's philosophy. Although in The Principles of Art his dis-
cussion tends to confine it to a level of thought between sen-
sation and intellection, it is capable of operating at higher-
order levels of thought as well. In The Idea of History he 
speaks of an "a priori" imagination (and we may recall that 
"a Yriori" is a term he uses to distinguish thought from feel-
ing . This a priori imagination (a) does the entire work of 
historical reconstruction, (b) operates in artistic creation, 
and (c) functions in perception by "supplementing and consoli-
dating the data of perceptio·n in the way so well analyzed by 
Kant, by presenting to us objects of possible perception which 
ar~ not actually perceived" (IH, 241-42). If a priori imagin-
at1on operates even at the level of historical reconstruction, 
it clearly escapes confinement to a strictly intermediate le-
v~l in the scale of forms of knowledge. It is simply, in Kan-
t1an terms, the faculty of re-presentation. 
366 
of activity-passivity (and in The New Leviathan Calling-gory 
wood explicitly extends this ambiguity to all the other Kan-
tian categories), and if imagination is indifferent to the 
distinction between real and unreal, the reader is left won-
dering how any interpretation can be lifted off the face of an 
utterly indeterminate flux of sensa. And if it cannot, the 
obvious question is how knowledge of an "external world" (i.e. 
the world extrinsic to our organs of sense)--in Collingwood's 
terms, the "not-self," is possible at all. 
5. Idealism and the Limitations of Phenomenology. 
In The Principles of Art (and to a lesser extent even 
in The New Leviathan) Collingwood seems to deliberately choose 
language that refuses to take sides in the realism-idealism 
controversy. As Louis 0. Mink points out, there are some le-
thal booby-traps left for anyone who tries to decide the issue 
from Collingwood's texts (MHD, 112). A case in point is the 
following passage, in which Collingwood is trying to reconcile 
the characterization of imaginata (a) as uninterpreted sensa, 
and (b) as feeling dominated and perpetuated by consciousness: 
Now it has already been argued . . . that the work of de-
termining relations between things must depend on some-
thing prior to it, namely having these things held before 
the mind in such a way that we can compare them with one 
another, and so become able to see how they resemble one 
another, and so forth. We must know what each is in it-
self before we can decide how they are related. To know 
what a given thing is in itself is not, of course, the 
same as knowing what kind of a thing it is . . . . Our 
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knowledge of what it is in itself, if we try to express 
that in words, will be stated in some such phrase as "this 
is what I see," or, since to call my act one of see~ngiS 
already to distinguish, "this is how I feel." ... And we 
become able to say this, not through bare sensation, but 
through consciousness of sensation. What makes us able to 
say it is that we have, by the work of attention, at once 
selected and perpetuated some element which we find in the 
field of sensation, and some corresponding element in the 
sensory act. (PA, 212-13). 
Collingwood apparently finds no difficulty in asserting of one 
and the same sensum that it has elements which are at once se-
lected, perpetuated, and found, and that corresponding elements 
exist in the sensory act. A few pages later a similar land-
mine is planted for explorers at a higher level: "The work of 
intellect," Collingwood writes, "is to apprehend or construct 
relations" (PA, 216, 255-56). Which is it? The reader will 
not get any direct satisfaction from Collingwood in answer to 
this question. 27 The reason for such deliberate ambiguity may 
27
cf. Mink, MHD, 112-13: "Collingwood does not want 
to decide whether thought 'apprehends' or 'constructs,' 'finds' 
or 'puts.' In his view, it does both. As the activity of 
converting implicit differences into explicit distinctions, it 
seems to itself, at any level, to be apprehending. But as an 
object of consciousness to a higher level, it seems to be con-
structing. Experience, one might say, is the realist, reflec-
tion on experience the idealist. Neither is false; what is 
false is the presumption that there is irreducible logical in-
compatibility between the theories expressive of each. In the 
dialectic of theories, realism states the viewpoint of any 
level of consciousness from its own standpoint, idealism the 
viewpoint of any level of consciousness in its reflection on 
a.lower level. The theory of levels accounts for each by as-
s~gning to each a function which cannot be usurped by the 
other." Cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 29, 59, 116, 136 ff. 
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be either that Collingwood wished to leave the question open, 
or else that Collingwood held to the simultaneous truths that 
(even at the level of perception) knowing and the known inter-
act, each making a difference to the other. 
There would be no way to decide between these two al-
ternatives were it not for a few pieces of circumstantial evi-
dence. We have already seen how Collingwood argues directly 
against the realists' thesis that knowing (in this case, con-
sciousness) makes no difference to the object known (the sen-
sum): it is carried out directly in his attack on Moore (in 
the doctrine of the unsensed sensum) as well as indirectly in 
his discussion of the modification of feeling by attention. 
We have also seen how Collingwood's attempt to save whatever 
sense he could from the empiricists' tradition concerning 
"sense data" led to his characterization of imagination (in 
the form of selective attention) as intermediary between sen-
sation and intellection, and his dismissal of "sense data" as 
interpreted imaginata masquerading as bare sensa. We have 
furthermore argued that the entire discussion about empiricism 
would be a non-sequitur and a diversionary aside if it were 
not that he hoped to save something from the tradition. What 
he saved was not, certainly, the ambiguous phrase, "sense 
data." Nor was it the disjunctive proposition that either 
knowing affects the known or the object affects the knower 
(but not both): this disjunction is eliminated with the argu-
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ment that activity-passivity is a category inapplicable to 
bare, uninterpreted sensation. What is saved is the role of 
thought as active down to the level of sensation, where it is 
present as the act of attention which alters feeling by per-
petuating and dominating it. But what is it that is dominated 
and perpetuated? Here we must enter our circumstantial evi-
dence. 
A.--In the theory of art propounded in The Principles 
of Art (see notes 7 and 8 above) Collingwood directly attacks 
the realistic estheticians for distinguishing too sharply be-
tween what is "found" in a work of art and what is "brought" 
to it by an observer. The position of the realistic estheti-
cians, who maintain that "beauty" is something subjective that 
is "imputed" to the art-object, is an attempt to rehabilitate 
an ancient technical theory of art based on the false analogy 
between art and craft. Collingwood describes what he takes 
to be their position as follows: 
(T)he technical theory depends on distinguishing what we 
find in the work of art, its actual sensuous qualities, 
as put there by the artist, from something else which we 
do not strictly find in it, but rather import into it from 
our own stores of experience and powers of imagination. 
The first is conceived a~ objective, really belonging to 
the work of art: the second as subjective, belonging not 
to it but to activities which go on in us when we contem-
plate it. The peculiar value of this contemplation, then, 
is conceived as lying not in the first thing but in the 
second. Any one having the use of his senses could see 
all the colours and shapes that a picture contains ... 
but ((to enjoy an esthetic experience)) he must use his 
imagination, and so proceed from the first part of the 
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experience, which is given in sensation, to the second 
part, which is imaginatively reconstructed. This seems 
to be the position of the "realistic" philosophers who 
maintain that what they call "beauty" is subjective.. (PA, 
148-49). 
such distinctions as used by realistic estheticians like Sam-
ual Alexander do not do justice to what Collingwood thinks the 
true situation to be: 
The distinction between what we find and what we bring is 
altogether too naive .... If ((an artist)) paints his 
picture in such a way that we, when we look at it using 
our imagination, find ourselves enjoying an imaginary ex-
perience of total activity like that which he enjoyed when 
painting it, there is not much sense in saying that we 
bring this experience with us to the picture and do not 
find it there . . . . No doubt there is a sense in which 
we bring it with us. Our finding of it is not something 
that merely happens to us, it is something we do .... 
The imaginary experience . . . is the kind of experience 
we are capable of having. Thus the two parts of the ex-
perience are not contrasted in the way in which we fancied 
them to be. There is no justification for saying that the 
sensuous part of it is something we find and the imaginary 
part something we bring . . . . We bring our powers of 
vision with us, and find what they reveal. Similarly, we 
bring our imaginative powers with us, and find what they 
reveal: namely an imaginary experience of total activity 
which we find in the picture because the painter has put 
it there. (PA, 149-51). 
Now if this is true for a work of art, it must be true in some 
sense for perception in general, and also for scientific ob-
servation, inasmuch as the same sensation and imagination are 
at work--even if one does not assume that the experience of 
nature is like an imaginary experience of total activity which 
is "put" there by an artist. What Collingwood is saying is 
that sensation itself is an active process of an agent, and 
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this is what he means when he says that it "makes" its sensa. 
He does not mean that the objects extrinsic to our sensory or-
gans are "created" ex nihilo by our minds. But he is also 
saying that our powers of vision find what they reveal--and 
the revelation involved is the process whereby somehow (and 
this is not ever specified by Collingwood) information is 
passed from objects within our field of experience as a pre-
sentation or uninterpreted sensum. It is the difference be-
tween "seeing" and "looking" or between "hearing" and"listen-
ing" that Collingwood is referring to when he adds the act of 
attention to this field of felt experience, and not the dif-
ference between a nothing and a something. Or to put it an-
other way, the difference that knowing (as perception) makes 
is not the difference between there being something where 
there was formerly nothing at all; it is rather the differ-
ence between something present but indefinite (an uninter-
preted sensum) and something present and now more definite (a 
sensum ready for interpretation--present and sustained). But 
Collingwood is not denying the presence of something--on this 
The Principles of Art is clear: 
Theoretically, the artist is a person who comes to know 
himself, to know his own emotion .... But this knowing 
of himself is a making of himself .... Moreover, his 
knowing of this . . . world is also the making of the new 
world which he is coming to know. The world he has come 
to know is a world consisting of language; a world where 
everything has the property of expressing emotion. In so 
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far as this world is thus expressive or significant, it 
is he that has made it so. He has not, of course, made it 
~of nothing." He is not God, but~ ITnite mindSITll 
at ~ very elementary stage in the development of its pow-
ers. He has made it "out of" what is presented to him in 
the still more elementary stage of purely psychical ex-
perience: colors, sounds, and so forth. (PA, 291-92; em-
phasis mine). 
B.--As if in confirmation of this conclusion that some-
thing must be presented to consciousness that is not created 
ex nihilo by that consciousness, Collingwood at one point even 
adopts the metaphorical terminology of matter and form to de-
scribe the levels of mental functions: 
(I)n the relation between any one level of experience and 
the next above it . . . the higher level differs from the 
lower in having a new principle of organization; this does 
not supersede the old, it is superimposed on it. The low-
er type of experience is perpetuated in the higher type in 
a way in which a pre-existing matter is perpetuated when 
a new form is imposed on it . . . . In this metaphorical 
sense of the words, any new and higher level of experience 
can be described in either of two ways. Formally, it is 
something quite new and unique, capable of being described 
only in terms of itself. Materially, it is only a pecu-
liar combination of elements already existing at the lower 
level, and susceptible of description in terms of these 
lower elements. Consciousness ... is formally unique 
.... Materially, it is only a certain new arrangement 
of psychical experiences. (PA, 233). 
Would Collingwood accept this metaphor as applicable 
at the level of sensation? Is it not possible that there is 
a similar relationship existing at the interface between sen-
sation and the world of objects extrinsic to the organs of 
sensation, such that sensation can be regarded as formally 
"something quite new and unique, capable of being described 
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only in terms of itself," but materially it is "only a cer-
t" tain new arrangemen of material entities--cells composed of 
organic and inorganic molecules, functioning together as an 
organ in response to physical stimuli from the environment? 
(Cf. NL, 9.5-9.56). 
From the point of view restricted by the self-imposed 
limitations of a science of mind, we must answer (as Colling-
wood does in The New Leviathan) that we do not know (see NL, 
5.2-5.4). But before involving ourselves in a discussion of 
the presuppositions of a phenomenology of consciousness, we 
must enter further pieces of evidence from The Principles of 
Art in which Collingwood lets himself escape for a moment from 
the confines of these presuppositions. 
C.--Where Collingwood is arguing that the distinction 
between real and imaginary sensa is not a distinction between 
activity and passivity, nor among passivities, nor among ac-
tivities, in the passages deleted from our above quotation 
Collingwood argues as follows: 
Response to stimulus is in some sense passive, in so far 
as it cannot arise without a stimulus; but it is also 
active, in so far as it is a response. If I am a kind of 
factory for converting wave-lengths into colours, air-
disturbances into sounds~ and so forth, as the material-
ists believe ... there is work done in that conversion; 
the machinery is active, even if it is controlled by no 
manager or foreman . . . . For sensation, as well as im-
agination, is on its bodily side a change arising within 
~ur own organism, and due to the energies of that organ-
~sm itself. The afferent nerves through whose activity 
we feel a pressure on a finger-tip are not solid rods con-
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veying that pressure itself to the brain; they are func-
tioning in their own way as a special kind of living tis-
sue; if they ceased to function in that way, no amount of 
pressure on the finger could give rise to sensation~ (PA, 
196-97). 
Now if Collingwood meant to come up with a radical idealist 
explanation for sensation, and one which hence eliminated the 
need for asserting that objects make a difference to the know-
ing of them, it is difficult to see why he would be consider-
ing such physiological mechanisms at all. No doubt, he is ar-
guing that thought (as attention) dominates the "feeling" pro-
vided within the psychic level of experience, and that even at 
the psychical level the organs of senses are not utterly pas-
sive. But he is not denying that the physiological mechan-
isms provide something for thought to dominate, or that the 
organs of sensation are "stimulated" by forms of physical en-
ergy. 
D.--Several pages later when Collingwood is discus-
sing the way in which feeling modified by attention (and no-
tice that the modification is only stated to be in terms of 
time and use--attention perpetuates and dominates feeling--
and not in terms of content: it does not modify a red into 
a blue, or blue into loud, or sweet into hard; cf. PA, 189) 
he talks about the psychological phenomenon of color fading, 
which is compensated by the act of attention: 28 
28
rn The New Leviathan Collingwood uses this identical 
example, but gives it precisely the opposite interpretation: 
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In the flux of sensation, one pattern of the total sen-
sory field is being replaced by another. Attention now 
focuses itself on one element in that field: for example 
this scarlet patch. As I look, the red is actually fad-
ing; it is being obscured by the superimposition of its 
own after-image, which dulls the scarlet moment by mo-
ment. But by attending to the scarlet and neglecting 
everything else I create a kind of compensation for this 
fading ((By this)) progressive refocusing of attention 
... we do not lift any sensa, as such, out of their na-
tive flux; but we obtain a new kind of experience by 
moving as it were with the flux, so that the self, and 
the object are (so to speak) at rest relatively to each 
other for an appreciable time. What we have done is .. 
. liberated ourselves for a moment from the flux of sen-
sation and kept something before us long enough to get a 
fair sight of it. (PA, 210). 
Collingwood's hesitation to accept fully these metaphors (''as 
it were ... so to speak") should not blind the reader to the 
affirmation of the point at issue. It is a temporal modifica-
tion of feeling that is being made, and by engaging in acts of 
attention "something" is kept before us, and for long enough 
time a "fair sight of it" may be gotten--not by lifting off 
any sensa (attention is not abstraction) but by running with 
it (so to speak) so that it appears stable compared to its 
moving background. 
"colours themselves as we actually see them are vague; and so 
with sounds, smells, emotions, etc. We never see anything ex-
actly any colour. However carefully we look at a colour it re-
mains ambiguous. Indeed, looking at it carefully creates a 
new ambiguity; for the eye becomes fatigued and a complimen-
tary after-image interposes itself between the eye and the 
colour at which one is looking, so that the mere looking at a 
colour dims it" (NL, 5.71). If "looking carefully" means "at-
tending to" the colour, it seems that this process adds to the 
fading of it rather than compensating for it. 
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E.--When Collingwood raises the question about how 
long a period of time a sensum has to be perpetuated by· at-
tention in order to be retained, he replies that (from the 
perspective of The Principles of Art) no definite answer can 
be given (PA, 210). But The Idea of Nature provides us with 
the start of an answer, and at the same time suggests a rea-
son for the use of terms which express qualified confidence 
in the physiological descriptions in the previously cited 
passages. In discussing the contemporary view of nature, Col-
lingwood argues that when the impact of evolutionary science 
began to be thought out it had already, in the 19th century 
methodology of history, a model for dealing with a world of 
constant change: 
History had by now established itself as a science, that 
is, a progressive inquiry in which conclusions are solidly 
and demonstratively established. It had thus been proved 
by experiment that scientific knowledge was possible con-
cerning objects that were constantly changing . . . . The 
historical conception of scientifically knowable change 
or process was applied, under the name of evolution, to 
the natural world (IH, 13). 
One of the consequences of the evolutionary view of nature is 
that, as Whitehead put it, "there is no nature at an instant," 
and therefore the study of natural forms of motion requires a 
notion of "minimum space" and "minimum time." In the latter 
case this issues in the principle that "different orders of 
substances take different orders of time-lapse to exist" (IN, 
22; cf. EM, 266-67). But this principle does not warrant 
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adoption of an idealistic stance. 
The principle . . . opens no door to subjective idealism. 
One might express it by saying that how the world of na-
ture appears to us depends on how long we take to observe 
it .... This, though true, would be misleading .... 
How the natural world appears to us does certainly depend 
on how long we take to observe it; but that is because 
when we observe it for a certain length of time we observe 
the processes which r~quire that length of time in order 
to occur. (IN, 23). 2 
But just as we noticed Chapter VI that historical knowledge is 
limited in one direction by the "facts" at the historian's dis-
posal, so observation in science is limited in physical situ-
ations in an exactly analogous fashion: 
Our experimental knowledge of the natural world is based 
on our acquaintance with those natural processes which we 
can observe experimentally. This acquaintance is limited 
downwards in space and time by our inability to observe 
any process that occupies less than a certain amount of 
space or a certain lapse of time, and upwards by the impos-
sibility of observing any process that occupies more space 
or more time than the range of human vision or the time 
covered by human records ... These limits, upper and 
lower, of our observations in space and time have been 
greatly enlarged by the apparatus of the modern scientist, 
but they still exist, and are ultimately imposed on us by 
our constitution as animals of a definite size and living 
at a definite rate . . . . The natural world which human 
scientists can study by observation and experiment is an 
anthropocentric world; it consists only of those natural 
processes whose time-phase and space-range are within the 
limits of our observation. (IN, 24). 
29 Cf. IN, 84: "Nature stays put, and is the same 
whether we understand it or not;" and IH, 133: "In science, 
· .. the facts are empirical facts, perceived as they occur. 
In history . . . fact . . . is not immediately given. It is 
arrived at inferentially by a process of interpreting data." 
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In these passages Collingwood is not writing as if 
the "natural world" external to our sense organs can have no 
effect on our knowing of it. In fact it is a presupposition 
of natural science that there is such a world and that it can 
make itself known to us (cf. IN, 175; EM, 222-23). The state-
ment that the natural world observed by science is an anthro-
pocentric world only echoes the Kantian restriction of scien-
tific knowledge to the bounds of experience possible for a 
human being of limited capacities; it does not deny that there 
is something there to be known. 
F.--Confirmation that we are on the right track comes, 
indirectly, from the Essay on Metaphysics. In a passage in 
which Collingwood is discussing the extent to which Aristo-
tle's metaphysics is compatible with contemporary scientific 
presuppositions, Collingwood singles out as a rejected presup-
postion the belief that the existence of nature is an observed 
fact: 
Aristotle thought . . . that by merely using our senses 
we learn that a natural world exists. He did not realize 
that the use of our senses can never inform us that what 
we perceive by using them is a world of things that hap-
pen of themselves and are not subject to control by our 
own art or any one else's ((but is rather)) the first and 
fundamental presupposition, on which alone any science of 
nature can arise . . . . For when we speak of the exist-
ence of natural things we mean (as Aristotle very truly 
says) the existence of things that move of themselves or 
events that happen of themselves. The idea of movement 
or happening . . . is contained in the idea of a natural 
world. The idea of motion, therefore (for if the world 
of nature is a world of bodies all the events in nature 
are motions), cannot be an idea which we obtain, as the 
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Greeks thought we obtained it, through the use of our 
senses. It is an idea which we bring with us in the 
shape of an absolute presupposition to the work of inter-
preting what we get by using our senses. The proposition 
that there is motion in nature is a metaphysical propo-
sition. (EM, 215, 217). 
Collingwood is not saying that we do not get something by the 
use of our senses, but only that through sensation we do not 
get the concept of motion or of an existent world of nature; 
what we get are uninterpreted sensa. And he is not saying 
that a world of nature and of natural objects does not exist, 
but only that assertion of its existence is not justifiable 
as a simple product of sensual experience, but rather through 
the correct interpretation of sensa. And finally, Collingwood 
is not ruling out the possibility that the "data" presented to 
us in sensation can be given and retained, but that "real, em-
pirical knowledge" of the natural world (or of any world of 
fact, including the historical world of evidence) absolutely 
presupposes the existence of a world of nature. 
G.--These passages also shed light on our problem in-
sofar as they provide us with a clue to understanding why, in 
~ Principles of Art, Collingwood hedges in his assent to the 
legitimacy of the physical ~asis for psychical sensa. The 
reason is not that he refuses to take sides on the realism-
idealism debate, but rather because he is bound by his own 
presuppositions concerning the proper limits to the methods of 
mental science. In The New Leviathan this rule is stated in 
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negative fashion as the Fallacy of Swapping Horses: 
I have mentioned two approaches to the problem of self-
knowledge: the natural sciences and the sciences of man 
.... Each is valid. Each is a search for truth, and 
neither goes unrewarded. Each, therefore, has its own 
problems and must solve them by its own methods .... 
Of these two different forms of science, the one that has 
started a hare must catch it. The reason is plain. You 
can only solve a problem which you recognize to be a prob-
lem. The same methods, therefore, which led to the ask-
ing of a question must lead to the answering of it . . 
. . No amount of admiration for some other horse must be-
tray you into the Fallacy of Swapping Horses. If the 
wretched horse called Mental Science has stuck you in mid-
stream you can flog him, or you can coax him, or you can 
get out and lead him; or you can drown, as better men than 
you have drowned before. But you must not swap him even 
for the infinitely superior horse called Natural Science. 
(NL, 2.6-2.73). 
As we shall see in section six of this chapter, Collingwood's 
efforts to stay strictly within the bounds of this rule in The 
New Leviathan lead him into difficulties concerning his char-
acterization of feeling. In The Principles of Art, however, 
he occasionally strays across the border, as in the above pas-
sages where he appeals to physiological descriptions. But in 
one very important passage he gives us a glimpse of how natur-
al science (in the form of behaviorism) and mental science are 
related. The passage is cryptic, shimmering with interpreta-
tive possibilities and ambiguities, and therefore we must 
quote it at length: 
At the merely psychical level, the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious does not exist . . . . The mind 
here exists only in the shape of sentience . . . . When 
the light of consciousness falls on such occupations, they 
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change their character; what was sentience becomes imagin-
ation. Hence we cannot study psychical experience, or 
even assure ourselves that it exists, by inquiring of our 
own consciousness; that can only tell us ... of the 
things to which it attends . . . . Those which are utterly 
outside its ken must be studied by other methods. But 
what are these methods to be? Behaviorism has dealt with 
the problem, and gone some way towards a correct solution, 
by dismissing "introspection," that is, inquiry made of 
consciousness, as futile, and identifying the psychical 
with the physiological. The method thus devised is per-
fectly sound, but for one flaw. Unless we had independent 
knowledge both that there is such a thing as psychical ex-
perience and what kind of thing it is, the problem which 
the behaviorist solves by his method could never arise. 
This independent knowledge is derived neither from observ-
ing bodily "behavior" nor from questioning consciousness, 
but from analy~ing consciousness, and thus discovering its 
relation to a more elementary kind of experience which it 
presupposes. The principle of this analysis depends on 
the fact that attention (or as we may now indifferently 
call it, consciousness or awareness) has a double object 
where sentience has a single .... ((A)) person who is 
said to be looking is described as aware of his own seeing 
as well as of the thing he sees. (PA, 205-06). 
Let us at the risk of some repetition try to be clear about 
what this important passage is asserting. (1) Psychical ex-
perience (the level of pure sensation) cannot be studied or 
shown to exist by inquiring of (putting questions to) con-
sciousness, (2) the reason being that consciousness alters 
sensation. (3) Therefore "introspection" (not in the sense 
used in his discussion of empiricism, but as the putting of 
questions to consciousness) -is ruled out as a method for stud-
ying psychical experience (but not as a method for studying 
consciousness)--some other method is required. (4) Behavior-
ism (a natural science) has devised a method perfectly sound 
for this purpose--a method which (a) rejects "introspection," 
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and (b) identifies the psychical with the physiological (and 
therefore subject to the investigative methods of the physical 
sciences). (5) The only flaw with behaviorism as a method is 
that it fails to recognize that unless it presupposes (a) that 
psychical experience exists, and (b) it is a certain kind of 
thing (namely a physiological phenomenon but present to con-
scious beings), it would have nothing to investigate. (6) 
This knowledge is established independently of both "introspec-
tion" and behavioral study; it is established by the analysis 
of consciousness. (7) The principle of this analysis is that 
consciousness has a double object, whereas sentience has a 
single. 
But what then is this "analysis of consciousness"? 
Judging by the "principle" of its analysis, it is nothing 
other than phenomenology: the principle cited is merely a re-
statement of the principle of intentionality. But then phe-
nomenological analysis must not only be able to tell us that 
psychical experience exists (because sentience has an object?) 
but also what kind of a thing it is (something present to us 
as a concrete sensum, to be attended to). 30 This passage is 
30This does not solve all the interpretative difficul-
ties in the passage under consideration. It is not clear, for 
example, how the analysis of consciousness can discover the re-
lationship of consciousness to a more elementary kind of ex-
perience (the psychical level) without altering it in the pro-
cess, because analysis must itself be a kind of consciousness. 
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therefore isomorphic with all those other remarks about psy-
chology scattered through his writings, from his rejection of 
the psychologistic reduction of religion in Religion and Phil-
osophy to his assault on psychologism as a metaphysical pseudo-
science in the Essay on Metaphysics (cf. EM, 112-42). In them 
he is arguing not that psychology (in this case, behaviorism) 
does not have a legitimate field of investigation, but that it 
presupposes philosophical psychology (in this case, phenomena-
l . 1 1 . ) 31 og1ca ana ys1s . 
But once the "flaw" in behaviorism is made good by ac-
ceptance of the presuppositions established by phenomenologi-
cal analysis, its methods are sound for examining the psychi-
cal level of a natural phenomenon, a level at which "introspec-
tion" is futile. And in The Idea of Nature Collingwood is not 
bound by the limitations of the inquiry into consciousness by 
the methods of introspection. The Principles of Art occupies 
an intermediary position--but Collingwood's sense of the limita-
tions presupposed in a given piece of thinking prevents him 
from giving a complete account of perception, and from giving 
31 By calling Collingwood's "analysis of consciousness" 
phenomenological we do not mean to imply a conscious identifi-
cation of Collingwood with the continental phenomenological 
movement begun by Husserl. If there is any such connection 
between Collingwood and the phenomenologists, it is nowhere 
explicit in his writings. Furthermore Collingwood would not 
a:cept phenomenological analysis as purely descriptive; he in-
Sl.sted always that it was "normative" or "criteria-logical." 
Cf. EM, 109; PA, 171, note. 
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full assent to the physiological aspects of perception--the 
level at which objects external to our sense organs initiate 
changes in those organs. 
H.--We find an actual instance of an "analysis of con-
sciousness" in one of the epilegornena to The Idea of History 
--"History as the Re-Enactment of Past Experience." The analy-
sis is dialectical: it takes the form of a number of objec-
tions raised by hypothetical realists and idealists to the as-
sertion that historical knowledge is possible only on the con-
dition that the historian can re-enact in his own mind past 
acts of thought. We shall take up this argument in Chapter 
IX, so we shall not at this point enter into the details of 
this dialectical analysis. It suffices to say that in this 
epilegornenon we have an actual case in which Collingwood argues 
against both the realist's view that acts of thought and their 
objects are independent of one another (and therefore that al-
though two acts of thought may have the same object, they are 
not the same thoughts because thoughts are bound to subjects 
and the subjects are different persons) and the idealist's 
view that objects are ultimately dependent on thought (and 
therefore that in being thought an object becomes subjec-
tive).32 On either view, he argues, history is not possible 
(IH, 289-90). 
plex 
tory 
32o . . . h . h f h" nee aga1n 1t 1s wort not1ng t at part o t 1s corn-
argument is aimed at particular idealistic views of his-
(Croce and Oakeshott), so the use of the term "idealism" 
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Collingwood's answer to these objectors is ultimately 
that thought is neither purely subjective nor purely objec-
tive, but always both (IH, 292). But in answering the ideal-
ist objector Collingwood goes one step further--a step that 
requires stating what we have just seen him call the principle 
of the analysis of consciousness: 
Why did ((the idealist objector)) think that the act of 
thought, by becoming subjective, ceased to be objective? 
. . . It is because he understood by subjectivity not the 
act of thinking, but simply consciousness as a flow of im-
mediate states. Subjectivity for him means not the sub-
jectivity of thought but only the subjectivity of feeling 
or immediate experience. Even immediate experience has 
an object, for in every feeling there is something felt 
and in every sensation there is something sensed: but in 
seeing a colour what we see is the colour, not our act of 
seeing the colour . . . • The subjectivity of immediate 
experience is thus a pure or mere subjectivity; it is 
never objective to itself: the experiencing never experi-
ences itself as experiencing. If, then, there were an ex-
perience from which all thought were excluded ... the 
active or subjective element in that experience could 
never be an object to itself, and if all experience were 
of the same kind it could never be an object at all. (IH, 
294-95). 
In this essay the term "experience" refers to the immediacy of 
something to consciousness, a term consistent with his usage 
throughout his writings. It also provides him with a means 
for distinguishing three senses of the term "awareness" which 
here should not be understood to be applicable to all forms of 
it--in particular objective (Hegelian) idealism. It is pos-
sible that the argument here cited would not be felt as dam-
aging by an objective idealist. We shall have more to say on 
this interesting variant of the autobiographical anti-realist 
argument at IH, 288, in Chapter IX. 
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k to be a synonym for "attention" and for "conscious-we now 
II 
ness. It means (1) the immediate experience of feeling, (2) 
self-consciousness, and (3) perception. Collingwood says the 
term should be confined to its second sense: "I am aware of 
my act not only as an experience but as my experience, and an 
experience of a determinate kind" (IH, 291). 
But then if awareness is self-consciousness how can 
thought be anything but subjective? How can thought be an ob-
ject to itself? In answering this Collingwood expands the 
term "awareness" even further: 
((The objector)) will perhaps say that one act of thought 
may be an object to another act, but not to itself. But 
this ... needs modification, for any object is properly 
the object not of an act but of an agent, the mind that 
performs the act. True, a mind is nothing except its own 
activities; but it is all these activities together, not 
any one separately. The question is, the~ whether a per-
son who performs an act of knowing can also know that he 
is performing or has performed that act. Admittedly he 
can, or no one would know that there were such acts, and 
so no one could have called them subjective; but to call 
them merely subjective, and not objective too, is to deny 
that admission while yet continuing to assume its truth. 
The act of thinking ... has to be studied as it actually 
exists, that is to say, as an act .... This study ... 
is self-knowledge . . ; it is the object of a self-know-
ledge which differs from mere consciousness in being self-
consciousness or awareness, and differs from being mere 
self-consciousness in being self-knowledge; the critical 
study of one's own thought, not the mere awareness of that 
thought as one's own. (IH, 292).33 
33
cf. Donagan's "Principle of Order," which is one of 
the four major presuppositions which Donagan claims hold for 
Collingwood's mature philosophy of mind: "If a man is con-
scious of one of his own acts of consciousness, then it is not 
by that act itself, but by another act of consciousness which 
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So now it appears that the schema is complete; in addition to 
(l) the immediate experience of sensation, (2) mere conscious-
ness, and (3) self-consciousness, we have also (4) critical 
self-consciousness or self-knowledge, the critical study of 
one's own thought. For an analysis of consciousness to be com-
plete it must be carried through to this final stage, which we 
have often seen Collingwood call philosophy. In a later chap-
ter we shall see that the critical study of one's own thought 
is the study of the presuppositions of that thought, or meta-
physics, and that the methodology of metaphysics necessitates 
the methodology of history. But for now we wish to point out 
that in an actual specimen of the analysis of consciousness 
Collingwood has in fact appealed to the principle of inten-
tionality in the sense that all consciousness (even conscious-
ness of sensation or perception) implies the presence of an 
object. 
Now if we pull these various strands of circumstantial 
evidence together into a final summary concerning the relation 
of knower to known, what emerges from the evidence of The 
Principles of Art, when taken in conjunction with the evidence 
from remarks in The ~ of _Nature and The Idea of History, is 
this: 
may be said to be of a higher order" (LPC,28). Any interpreta-
tion which accepts an overly-strict adherence to this principle 
must ultimately come to grips with the passage just cited, 
which states that this principle "needs modification" and de-
fends the thesis that at least one act of consciousness can be 
self-illuminating, namely self-knowledge. 
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TABLE 7 
THE KNOWER-KNOWN RELATIONSHIP IN PERCEPTION 
The knower-known relationship as it occurs in the act of 
perception is not adequately described by simple assign-
ment of activity or passivity to either knowing or its 
object. (PA, 196-97) 
a. Knowing does not create its object ex nihilo (i.e., 
knowing is not totally active with respect to an 
object); (PA, 291-92) 
b. nor does the object create knowledge of itself ex 
nihilo in the knower (knowing is not totally pas-
sive in the act of perception). (PA, 196-97) 
c. Although knowing is active (in the form of sentience) 
even at the level of sensation, for there to be an 
object of sensation something must be present to it 
(and therefore active in this minimal sense)--i.e. it 
must present itself to the knower's field of senti-
ence. (PA, 210) 
2. In perception the object affects knowledge by being pre-
sent to sensation; its being an object for sensation is 
the same as its being present to sensation. Its esse is 
sentiri. (PA, 189, 8-24; PA, 198; cf. PA, 206) 
3. At the level of sensation, knowing affects the object by 
perpetuating it and domesticating it by an act of atten-
tion. This act makes the sensum one's own (an item of 
our own experience) and maintains its presence in experi-
ence for sufficient time to allow further acts of thought 
concerning it to occur (discrimination, comparison, ab-
straction, measurement, etc.). (PA, 212-13) 
NOTE: In this table, "object" is to be taken as "object 
of sensation"--i.e., whatever is sensed, or present to sensa-
tion. "Knowing" is, unless qualified, to mean "empirical 
knowledge"--i.e., knowledge by perception, and has the same 
broad extension as "thought"--including first order attention. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
These further acts of thought are interpretations of a 
sensum. 
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Limitations on observation come (a) from the side of the 
object (how long a process takes to occur, how large or 
small it must be in order to exist) as well as (b) from 
the side of the subject (the limits of duration of atten-
tion, spatial discriminatory capacities, etc.). These 
are (a) the presupposition concerning minimum space and 
time in nature, and (b) the limits of possible experience 
in subjects, respectively. (IN, 23-24) 
The assertion of the existence of a world of nature ex-
ternal to our organs of sensation and capable of present-
ing information to us by acts of these organs, is not a 
matter of direct perception, but the result of an inter-
pretation of sensa. This assertion is a presupposition 
of natural science. (EM, 213, 217) 
Natural science overlaps the study of mind at the psychi-
cal level, the physiological aspects of which are studied 
by behaviorism, using the methods of natural science, and 
not using the methods of conscious inquiry or introspec-
tion. (NL, 2.6-2.73; PA, 205-06) 
That there is such a level of experience, and that it 
consists of concrete sensa present to sensation as some-
thing to be attended to (i.e. as uninterpreted sensa) is 
presupposed by behavioral psychology, but is demonstrated 
by the analysis of consciousness, on the basis of the 
principle of intentionality. (PA, 205-06) 
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6. The New Leviathan: Attention as a Linguistic Act. 
Unfortunately we are not yet finished with our survey 
of Collingwood's writings on the issue of realism. We come 
at last to his final work, The New Leviathan--the last work 
published during his lifetime, and his final word on the sub-
ject of the philosophy of mind. 34 As with The Principles of 
Art, we are looking for evidence concerning Collingwood's 
1 . f h . . 1 d . f 1. 35 d eva uatlon o t e prlnclp e octrlne o rea lsm, an espe-
34The New Leviathan is an odd book in many ways, when 
compared to Collingwood's other works. It is written in a 
highly aphoristic and Olympian style, with the pseudo-mathema-
tical device of numbered paragraphs and sub-numbered sentences. 
Its rhetoric is more hectoring and bombastic than usual, with 
racial slurs directed at whole nations or peoples--especially 
the Germans and Turks (cf. NL, 12.4-12.42, 33.47-33.75, 42.1-
42.74, 44.1-44.9, and 45.1-45.96). Some of these oddities may 
be written off as due to the highly emotional circumstances 
under which the book was written (he writes that he concluded 
it during a Nazi bombardment of London), as well as the trials 
of his struggle with his rapidly failing health (cf. NL, v). 
Specific oddities in terms of doctrine will be dealt with di-
rectly in our discussion. But an interpreter should be cau-
tious about the weight he puts on specific and unparalleled 
statements that he finds in this work--statements that do not 
appear supported elsewhere in Collingwood's other writings. 
In our own work we have therefore approached it with caution, 
and treat it last rather than first; to reverse this procedure 
(as Donagan and Mink do) and deal with The New Leviathan as a 
foundation for understanding his mature philosophy of mind is 
not, in our opinion, sound strategy (cf. Donagan, LPC, 19). 
35The New Leviathan.is subtitled "Man, Society, Civi-
lization, and Barbarism," and these correspond to the four 
parts into which the book is divided. Although there are 
scattered remarks about perception, thinking, and science 
throughout the latter three parts, our main concern will be 
only with the first part, in which the philosophy of mind is 
expounded that serves as a foundation for parts II-IV. That 
the argument of The New Leviathan as a whole is fundamentally 
391 
cially as that evaluation affects his analysis of perception. 
As it happens there is no direct argument in The New Leviathan 
that has the form of the autobiographical refutation of real-
. But there is a discussion of the issue of empiricism ~sm. 
that parallels (but definitely does not duplicate) that given 
in The Principles of Art. As in the earlier work, this dis-
cussion arises in the context of the distinction between 
feeling and thought (NL, 1.61, 4.13-4.19). Within feeling 
Collingwood distinguishes a sensuous element and an emotional 
charge (NL, 4.1). But unlike the earlier work he calls thought 
a "constituent" of mind and feeling an "apanage": feeling be-
longs to mind not the way a man belongs to a family or a plank 
to a boat (as a constituent or an element) but in the way in 
which an estate belongs to a family or a mooring to a boat--
anti-realistic hinges on the denial that theory and practice 
can be separated (or that theoretical reason can be separated 
from practical reason)--a denial made at the very beginning 
(NL, 1.66) and reinforced throughout parts I-IV in various 
forms (cf. NL, 7.22, 14.3-14.31, 18.13, 19.25, 20.21, 27.55, 
36.25-36.7, 41.32-41.33). Since The New Leviathan is primar-
ily an ethical treatise (or perhaps more properly a treatise 
on social and political philosophy) the stress on the perni-
cious consequences of realistic philosophy (cf. A, 47-48, 
147) is quite understandable. But throughout the work there 
are other direct assaults on what Collingwood had recognized 
to be realistic doctrines: e.g. the rejection of the reduction 
of the term "society" to the abstract notion of class (NL, 
19.37, 19.7); a defense of the notion of a common good and a 
rejection of the view that all "goods" are private (NL, 20.12-
20.22, 21.27-21.65, 36.25-36.55); and the description of the 
body politic as a dialectical entity (NL, 24.52-24.75, 29.1-
29.75, 39.1-39.15). 
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i.e. as something it has but not as something it is (NL, 4.13-
4.19). With this distinction in mind, Collingwood addr~sses 
the question of radical empiricism: 
There is a saying, nihil est in intellectu nisi quod prius 
fuerit in sensu. If this were true, the precision or de-
finiteness which is characteristic of thought would already 
be characteristic of feeling. Many people try to persuade 
themselves that it is; but they are mistaken. They regard 
feeling as a constituent of knowledge; but it is only an 
apanage of knowledge: an indispensable apanage, but an 
apanage and no more. Are there objects of feeling or not? 
I do not know. Nobody knows. Some have said there are, 
some have said there are not. As the question is unanswer-
able on positive grounds I answer it on methodological 
grounds .... Entia non sunt multiplicanda (runs Occam's 
Razor) praeter necessitatem. Following this rule I answer 
the question: "Are there objects of feeling or not" by 
what I call a methodological negative. Feeling must on 
any view have modes . . . . The question is whether a 
theory of feeling needs objects as well as modes. The 
Lockian theory does; the Cartesian does not. By Occam's 
Razor the Cartesian theory is preferable. (NL, 5.19-5.2, 
5.39). 
Is Collingwood taking a different tack here than he 
did in The Principles of Art? It would certainly seem so, 
since on the strength of the above quotation a reader could 
certainly say that the "matter-form" analogy accepted in the 
earlier work is certainly not applicable to something that is 
an "apanage" and not a "constituent." If feeling is "an 
apanage and no more" (and we do not ask how it can be an "in-
dispensable apanage" and still not be a constituent) it cannot 
stand with respect to higher levels of experience as something 
capable of being perpetuated as a "certain new arrangement of 
psychical experiences" or as a "peculiar combination of ele-
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ments" preserved by an act of consciousness (PA, 233). 
But before analyzing his argument to justify this "me-
thodological negative," we must notice that Collingwood is put-
ting~ guestion to consciousness, finding that it is unanswer-
able on "positive" grounds, and therefore answering it on me-
thodological grounds. We recognize this to be a case of the 
"inquiry into consciousness" that Collingwood had said cannot 
tell us what sort of thing the psychical level is or even whe-
ther it exists. A non-positive answer is therefore not sur-
prising on the grounds of the positive evidence offered by 
consciousness alone. It is also not surprising that methodol-
ogy enters into the discussion, since Collingwood had asserted 
that what the method of inquiry into consciousness could not 
establish could be settled by the methods of behavioral psy-
chology as corrected by the "analysis of consciousness" using 
the principle of intentionality. What is surprising is that 
the "methodological answer" to the question turns out to be 
negative: there are no objects of feeling. The "methodologi-
cal" criteria therefore cannot refer to the methods of beha-
vioral psychology (there is no experimental evidence cited), 
nor is there any "analysis of consciousness" here based on the 
principle that consciousness has a double object while sensa-
tion has a single. In fact it appears that the criterion be-
ing used does not allow sensation to have even a single ob-
ject: it has only modes. The criterion appealed to must 
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therefore be the principles involved in an "inquiry into con-
sciousness" which (as expected) cannot answer such questions. 
But why then is the question answered in the negative? 
Should it not be simply left open (as it is at NL, 5.2, where 
he says that he does not know and nobody else does either)? 
Should it not merely be stated that feeling is ambiguous with 
respect to this category as it is with the other Kantian cate-
gories (NL, 5.66)? In order to get a handle on why Colling-
wood reaches such a conclusion, let us look at the argument 
offered between the question and the answer, deleted from the 
above-quoted passage. The passages are long and difficult, 
and are best dealt with by paraphrase. The argument proceeds 
as follows: 
(1) Locke asserted that there are proper objects 
(colours, sounds, etc.) of acts of feeling (seeing, hearing, 
etc.); the general name for these objects is "sense data" (NL, 
5.21-5.23). Since data are first-order objects to sensation, 
and hence second-order objects to simple consciousness (con-
s . . . t . . . f ) 3 6 Th . d . c~ousness ~n ~ s most pr~m~t~ve orm . e ~mme ~ate or 
36There is a lack of terminological uniformity between 
The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan which adds to the 
difficulty of comparing the views of mind presented in each--
a confusion complicated by the alternation between the purely 
relative use of terms (like "first-order" and "second-order" 
objects, where the same object may be a first-order or immedi-
ate object to one level of consciousness and a second-order or 
mediated object to a second level reflecting on the first) 
and the use of similar terms to refer to concrete levels of 
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first-order object of simple consciousness is the activity of 
sensation itself (NL, 5.24). (2) Berkeley asked, "What.is the 
status of objects of sense-perception?" and answered, "Their 
esse is percipi," meaning that the being of colour is its be-
-
ing seen, the being of sound its being heard, etc.--the sounds, 
colours, etc. being apanages of mind or products of the activi-
ties of seeing, hearing, etc. (NL, 5.27-5.29). (3) G. E. 
Moore and others (obviously contemporary empiricists) beginning 
with the same assumption (i.e. that sense-data are objects of 
sensation) reach the opposite conclusion, i.e. that any object 
is precisely what it would be if we were not aware of it (NL, 
5.31; Collingwood quotes from "The Refutation of Idealism"). 
(4) The Cartesian answer is that there are modes of feeling 
(blue, hard, loud, etc.) but no objects. This does not mean 
that Descartes denied that there were such things as blue co-
lors, loud sounds, etc., but that "Descartes denied the blue 
colour to be the object of a transitive verb to see, as a dog 
may be the object of a transitive verb to kick. It means that 
for Descartes the grammar of the sentence 'I see a blue colour' 
is not like the grammar of 'I kick a bad dog' but like the 
grammar of 'I feel a transient melancholy' or 'I go a fast 
walk.' The colour, the melancholy, the walk, are not objects 
of an action, they are modes of an action; their names have an 
mind (like "first-order" and "second-order" consciousness). 
Where there is apparent lack of synonymy we shall indicate the 
fact. In this case Collingwood's use of "simple consciousness" 
is synonymous with first-order attention from The Principles 
of Art. 
--
396 
adverbial function in the sentences in which they occur" (NL, 
5.34-5.35). On the Cartesian theory feeling as sensuous or 
emotional has modes, but neither sensations nor emotions have 
objects: therefore "in neither case is there anything of which 
it is other than idiotic to ask whether its esse is percipi or 
not" (NL, 5.37). (5) If the Cartesian theory is accepted, 
then the question which (a) Berkeley answered one way ("sensa 
are mind-dependent") and Moore and others answered in the oppo-
site way ("sensa are not mind-dependent") is a nonsense ques-
tion; it is "a question to which no possible answer is right 
because it arises logically from an assumption that is not 
made" (NL, 5.36). 37 (6) By Occam's Razor, the infinity of en-
tities required by the theory that says that feeling has ob-
jects as well as modes is ruled out as unnecessary. All one 
needs for an account of feeling is modes. Therefore the Car-
37 The argument here is confusing, but the following 
schema seems likely: 
Question: Are sensa mind-dependent? 
Answer (1): Sensa are mind-dependent (Berkeley). 
Answer (2): Sensa are not mind-dependent (Moore). 
Presupposition: Mind-dependency is something that sensa 
can have or be. 
The implication seems to be that this presupposition (if that 
is indeed the presupposition that Collingwood has in mind) is 
not being made on the Cartesian theory because to be mind-de-
pendent something must be a constituent of mind or of conscious-
ness, and feelings are not constituents of mind but apanages 
(and apanages are not constituents). Another way of saying this 
is that feelings cannot have 2nd-order objects because they are 
not conscious acts; therefore whether apanages have 2nd-order 
objects (objects as well as modes) is a nonsense question. 
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tesian theory is preferable on methodological grounds. (NL, 
5.39). (7) But either view (i.e. that there are both modes 
and objects of feelings or that there are only modes) fits the 
facts, and neither is inherently nonsensical (NL, 5.38). 
We seem to be on familiar territory--this review par-
allels that given in The Principles of Art on the question of 
real and imaginary sensa. But there are several important dif-
ferences in the two accounts. (a) Although Collingwood winds 
up stating, as we have already noticed, that feeling is "am-
biguous" with respect to the Kantian categories (and hence 
have the status of uninterpreted sensa) he concludes here with 
a Cartesian rather than a Kantian answer to the question, "Are 
there objects of feelings?" (b) In opting for this answer 
Collingwood introduces an essentially linguistic argument 
(i.e. that the terms referring to sensa function as adverbs 
rather than as nouns) that is absent in the previous account. 38 
38The linguistic argument, while interesting, is both 
(a) non-essential to the main argument, and (b) unreliable. 
(a) To demonstrate its inessentiality it is only necessary to 
read the above summary of the argument without it--it still 
makes perfect sense. The use of Occam's Razor does notre-
quire the adverbial function of sense-object terms; it hinges 
on the non-necessity of positing two sets of entities, sense-
modes and sense-objects, when all one needs are modes. (b) 
But this highlights the unreliability of the argument, since 
what Descartes (and Collingwood) seem to be proposing is to 
substitute the term "mode" for the term "object." Now it is 
true that sense-modes sometimes function adverbially (e.g. "He 
felt the train moving, but visually nothing changed"), but 
then the distinction refers to the manner in which things are 
felt--by touch, sight, taste, etc.--rather than what is felt 
£y these modes. For if terms like blue, sweet, loud, etc. 
function adverbially in a sentence, then it should be proper 
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(c) The Cartesian answer, which he accepts, renders it "idiot-
ic" to assert that there is anything of which it is true to 
assert that its esse is percipi (which runs counter to his 
previous assertion that the esse of a sensum is sentiri). (d) 
And yet he states that neither the assertion that sensa are 
mind-dependent (Berkeley) nor the assertion that they are not 
(Moore) is inherently nonsensical, and that both fit the facts. 
This contradicts his earlier argument that Moore's position 
(or the position of any empiricist who argues that there are 
entities describable as "sense data" which are objects of the 
act of sensation) implies that something absurdly describable 
to say that "He tasted sweetly" or "He looked bluely" or "He 
heard loudly"--all of which are semantically peculiar. The 
more acceptable usage is not adverbial but adjectival: "He 
tasted a sweet pastry," or "He gazed at a blue feather," or 
"He heard a loud siren," etc. On the Descartes-Collingwood 
theory it would seem that each "object" of feeling is only an-
other mode, so that we would have to posit separate senses for 
every color, taste, texture, etc.--each being a "mode" or mo-
dification of the general term, "feeling." But linguistic 
legislation cannot settle the problem of what it would mean 
if sense-data terms were made proper objects of verbs of sen-
sation: "I see blue," "I hear loud," etc.--which appear to 
be truncated or incomplete sentences. Completion of their 
sense is made possible by intentional or sense-giving acts of 
interpretation. The substitution of the term "mode" for "ob-
ject" merely postpones the inevitable question, are such en-
tities present to us or do we present them to ourselves? But 
if Collingwood's linguistic argument is taken not as a piece 
of verbal legislation but as an illustration of an epistemolo-
gical point he wishes to make, then his denial that there are 
objects of feeling may come down to nothing more than the de-
nial of sense-data as the perception of substances rather than 
of processes of nature. It would thus be consistent with The 
~ of Nature, which states that one of the consequences or-
the moaern view of nature is the resolution of substance into 
function (IN, 16-17). 
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as "unsensed sensa" can exist. And finally, (e) there is no 
mention here, or in what follows it in The New Leviathan, of 
anything to do with imagination or imaginary sensa. 
Some, but not all, of these discrepancies may be re-
solved by paying careful attention to a subtle shift of levels 
between the two works, The New Leviathan being strictly bound 
by the negative limitations of "The Fallacy of Swapping Hor-
ses," and The Principles of Art sitting a little looser in 
the saddle. In the later work the inquiry proceeds by putting 
questions to consciousness and answering them by taking 
"soundings" (consciously reflecting or introspecting) at var-
ious levels of consciousness. Since this is the Cartesian 
method, 39 it is predictable that the same method will yield 
similar conclusions: consciousness does not need to assume 
that sensation has objects as well as modes. The methodologi-
cal negative therefore merely allows the inquiry to proceed by 
not inhibiting it with questions that it cannot (on its pre-
suppositions) answer. Since one of its main presuppositions 
is that the only constituents of mind are acts of conscious-
39collingwood's starting point in The New Leviathan is 
even Cartesian: "Of all the .things we know-or have been told 
about Man, which is the one thing that concerns us at the pres-
ent stage of our inquiry? I answer: The division between body 
~Mind" (NL, 1.21). But of course, Collingwood's aim is not 
to construct a mathematically secure science, nor to proceed 
only by way of clear and distinct ideas. Nevertheless these 
concessions to Descartes should alone be enough to render sus-
pect any account of Collingwood's philosophy of mind that be-
gins with the assertion that it is fundamentally anti-
Cartesian (Donagan, LPC, 25). 
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ness, and that with respect to these essential elements feel-
ings are merely apanages, it is not a matter for consciousness 
to decide what the relationship may be between feelings and 
what they are directed towards. Whatever these objects may be, 
they are not first-order objects for consciousness. Therefore 
when Collingwood rejects the assertion that sensation has ob-
jects he may be doing nothing more than what he does in The 
Principles of Art when he criticizes the notion of "sense 
data": he may be rejecting the absurd notion of "unsensed sen-
sa." In other words, the terms "sense-object," "sense datum" 
and "unsensed sensum" may be synonyms: all may refer to a sen-
sum as a datum--something really present only as re-presented, 
an imaginatum. 
But then the reader is stumped for an explanation as 
to why Moore's position is not inherently nonsensical, and why 
the notion of "sense-object" is not resolved into an imagina-
tum, as it is in The Principles of Art; in The New Leviathan 
the entire issue of imaginative representation is never men-
tioned. Can we assume that this is because he had said all he 
cared to on the subject in The Principles of Art (cf. Mink, 
MHD, 81)? That might be the case were it not for some remark-
able direct discrepancies between the two works on the issue 
of feeling, discrepancies not easily dismissed on the above 
grounds. 
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These discrepancies become more obvious the instant 
we begin to expand the discussion of feeling. In The New 
Leviathan Collingwood characterizes feeling and its relation 
to thought as follows. (1) It is an apanage of mind rather 
than a constituent (NL, 4.19-4.2). (2) It consists of sen-
suous elements and emotional charges which interpenetrate all 
over the field of feeling (NL, 4.1, 4.4). (3) Feelings are 
evanescent--they begin to perish as soon as they begin to 
exist (NL, 5.5). (4) Feelings are indefinite (NL, 4.8) but 
strong (NL, 4.86). (5) The strength that feeling has is (a) 
vividness ("compression strength"--basically, intensity) and 
(b) tenacity (the quality a feeling has which makes it "linger 
in the mind, be slow to vanish, and be easily revived when the 
occasion permits") (NL, 5.14-5.17). (6) Within the here-and-
now field of feeling (NL, 4.4) there are place-differences, 
time-differences ("it has spatial and temporal bulk"), and in-
tensity differences (louder and softer sounds, brighter and 
dimmer colors, etc.) (NL, 4.4, 4.43). (7) Within this field 
there is also a focal region where precision and intensity are 
greatest, and a penumbral region where they decrease in every 
direction until in some outer zone precision and intensity re-
cede into dimness and confusion (NL, 4.44). 
Thus far the description of feeling is not signifi-
cantly different from that given in The Principles of Art. 
But Collingwood adds several more statements about feeling in 
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relation to thought, statements that lead us into unfamiliar 
territory. (8) Feeling has no edges--its spatial and temporal 
penumbra fade away (NL, 4.45). (9) Feeling is the proper ob-
ject of simple consciousness and is immediately given to that 
consciousness (NL, 4.19, 4.24, 4.71). Without this simple 
consciousness and the field of feeling present to it there 
could be no higher-order acts of selective attention (NL, 4.5). 
(10) Distinctions within the field of feeling are made by an 
act of selective attention--a practical act of second-order 
consciousness in which one's attention is turned one way or 
another, "creating ... a situation in which ... conscious-
ness is concentrated on one object (one feeling) or another" 
(NL, 4.5). (11) The act of attention really makes the edges 
of anything distinguished within the field of feeling (NL, 
4.52 -4.6)--distinctions such as positional distinctions (dis-
tinctions of place and time), qualitative distinctions, dis-
tinctions between sensations and their emotional charges, be-
tween different sensings (seeing, hearing, smelling), etc. 
(NL, 4.61-4.63). (12) Any characteristics that feelings may 
have are discoverable by simply reflecting on that conscious-
ness; to attempt to argue about it is to commit the Fallacy 
of Misplaced Argument (the fallacy of arguing about any object 
immediately given to consciousness) (NL, 4.71-4.73). (13) 
There is no generalizing about feelings ("that is, no framing 
universal propositions about them and assuring oneself that 
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these are true, or (alternatively) omitting to do so because 
one is too lazy"), although it is possible to think inductive-
ly about feeling ("to think inductively is to assume, because 
this x has (or some x's have) a certain characteristic, that 
other x's have or would have the same characteristic") (NL, 
5.55-5.56). (14) Feelings have modes but not objects (NL, 
5.2-5.39). (15) Feeling is ambiguous with respect to activity 
(something I do) or passivity (something I undergo) (NL, 5.4-
5.49). (16) Feeling is ambiguous with regard to the Kantian 
categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality (NL, 
5.6-5.66). (17) It is also ambiguous with regard to the Kan-
tian category of quality, although this ambiguity has limits 
(NL, 5.67-5.72). (18) Feelings cannot be remembered, although 
propositions about feelings can be remembered (NL, 5.54). (19) 
Feelings may be preconscious until they are reflected upon by 
an act of consciousness (NL, 5.9-5.91), or unconscious insofar 
as they are repressed (NL, 5.86-5.87). (20) Feeling remains 
preconscious until it is named (NL, 6.28). Naming is a ling-
uistic act of expression, which includes everything from the 
language of gesture (e.g. an expressive shiver to the cold) 
to the language of speech (saying "it is cold") (NL, 6.1, 
6.25). "Language in its simplest form is the language of con-
sciousness in its simplest form; the mere 'register' of feel-
ings, as wild and mad as those feelings themselves; irrational, 
unorganized, unplanned, unconscious" (NL, 6.58). (21) A lang-
uage is an abstraction from discourse, which is the activity 
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by which a man means anything (NL, 6.11). To discourse is to 
mean something by the gesture (expression) you make; a lang-
uage is a system of gestures (sounds or the like) as having 
meanings. Discourse is the activity of meaning something (a) 
by something else (b), where meaning (a) is an act of theore-
tical consciousness, and (b) is a practical activity, the pro-
duction in oneself or others of sounds, etc. which serve as 
the vehicle of that meaning (NL, 6.18-6.19). (22) Finally, 
selective attention is an act of practical thinking, at the 
level of conceptual thought (NL, 7.2-7.21); it is a doing of 
something to oneself (focusing consciousness on part of the 
field of feeling) and also a doing of something to the object 
(circumscribing it, drawing a line between it and the rest of 
the field) (NL, 7.3). 
Leaving the higher functions of consciousness for la-
ter discussion (we will have more to say about language, lo-
gic, and conceptual and propostional thinking in Chapter VIII), 
we must now ask how all this stands with respect to the funda-
mental tenet of realism. Once again we meet with Collingwood's 
intransigent insistence on the activity of thinking and its 
role even at the primary level of perception. And once again 
we find Collingwood anxious ·to reject the view of mind that 
makes it a passive partner in the knower-known relationship. 
In his final published work, then, it is clear that Colling-
wood has retained his opposition to the principal doctrine of 
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realism that the known is unaffected by the knowing of it. To 
this extent the autobiographical interpretation is vindicated. 
But what about our further question about whether the 
object has any effect on the knower? And is this description 
of the functions of consciousness consistent with that given 
in The Principles of Art, and how does it compare with the 
circumstantial evidence that we educed from that earlier work 
and from his other late writings? Although we would like to 
defend Collingwood's later philosophy of mind as a brave at-
tempt to reconcile idealism and realism, we find instead that 
in The New Leviathan he appears to be so intent on overcoming 
the errors of realism that he leaves little room for interpret-
ing the knower-known relationship in anything but idealistic 
terms: not only does knowing make a difference to the object 
known even to the level of perception, but there seems to be 
no way that the object can make a difference to the knowing 
of it. 
The crux of the matter is, of course, sensation itself. 
If there is no way that sensation can present to us a world of 
sensa that is something more than in a state of constant flux, 
utterly diversified, and without any "edges" at all, then it 
is impossible to see (1) why an exercise of the "circumsrib-
ing" function of attention is not utterly free to make any 
sort of arbitrary pattern of fancies out of the chaos of sensa 
on which it operates; (2) why there should be any sort of cor-
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relation between various modes of sensation with respect to 
one and the same object of sensation; and (3) how it is_pos-
sible to disambiguate feeling at all by any act of interpre-
tation. We will take up each of these points separately. 
(1) We have seen that Collingwood described the field 
of feeling as containing positional and qualitative distinc-
tions, place-differences and time-differences, intensity dif-
ferences, and even focal and penumbral regions. But then we 
saw him go even further and assert that there are no edges 
within the field of feeling, and that all distinctions within 
it are made by acts of selective attention--an act of practi-
cal consciousness. He goes so far as to say that not even so 
much as a "red patch" is immediately given to consciousness, 
because "the red is actually given in feeling to consciousness 
as ~ quality transfusing all the rest of the same field" (NL, 
5.65; emphasis mine). The sensa given in feeling "interpene-
trate" all over the field of feeling (NL, 5.62), and only the 
activity of consciousness as selective attention can "cut up" 
such a field into distinct feelings ("sensations distinct from 
emotions, visual sensations distinct from auditory sensations, 
red patches distinct from green patches, and so on ad infini-
~") (NL, 5.63). The field of sensation is utterly ambigu-
ous with regard to all the Kantian categories, and only one 
small postscript indicates that this ambiguity has any limits: 
with respect to the category of quality Collingwood says that 
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"colour may be indeterminate, but it falls between points on 
a colour-scale. We can always fix these limits as closely 
as we need ... but the ambiguity is only restricted, it can 
never be removed" ( NL, 5. 7 2) . 
But how is it possible to "restrict" an ambiguity that 
(a) includes the impossibility of distinguishing even so much 
as a red patch on a green field, and that (2) excludes sensa 
from having any "edges" at all? And how is it possible for 
there to be differences (qualitative, quantitative, etc.) with-
in a field if everything within that field "interpenetrates" 
and "transfuses" and "begins to perish as soon as it begins 
to exist"? And how can there be such differences present in 
the field if it is only consciousness that puts such distinc-
tions there? 
Lacking answers to these questions we must conclude 
that something has gone wrong with Collingwood's description 
of feeling, and especially of sensation. It is not consistent 
with itself within The New Leviathan, and it certainly is not 
consistent with his remarks in other works, about scientific 
observation and its presuppositions. In order that there be 
something "there" for perception to attend to, we must assume 
that edges are not only "made" by acts of selective attention, 
they are also "found" to be there when something is attended 
to--once, twice, or however many times one chooses. And al-
though within a given field of sensation--vision, for example--
408 
there may be ambiguities (colors at the periphery of my vision 
begin to interpenetrate, or even within the direct foreground 
of my visual field if I let my focus blur), it is nonetheless 
equally an item of experience that for a given position within 
that field something is not always red, green, blue, etc. all 
over at the same time, and to the same degree--this much at 
least he admitted in The Principles of Art, when he argued 
that "we cannot, in seeing a red patch, mistake it for a blue 
one" (PA, 189). It is sometimes predominately one color or 
another, or it is mottled, or whatever, but certainly not al-
ways totally indefinite. And if it is true that I become aware 
of edges by letting my focus wander back and forth from a red 
patch to its surrounding green field and back again, and there-
by re-establishing the distinctness of the red patch from its 
background, it is not a matter of utterly creating this edge 
ex nihilo in the visual field, it is a matter of re-creating 
or re-presenting it for myself in the act of perception. If 
it were not then it would be nonsense to assert that observa-
tion of nature yields any information at all. Selective at-
tention would just as surely create the patterns of nature as 
a painter creates a visual scene on his canvas: it is a re-
verse "tabula rasa" with the messages written on the blank 
sheet of sensation by the perceiver's consciousness rather 
than by natural objects. 
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(2) So also with the formation of percepts which the 
medieval scholastics would subsume under the faculty of."com-
mon sense" (not the body of assumed rules or customs or atti-
tudes towards the world and others, but rather the result of 
the operation of a faculty related to imagination, and which 
holds together sensa from various organs of sensation--colors 
and shapes with sounds, textures, smells, taste~ etc.--to form 
a "common sensible"). Collingwood's sensuous field as he de-
scribes it cannot be distinct even with respect to modes, if 
he is to be consistent, since "visual sensations distinct from 
auditory sensations ... and so on ad infinitum" (NL, 5.63) 
are only distinguished by acts of selective attention. But 
then it becomes utterly arbitrary whether I associate this 
color brown to which I am attending with this shape which I 
am holding, where the shape happens to be a cup I am holding 
under the table and color is that of the table between my eyes 
and the cup. Or even worse, what is to stop my act of atten-
tion from taking this loud noise for this sweet taste? Col-
lingwood wishes us to withhold such distinctions until we 
reach a higher level of discrimination, but by then it is 
too late: no amount of discriminating is going to inform me 
of an error of this sort unless some original act actually 
grants me information on the basis of which I can correct my 
error. On Collingwood's grounds (at least in The New Levia-
than) it is impossible, using the findings of mental science, 
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to ever have any such original act. Sensation as such is es-
-
sentially and irretrievably ambiguous. 
(3) But the problems that Collingwood gets himself in-
to in The New Leviathan are not due solely to his assertion 
that the field of sensation is ambiguous with respect to one 
or another of the Kantian categories (which is true even for 
his position in The Principles of Art insofar as uninterpreted 
sensa are ambiguous until interpreted by application of one or 
more categories) but rather they are also due to the fact that 
he goes beyond this point and makes statements about the field 
of feeling that are actually interpretations of it--generali-
zations about feeling that his own principles do not allow him 
to make. Thus although he says that no generalizations can 
be made about feeling (which is itself a generalization about 
feeling) he proceeds to say that within a visual field all 
colors interpenetrate, that they have no edges, that within 
the field of feeling there are place-differences and time-
differences, that they cannot be remembered, etc. What are 
these but generalizations about feeling? And how does a 
reader begin to reconcile the statement that there can be no 
generalization about feeling with the statement that immedi-
ately follows it, that it is possible to "think inductively" 
about feeling, where "to think inductively is to assume that 
because this x has ... a certain characteristic, that other 
!_'s have or would have the same characteristic" (NL, 5.55-
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5 .66)? For what else could inductive thinking, on this de-
scription of it, be but generalization? 
Now it is true that in The Principles of Art many of 
these same generalizations were made about feeling, but they 
were merely provisionally assumed as a way of distinguishing 
feeling from thought, and in order to establish the interme-
diate role of imagination. Once imagination as attention is 
understood as the minimum specification of the genus thought, 
the realm of feeling is redefined as the psychical level of 
experience on which attention operates, and through which at-
tention "finds and makes" the patterns it requires of the 
world extrinsic to our sense organs. The methodology of men-
\ 
tal science has not been violated, because consciousness as 
attention is used to define feeling (feeling is what atten-
tion is conscious of; sensa are its second-order objects). 
All this is demolished by the overstatements of The 
New Leviathan. Does the later work then represent a change 
of mind in The Principles of Art? And if Collingwood is say-
ing that the experience of distinctions as given to us in 
sensation is not his experience is he not "disowning" a feel-
ing, and is this not the "corruption of consciousness" that 
he sought to warn us against? We cannot answer these ques-
tions on the basis of the existing evidence. We can only try 
to discern what Collingwood was trying to say--what he in-
tended to mean rather than what he merely said. Now it is 
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clear that Collingwood wishes to say, in The New Leviathan, 
not only (1) that feeling prior to reflection upon it is lack-
ing in the distinctions proper to thought alone, and hence has 
only a potentiality for categorial predication, but also (2) 
that it has place-distinctions and time-distinctions and 
intensity-distinctions (even in the pre-reflective state), and 
(3) that it nonetheless belongs to us as a field of experience 
--as an apanage of mind, or something we have, rather than a 
constituent, or something we are. 
This is basically a Kantian view on the structure and 
function of mind, since (2) is another way of stating what 
Kant called the "forms of sensibility"--space and time: for 
anything to be an object of possible experience, according to 
Kant, it must be spatially extended and temporally successive. 
This even seems to be consistent with the view expressed in 
The Principles of Art, where Collingwood speaks of the func-
tion of attention as perpetuating sensa by keeping them before 
us long enough to get a fair sight of them; and also consist-
ent with the view of The Idea of Nature where Collingwood 
talks about minimum-space and minimum-time as limiting condi-
tions for scientific, experimental observation. 
But it has the same problems that the Kantian forms of 
sensibility have. Sensa as placed and timed are not utterly 
indeterminate, but are rather determined to be someplace and 
sometime, and therefore bearing interpretation, in the minimal 
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sense, already. If they are conditions for the possibility 
of objects of sensation, then they must be conditions no~ 
only for the subjective act of a percipient, but also con-
ditions true for the object as well--in Collingwood's terms, 
for the sensum. The sensum has to be the "kind of thing" 
that meets the requirements of sensation; it has to be a spa-
tially-extended and temporally-persistent thing if perception 
of it is to be possible. 
The question ultimately comes down to this: if dis-
tinctions, "edges," are not found but made by acts of practi-
cal consciousness, how is it possible to attend to what is 
not there--to something (the field of interpenetrating sensa) 
that is not something (nothing determinate at all)? There 
seems to be nothing to attend to. Collingwood would say that 
there is something there, only not something definite, and 
that once selective attention has done its job, it can find 
the distinctions that it put there. But the retort occurs 
immediately: put where? To distinguish even left and right 
sides of a sensory field involves a distinction, which in 
turn presupposes spatial distinctions with respect to one's 
own body within the sensory field. Are these "put" there as 
well? 
In Collingwood's case the issue is further complica-
ted by the addition of intensity-distinctions and even a mini-
mal qualitative distinction, as well as a focal and penumbral 
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structure to the here-and-now field of sensation (which must 
also be a "there-and-then" if the focal-penumbral analogy is 
to be carried out). All of this adds up to a field of feel-
ing that is not altogether indeterminate. But supposing that 
we can ignore the contradiction of a field that is determin-
ately indeterminate, a here-and-now that is also a there-and-
then, etc. we still wish to know how what remains of indeter-
minacy if such a field is disambiguated. On this Collingwood 
leaves the reader in no doubt: disambiguation of the field of 
feeling is the work and product of thought which, by a practi-
cal activity called language, functions as selective attention. 
Unfortunately this activity is also not free of am-
biguity, because "language" is not merely the practical side 
of second-order thought, as some passages in The New Leviathan 
would lead us to believe (e.g. NL, 4.33). It necessarily and 
essentially involves a theoretical aspect--the element not 
only of producing sounds or gestures or expressions, but of 
meaning something by them, where the meaning is an act of 
theoretical consciousness (NL, 6.18-6.19). But this descrip-
tion of language as discourse must be taken as the narrower 
sense of the term, "language," which does not include psychi-
cal expressions (grimaces, blushes, tears, etc.) because the 
latter do not include thought at all, and hence not theoreti-
cal consciousness and not meaning. How then does one import 
meaning into the psychical level of sensation and the chaotic 
world of sensa? 
415 
The disambiguation we are especially interested in is 
that of the much discussed red patch. If the edges of such a 
patch (and the color itself as distinct from its background) 
are made by an act of selective attention which is linguistic 
in the sense just stated (i.e. including the non-vocal act of 
meaning, where meaning is an act of theoretical consciousness), 
then for a portion of the field of feeling to be not only pre-
sent as a "this" but as an interpreted presence, "this red," 
and an interpreted presence related to other such items in a 
field of feeling, a "this red patch in a green field," it must 
be related to theoretical consciousness through meaning. But 
once again the inevitable question arises, is this found in 
the sensory field or is it put there? On Collingwood's ear-
lier account of the matter it is still possible to say, "both 
found and put"--leaving the details to behaviorism shored up 
by the analysis of consciousness. But in The New Leviathan 
the disambiguation of feeling by the elliciting of meaning ap-
pears to be impossible, since one is forbidden to make any 
generalizations about feeling. There seems to be no way to 
bridge the gap between meaning as an act of theoretical con-
sciousness, and utterly ambiguous sensa. 
7. Conclusion. 
The only way out of these dilemmas is to return to 
the position of The Principles of Art, where such intemperate 
assertions are not made, and where there is still a possibil-
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ity for a "science of feeling" to establish what a "science 
of mind" cannot--i.e. the manner in which objects extrinsic 
to our sense organs can act on them to yield information about 
the natural world. This does not mean that we must ignore The 
~Leviathan altogether: in the summary with which we shall 
conclude this chapter we attempt to retain from it those ele-
ments of the philosophy of mind which are consistent and com-
patible with the groundwork laid out in The Principles of Art. 
In the matter of language, for example, the later work shows 
a distinct improvement (as we shall see in the next chapter). 
But how does it finally stand with Collingwood's view 
of the knower-known relationship insofar as the principal doc-
trine of realism is concerned? Our final conclusion must be 
somewhat disappointing. It is not a matter of faulting Col-
lingwood for failing to be idealist enough to recognize that 
reality somehow exists "for us" and not merely "for itself;" 
or for not being realist enough to recognize that there is a 
world of objects unaffected by our knowing of them (or, as 
some would have it, that the natural language we use to ex-
press our thoughts is of necessity a physical-object language). 
It is a matter of faulting Collingwood for failing to be Col-
lingwood enough, for failing to recognize that the "Law of 
Primitive Survivals"40 does not apply only to higher-order 
40 
"(A)nother principle that I have assumed throughout 
• · . ((is)) the LAW OF PRIMITIVE SURVIVALS. It runs as fol-
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mental functions, but (by the logic of the overlap of classes) 
operates even at the level of sensation, or that no matter how 
far one goes down the "scale of forms" one never reaches a 
zero-point in the scale (EPM, 31 ff., 81-82). These general 
principles alone should have led him to recognize that some-
thing is given in sensation other than a riotous chaos of in-
terpenetrating and utterly ambiguous sensa; that sensation, al-
though the activity of a not utterly passive agent, is nonethe-
less the working-up and further organization of elements con-
tinuous with the world of nature and of nature's energies, and 
not something utterly created by the agent and imposed as a 
form on a passive and indeterminate matter. 
Why Collingwood failed to describe adequately sensa-
tion could only be settled by appeal to evidence which we do 
not yet have. Perhaps from the body of his unpublished man-
uscripts a theory of perception may yet emerge that can pull 
together the paradoxes that are left unresolved in his pub-
lished philosophy. But we must notice that the failure is due 
to the espousal not of realism, but of something more akin to 
the radical idealism as we prepositionally formulated it at 
the beginning of this chapter. We therefore cannot rest con-
lows. When A is modified into B there survives in any example 
of B, side by side with the function B which is the modified 
form of A, an element of A in its primitive or unmodified 
state" (NL, 9.5-9.51). We recognize this to be the law of di-
a~ectical relationship present in Collingwood's writings ever 
S1nce Religion and Philosophy, but obviously not always fol-
lowed. 
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tent with any interpretation that asserts that the dogmatism 
of Collingwood's later philosophy was a reversion to the real-
ism of his youth. On the contrary, it was a reversion to, and 
ultimately the dogmatic assertion of, his youthful idealism. 
The application of the "Fallacy of Misplaced Argument" to rule 
out controversy concerning sensation is as much an expression 
of this dogmatism as is the removal of absolute presuppositions 
from the criteria of truth and falsity in the Essay on Meta-
physics. But the case of sensation presents the interpreter 
with examples of overstatement that tend to stress the contri-
bution to knowledge made by the knower, rather than one that 
stresses the contribution of the object. Therefore as we al-
ready noted, to this extent the autobiographical interpreta-
tion is vindicated. 
Collingwood's position of the relationship of knower 
and known was from beginning to end one which is developed in 
direct opposition to what he understood to be the fundamental 
tenet of realism. He never succeeded in utterly freeing him-
self from this preoccupation with the errors of realism, and 
it was perhaps this preoccupation that ultimately drove him to 
overstatement. It may be unfortunate that overstatements were 
made at all, but it is at least consistent with the overall 
interpretation offered in the Autobiography. 
We end this chapter with a final summary of Colling-
wood's core philosophy of mind. 
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TABLE 8 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
1. The field of human experience consists of two kinds of ex-
perience, feeling and thinking. (PA, 157). 
a. Feeling is the here-and-now presence of a field of 
successive sensa, each with its emotional charge. Re-
lative to thought, feeling is simple, private, evane-
scent, perpetually in flux, and appears to arise in us 
independently of our willing it. Feeling exists at 
the psychical level, is rooted in our physiological 
processes, and is (in some sense) the foundation upon 
which the superstructure of thought is erected. The 
study of feeling is the proper domain of behavioral 
psychology. (PA, 157-64, 205). 
b. Thought is the deliberate act (or achievement) of an 
agent, and can succeed or fail. Relative to feeling, 
thought is bipolarly complex, public, capable of gen-
uine recurrence and contradiction, and is somehow con-
sequent on feeling. It exists at the mental level, 
and is not subject to empirical investigative methods 
alone, but is rather the· object of criteriological 
sciences. All thought presupposes feeling. (PA, 157-
60, 164-66, 221). 
c. A science of mind proceeds by means of inquiry into 
consciousness, or by putting questions to conscious-
ness and answering them with data provided by con-
sciousness itself. From the point of view of a sci-
ence of mind, feeling is an apanage of mind (something 
it has), but a constituent of experience (something it 
is); thought is the only constituent of mind, but it 
is also a constituent of human experience. (PA, 205-
06; NL, 1.61, 4.14-4.2; IH, 291-94). 
2. Feeling has a double character, sensation and emotion, uni-
ted in any given experience, but distinguishable by acts 
of attention. (PA, 160-62; NL, 4.1). 
a. Sensation is the activity of seeing, hearing, tasting, 
etc. something; and what is sensed in these acts are 
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sensa: colors, sounds, tastes, etc. Sensation is 
prior to emotion as capable of being attended to apart 
from emotion, but not temporally, logically, or caus-
ally prior. A sensum can be "sterilized" by ignoring 
its emotional charge. (PA, 160-62). · 
b. Emotion is the "charge" accompanying a sensum. Rela-
tive to sensation, emotion is secondary, or capable of 
being "stripped off" a sensum and ignored. It is like-
ly that emotion is present in all experience, and ex-
ists in modified state up to the level of intellect. 
(PA, 160-62, 169-70, 221, 294). 
c. All thought presupposes feeling; and thought alters 
feeling, which becomes by successive development due 
to thought, imagination, appetite, passion, desire, 
etc. by acts of practical thinking. (PA, 230-34; NL, 
7.1-7.24, 9.55, 11.1-11.24). 
3. Thought is distinguished as primary and secondary, on the 
basis of what is being thought about, or as practical or 
theoretical depending on what it affects. (PA, 164-68; 
NL, 1.63-1.68, 10.51). 
a. 1st order thought (or empirical thinking) is concerned 
exclusively with feeling, relations between sensa, be-
tween sensa and sensation, between sensation and emo-
tion, etc. (PA, 164-66; cf. NL, 4.31). 
b. 2nd order thought (or intellect) is concerned with 
other acts of thought; it is thought about thought. 
Its acts may be abstract, analytical, conceptual, pro-
positional, rational, etc. (PA, 166-68, 253-54; NL, 
6.58-6.59). 
c. Practical thought is making up one's mind to (do some-
thing to oneself or to one's environment). Thought 
is primarily and always practical, because it always 
has an effect on oneself or on one's environment. 
(NL, 1.65-1.68, 7.22, 9.35, 14.3; PA, 289; IH, 310-12). 
d. Theoretical thought is making up one's mind that (such 
and such is the case, or is not the case, or would be 
the case if ... , etc.). (NL, 1.64-1.67, 14.3, 
14.35; PA--, 253, 289; IH, 310-12). 
4. Attention (or awareness or consciousness) is the absolute-
ly fundamental act of thought which stabilizes and perpe-
tuates feeling-acts long enough that they may enter into 
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relations with other feelings and with thought. Atten-
tion is the act of appreciating something present as a 
concrete individual, just as it stands, before analyzing 
it. (PA, 203-04). 
a. 
b. 
1st order attention is an act of first order thought; 
it divides the field of feeling into focal and pen-
umbral regions, perpetuates and domesticates feelings 
--i.e. stabilizing feelings and asserting ourselves 
as the owners of these feelings and able to dominate 
them. It is therefore the free act of an agent, an 
act free in a sense intermediate between the freedom 
of sensation (the freedom to respond in several ways 
to a stimulus) and the freedom of intellect (the true 
freedom of choice of alternative plans or courses of 
action). (PA, 203-08, 215-22). 
2nd order attention is an act of 2nd order thought; 
it is the practical act which isolates and identifies 
a re-presented imaginatum by naming it, or by perform-
ing a linguistic act of meaningful expression. As a 
2nd order act of thought, attention is abstractive or 
conceptual. (NL, 4.3-4.68, 6.2-6.36; IH, 242, 291). 
5. Imagination is feeling altered by consciousness--feeling 
as selected, perpetuated, and domesticated by attention. 
Imagination is another name for consciousness, awareness, 
or attention, but it is distinguished as the result of at-
tention or the result of the conversion of a sensum unin-
terpreted into one ready for interpretation or into one 
interpreted by an act of 2nd order thought. It is an a 
priori function of thought which operates at the level-of 
1st order thought as perception, and at higher levels as 
artistic interpretation, scientific hypothesis formation, 
and historical reconstruction (PA, 209-15; IH, 242, 291). 
6. There are therefore three stages logically distinguishable 
in the life of a feeling: 
a. Bare feeling is something given in sensation, and if 
unattended to, is carried away in the flux of feeling. 
Its being is its presence to sensation, and it is re-
lated to thought as an uninterpreted sensum. 
b. Conscious feeling (or feeling as the object of first-
order attention or of simple consciousness) is feeling 
perpetuated and dominated by consciousness or imagina-
tion. Its being is its re-presentation to conscious-
ness, and it is related to thought as a sensum ready 
for interpretation. 
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c. Related feeling (or feeling as the object of second-
order attention, or of consciousness proper) is feel-
ing placed in its relation to other feelings, some-
thing constructed or apprehended inferentially ·by the 
work of intellect. Its being is relational, and it 
is related to thought as an interpreted sensum. (PA, 
213-14). 
d. "Sense datum" refers equivocally to all or any of 
these above three, but it is properly speaking only 
(c), related feeling. (PA, 169-70). 
7. The expression of feeling is a bodily act (a practical 
act) having levels which correspond to the stages in the 
life of a feeling). 
a. Psychical expression is the involuntary muscular and 
glandular register of feeling, as wild and disorgan-
ized as these feelings themselves. (PA, 228-34, 266; 
NL, 6. 58). 
b. Imaginative expression or language in the broad sense 
is the activity of discourse, or of meaning something 
(a) by something else (b), where meaning (a) is an act 
of theoretical consciousness, and (b) is a practical 
activity, the production in oneself or others of a 
physical vehicle for that meaning. At its lowest le-
vel language is simple naming; this is the level of 
conceptual thought. (NL, 6.2-6.28). 
c. Intellectual expression is language at the level of 
propositional or analytic thought and all levels be-
yond this (e.g. rational thought). It is thought ex-
pressed as questions, propositions, inferences, rea-
sons why, etc. (NL, 6.1-6.29, 6.57-6.59; PA, 221, 224-
54). 
CHAPTER VIII 
LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND MENTAL ACTS 
1. Introduction. 
In Chapter I we found that one of the major controver-
sies concerning Collingwood's philosophy, as assessed by his 
interpreters, is his contention in the Essay on Metaphysics 
that metaphysics is an historical science --i.e. that the pro-
per occupation of the metaphysician is to detect the presup-
positions being made by the scientists of a certain era. The 
presuppositions, insofar as they are absolute (that is, not 
themselves answers to questions but standing as presupposi-
tions to all questions in a systematic inquiry), are neither 
true nor false, and in discovering them the metaphysician acts 
as an historian. His job is not to pass judgment on the truth 
or falsity of these absolute presuppositions, but merely to 
detect and report them. Since the entire controversy concern-
ing the historical character of metaphysics turns on the role 
of absolute presuppositions, and since the theory of presuppo-
sitions is part of Collingwood's question-and-answer (Q-A) 
logic, we concluded that Q-A logic is itself one of the major 
concerns in the interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy. 
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In Chapter III we found that according to the Auto-
biograEhy, Collingwood's attack on the methods of the realists 
entailed, for him, the rejection of propositional logic (F-
logic) as an index for correct thinking, since it posited truth 
as a property of propositions. In direct opposition to this 
Collingwood proposed an alternative in the form of a Q-A logic, 
in which truth is taken as a property of propositions only as 
answers to questions. By reflecting on the sort of thinking 
he was accustomed to doing in his own historical work, Colling-
wood found that if one includes in this thought process the pre-
suppositions on which questions are formulated and from which 
they arise, then the presupposition-question-answer (P-Q-A) 
complex is not only the unit of truth and falsity in systema-
tic inquiry but also the index of meaning and validity. The 
Q-A logic that he developed from these reflections was formu-
lated, he felt, in direct opposition to the false methods of 
the realistic philosophers, who ignored the necessity of re-
constructing the concrete question for the propositional an-
swer they were abstractly criticizing--an extension of their 
ignorance of historical matters. He went as far as to write 
up his Q-A logic and offer it to a publisher, but it was turned 
down, and he subsequently des·troyed the only manuscript of it. 
In Part II we found that in his early philosophy Col-
lingwood does indeed criticize the formal logic of dogmatic 
realism, and in SEeculum Mentis he does argue that truth is a 
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function of Q-A complexes. But we also found that in his ear-
liest publication, Religion and Philosophy, there is no mention 
of a Q-A logic as such, but there is a good deal of discussion 
about dialectic and dialectical relations. In Speculum Mentis 
dialectical relations are even expanded into a logical schema, 
so that the truth embodied in a system of thought which shows 
development is described as dialectical in form, and dialectic 
is contrasted with formal logic as the logic of the concrete 
and abstract universal respectively. Since there was some evi-
dence that led us to suppose that formal logic was held to be 
of limited validity in its function as the justification of 
the consistency of scientific conclusions, we suggested that 
although there is no mention of the fact in the Autobiography, 
the early writings show evidence that when Collingwood dis-
cusses "logic" we may be dealing not with one sort of logic 
but with at least three: (1) Q-A logic (discussed in Specu-
lum Mentis, partially described in the Autobiography, and re-
appearing in semi-formal attire in the Essay on Metaphysics); 
(2) F-logic (the formal logic in the tradition stemming from 
Aristotle--described and criticized in Speculum Mentis, called 
"propositional logic" in the Autobiography and ascribed to the 
realists, and discernible as _the logic employed by "exact and 
empirical sciences" in the Essay on Philosophical Method); and 
(3) D-logic (the dialectical logic present in germ form even 
in his earliest work, Religion and Philosophy; described, ex-
eroplified, and exalted in Speculum Mentis; but mysteriously 
unmentioned in his Autobiography). 
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Our task in this chapter is minimally to examine the 
evi~ence provided by his later writings to test whether or not 
he remained true to his autobiographical assertions concern-
ing his "revolutionary" logic. Since the most notorious and 
explicit formulation of this Q-A logic is in the fourth chap-
ter of the Essay on Metaphysics, it is clear that we shall 
have to examine this chapter in some detail. But since our 
examination of his early writings raises questions about the 
relationship between Q-A logic and D-logic, and of both of 
these to F-logic (questions not even hinted at in the Auto-
biography) we shall have to expand our discussion to include 
these topics as well. Since the Essay on Philosophical Method 
describes the sort of logical relations he had in his earlier 
works called "dialectical," it is clear we shall have to ex-
amine the major doctrines of this important work as our pri-
mary source for what Collingwood understood by what we are 
calling D-logic. And finally we find that the only locus of 
discussion of F-logic and logical relations in the later writ-
ings is in connection with language and the higher-order func-
tions of mental activity in The Principles of Art and The New 
Leviathan. This necessitates picking up the discussion of 
Collingwood's philosophy of mind where we left it in Chapter 
VII--viz. with the analysis of the functions of intellect. 
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Our strategy is therefore as straight-forward as it 
was in the last ·chapter. We propose to take up these topics 
in the order in which we have just reviewed them. In each 
case we shall first present a brief summary of the major the-
ses of the texts we are considering, in tabular form. This 
will be followed by a critical discussion of issues relevant 
to the topics of this chapter. In the concluding section we 
shall attempt to pull the strands of the discussion together 
in a final evaluation of what we can reconstruct of Colling-
wood's thought on the subject of logic. 
2. Questions, Answers, and Presuppositions. 
In Chapter IV, where we discussed the form of experi-
ence that Collingwood called "science" in Speculum Mentis (i.e. 
the form of experience that habitually takes its object to be 
an instance of an abstract universal), we noticed that Q-A 
logic was left in an incomplete state, inasmuch as the rela-
tionship of questions to presuppositions was not made explicit. 
This incomplete analysis led to the further difficulty of an 
equivocation in the use of the term "hypothesis" as he used 
it in his description of scientific thinking. This equivo-
cation in turn rendered ambiguous his discussion of the 
hypothetical-categorical distinction on which he based his 
judgment of the superiority of history over science. We shall 
have more to say in the next section on the issue of categori-
428 
cal and hypothetical judgments, but at this point we must make 
good our promise from Chapter IV to clear up the ambiguity 
about questions and hypotheses. 
That ambiguity rested on the description of questions 
and hypotheses as "non-assertions," the equivocation being 
that questions are not merely non-assertions but proto-
assertions or non-assertions which seek completion in asser-
tion. Sentential or propositional fragments are also non-
assertions, but they are not therefore either questions or 
hypotheses. Since we shall in all likelihood never know what 
the contents of his early unpublished work, "Truth and Con-
tradiction," had to say on the subject of Q-A logic, we are 
left to the surviving fragments of that doctrine in his pub-
lished writings as the only evidence we have for reconstruct-
ing his thought on the matter. On the evidence of Speculum 
Mentis we can safely assume that as of 1924 he was not employ-
ing the distinctions necessary to disentangle questions from 
hypotheses. We can also state that on the evidence of The 
Idea of Nature the distinction is being clearly utilized in his 
lectures of 1934 (cf. IN, v, 29-30). So on the evidence of 
these two works alone it appears that he had worked out the 
requisite distinctions sometime between 1924 and 1934. 1 
1Knox found it incredible that Collingwood had devel-
oped his position on Q-A logic and presuppositions prior to 
1932, and on this ground alone he felt justified in rejecting 
the autobiographical interpretation (IH, x-xi). But as we 
have already observed, there is no such direct assertion in 
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But the date on which he actually worked out the ne-
cessary distinctions is not as relevant to our discussion as 
the fact that he ultimately did work it out to his own satis-
faction, and that we have an indication of his basic ideas on 
the subject from the fourth chapter of the Essay on Metaphy-
sics. Since the summary is given there in semi-formal outline 
-
already, we shall here merely summarize it in tabular form, 
interspersing his own notes and comments between the various 
definitions and propositions. (His "notes" were numbered; his 
comments were not.) 
the Autobiography, and even if there were it is hardly grounds 
for rejecting the autobiographical interpretation without suf-
ficient evidence to the contrary. We have already stated that 
we do not accept Knox's authority in his claim to have had ac-
cess to such unambiguous and unqualified evidence in Colling-
wood's unpublished manuscripts, since to do so would be guilty 
of uncritical historiography. 
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TABLE 9 
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER LOGIC IN THE ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS: Q-AM 
proposition 1. 
Comment 1. 
Comment 2. 
Note 1. 
Every statement that anybody ever makes is 
made in answer to a question. (EM, 23). 
Statements and questions may be made to some-
one else or to oneself (EM, 24). 
In proportion as a person thinks scientifi-
cally heknawsthat his statements are answers 
to questions. 
A question is logically prior to its own 
answer. 
Comment 3. A question is also temporally prior if think-
ing is scientific, but the temporal priority 
is such that the question does not cease to 
be a question when the answer begins, but con-
tinues for the whole duration. 
Comment 4. An answered question does not cease being a 
question; it only ceases being an unanswered 
question .. (EM, 24). 
Definition 1. Let that which is stated (i.e. that which can 
be true or false) be called a proposition, and 
let stating it be called propounding it (EM, 25). 
Note 2. The use of the word "proposition" is exclusive-
ly limited to that which is stated, and "pro-
pounding" only for proposition. This is not 
ordinary usage, which would allow also that a 
supposition or question be propounded as well. 
Proposition 2. Every question involves a presupposition. 
Comment 5. Any given question directly or immediately in-
volves only one presupposition, that being the 
presupposition from which it arises. Indirectly 
it may involve more than one. (EM, 25). 
Comment 6. The answer to any question presupposes whatever 
the question presupposes (EM, 63). 
Definition 2. 
Comment 7. 
Definition 3. 
Definition 4. 
Comment 8. 
Comment 9. 
To say that a question "does not arise" is 
the ordinary English way of saying that it 
involves a presupposition which is not in 
fact being made (EM, 26). 
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One can make presuppositions without knowing 
it, or without knowing what presupposition 
one is making ((cf. comments 2 and 5)). 
The fact that something causes a certain 
question to arise I call the "logical effi-
cacy" of that thing (EM, 27). 
To assume is to suppose by an act of free 
choice. 
All assumptions are suppositions, but not 
all suppositions are assumptions.l 
Some suppositions are made without being 
aware that they are made, or without being 
aware that others might possibly be made. 
(EM, 27). 
Proposition 3. The logical efficacy of a supposition does 
not depend upon the truth of what is sup-
posed, or even on its being thought true, but 
only on its being supposed (EM, 28). 
Comment 10. In scientific thinking it is possible and 
often profitable to argue from suppositions 
which we know to be false, believe to be 
false, or neither know nor believe to be 
false or true (EM, 28). 
Proposition 4. A presupposition is either relative or abso-
lute (EM, 29). 
1
collingwood does not further define "assumption" and 
"~upposition," but from his remarks it appears that "supposi-
t~ons" are presuppositions (and may therefore be either abso-
lute or relative), and that "assumptions" are presuppositions 
of which we are conscious. Since we are not always conscious 
of our presuppositions (Definition 4 and Comment 9), it follows 
that not all suppositions are assumptions. 
Definition 
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5. By a relative presupposition I mean one which 
stands relatively to one question as its pre-
supposition, and relatively to another ques-
tion as its answer (EM, 29). · 
comment 11. To question a presupposition is to demand that 
it should be verified; that is, to demand that 
a question should be asked to which the affir-
mative answer would be that presupposition it-
self, now in the form of a proposition. Hence 
to speak of verifying a presupposition involves 
supposing that it is a relative presupposition 
(EM, 30). 
Definition 6. An absolute presupposition is one which stands, 
relatively to all questions to which it is re-
lated, as a presupposition, never as an answer 
(EM, 31). 
Comment 12. Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable 
(EM, 32) . 
Comment 13. The use of absolute presuppositions in science 
is their logical efficacy; it does not depend 
on their being true or false, but only on their 
being supposed. 
Proposition 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions. 
Comment 14. That is because they are never answers to 
questions. 
Comment 15. The distinction between truth and falsehood 
does not apply to absolute presuppositions 
at all, that distinction being peculiar to 
propositions (EM, 32). 
Comment 16. Any question involving the presupposition 
that an absolute presupposition is a proposi-
tion is a nonsense question. This includes 
such questions as "Is it true?" or "What 
evidence is there that it is true?" (EM, 33). 
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Now even though, incredibly enough, Collingwood does 
not here define the terms "questions," and "presupposition," 
and although the term "hypothesis" does not appear in this 
outline, it is nonetheless clear that since an hypothesis is 
a supposition consciously made within a given inquiry, 2 we 
may take it that an hypothesis is what Collingwood is calling 
an assumption. With the distinction between questions and 
assumptions made explicit, the ambiguity from Speculum Mentis 
concerning questions and hypotheses as non-assertions dis-
appears. 
But we are also confronted with a new problem insofar 
as there are several noteworthy differences between the two 
versions of Q-A logic, i.e. that offered by the Autobiography 
and by the Essay on Metaphysics (which we shall hereafter re-
fer to as Q-AA and Q-AM respectively). (1) We notice that 
Q-AA stressed the fact that Q-A logic differed from proposi-
tional logic inasmuch as it took the Q-A complex as the unit 
of meaning, truth, and validity, rather than recognizing these 
to be properties of propositions as such (see above, Table 3 
nos. 2, 3, and 4). In Table 9 we notice there is no mention 
of meaning or validity, and truth or falsity is taken as the 
defining characteristic of propositions as such (Def. 1). 
. 
2
we assume that from the point of view of scientific 
lnquiry the notion of an unconscious hypothesis would not be 
acceptable, since one could never know when the conditions 
for a satisfactory demonstration of it were fulfilled. Cf. 
Table 9 , Comment 2. 
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(Z) The strict Q-A correlativity of Q-AA is here universal-
ized and stated in terms of persons (Proposition 1). (3) In 
connection with the function of presuppostions in "raising" 
questions, which is never defined in Q-AA, Collingwood here 
introduces the notion of "logical efficacy," or the property 
of "something" (e.g. suppositions) which "causes" questions 
to arise (Definition 3, Proposition 3). 
At first these differences seem innocuous enough. The 
first falls back on the ancient tradition dating back to Plato, 
that the minimal unit of truth or falsity is the proposition 
or declarative sentence. The second states the Q-AA require-
ment of correlativity in terms of persons engaged in acts of 
questioning and answering. And the third specifies the prior-
ity relationship of presuppositions to questions and answers. 
The omission of the requirement that meaning and validity hold 
only for Q-A complexes and not for propositions by themselves 
might also be written off as a mere oversight of Q-AM. But 
hones~requires us to admit that there are actually major 
problems involved in these differences between Q-AA and Q-AM, 
problems noticed (and sometimes exploited) by many of Colling-
wood's interpreters. For if truth or falsity is proper to 
propositions as such, how are we to understand the related 
truth-value of questions and presuppositions, not to mention 
the Q-AA assertion that truth and falsity do not belong to 
propositions as such? And if Q-A correlativity is defined in 
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terms of persons, how ~an Q-A logic escape the charge of psy-
chologism, which is offensive to logicians precisely because 
it is necessarily rooted in the subjective processes of con-
sciousness? And how can one decide which presupposition 
"causes" a question to arise within such subjective states of 
consciousness? 
Since these difficulties all turn in one way or another 
on the Q-AA assertion of the priority of the Q-A complex over 
the proposition as the unit of meaning, truth, and validity, 
a priority inadvertantly called into question by Q-AM' we shall 
examine each of these logical functions in turn. If the Q-AA 
claim cannot be upheld, we shall have to ask whether Q-AM is 
sufficient correction of his earlier view to sustain the Q-AA 
claim for Q-A logic as an alternative to traditional F~logic. 
(1) Let us examine first the claim of the Autobiog-
raphy for a Q-A meaning-priority over the meaning of a propo-
sition as such. In Q-AA Collingwood insisted that (a) in or-
der to find out what a proposition means the question to which 
the proposition is an answer must be known; and also (b) since 
each answer is to a certain specific question in the systema-
tic inquiry, it is possible using the same piece of evidence 
(presumably the textual assertion) to argue back from a propo-
sitional answer to its question (see Table 3, nos. 4 a-d, 
6 a-b). But these two requirements seem impossible to fulfill, 
since it is difficult to see how one can ever know to which 
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question an answer belongs, and hence which presupposition-
question (P-Q) complex is specifically prior to it, unless one 
had independent and prior knowledge of the meaning of the pro-
positional answer (cf. Mink, MHD, 128). Supposing the asser-
tion is "Eric is going to Elgin"; how is one to decide whether 
this assertion belongs to the question, "Where is Eric going?" 
or to the question "Is the moon more or less than 106 kilo-
meters distant from the earth?" Without knowing that the 
proposition about Eric has no evident meaning-correlation 
with a question concerning the distance between planetary 
bodies, the answer appears unassignable to one question or 
P-Q complex rather than another. 
Collingwood might well reply that the Q-A complex we 
are discussing is an absurd example, because it does not meet 
the requirements (a) that they belong to the same systematic 
inquiry, and (b) that a question must be relevant to that in-
quiry. Therefore a question cannot be fished out of a "hy-
peruranean lucky bag" and stuck together with an utterly un-
related question. But absurdity is what we use as an index 
for the passage into incoherence, and we wish to know how Col-
lingwood's Q-A logic prevents us from such a lapse. On his 
grounds such a lapse appears not only possible but inevitable, 
since we do not have any criteria for deciding what consti-
tues "sameness of inquiry." But even laying aside this im-
portant omission, if we take the case of a recognizably syste-
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matic inquiry (and in so doing tacitly import requirements 
not specified by Collingwood), similar objections arise. 
supposing the inquiry is legal, and we are trying to find out 
what the question was that is Q-A related, to an assertion--
a slip of paper bearing the words, "Eric is going to Elgin." 
Is this the answer to the question, "Where is Eric going?" or 
"Who is going to Elgin?" or "Is anyone going to Elgin?" It 
appears that in even a fairly simple case with directly re-
lated questions and answers, an answer may retain its meaning 
while being Q-A related in several Q-A complexes. In short, 
it appears that the meaning of a proposition may be Q-A com-
plex independent. 
Obviously one of the other of the two Q-AA require-
ments must be abandoned, and since we wish to retain the no-
tion of a systematic inquiry for Q-AM, but not necessarily 
the meaning-requirement, it may be necessary to drop the lat-
ter and declare Q-AM to be an improved revision. If we 
adopted this conclusion we evade the viciously circular ar-
gument that "we cannot know what a statement means unless we 
know what question it answers, but we cannot decide which 
question it answers unless we know what it means" (Mink, MHD, 
128). But we do not yet know if there is some special sense 
of the highly ambiguous term, "meaning" which Collingwood 
may have in mind, and which may escape such objections as 
these. 
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(2) But there is a second logical function attributed 
to the Q-A complex in the Q-AA version, but not appearipg in 
Q-AM--i.e. validity. According to the Autobiography, "no two 
propositions can agree with or be contradictory to one another 
unless they are answers to the same question" (Table 3, 3). 
Again, even setting aside the issue of how one establishes 
which question corresponds to a given answer, it appears to 
fail to meet objections on the grounds of fairly straight-
forward examples. In our example from the previous section 
the contradictory of "Eric is going to Elgin" would be, on 
propositional grounds alone, "Eric is not going to Elgin," 
and it is capable of being constructed without any reference 
to a common question, whatever that might be. What is worse, 
we can say that these propositions are contradictory even 
though they may be answers to different and even opposing 
questions: the first may be an answer to "Is Eric going to 
Elgin?" and the latter to "Is Eric not going to Elgin?" They 
are obviously not the same question, yet they are contradic-
tory answers (cf. Krausz, CEPC, 225). Furthermore, as we saw 
in the example from the previous section, one and the same 
answer may be the answer to several different questions, with-
out losing its identity, i.e. its agreement with itself. It 
would appear, therefore, that validity and such validity re-
lations as agreement or contradiction are also Q-A context 
independent. 
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With this line of argument Collingwood would be even 
less tolerant then the former. The sense of sameness he is 
talking about, he would reply, is not that of an abstract 
class or universal, or even of propositions constructed on 
these grounds. "Sameness of question" is determined on the 
basis of sameness of an historical process, the process of a 
concrete inquiry, where the researcher holds before his mind 
a question the central meaning of which is continually being 
modified in the light of new data or partial answers to it 
(cf. Table 3, 3 a-b). 
Since this reply borders on the relationship of Q-A 
and D-logic, we shall have to postpone a more satisfactory 
consideration of it until we have had a chance to examine the 
latter more closely (which we shall do in the next section). 
But we may note here that it still fails to meet the objec-
tion. From the point of view of the F-logic that Q-A logic 
is supposed to replace, it j_s inadequate: F-logic makes the 
claim that in the case of certain propositions it is possible 
to decide on their validity on structural or syntactic 
grounds alone, i.e. on the placement and grouping of their 
logical constants, irrespective of its location in a Q-A com-
plex or of the specific meaning of its terms. The assertion, 
"Eric is going to Elgin and it is not the case that Eric is 
going to Elgin" is invalid on formal grounds alone, because 
there is a self-contradiction involved in the statement. Such 
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a self-contradiction would even render a question invalid, in-
sofar as questions of the form, "What is the A such that A 
and not-A?" can have no valid answer for any possible substi-
tution for A in the question. And if Collingwood were to 
point out that this is what he meant when he said that a ques-
tion is "right" if it enables the inquiry to proceed (Table 3 
4 c), we should have to reply that a contradictory answer 
stops the inquiry from proceeding not because it is the 
"wrong" answer but because it is self-contradictory, which it 
would be no matter which Q-A complex it appeared in. 
Perhaps we are flogging a dead horse, insofar as there 
is no mention of contradiction or validity relations in Q-AM. 
But then what sort of logical relations are there between pro-
positions, questions, and presuppositions? We shall take this 
up again when we examine the consistency claims for Q-A logic. 
However, we have one further logical function of Q-A com-
plexes to attend to, one which appears in both Q-AA and Q-AM. 
(3) Although Collingwood states in Q-AM that the 
proposition is that which can be true or false (Table 9, De-
finition 1), he also states that every proposition is an an-
swer to a question (Table 9, Proposition 1), so that it ap-
pears that he wishes to retain the Q-AA requirement of strict 
Q-A correlativity with respect to truth claims (Table 3, 4). 
While it is true that Q-AM does not explicitly state that the 
presence of a question (with or without its presupposition) is 
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a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of proposi-
tional answer in a P-Q-A complex, this was clearly his ~nten­
tion in Q-AA' so we wish to examine the sense in which a pro-
position is dependent for its truth on the P-Q complex antece-
dant to it. Now in both Q-AA and Q-AM Collingwood specifi-
cally states that the presupposition of a Q-A complex need not 
be true, but only supposed; and he never suggests that ques-
tions by themselves have any assignable truth value aside from 
their answers or presuppositions, so that it is not unreason-
able to assume that questions are neutral with respect to 
truth or falsity. But then if both questions and presupposi-
tions need not have any assignable truth value, from whence 
comes the truth or falsity of the answer? 
Collingwood would no doubt reply that he never said 
that an answer is deducible from a question and its presupposi-
tion; in fact he would say that its not being deducible is 
essential to the relationship of presupposition. If there 
were no need for inquiry, then there would be no need for pre-
suppositions, since questions would not "arise" and proposi-
tions could simply be deduced from one another as in a purely 
formal system. Collingwood is speaking of the sort of in-
quiry which is not closed or complete with respect to proposi-
tions and their relations. He is discussing on-going inquir-
ies in which discoveries are being made, real questions are 
arising, answers are being verified in ways appropriate to the 
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systematic inquiry at hand, and assumptions are being called 
for as an aid to deciding alternative answers to questions. 
But then the truth value of a propositional answer is 
being decided by verificational processes outside the Q-A com-
plex itself, and we are faced with the alternative of adding 
a further requirement to the truth claim for the Q-A complex 
(i.e. that a Q-A complex is true or false only if the answer 
is verifiable or falsifiable), or dropping the claim alto-
gether (i.e. that the truth or falsity of a proposition is 
dependent on its being an element in a Q-A or P-Q-A complex). 
But in either case it appears that truth is something that is 
Q-A complex independent. In our previous example, if "Eric 
is going to Elgin" is true only if Eric is indeed going to 
Elgin and false if he is not, this appears to be the case whe-
ther or not "Eric is going to Elgin" belongs to the question, 
"Where is Eric going?" or "Who is going to Elgin?" Unless 
Collingwood has some special sense in mind for the term 
"truth," we are forced to admit that even this requirement 
fails to hold for even a simple example. 
But perhaps we have disproven too much. There is cer-
tainly some sort of logical connection between a proposition 
and its presupposition, and there is also a logical relation 
between a question and its presupposition. And we can say 
that a proposition that is a valid answer to a question pre-
supposes whatever the question presupposes, so that there is 
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some sense in which answer, question, and presupposition form 
a logical complex. But it appears that in attempting to sort 
out the logical relations of the terms of this complex Colling-
wood conflated a number of distinct characteristics of linguis-
tic entities--viz. meaning, truth, and validity--and then as-
signed them all to the Q-A complex. But (1) meaning is a lin-
guistic function that applies minimally to terms (individual 
words, or phrases and propositions regarded precisely as terms, 
and capable of being used as the subject of an assertion--e.g. 
of the form, "A means B"); (2) truth is a function minimally 
applicable to propositions (whatever says something (a predi-
cate) about something else (a subject)); and (3) validity is 
a function of complexes of propositions bound together by log-
ical connectives. On the face of it, it appears unlikely that 
anything like a Q-A or P-Q-A complex can satisfy logically ap-
propriate conditions for being the minimal unit for all three 
of these functions. 
However it also seems unlikely that an Oxford pro-
fessor of philosophy, respected enough to be named to the dis-
tinguished chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics, would 
be wholly ignorant of such an elementary logical distinction. 
We therefore suspect that something has escaped our notice. 
Perhaps Collingwood does have a special usage in mind for each 
of these functions (meaning, truth, and validity), so that 
they may after all escape some of these objections. Pursuing 
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this lead will take us into a discussion of Collingwood's 
views on language and intellectual consciousness, which·will 
occupy us in section 4 of this chapter, immediately following 
our analysis (in section 3) of his Essay on Philosophical 
Method, the distinctions of which are required to make sense 
of his definitions both of language and of mind (i.e. defini-
tion by means of what he calls a "scale of forms"). 
But we have one last claim for Q-A logic to attend to 
before pursuing this line of inquiry. According to the Auto-
biography, Q-A logic is supposed to be an alternative to pro-
positional F-logic, which he says it replaces. Minimally this 
must mean that it can do the same things that F-logic does, 
and satisfy the claims that F-logic makes for itself. And 
there is much to recommend a direct parallel between Q-A and 
F-logic. If we wish to understand what sort of logical rela-
tions are involved in P-Q-A complexes we must begin by assum-
ing that it is a function more akin to validity than to truth 
or meaning, since it involves a relationship between elements 
that are on a level with propositions rather than with terms, 
and it relates these elements within a complex which resembles 
a group of propositions linked by logical connectives. Se-
condly one can say that there are certain truth-functional 
relationships that exist between the elements of a P-Q-A com-
plex, although it is not straight-forwardly one of entail-
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ment: 3 questions alone nor questions with their presupposi-
tions nor presuppositions alone do not entail their answers, 
even though a propositional answer alone can be shown to en-
tail certain presuppositions (e.g. (a) "There is a noon train 
to Elgin," and (b) "Who is taking the noon train to Elgin?"; 
but (c) does entail (a)). 4 Similarly within a P-Q-A complex 
one can say there are certain logical relationships that exist 
between the question and the other elements: for example that 
if a propositional answer and one of its direct presupposi-
tions are known, a valid question can be reconstructed and in-
3What the exact truth-functional relationship is be-
tween a proposition and its presupposition has been a matter 
of lively contemporary debate into which we shall not enter 
here. But we may note in passing that most of the contending 
definitions of presupposing take into account the difference 
between presupposition and entailment. For a good discussion 
of the subject and an excellent bibliography, see Nuel D. 
Belnap and Thomas B. Steel, The Logic of Questions and Answers 
(New Haven, 1976). 
4 Cf. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory 
(London, 1952), pp. 174-75: "If a statementS presupposes a 
statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precon-
dition of the truth-or-falsity of S, then of course there will 
be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial 
of S' .... But we must distinguish this kind of logical ab-
surdity from straight-forward self-contradiction. It is self-
contradictory to conjoin S with the denial of S' if S' is a 
necessary condition of the truth, simply, of S. It is a dif-
ferent kind of logical absurdity to conjoin S with the denial 
of S' if S' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity 
of S. The relation between S and S' in the first case is that 
S entails S'. We need a different name for the relation be-
tween S and S' in the second case; let us say, as above, that 
S presupposes S' ." Notice that Strawson's definition holds 
directly between statements or propositions, and does not in-
volve questions at all. Cf. note 5, below. 
446 
terposed between them (in our above example, (b) is construct-
able directly from (c) and (a)--assuming that we know that (c) 
is an answer to a question, and that (a) is a common presuppo-
sition to both the question and its answer); that from a pro-
positional answer and an appropriate question one or more pre-
suppositions can be constructed; that from a question and its 
presupposition(s) the range of alternative possible answers is 
limited; etc. 5 And finally, one can say that the terms used 
in any given P-Q-A complex cannot be used with shifting mean-
ings without destroying the sense (and consequently the logi-
cal relations) of the P-Q-A complex itself (in our above ex-
ample question (b) and answer (a) are compatible with presuppo-
sition (a') "There are no passengers on the noon train to 
Elgin," only if "taking the train" in (b) means "driving the 
train," and Eric is an engineer; otherwise a P-Q-A complex 
consisting of (a')-(b)-(c) would involve a self-contradiction, 
and therefore would be nonsensical). 
5
cf. P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Berkeley, 1972), p. 
82: "I say that P presupposes Q when, if Q is not true of an 
object x, the question does not arise whether or not we ought 
to predicate P of x, and thus neither P nor its negation is 
true of x • . . . This relation of presupposition is quite 
different from entailment .... " Cf. also Belnap and Steel, 
P· 113: "A question, q, presupposes a statement, A, if and 
only if the truth of A is a logically necessary condition for 
there being some true answer to q. Evidently it is a conse-
quence of this definition that A is a presupposition of q, if 
and only if every direct answer to q logically implies A." 
B~th of these definitions introduce the notion of a question 
d~rectly into the definition of presupposition, in contrast 
to Strawson (above, note 4). 
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Thus it is not difficult to show that there are speci-
fiable logical relations involved in Q-A logic with its dis-
tinctive P-Q-A complexes; and we can also say with some con-
fidence that meaning, truth, and validity do have a bearing 
on these P-Q-A complexes, inasmuch as they require an identity 
of meaning of their terms, have truth-functional relationships 
between the elements of the complex, and validity or entail-
ment relationships between propositional answers and their 
presuppositions. But this seems to reverse what Collingwood 
was trying to say about Q-A logic (at least in Q-AA): in-
stead of Q-A complexes determining the meaning, truth, and 
validity of propositions, it appears that all three are es-
tablished independently of those complexes, and have a logi-
cal priority over them. Without some sort of deductive in-
ference structure how could one decide whether a question 
legitimately arises from a given presupposition, and conse-
quently what counts for a real answer in a P-Q-A complex? 
And without some means of establishing the semantic identity 
of the terms, we have no way, within Q-A logic, to determine 
the limited range of answers and/or presuppositions allowable 
for a given question. It appears, therefore, that far from 
being an alternative to F-logic, Q-A logic presupposes it. 
But the final blow to the thesis that Q-A and F-logic 
are alternative logics is that Q-A logic fails to meet the 
claims of consistency, compl~eness, and formality that F-logic 
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not only claims but demonstrates for itself--at least for the 
sort of axiomatic F-logic with which Collingwood was familiar. 6 
Now in some respects Q-A logic as Collingwood discusses it has 
the appearance of a formal system: it states some criteria 
for what counts as an element within that system (questions, 
answers, presuppositions--although as we noted, questions and 
presuppositions are never defined), as well as how they are to 
be introduced or eliminated (assumptions are made by acts of 
free choice, questions arise in accordance with the logical 
efficacy of a presupposition, questions are eliminated if their 
presuppositions are not made, or if they are raised with re-
spect to absolute presuppositions, etc.). But this appear-
ance of system breaks down when it is examined more closely 
for its consistency, completeness and formality. 
(1) Concerning consistency we have perhaps already 
said more than enough. In summary we may note that if it is 
possible in some cases (i.e. complex propositions bound by 
logical connectives) to decide on the truth or falsity of a 
proposition on formal grounds alone, without knowing anything 
about the question which it answers, or without requiring 
that the variables within a proposition be specified semanti-
6 Cf. I. M. 
Thought (New York, 
of F-logic and its 
3n. 
Bochenski,. The Methods of Contemaorary 
1968), pp. 70-72· On Collingwoo 's notion 
sources, see EPM, 148n, 153; Krausz, CEPC, 
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cally, 7 then it seems not only that the Q-AA contention that 
meaning, truth, and validity are properties not of proposi-
tions alone but of Q-A (or perhaps P-Q-A) complexes is false, 
but so also is the Q-AM assertion that some presuppositions 
(viz. absolute presuppositions) cannot be true or false be-
cause they are not (or cannot be) answers to questions. On 
formal grounds alone we may argue that any assertion is false 
if it contains a formal contradiction. 
In the sequel we may find that Collingwood might have 
meant that the question of formal coherence belongs to a dif-
ferent systematic inquiry (i.e. part of a Q-A system where the 
questions raised are precisely about the coherence of state-
ments). But we may still observe that formal questions can-
not ever be irrelevant in any systematic inquiry to which Q-A 
logic is applicable: insofar as an inquiry is systematic (or 
claims to be so) its coherence is presumed. 
(2) Concerning completeness, we must ask, first of 
all, what is the full set of expressions of which questions, 
answers, and presuppositions are members? Collingwood says 
that they are the elements of a systematic inquiry, but that 
is hardly enough: a systematic inquiry may also involve dig-
ging in the earth or flying to the moon, but these activities 
are not part of a P-Q-A complex. The elements of such a com-
7Bochenski, p. 33; cf. IH, 253. 
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plex obviously belong to a set of expressions in a language 
of some sort, a set at once broader than that of F-logLc (be-
cause F-logic is ordinarily confined to the set of all propo-
sitions that can be true or false, whereas Q-A logic includes 
questions and presuppositions, which are not propositions nor 
proposition-fragments and yet have logical functions), and 
narrower than it (because Q-A logic is only concerned with 
those P-Q-A complexes that are part of a systematic inquiry, 
and not the set of all possible propositions, whether they are 
part of such an inquiry or not). Furthermore it can only in-
clude the set of all meaningful expressions in a systematic 
inquiry, since presuppositions and questions, while truth-
value neutral, are nonetheless bearers of meaning at the level 
of complexity of a statement (to be a presupposition, for ex-
ample, a statement need not be true or false, but it must be 
intelligible--i.e. a well-formed grammatical sentence). 
It is not just a matter of having a group name for 
these elements of Q-A logic, it is a matter of deciding (or 
having grounds for deciding) what counts for a well-constructed 
formula (a meaningful expression) in it and ruling out all ex-
pressions that are not. It is clear that Collingwood has some 
such criteria in mind, because he indicates that not just any 
combination of terms with a question mark at the end could 
count as a question (cf. Table 3, 4 a), nor can any arbitrary 
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grouping of words count as a supposition or proposition just 
because it ends with a period. Candidates for membership in 
Q-A logic are evidently grammatically sound and formally co-
herent questions and assertions in a language of some sort, 
presumably the language accepted and employed by the inquiry 
in progress. But this means that Q-A logic relies on extrin-
sic factors for what counts for a candidate for membership in 
the Q-A system, and we must presume such grammatical and for-
mal criteria as essential to it. If Collingwood presupposes 
all these rules in the construction of his Q-A logic, how can 
we concur with his suggestion in the Autobiography that Q-A 
logic was intended as an alternative to F-logic, or that in 
logic he was a revolutionary? 
If there is anything revolutionary in his Q-A logic 
it is not that it supplants grammar and formal logic, but 
rather that, if anything, it extends them or adds something 
to them in their application within organized inquiry or 
knowledge-acquisition, something essential that was ignored 
in the reduction of knowledge to a set of propositions which 
merely conform to the rules of grammar and logic. (In sec-
tion 4 of this chapter we shall take this matter up again in 
connection with Collingwood's discussion of language and 
logic in The Principles of Art.) 
(3) Finally, concerning formality, it is clear from 
the very first proposition of Q-AM that Q-A logic is not stay-
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ing within the bounds of a formal system: Proposition 1 ap-
pears to be stating a matter of psychological rather than 
purely logical fact. If proposition 1 had read: "From every 
statement a question can be constructed," it might have gen-
erated some interesting formal problems--e.g. what the in-
terrogative function entails for propositions cast into this 
mode; how they might function in relation to declarative pro-
positions of various sorts; etc. But instead Collingwood 
says that "every statement that anybody ever makes is made in 
answer to a question," where personal agency is brought into 
what might otherwise be a purely logical analysis of the re-
lationship between questions and answers. Since the thrust 
of 20th century logic is precisely in the opposite, non-
psychologistic direction8 it is clear that this way of stat-
ing the relationship of question and answer would not be re-
garded by formal logicians as acceptable. 9 
8I. M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy 
(Berkeley, 1969), p. 253. 
9Even sympathetic critics have taken offence at this 
approach: see J. F. Post, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory 
of Presuppositions," Inquirt, VIII (1965), pp. 332-54: "The 
reader is first struck by t e psychologism of what purports 
to be a purely logical investigation . . . . The psychologism 
runs throughout" (p. 333). Post sets out to eliminate the 
formal absurdities from Collingwood's theory of presupposi-
tions, as does Krausz in his article for the book of critical 
essays on Collingwood which he edited: see CEPC, 222-40. 
The reconstructions by both Post and Krausz are admirable, but 
fail to take into account what Collingwood had in mind for Q-A 
logic. He gave no indication that he ever intended it to be 
reducible to, or incorporatable into, a formal system of 
logic. A formal "erotetic logic" treats questions just as 
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But aside from this there is still a question of 
whether Proposition 1 (and notice that it is called a pro-
position rather than a definition) is factually true. Is 
it reasonable to assume that every statement that is ever 
made by anyone is made in answer to a question? What about 
commands, warnings, and exclamations; petitions filed in 
court; classroom lectures, declarations of religious faith, 
sentences read during a filibuster in Congress, etc. (cf. 
Mink, MHD, 127-28)? But even aside from exceptions, we are 
certainly not aware that this is always the case. Colling-
wood's assurance that this priority of questions is purely 
logical (Table 9, Note 1) may soften the claim a bit, but it 
does not render it any less uncertain. If a question is logi-
cally prior to its answer, how are we to understand this pri-
ority? Collingwood discusses it in terms of causality, since 
a question arises as a result of the causal operation of what 
he calls the "logical efficacy" of a supposition (Table 9, 
Definition 3). Even if we could set aside our hesitation to 
accept something like an efficient cause operating at the 
logical level of thought, we are still left wondering about 
formal logic treats propositions--as so many finished products. 
It is not concerned with the process of asking questions, but 
only with the formal properties of questions once they are al-
ready asked. But Collingwood was interested precisely in the 
~ro:ess of ongoing inquiry, where questions are arising; he 
1ns1sted that the process was completely reducible neither to 
psychological feeling states nor to the rules of formal logic, 
and yet had a "logic" or rationality of its own. 
454 
the priority of questions to answers. If it is a priority in 
thought we wish to know why it is not merely carried away in 
the stream of immediate consciousness, or why it is not "mere-
ly psychological" or subjective (cf. IH, 292). What is the 
objective dimension to a question--i.e. that aspect of it 
which is not carried away in the stream of subjective con-
siousness? Is it not merely subjective and hence merely psy-
chological unless one can also specify this objective compon-
ent? 
This is where the formalist would press him hardest 
for an answer, and it is difficult to see how he would reply. 
Every time Collingwood uses the term "logical" to describe 
the priority of Q-A complexes, or of presuppositions to ques-
tions, or of questions to answers, he is tacitly appealing to 
criteria which he simultaneously appears to dismiss--ie. to 
the objective aspect wherein the relationship does not depend 
on mere co-location in subjective consciousness. Without such 
objective criteria we could hardly know what assumptions were 
uniquely efficacious in causing a certain question to arise, 
since in our subjective consciousness we are seldom aware of 
what all the assumptions are that we are making relevant to a 
given situation. But to say that anyone employing Q-A logic 
is bound by the relationships he is describing is to say that 
the rules of Q-A logic hold independently of subjective 
thought-contexts, and are binding directly on the related ele-
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ments of the P-Q-A complex. Without such an objective speci-
fication Collingwood's Q-A logic is open to the sort of.criti-
cism that one of his sympathetic critics leveled at him: 
"Collingwood says that 'every thought we find ourselves 
thinking is the answer to a question' ((EM, 36)). Surely 
every presupposition, whether it is an AP ((absolute presup-
position)) or not, may be a thought we find ourselves think-
ing. Hence every presupposition may be the answer to a ques-
tion, and it seems that there can be no AP's. Short of radi-
cal revision of the whole chapter, there is no way out of this 
d . . .,10 contra 1.ct1.on 
* * * * * 
From the foregoing it is clear that on the face of it 
there are serious difficulties with Q-A logic either in the 
Q-AA or Q-AM versions. The P-Q-A complex does not succeed in 
standing up to the autobiographical claim that it is the unit 
of meaning, truth, and validity, nor does Q-A logic meet the 
criteria of consistency, completeness, and formality required 
of it if it is to serve as an alternative to F-logic. Unless 
we can find mitigating arguments in the later writings to re-
10Post, "A Defense of Collingwood's Theory of Presup-
positions," p. 336. Post also raises an interesting objection 
to the suggestion that there is a class of assertions (abso-
lute presuppositions) which have no truth value: "A sentence 
W~th no truth value would be implied by every statement, 
Sl.nce there would be no way for the latter to be true and the 
former to be false" (ibid.). 
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concile some of the more glaring of these difficulties we 
shall find it impossible to uphold the Autobiography on this 
issue: it fails to be coherent on its own much less as an 
interpretation of anything else. 
But perhaps misled by Collingwood's autobiographical 
claim that Q-A logic is to be understood as an alternative to 
replace F-logic, we have been asking the wrong questions about 
Q-A logic, expecting something more of its explicit perfor-
mance than its implicit promise is capable of delivering. 
Rather than being a substitute for F-logic, suppose Q-A logic 
is regarded as complementary to it, perhaps even tacitly pre-
supposing it? Suppose it addresses not a body of determinate 
propositions but rather a somewhat indeterminate situation 
from which definite propositions are to be extracted? In 
such a situation knowledge would be something yet to be 
achieved, and the asking of questions based on presupposi-
tions (which may state the basic structural framework or re-
levant features of the situation within which such knowledge 
is to be determined) would be one of the means that bring 
determinacy to it. Questions would therefore be one of the 
signs of the difference which knowing introduces within the 
knower-known situation, signifying the presence of conscious-
ness or awareness at the linguistic plane of knowledge. And 
the P-Q complexes would therefore have a heuristic priority 
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not reducible to, but presupposing, F-logic and its relevant 
. h" . . 11 requirements Wlt ln lnqulry. 
But if we try to interpret Collingwood's Q-A logic in 
strictly formal terms we are committed to ruling out any "psy-
chologisms" that may appear in it, which threatens to gut the 
theory as Collingwood proposes it: he would not ultimately 
warrant the requirement of an F-logic which would call for the 
elimination of the personal dimension to inquiry precisely be-
cause that is what he claims all knowledge is for--i.e. self-
knowledge. Therefore it is clear that just as in Speculum 
Mentis he had argued against the abstract universal, so too 
he presents Q-A logic as the thought of an agent employed in 
the acquisition of knowledge. The combined weight of the evi-
dence we have considered thus far indicates that Collingwood 
would refuse to give up this requirement. 
But then this involves using terms like "question," 
"answer," and "presupposition" and even "meaning" and "truth," 
in something other than a univocal, F-logical way. They may 
not be the merely formal entities they appear to be, but 
rather they may include in their meanings a reference to their 
entertainment within a personal consciousness. They may be, 
in short, epistemological entities rather than merely or 
purely logical ones, and as epistemological entities they 
11 Cf. Donald S. Mackay, "On Supposing and Presuppos-
ing," The Review of Metaphysics (Vol. II, no. 5, 1948), pp. 
1-20. 
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must be regarded as displaying the properties of mental ac-
tivities better expressed by the use of verb-forms rather 
than noun forms: questioning, propounding, answering, pre-
supposing, etc.--the very forms that Collingwood prefers to 
use. 
In the next section we shall explore the requirements 
that Collingwood finds necessary for dealing with the struc-
ture of concepts of this sort--concepts that we have already 
witnessed him calling "dialectical." 
3. Dialectical Logic and Philosophical Methodology. 
The one work in which Collingwood makes the sort of 
distinctions required for a logic that can serve as an al-
ternative to traditional F-logic is in the Essay on Philoso-
phical Method--a work which in his autobiographical self-
estimate he called "my best book in matter; in style, I may 
call it my only book, for it is the only one I ever had the 
time to finish as well as I know how" (A, 118). In the Essay 
the subject matter (philosophical logic or methodology) is 
distributed in a manner which corresponds to the traditional 
(Aristotelian) division of logic into terms, judgments, and 
inferences. Chapters II-IV deal with terms--philosophical 
concepts or universals (the overlap of classes, the scale of 
forms, and definition and description). These chapters also 
discuss classification and division, but not extensionality 
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or the distinction between the denotation and connotation of 
terms. Chapters V and VI deal with the quantity and quality 
of judgments, but say nothing directly about predication, the 
distribution of terms, or the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
chapter VIII deals with deductive and inductive inference, but 
not with the modes of valid or invalid deductive interence. 
And Chapter IX even discusses the systematic claims of com-
pleteness and consistency, but says nothing about formality 
(cf. Mink, MHD, 61-62). It would therefore appear that if we 
are ever to find a clue for understanding Collingwood's view 
of "logic" it would be in this work. 
However we have already had occasion to note that 
there are formidable problems in trying to ascertain what 
the standpoint of the Essay is, or how the reader is supposed 
to take its substantive remarks about non-philosophical me-
thods or even non-methodological philosophical issues. We 
may recall from that discussion that in the Essay he states 
that (a) the manner in which non-philosophical concepts, judg-
ments, and forms of reasoning are characterized is not meant 
to say anything explicitly about mathematical or empirical 
science, but is rather only meant to contrast methods common-
ly thought to be employed by these modes of thought and mis-
takenly applied to philosophical subjects (EPM, 9, 151); and 
(b) he confesses in the final chapter that his initial agree-
ment with the reader to treat as an hypothesis the assumption 
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that philosophical concepts have a peculiar logical structure, 
has been violated throughout by appeal to philosophical ex-
perience (EPM, 222-23). In the context of our present dis-
cussion these two difficulties put obstacles in our path to 
understanding Collingwood's views on logic. The first renders 
suspect any interpretation of the Essay which takes as liter-
ally true its remarks on subjects other than philosophy; and 
the second raises the issue of the circularity of the argu-
ment of the Essay insofar as the defining characteristics he 
proposes as applying to philosophy itself are first advanced 
hypothetically and then "proven" categorically by appeal to 
the experience of philosophers. We might get around the first 
obstacle by pointing out that the Essay itself argues that 
logic is a part of philosophy, and "what philosophy is" is 
the very subject of the book (EPH, 2-3, 7). But this is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that Collingwood states that he 
will not discuss the implications of the Essay for metaphy-
sics, logic, or the theory of knowledge (EPM, 7-8)--a promise 
which is also violated throughout, e.g. by his discussion of 
the ontological argument and the subject matter of metaphysics 
in the sixth chapter, by his discussion of philosophy as a 
branch of literature in the tenth, as well as his use of ex-
amples from epistemology, logic, and ethics throughout the 
book. 
Until we have had a chance to survey the key concepts 
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and the central argument of the Essay we cannot resolve these 
difficulties of the standpoint of the Essay. But from even a 
superficial reading of the introductory chapter one can draw 
several conclusions about how Collingwood intended the Essay 
to be taken. (1) The Essay is concerned with discussing the 
nature of philosophy as an activity of thought, exemplified 
as philosophical experience and expressed on certain occasions 
in characteristic or typical ways (EPM, 2-3, 7); (2) Concern-
ing this activity certain generalizations are possible which 
are capable of serving as ideal principles of method, and to 
which we are bound when we are trying to think philosophically 
(EPM, 3-4). (3) The strategy of discussing is basically 
Kantian in the sense that (a) certain "facts" (or experiences) 
are brought to our attention, (b) and then described and anal-
yzed by comparing them with similar examples from non-
philosophical (or pre-philosophicaD equivalents, (c) the com-
parison exhibiting a peculiar but typical structure to phil-
osophical concepts, judgments, and forms of reasoning, (d) 
which is only possible under certain necessary conditions 
(EPM, 3-4, 222-23). At the very least, then, we are entitled 
to say that Collingwood's overriding concern in the Essay is 
to say something that is true for a certain kind of thought, 
namely philosophy. This will have to suffice as a provi-
sional sense of the standpoint of the Essay until we examine 
the issue of its argumentative circularity. 
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As usual we will begin with a brief outline of the 
key concepts and conclusions of the Essay before proceeding 
to a discussion of them and an analysis of the main line of 
argument in the Essay. 
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TABLE 10 
PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 
The overlap of classes: the concepts or universals of 
philosophy are exemplified in overlapping classes instead 
of mutually exclusive classes. A universal concept is one 
which unites a number of different instances in a class--
either a plurality of individual instances in a general 
concept or a plurality of specific differentiations into 
a generic concept. The overlap of species of a philoso-
phical genus consists in the inclusion of part of the mean-
ing of one of the concepts in the meaning of another (i.e. 
it is a relation of intension between concepts rather than 
a relation of extension between classes). Alternative 
ways of stating the overlap are: (a) two or more specifi-
cally differing concepts may be exemplified in the same in 
the same instances (i.e. they may be conceptually differ-
ent but instantially the same), so that any distinction in 
philosophy may be a distinction in concepts without a dif-
ference in instances; and (b) Aristotle's formula for the 
overlap, i.e. that two concepts may be the same but their 
being is not the same (being an instance of the one is not 
the same as being an instance of the other). (EPM, 27, 
31, 40, 50, 91). Ignoring the first rule of philosophical 
method (i.e. that the specific classes of a philosophical 
concept are always liable to overlap) leads to three re-
lated fallacies: 
a. The fallacy of false disjunction (ffd) states that 
when a generic concept is divided into its species 
there is a corresponding division of its instances 
into mutually exclusive classes. 
b. The fallacy of precarious margins (the positive ap-
plication of the ffd) states that if there is a dis-
tinction between two concepts there must be a dif-
ference between their instances (or, the margins be-
tween species of a philosophical genus can be 
trusted not to spread to include all the instances of 
co-ordinate species). 
c. The fallacy of identified coincidents (the negative 
application of the ffd) states that where there is 
no difference in the extension of two concepts, there 
is no distinction between the concepts themselves. 
(EPM, 48-50). 
z. 
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The scale of forms: the specification of a philosophical 
genus (or concept) is such that its species differ from 
one another both in degree and in kind, and are related 
to one another both by opposition and by distinction. 
They therefore constitute a scale of overlapping forms in 
which (a) whenever the variable increases or decreases, 
certain critical points on the scale are reached at which 
one specific form disappears and is replaced by another; 
(b) the variable of each species (its specific difference) 
is identified with the generic essence; (c) every species 
is a realization of the genus (there is no zero-point to 
the scale where the generic essence is altogether absent, 
but rather it starts with unity as the minimum realiza-
tion of the genus); and (d) any point on the scale sums 
up (or intensionally includes) the whole scale from the 
minimum specification to that point. The scale of forms 
explains the overlap of classes (i.e. shows how it is 
possible) insofar as successive species of a philosophical 
genus intensionally include the positive content (or mesh-
ing) of all the forms preceding it in the scale. (EPM, 
56-60, 81, 89, 91). Ignoring the second rule of philoso-
phical method (i.e. that the specification of a philoso-
phical concept constitutes a scale of forms) leads to 
several related fallacies, all arising from the ffd ap-
plied to differences of degree and kind and relations of 
opposition and distinction: 
a. The fallacy of calculation assumes that because there 
are differences of degree in philosophical concepts 
they are susceptible of measurement and calculation 
(i.e. that they are differences of degree only and 
not also differences of kind). 
b. The fallacy of indifference assumes that because the 
species of a philosophical genus differ in kind, they 
exhibit no differences of degree. 
c. The fallacy of the false positive assumes that where 
terms are related in a philosophical series the rela-
tion is not of opposition but of mere distinction (so 
that it makes positive terms out of negative ones). 
d. The fallacy of null opposition asserts that the terms 
related in a philosophical series are opposites but 
not distincts (so that the negation of positive terms 
have no actuality). (EPM, 80-81, 85-86). 
3. Philosophical definition: the definition of a philosophi-
cal concept is by means of a scale of forms, beginning 
with a rudimentary minimum definition (the generic es-
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sence) and adding qualitatively new determinations which 
gradually alter the original definition and improve it as 
a statement of the concept's essence. Philosophical de-
finitions are descriptive (i.e. they aim at a complete 
listing of attributes, but not by mere enumeration but by 
exhibiting their connections); (b) are real rather than 
verbal (i.e. they seek to state the essence of a concept 
rather than the meaning of a word); and (c) are relative 
rather than absolute (i.e. they seek to make more precise 
what was to some extent definite already, rather than stat-
ing a definition which makes the difference between know-
ing something and not knowing it at all). (EPM, 92, 94-
98, 100-01). The phases of a philosophical definition 
are: 
a. the minimum specification of a concept--the lower end 
of the scale, or the necessary rudimentary expression 
of the genus without which it would fail to be a genus 
at all; 
b. the intermediate specifications--later modifications 
of the minimum specification by adding new qualifying 
determinations; and 
c. the final specification--the phase reached when the 
definition explicitly states all that can be found in 
the concept and is adequate to the thing defined. 
(EPM, 100-01). 
4. The principles of concrete affirmation and negation: phi-
losophical judgments are so related that every negation 
involves an affirmation, and every affirmation involves a 
specific (not indiscriminate) negation. Whenever a phi-
losophical assertion is made it affirms something definite 
and also denies something definite. In philosophy the af-
firmative judgment (S is P and not Q) and the negative 
judgment (S is not Q but P) are equally definite and speci-
fic answers to the same question (what isS?). (EPM, 107-
08, 110). Ignoring these two principles leads to two as-
sociated fallacies: 
a. The fallacy of abstract negation assumes that the re-
jection of one account of a philosophical matter does 
not require giving a better account of it, or that it 
is possible in philosophy to negate without affirming. 
b. The fallacy of abstract affirmation assumes that in 
philosophy it is possible to affirm (i.e. predicate 
a concept in a judgment) without denying anything de-
finite. (EPM, 105-07). 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
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Philosophical judgments as universal: philosophical 
judgments are universal TI.e. of the form, all Sis P), 
but rather than excluding this includes the subordinate 
forms, the particular judgment (every S-type is P) and 
the singular judgment (every individual S is P) as well 
as the purely universal judgment (S as such is P). All 
three types of structure are to be found in the philoso-
phical judgment; what is not found is any sufficiency of 
one to the exclusion of the rest. (EPM, 111-12, 115). 
Philosophical judgments as categorical: philosophical 
judgments are not merely hypothetical (i.e. of the form, 
if S is P it is Q) but also are essentially categorical 
in intention (i.e. of the form, Sis P). As categorical, 
philosophical judgments are never devoid of objective or 
ontological reference. (EPM, 121, 125). 
Philosophical inference as reversible: the arguments of 
philosophy, instead of having an irreversible direction 
from principles to conclusion (as in deduction) or from 
data via principles to conclusion (as in induction), have 
a reversible direction, the principles establishing the 
conclusion and the conclusions reciprocally establishing 
the principles. Philosophical arguments escape vicious 
circularity insofar as the conclusions in philosophy are 
already something known, and establishing them by means 
of principles means making them known in a different and 
better way. Philosophical conclusions are anticipated by 
an experience that possesses them in substance before its 
reasoning begins, and its conclusions can be checked by 
comparing them with these anticipations. In a philosophi-
cal scale of forms, the terms "experience" and "conclu-
sion" are applicable to any two successive stages (or lev-
els): the higher level "explains" the lower. (EPM, 160, 
163, 172). 
Philosophy as systematic: it is the ideal of philosophi-
cal discourse to be constructive or systematic--that is, 
as final, complete, objective, and unified as it can be. 
Although none of these ideals can be met absolutely, in 
viewing philosophical science itself as a scale of forms, 
its topics can be arranged as a hierarchy of overlapping 
concepts, differing in degree and kind, and related as op-
posites and distincts. (EPM, 177, 186-93). 
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No doubt this outline does scant justice to the argu-
mentative structure and detail of example in the Essay~ and 
perhaps raises more questions than it resolves. We cannot 
deal with all of Collingwood's arguments and illustrations 
without duplicating in length the Essay itself. But we shall 
have occasion to discuss several of the examples in what fol-
lows, in connection with our examination of the structure of 
his main argument. But perhaps we can settle several ques-
tions with some comments about each of the key concepts we 
have just summarized. 
(1) The first misconception to be avoided is that 
Collingwood's Essay is concerned with describing characteris-
tics of philosophical concepts, judgments, and inferences that 
belong exclusively to philosophy. Although each of these lo-
gical units is contrasted with its non-philosophical equiva-
lent, the contrast does not make an absolute distinction be-
tween the two sorts of usages. In each case he is careful to 
point out that while such character~stics are occasionally 
but exceptionally encountered in non-philosophical experience, 
in their philosophical employment they are typical, important, 
and essential. Thus when he discusses the overlap of classes, 
for example, he points out that it occurs even in empirical 
science: exceptional or paradoxical border-line cases provide 
obstacles in any attempt to carry out a schema of classifica-
tion based on an arrangement of species of a genus into mu-
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tually exclusive classes which exhaust the membership of the 
genus between them. Collingwood points out the instance of 
the classification of animals (a problem discussed with in-
sight by Aristotle), in which amphibians overlap the classes 
of fish and reptile, having characteristics of both (i.e. they 
are vertebrates with lungs, like reptiles, but capable of un-
derwater breathing, like fish) (EPM, 30). But where such an 
overlap is exceptional in empirical science and ruled out by 
the~ priori divisions of exact sciences, 12 in philosophy it 
is typical and essential. As examples Collingwood points out 
the predicability of the transcendental attributes, unity, 
truth, and goodness, under all the categories (EPM, 32-33); 
the overlap of judgment and inference as two species of the 
genus thought, in logic (EPM, 36); the overlap of thought and 
action as characteristics studied by logic and ethics respec-
tively (EPM, 43-44); and in ethics the overlap of good acts 
across the divisions of goods into the species pleasant, ex-
12
collingwood seemed to think that the difficulties 
of border-line cases arises only in empirical science but not 
exact sciences, since in the latter (i.e. in mathematics) the 
divisions can be carried out a priori by stipulative defini-
tions, and hence the exclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the 
species are assured (EPM, 30-31). But insofar as the over-
lap of classes is defined by the scale of forms as being a re-
lation of overlap-by-inclusion, the system of classification 
of numbers seems to fit his description of an overlap of spe-
cies of a genus, as Donagan points out (CEPC, S-6). 
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pedient, and right (EPM, 41). 13 
It is interesting to note in connection with this dis-
cussion that Collingwood relates the non-philosophical and 
philosophical usages of a term with the pre-philosophical and 
philosophical phases of a concept--which is reminiscent of 
Q-AA logic, in which the sameness of two questions is said to 
be the sameness of an historical process (EPM, 33; cf. above, 
Table 3, no. 3a). He writes: 
There are words which are used in two different ways, a 
philosophical and a scientific; but the words are not on 
that account equivocal; they undergo a regular and uni-
form change in meaning when they pass from one sphere to 
the other, and this change leaves something fundamental 
in their meaning unaltered, so that it is more appropriate 
to speak of two phases of a concept then two senses of a 
word. For example, matter is a word used both in physics 
and metaphysics .... Such cases are common. Mind, for 
the scientist, in this case the psychologist, is the name 
of one limited class of things outside which lie things of 
other kinds; for the spiritualistic philosophy, it is a 
name ... for all reality .... Even in concepts that 
have no strictly scientific phase, a similar distinction 
can often be traced between a philosophical phase and a 
non-philosophical. (EPM, 33-35). 
13Mink points out that it is possible and relatively 
easy to work out a system of mutually exclusive species for 
this example from ethics, simply by employing the mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive classes, (a) pleasant and expedient 
and right, (b) pleasant and expedient, but not right, (c) 
pleasant, but not expedient and not right, (d) expedient, but 
not pleasant and not right, etc. (MHD, 65). One might extend 
Mink's suggestion and defend the claim that by a rigorous use 
of stipulative definitions, a system of classification can al-
ways be constructed that employs mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive classes. But as Mink notes, most of the difficul-
ties in what Collingwood says in the chapter on the overlap of 
classes, many of which arise from examples which seem to pre-
~ume an overlap of extension between classes, are cleared up 
~n the chapter on the scale of forms (MHD, 66, 70). 
470 
In a later chapter in which Collingwood is comparing the li-
terary language of philosophy to the technical (i.e. artifi-
cially symbollic) language of science, he points out that the 
subject matter of philosophy demands a vocabulary with groups 
of words "nearly but not quite synonymous, differentiated by 
shades of meaning which for some purposes can be ignored and 
for others become important," and single words which have 
various senses according to the ways they are used, but with-
out being utterly equivocal (EPM, 206-07). It is precisely 
in such a vocabulary as this, and in cases of overlapping 
meanings to which such a vocabulary applies, that philosophy 
is interested, and which gives it its typical characteristics. 
But we must also notice, before passing on to con-
sider further parallels between philosophical and non-
philosophical concepts, that here as elsewhere in the Essay 
Collingwood does not provide us with clear guidelines for 
the limits of this distinction, or with any criteria for de-
ciding when a concept is rightfully being employed in its sci-
entific phase and when in its philosophical one. Further-
more, (as even his comment in the above quotation shows a dim 
awareness), lumping pre- and non-philosophical concepts to-
gether may overlook important distinctions which may turn out 
to be pertinent when the overlapping meanings of the term in 
its philosophical employment are being unpacked. Collingwood 
may be guilty of falling prey to the "genetic fallacy"--i.e. 
assuming that an earlier stage in the development of a concept 
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is a necessary condition for the understanding of the mature 
concept--in short, confusing temporal and logical priority. 
(2) Another example of the manifestation of a phil-
osophical characteristic in a non-philosophical context is 
the scale of forms. Collingwood points out that the "fusion" 
of differences of degree with differences of kind in a scale 
of forms is not unique to philosophy, but is also familiar to 
"common sense" or ordinary experience, as in social struc-
tures which distinguish between nobility and gentry, or in 
criminal codes which distinguish between capital and other de-
grees of punishment (EPM, 73). It is also familiar in empiri-
cal science, where the double criteria of degree and kind are 
operative in scales of forms in which different forms are 
modified and replaced by others: Collingwood cites the ex-
ample of the states of matter, e.g. ice, water, and steam, 
which differ from each other in both degree (colder and hotter) 
and kind (solid, liquid, and gaseous states). Other examples 
are the periodic table of elements and the stages of organis-
mic development (e.g. embroyogenesis) (EPM, 59). He even in-
sists on this as a way of defining a scale of forms: 
The combination of differences in degree with differences 
in kind implies that a generic concept is specified in a 
somewhat peculiar way. The species into which it is di-
vided are so related that each not only embodies the ge-
neric essence in a specific manner, but also embodies some 
variable attribute in a specific degree. In respect of 
the variable, each specific form of the concept differs 
from the rest in degree; in respect of the manner in which 
the generic essence is specified, each differs from the 
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rest in kind. In such a system of specifications the two 
sets of differences are so connected that whenever the 
variable, increasing or decreasing, reaches certain cri-
tical points on the scale, one specific form disappears 
and is replaced by another. A breaking strain, a freez-
ing point, a minimum taxable income, are examples of such 
critical points on a scale of degrees where a new speci-
fic form suddenly comes into being. A system of this kind 
I propose to call a scale of forms. (EPM, 57). 
Just from the examples cited here it is clear that there are 
non-philosophical as well as philosophical scales of forms; 
but Collingwood remarks that it is just in such cases where 
differences of degree and kind exist in combination that phil-
osophical thought is primarily interested (EPM, 56-57). 
But in this case he goes one step further, and tries 
to distinguish philosophical from non-philosophical scales of 
forms. In the latter the variable is something extraneous to 
the generic essence (e.g. heat, which accounts for the vari-
ation of water in its transformations of state, does not enter 
into the generic essence of water as expressed in the formula, 
H20). But in a philosophical scale of forms the variable is 
identified with the generic essence itself (e.g. in Plato's 
forms of knowledge the variable is given as definiteness or 
truth, which is an essential characteristic of all knowledge 
as such) (EPM, 59-60). 
However, since Collingwood does not specify for his 
readers what he means by the terms, "generic essence," "vari-
able," and "specific forms," rather than clarifying the issue 
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this distinction raises a hornets nest of further difficul-
ties. What does it mean to say that the variable is id~nti­
fied with the generic essence? It is not a matter of de-
manding technical definitions for these terms, since on Col-
lingwood's grounds this may involve him in an infinite re-
gress (see Table 10, 3: philosophical definitions are by 
means of a scale of forms, so that the concept of a scale of 
forms is defined by means of a scale of forms). What we wish 
to know is minimally how he is using these terms, even if 
this can be stated only in mere verbal equivalences. 
From scattered remarks throughout the Essay we may 
offer the following as a first approximation to this require-
ment. (a) A generic essence is whatever is included in the 
definition of a genus, where (b) a definition is anything 
which fixes limits, discriminates, distinguishes, makes 
clearer or more precise, or removes ambiguities, and (c) a 
genus is a universal or a concept--i.e. that which unites a 
number of different things, either as (d) a general concept 
unites a plurality of individual instances into a class, or 
(e) a generic concept unites a plurality of specific differ-
entiations into a universal (EPM, 26-28, 94-95, 98-100). (f) 
A variable is whatever is being used as the index of differ-
ence in degree, or that in respect of which each specific form 
(species) of a concept (genus) differs from the other specific 
forms in degree (EPM, 57). (g) A specific form is any further 
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modification, qualification, distinction or determination of 
a generic essence, general term, or concept (EPM, 94-95., 100). 
(h) Essence and property are two species of attribute, to 
which correspond definitions and theorems as two species of 
exposition (EPM, 95). (i) An attribute is anything which 
serves to qualify, modify, distinguish or determine a genus. 
Armed with these preliminary definitions we may now 
return to the distinction between a philosophical and non-
philosophical scale of forms: in the former the variable was 
said to be identified with the generic essence, in the latter 
it was something extraneous. Paraphrasing this distinction 
using our preliminary definitions yields statements something 
like these: in the specification of a concept one species 
differs in degree from another species in virtue of some at-
tribute which in the case of a non-philosophical concept is 
not included in the essential definition of the genus, whereas 
in a philosophical concept it is so included. In short, it 
turns out to greatly resemble the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion. Is Collingwood distinguishing between a philosophical 
and a non-philosophical scale of forms on the grounds that 
judgments stating such a scale are either analytical (if phil-
osophical) or synthetic (if non-philosophical)? 
(3) Once more we are up against the problem of Col-
lingwood's use of the term "identity," since we do not know 
what "identified" means in the expression "the variable is 
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14 identified with the generic essence. We may suppose that 
he minimally means that in philosophical genera defined. by a 
scale of forms there are real and necessary connections be-
tween the variable attribute and the genus which is being 
specified in differing degrees (EPM, 100). 15 Whether this 
means that philosophical assertions are analytic (in the 
sense of the tradition deriving from Leibniz--viz. that the 
predicate is "contained in" the subject) is not ever directly 
14
cf. Immanuel Kant, Criti!ue of Pure Reason, trans. 
by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1929 , p-.-4~"Either the pre-
dicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (co-
vertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the 
concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with 
it. In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, in the 
other synthetic. Analytic judgements (affirmative) are there-
fore those in which the connection of the predicate with the 
subject is thought through identity; those in which this con-
nection is thought without identity should be entitled syn-
thetic." 
15By way of explanation of what Collingwood means by 
the "differentiation" involved in the specification of a ge-
neric concept in a scale of forms, Mink writes: "Two things 
may be differentiated as distinct from each other or as QE-
Sosite to each other. Opposition "is a relation subsisting 
etween a positive term and its own mere negation or absence" 
(EPM, 75); distinction is,apparently, any relation of differ-
ence between two positive terms which differ in meaning" 
MHD, 67). On this interpretation one might also say that 
'difference in kind' is also a relation between two positive 
and different attributes, and 'difference in degree' is are-
lation between a positive term or atrribute and its relative 
negation or absence. Unfortunately this interpretation is 
weakened by the qualifying preface to the remark that Mink 
q~otes, which reads: 'In its non-philosophical phase, opposi-
t1on is a relation subsisting between a positive term and its 
own mere negation or absence' (EPM, 75--emphasis mine). 
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stated in the Essay itself. But based on the discussion of 
philosophical judgments as categorical-universal and the con-
troversy this generated with Gilbert Ryle, 16 we may infer 
that he does not mean us to understand the scale of forms 
in a strictly analytical sense. To these two pieces of evi-
dence we must now turn. 
(a) Collingwood insists that philosophical judgments 
are universal, but also that they are not therefore merely 
hypothetical 17 --they are also essentially categorical, i.e. 
16There are three unpublished letters between Colling-
wood and Gilbert Ryle, presently in the Bodleian Library, Ox-
ford. CRC-I is dated 4 May, 1935, and is from Collingwood to 
Ryle; CRC-II is from Ryle to Collingwood, dated 21 May 1935; 
and CRC-III is from Collingwood to Ryle, dated 6 June 1935. 
All are related to the article written by Ryle, entitled "Mr. 
Collingwood and the Ontological Argument," Mind, Vol. XLIV, 
no. 174 (April, 1935), pp. 137-51--basically-a-discussion of 
Chapter VI of the Essay on Philosophical Method. In CRC-I, 
14, Collingwood points out that EPM, 63 (where Collingwood 
takes up an objection to the view that opposition and dis-
tinction are fused in a scale of forms, so that the scale of 
forms explains the overlap of classes) is directed against a 
view of Croce. In the Idea of History Collingwood expands on 
this point. Croce criticizea-Hegel's philosophy of history 
for confusing opposition and distinction, since opposites re-
fer to concepts and distinction to individuals. But Colling-
wood argues that both are applicablE! to historical events in-
sofar as events have an inside consisting of thought, and 
thought is conceptual and hence oppositional. Opposition is 
a dialectical term, as is reconciliation or synthesis (IH, 
119). 
17 Cf. Bernard Bosanquet, Knowledge and Reality (Lon-
d?n, 1892), pp. 1-58. Collingwood, like Bosanquet, took issue 
W~th Bradley's use of the categorical-hypothetical distinc-
~1on, which Bosanquet summarized as follows: "The universal 
JUdgement, if bona fide universal, and in sense singular or 
collective, cannot,-so-Mr. Bradley maintains ((in The Princi-
E}es of Logic)), be categorical. A categorical judgement af-
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the subject of the assertions being made is no mere ens rati-
onis but something actually existing (EPM, 125). We shall 
-have more to say about the categorical aspect of philosophi-
cal judgments in a moment, but we may point out that in stat-
ing it he is declaring his departure from at least the nar-
rower versions of the analytic-synthetic distinction, since 
he indicates that the universal statements of philosophy have 
objective reference and are not merely tautologies that indi-
cate only the equivalent use of words. 
(b) This is confirmed in the second and final of his 
letters in his correspondence with Ryle concerning his logical 
views expressed in the Essay. In it Collingwood states that 
the most important difference between them is Ryle's dis-
belief in synthetic ~ priori propositions, a disbelief which 
he says he does not share, and is connected with the possi-
bility o-f metaphysics ( CRC- I I I, 1, 7). In stating his dissent 
from Ryle's insistence that all universal propositions are hy-
pathetical, and hence that "no universal propositions are ca-
firms the existence of its elements, and enunciates some mat-
ters, conveyed by an idea, as true directly of Reality. But 
a universal or abstract judgement does not affirm the exist-
ence of its elements, and may be true though none of them 
exist or are even possible of Reality" (p. 5). Bosanquet in-
sists that some judgements, like "Heat is a mode of motion," 
and "Gases have a spectrum consisting of lines," have subjects 
that "are thought ~enerally, through abstract characteristics, 
and are not indivi ually known," but are nevertheless fact: 
"They are universal fact, and to say this is impossible seems 
to me a flat denial or-the commonest experience" (pp. 14-15). 
Cf. CRC- I, 13. 
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tegorical" is a tautology (CRC-II, 5), Collingwood replies 
that tautologies are always merely verbal. On his own·view 
of logic, universal propositions deal with real propositions 
and not just verbal ones--that is, they deal not merely with 
affirmations and negations about words, but about things 
( CR C- I I , 5 - 7) • 
In his first letter to Ryle, Collingwood located the 
problem at a different level: 
It seems probable to me that the fundamental point at is-
sue between us is concerned with the way in which we an-
swer the question "what is a universal?" .... It looks 
to me as if, in your logic, this question was answered by 
saying "a universal is a class"; i.e. that whenever we 
make a statement (assent to a proposition) about "all x" 
we are really making n statements about the n instances 
of~ which exist. The theory of universals Is thus, so 
to speak, resolved into the theory of classes. It seems 
to me that this analysis ... (following Russell) ... 
would represent a line of thought more or less identical 
with logical nominalism. In my own view, this line of 
thought is so far from satisfactory that it inverts the 
necessary order of analysis and is thus a case of obscurum 
per obscurius. I am disposed to think that what makes a 
number of things instances of a class is their common pos-
session of some common nature, and that this common nature 
(the so-called "universal") is thus the ratio essendi of 
the class as such. Instead of resolving the theory of 
universals into the theory of classes, I should therefore 
be inclined to the opposite line, of resolving the theory 
of classes into the theory of universals. This is of 
course akin to logical realism. (CRC-I, 28). 
In the conclusion of the letter Collingwood summarizes the 
matter in the statement that "the question which most funda-
mentally seems to divide us appears to me to be question: Is 
a universal simply a class, or is it that which makes a class 
a class?--where you take the first alternative and I the 
d" sec on ( CR C- I , 2 9 ) • 
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It does not take much imagination to see the connec-
tion between what Collingwood is here calling simply a "uni-
versal" and what he had called a "concrete universal" in~­
culum Mentis--a similarity which is all the more striking for 
the absence of that small qualifier, "concrete." It will be 
recalled from Chapters V and VII (above, pp. 5-3, 5-16, 7-22, 
7-28, 7-36, 7-39 and 7-47) that in Speculum Mentis Collingwood 
(a) contrasted the "concrete universal," or one to which the 
differences between its particulars are relevant," to the 
"abstract universal," which is "indifferent to the variation 
of its own particulars" or "to their own exemplification in 
this particular or that, and differentiated only in their spe-
cifications" (SM, 162-63). He also (b) contrasted the struc-
ture of a classificatory system based on abstract classes with 
the structure of a dialectical series of progressively inclu-
sive ("overlapping") universals (SM, 55, 162-64, 206-07); and 
(c) he contrasted the formal logic built on the notion of the 
abstract universal, or class-concept, with the dialectical 
logic which employs the concrete universal (SM, 49, 195, 279). 
And finally, (d) he argued that a dialectical logic which em-
ploys the concrete universal "destroyed any distinction be-
tween a logic of opposition and a logic of difference" (SM, 
244). 
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It is clear that the Essay continues and develops this 
line of thinking first sketched out in Speculum Mentis:. (a) 
is another way of stating the distinction between the philoso-
phical and the non-philosophical concept; (b) is transparently 
a description of a "scale of forms;" (c) is the contrast he is 
drawing between his own logic and that of Ryle, in his corres-
pondence with Ryle, his own being built on the notion of a 
universal concept as described in the Essay; and (d) is the 
"fusion" of "relations of opposition and distinction" and 
"differences of degree and of kind" as described in the Essay 
concerning the scale of forms. The logic described in the 
Essay is therefore the dialectical logic discussed in Speculum 
Mentis. 
If this is so there is one interesting corollary on 
the Essay's thesis that the "variable is identified with the 
generic essence"--about which we may speculate. Does Colling-
wood have in mind the fact that the F-logic built on the no-
tion of a class, the substitution of one or another instance 
for a "variable" takes for granted that no difference occurs, 
as a result of the substitution, to the formula in which the 
variable occurs? And if so, would this situation not be dras-
tically altered where the substitution-instances are specifi-
cations of a philosophical concept having the structure of a 
"scale of forms" as he describes it--i.e. one in which on in-
stance differs from another not only in degree but also in 
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kind, and has relations with it not only of distinction but 
of opposition as well? We should like to think that this is 
the case, so that when Collingwood speaks of an abstract uni-
versal as being "indifferent to the variation of its particu-
lars" we may understand him to mean that when an abstract 
term is being used as a simple class concept the relationship 
it has with its instances is a relationship of a variable 
with its replacement instances. But when a concept is so 
structured that it has a layering of overlapping meanings, 
such a relationship of sustitutivity or replacement is not 
possible without doing violence to its structure of meaning, 
or without reducing it to being an abstract class-concept. 
Remaining alert to this possibility, but also aware 
that it is not explicitly warranted by any texts of the 
Essay, we turn to his discussion of judgments--the point of 
contact between D-logic and Q-A logic. 
(4) As entries 4, 5, and 6 of Table 10 indicate, Col-
lingwood maintained that all philosophical judgments are uni-
versal, categorical, and affirm or deny concretely. Colling-
wood nowhere insists that this characterization of the philo-
sophical judgment is complete, but he does argue that it is 
minimally necessary. All three of these requirements pose 
difficulties for Q-A logic. The "principle of concrete af-
firmation and negation," for instance, applies to the class 
of expressions that in Q-A logic are called propositions, 
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namely that which can be true or false. But what about abso-
lute presuppositions? Collingwood's formulation of the prin-
ciple appears to relate it to the Q-A complex: 
The affirmative judgement in philosophy runs thus: S is 
p and not Q; the negative thus: S is not Q but P; where 
p and Q are equally definite and specific answers to the 
same question: what is S? The peculiarity of the phil-
osophical judgement in respect of quality, then, lies in 
the peculiar intimacy of the relation between its affirma-
tive and negative elements, which is of such a kind that 
p cannot be validly affirmed while Q is left indetermin-
ate, nor Q validly denied while P is left indeterminate. 
(EPM, 110-11). 
But this leads to the curious result that absolute presupposi-
tions, which are neither true nor false because not answers to 
questions, are not philosophical because they do not affirm or 
deny; either that or there are some philosophical propositions 
(namely absolute presuppositions) which neither affirm nor 
deny (or perhaps affirm without denying or deny without af-
firming)--which violates the principle of concrete affirma-
tion and negation. 
What we do not know is whether Collingwood would agree 
that whatever judgments affirm or deny must be also true or 
false, or whether there is a class of judgments which can af-
firm or deny, and do so concretely, without being either true 
or false. It is clear that from the point of view of Q-A 
logic, the latter case is clearly possible. It is also clear 
that D-logic makes affirmation and negation essential to judg-
ment as such: Collingwood writes in the Essay that ''Any judg-
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roent predicates a concept, and whenever we affirm one speci-
fic concept we deny the other specifications of the same ge-
nus" (EPM, 107). But what of truth or falsity in D-logic? 
(5) Truth and falsity in D-logic appear to have some-
thing to do with the universal-categorical aspect of phil-
osophical judgments. We shall take up the universality as-
pect in this section and the categorical aspect in the next. 
According to the Essay just as philosophical concepts are 
characteristically universal, so also are philosophical judg-
ments, but Collingwood seems to assume that his readers will 
understand what he means by this. (cf. EPM, 111). From his 
example of a universal judgment ("all men are mortal") we may 
assume that he means by it a judgment of the form "All S is 
P," or one which affirms or denies a predicate concept of a 
universal subject. But after having told us that the relation 
between concepts in philosophy is an intensional "overlap" 
rather than an extensional one, he describes the universal 
judgments of philosophy in extensional terms: 
The species universal, particular, and singular overlap; 
the universal judgement that all men are mortal does not 
exclude, it includes the particular judgement that some 
men are mortal and the singular judgement that this in-
dividual man Socrates is mortal. These three elements 
introduce differentiations into its significance, even 
considered as a universal judgement: as a pure universal, 
it means that man as such is mortal; as a universal of 
particulars, it means that every kind of man is mortal; 
as a universal of singulars it means that every indivi-
dual man is mortal. These are not so much three kinds of 
universal judgement as three elements present in every 
universal judgement whether in philosophy or anywhere 
else. (EPM, 111). 
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In the ensuing discussion Collingwood tries to dis-
tinguish the universality of philosophical judgments from that 
of others, but in the process appears to badly conflate what 
is here given in extensional terms with (a) what is empha-
sized in a judgment, (b) the sequence in which judgments are 
made, and (c) the priority of meaning of judgments. Thus he 
says that (a) the type of judgment in which the "determining 
element" is the singular (in what he calls induction by simple 
enumeration) is such that "each individual instance of S is 
found on examination to be P and is called a generalization;" 
but (b) a second type "begins not from the singular but from 
the particular" and "goes on to judge" that since each par-
ticular kind of S is P, S as such is P (which he calls an em-
pirical generalization); and (c) in the third type the univer-
sal element is taken as primary: "we begin by thinking that 
S as such is P, and this is seen to involve the particular, 
that any specific kind of S is P, and the singular, that each 
instance of S is P" (called the universal judgments of exact 
science or mathematics) (EPM, 111-12; cf. EPH, 135-36). In 
these cases the manner in which the universal judgment is 
reached, or its sequence in the way it is advanced, is taken 
as what determines the type or meaning of universal judgment 
it is, and the type of universal judgment indicates what is 
being emphasized in that judgment. 
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The compression of these three "types" into one judg-
ment--the universal judgment of philosophy--is evidently not 
8 source of embarrassment for Collingwood, and the best indi-
cation of this is in his response to Ryle on the matter. In 
the first letter of their correspondence he states that in his 
view logic is concerned with "real thinking" which "contains 
within itself every kind of proposition, simultaneously 
thought together and having a logically necessary structure--
these forming for any universal judgment its logical context, 
which consists of "things which if we didn't think we couldn't 
think what ex hypothesi we are thinking" (CRC-I, 16-19). 
Further: I believe that this logical context must have a 
certain logical structure. I believe, for example, that 
there are always in it affirmative and negative elements, 
... categorical and hypothetical elements ... ((and)) 
propositional and inferential elements. I believe that in 
any example of real thinking all these elements are pre-
sent; although ... they are certainly not all ordinarily 
(or perhaps ever) expressed in words ...• When I say 
"all," I am making a big assumption: I am assuming that 
there is a certain complex of element-types which forms a 
whole, and that every example of real thinking contains 
an example of every element-type contained in this whole. 
( CR C- I , 1 7 -18 ) . 
Collingwood confesses that he cannot give a complete account 
of the whole of element-types that he is discussing, but he 
admits that what he has in mind is (a) "the old-fashioned for-
mal logic" which holds that any proposition whatever must have 
a certain quality, quantity, relation, and modality--any com-
plete whole consisting of these four element-types with its 
respective alternative variants; and (b) he says that this 
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"old-fashioned formal logic" was modified by Kant who disting-
uished three element-types within each of the four character-
istics of a proposition, bringing the number of element-types 
to twelve. Without subscribing to this as a final number, 
Collingwood indicates his assent to the existence of a "good 
many" constant element-types found in any example of real 
thinking. 
He then concludes this remarkable synopsis of his be-
liefs concerning logic with the following sketch: 
I think that what ... I have called kinds of proposi-
tions, may be one of two things. They may be what I am 
here calling element-types, and in that case any example 
of real thinking will contain within itself ~ example of 
every kind of proposition. Or they may be . . . varie-
ties or-propositions which are not element-types, but are 
merely variants or alternative forms of this or that one 
element-type. In the former case, every kind of proposi-
tion (or inference for that matter) which the logician 
studies must be an element-type of which an instance is 
present in the real thinking done by himself as a logi-
cian. In the latter case, of course, this need not hap-
pen. Lastly I believe that the main task of logical 
theory is to ascertain, so far as one can, what I have 
called the logical structure of real thinking and the 
element-types involved in that structure. I expect that 
you would entirely deny this, and maintain that when the 
logician speaks about kinds of propositions he means not 
element-types but alternative varieties. I will not go 
on to argue that point; I will only observe that logical 
atomism, although I recognize the very important work 
which it can do in the analysis of propositions taken 
singly, begins by begging the question which I am here de-
clining to argue, in assuming that when we simultaneously 
assent to a number of propositions . . . we are not think-
ing simultaneously a complex of thoughts which must be 
thought together if it is to be thought at all, i.e. a 
complex having a logically necessary structure which is 
itself an important subject for logical study, but merely 
an assemblage of thoughts each of which presents to the 
logician only the problems arising out of itself taken by 
itself. (CRC-I, 18-20). 
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This very important letter is the only place, so far 
as I know, that we find Collingwood, as he says, "giving my-
self away rather completely" on the subject of his view of 
logic. We shall therefore be forced to rely on it heavily for 
an understanding of what Collingwood is attempting to say in 
the Essay. 
But in the context of our present discussion we no-
tice especially that it is not accidental when we find Col-
lingwood engaged in a compression of several logical functions 
into one act, since "real thinking" (which must be what is be-
ing expressed in a philosophical judgment) "contains within 
itself" all the "element-types" on which logical judgment is 
based; and further that this is a complex of thoughts which 
"must be thought together if it is to be thought at all, i.e. 
a complex having a logically necessary structure." But we 
shall have to be on our guard against accepting any manifesta-
tion of "real thinking" as a Deus ex machina explanatory de-
vice to resolve all logical discrepancies we may encounter. 
"Real thinking," whatever else it may be, has a "logically ne-
cessary structure," so that wherever this structure fails to 
appear we may assume that real thinking has not successfully 
occurred. 18 
18collingwood's first letter to Ryle also confirms 
~rom a different direction our earlier provisional character-
~zation of the Kantian standpoint of the Essay: his own state-
ment to Ryle that the "element-types" of "real thinking" cor-
respond roughly to the Kantian schematized categories gives 
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(6) We are still on the trail of what Collingwood's 
vieW in the Essay, and hence in D-logic, of truth and falsity 
is, and we come now to the chapter on philosophical judgments 
as categorical--perhaps the most controversial chapter in the 
entire Essay, primarily because of the use of the ontological 
argument and its extension to the domains of logic and ethics. 
As we have already noted, it was this chapter that set off the 
exchange between Collingwood and Ryle. 
Once again under the rubric of "categorical" Colling-
wood seems to be compressing into a single notion a number of 
functions which are logically distinct, 19 and in Ryle's criti-
cism of this chapter it is this compressive indistinctness 
that causes the greatest distress. Both in his review article 
and in his correspondence with Collingwood, Ryle accuses Col-
us grounds for saying that what Collingwood is attempting in 
the Essat is a brief survey of some salient features of what 
Kant woud call "transcendental logic" (although there is not 
much to be gained by overemphasizing this point). 
19At various points in Chapter VI of the Essay Col-
lingwood says about categorical philosophical judgments (a) 
that the subject of categorical judgments is something actu-
ally existing (EPM, 117); (b) that the subject of such judg-
ments cannot be conceived except as actual (or its essence 
implies existence) (EPM, 131, 133); (c) that the subject of 
such judgments actually provides an instance of itself (EPM, 
130); (d) that in such judgments we declare ourselves com-
mitted to believe that (a) ffiPM, 127); and (e) that anything 
describable by such a judgment is obliged to produce an in-
stance of itself (EPM, 130). 
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lingwood of failing to distinguish between propositions which 
assert concrete matters of fact (particular or existence pro-
positions, which Ryle holds are the same--all existence pro-
positions being particular propositions and vice-versa) and 
universal propositions which assert an abstract relationship 
between properties, but do not say anything about something 
which exists (CRC-II, 2, 4, 5; cf. MFA, 250-51). And indeed, 
Collingwood's formulation of the rule for categorical-
universal judgments in philosophyseems to be designed to cut di-
rectly across this distinction. In discussing the Anselmian 
ontological argument as an instance of the rule Collingwood 
writes: 
Divesting his argument of all specially religious or the-
ological colouring, one might state it by saying that 
thought, when it follows its own bent most completely and 
sets itself the task of thinking out the idea of an ob-
ject that shall completely satisfy the demands of reason, 
may appear to be constructing a mere ens rationis, but in 
fact is never devoid of objective or ontological refer-
ence ...• (I)n effect his argument amounts to this, 
that in the special case of metaphysical thinking the dis-
tinction between conceiving something and thinking it to 
exist is a distinction without a difference . . . . Re-
flection on the history of the Ontological Proof thus of-
fers us a view of philosophy as a form of thought in which 
essence and existence, however clearly distinguished, are 
conceived as inseparable. On this view, unlike mathema-
tics or empirical science, philosophy stands committed to 
maintaining that its subject matter is no mere hypothesis, 
but something actually existing. (EPM, 124-25, 127). 
In his response to Collingwood's Essay Ryle denied 
that the ontological argument proves anything because it is 
formally fallacious. Hence it does not prove that there is 
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anything about which it is true to say that its essence im-
plies its existence, because a statement of essence is B uni-
versal proposition and hence hypothetical. From a hypotheti-
cal statement alone or in conjunction with others no concrete 
matter of fact or existence proposition can be inferred. In 
order to infer the existence of something, Ryle argues, one 
needs at least one genuine singular proposition, i.e. one 
which either (a) embodies at least one logically proper name, 
or (b) has at least one definite description which in fact de-
scribes something. Unless a universal proposition rests on 
or contains a logically genuine singular proposition, it does 
not successfully refer. (CRC-II, 2, 5). 
In his reply to Ryle Collingwood counterattacked by 
denying the distinction on which Ryle based his disproof. It 
is, he says, fallacious: not all universal propositions are 
hypothetical, and it is not only singular and particular pro-
positions that can assert existence: 
You seem to me . . . to be arguing on the assumption . 
that any general proposition must belong to either one or 
the other of two classes ... "any-propositions" and 
"every-propositions." I wish to maintain that there are 
also what I will call "all-propositions." (a) any-
propositions. These are what you call general hypotheti-
cals, which do not depend for their truth on the existence 
· . . of any of the things to which they apply . . . . 
(Y)ou accept my account of these and my description of 
arithmetical and geometrical propositions as belonging to 
this type. (b) every-propositions. These I think you 
are assuming ... as a kind, and the only possible kind, 
of general categorical. They apply to every instance of 
a certain class, and depend for their truth upon the exist-
ence ... of these instances .... (Y)ou believe ... 
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that the only way in which a general proposition can be 
categorical is by being enumerative. With this logical 
doctrine is bound up a metaphysical doctrine to which 
... you also subscribe: viz. that what exists is an as-
semblange, or various assemblanges, of "particular mat-
ters of fact." ... But in fact I am quite consciously, 
in my essay, attacking these assumptions. I will admit 
for the sake of argument that there are any-propositions 
and every-propositions; but I contend that there are also 
all-propositions or (as some logicians have called them) 
"true universals" having a categorical character, i.e. 
they are not enumeratives, and yet they are not indiffer-
ent to the existence of the things to which they apply, 
but are of such a kind that their truth depends on that 
existence. I regard such propositions as especially 
characteristic of philosophy. (CRC-I, 24-25). 
This is as close as we shall ever come to understanding what 
the doctrine on truth is in the Essay, and since this issue 
(at least on Collingwood's view of it--cf. CRC-I, 7) crosses 
over the boundary of logic and enters that of metaphysics, we 
must postpone further discussion of this until Chapter X. 
But we must note here that in order to defend his case, 
Collingwood must produce at least one acceptable example of 
what is to count for a valid categorical universal judgment, 
or a synthetic a priori proposition. As we shall see in Chap-
ter X, in the Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood provides us 
With several candidates for such judgments--"God exists" be-
ing one of them, but others are offered in his discussion of 
the transcendental analytic section of Kant's first Critique. 
In the present instance Collingwood sticks to existential 
Propositions, as in his reply to Ryle: 
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I believe that such propositions as "God exists," "mind 
exists," "matter exists," and their contradictories, do 
not assert or deny particular matters of fact; nor do I 
believe that they assert or deny anything which cari be 
adequately described as collections or classes of matters 
of fact. To assert or deny propositions of this kind, 
with reasons given for the assertion or denial, seems to 
me the business of constructive or destructive meta-
physics • • . . I do think that a philosophical proposi-
tion may be e.g. about thought or matter; and ... if I 
learnt to use your language, I could call thought or mat-
ter a designated entity; but I could never allow that it 
was either a particular matter of fact or a mere collec-
tion of particular matters of fact. (CRC-I, 4, 6). 
But the most peculiar and idiosyncratic instance that 
Collingwood gives of the rule that philosophical judgments are 
never devoid of objective or ontological reference is not the 
Ontological Proof of Anselm, but his discussion of logic. He 
paraphrases this view in his letter to Ryle: 
Logic not only discusses, it also contains reasoning: 
consequently, whenever a logician argues a point in the 
theory of inference, he is producing an instance of the 
thing under discussion; and, since he cannot discuss with-
out arguing, he cannot discuss any point in the theory of 
inference without doing so. Consequently, in so far as 
it necessarily contains reasoning, the theory of reason-
ing ((i.e. logic)) cannot be indifferent to the existence 
of its own subject-matter; in other words, the proposi-
tions which constitute the body of that part of logic can-
not be in substance hypothetical. For example, if a logi-
cian could believe that no valid reasoning anywhere ex-
isted, he would merely be disbelieving his own logical 
theory. (CRC-I, 11-12; cf. EPM, 130). 
The logician, to paraphrase a paraphrase, not only mentions 
logic he also uses it in the construction of his logical sys-
tem. But both this example and the example he gives from 
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ethics 20 seem to illustrate a different point than the one he 
was making about the Ontological Proof of Anselm. Concerning 
logic and ethics he seems to be saying that such concepts are 
self-instantiating--logic being logical and ethics being ethi-
cal; and that the denial of such self-instantiating concepts 
leads to a different sort of absurdity--what might be called 
categorical nonsense (or perhaps what Austin has called "per-
formative absurdity"--cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 184). Thus if one 
were to set out to formally demonstrate that there is no such 
thing as logical demonstration, or if one were to argue that 
one ought not to say what one should or should not do, he 
would be engaging in a categorical (or performative) absurdity: 
what he says he is doing is incompatible with what he is do-
ing. But certainly the Ontological Proof does not produce or 
provide an instance of itself. Although it presumes a commit-
ment to the definition of God as a being than which none 
greater can be conceived, if one were to deny that ''a being 
none greater than which can be conceived" has ontological re-
ference he would not be doing something incompatible with what 
20collingwood argues that ethics cannot be merely de-
scriptive nor merely normative any more than can logic. Ethics 
describes not action as opposed to ideas of action, but the 
moral consciousness; and this it is forced to describe as al-
~ea~y being in some sense what it ought to be. Conversely 
fth1s in turn will affect the account which it gives of action; 
or no theory of moral ideals is conceivable which does not 
~dmit that to some extent moral ideas affect action" (EPM, 
32). Ethics, in short, must be ethical. 
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he is saying he is doing. The Ontological Proof does not seem 
to meet the description he is offering for categorical judg-
ments as self-instantiating, and at this point we do not have 
a clear idea of what Collingwood understands to be the uniting 
concept for these two sets of examples. 
A candidate for a common concept might be "having on-
tological reference." But then what sort of "ontological re-
ference" does logic have? If logic has ontological reference 
in the sense that it occurs as a thought-process in someone's 
mind who is thinking logically, then it is no less true that 
mathematics and empirical science have a similar reference. 
But the entire point of using the Ontological Proof as an ex-
ample seems to indicate that the "ontological reference" that 
he has in mind is not merely to "second intentions" or to 
mental events: it is not, he says, a mere ens rationis but 
something actually existing. We therefore seem to ~e left 
with the suggestion that there are some judgments which ne-
cessarily imply the existence of what they describe. But then 
this narrows the field to the one special case being dis-
cussed in Anselm's argument, as Collingwood himself admits: 
"What it does prove is that essence involves existence, not 
always, but in one special case, the case of God in the meta-
physical sense: the Deus sive natura of Spinoza, the Good of 
Plato, the Being of Aristotle: the object of metaphysical 
thought: (EPM, 127). It is true that Collingwood attempts to 
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extend this "object" to "philosophical thought in general" by 
adding that "metaphysics . . . is not unique in its objective 
reference or in its logical structure; all philosophical 
thought is of the same kind, and ... partakes of the nature 
of metaphysics, which is not a separate philosophical science 
but a special study of the existential aspect of that same 
subject-matter whose aspect of truth is studied by logic, and 
its aspect as goodness by ethics" (EPM, 127). But the exten-
sion fails to convince the reader, for there is no good reason 
provided for dropping the limitation of the "essence involves 
existence" maxim to that "one special case" being discussed in 
the ontological proof. 
But here we once again encounter Collingwood's advance 
warning that he will not pursue the consequences of his Essay 
into the realm ~f metaphysics (much as we are tempted to admit 
that he has already done so), and we must leave the matter in 
this unsatisfactory state (as he himself does) until we have 
an opportunity to examine his explicit views on metaphysics in 
greater detail. 21 
21 The reader is left at this paint with the very un-
easy suspicion that Collingwood has stated a very important 
~hilosophical truth, but expressed it very badly, and left it 
1n a highly ambiguous state. Everyone knows that philosophers 
have claimed to be stating truths that have ontological refer-
~nce, and further that they have employed arguments to rein-
?rce these truths. What is in question (at least since the 
t1me of Hume) is whether there is any necessary validity to 
~hat claim, and whether their arguments succeed in demonstrat-
1ng what their authors believe they do. Collingwood seems to 
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(7) If the chapter on categorical thinking is the 
most controversial one in the Essay, the chapter on philoso-
1 . f 22 . h . 1 . . h h h phica ~n erence ~s t e most ax~a : ~t ~s t e c apter t at 
more than any other displays what is unique in a philosophi-
cal methodology that ideally unifies the specific topics in 
philosophy; and it is the chapter in which Collingwood com-
pletes the discussion of the work of his predecessors on the 
subject. 23 In Collingwood's view the development of the idea 
be saying that the real tradition in philosophy has always 
been committed to maintaining this claim to ontological refer-
ence, and that to abandon it is to abandon philosophy. But to 
adequately argue that the ontological reference claims of meta-
physicians is successful he would have to rely on something 
more than the evidence provided by the ontological argument. 
What is required is a fully developed theory of meaning and 
reference. In the sequel we shall see that he did make a 
start on such a theory in his discussion of language and men-
tal acts. 
22Part of the material of Chapter VIII of 
was presented in our own Chapter VII, Section 2. 
wood's view of inference, cf. IH, 253-56. 
the Essay 
On Colling-
23 In the first chapter Collingwood reviewed the stages 
of development of the notion of philosophical method, which 
we saw falling into four major phases: (a) the Socratic phase, 
in which the function of dialectical questioning was vigor-
ously employed to make implicit thought explicit in defini-
tions; (b) the Platonic phase, in which dialectical method is 
expanded to include arguments which directionally proceed from 
quasi-mathematical, hypothetical definitions to non-
hypothetical first principles of thought, primarily by removal 
of hypothetical restrictions as the argument proceeds; (c) the 
Cartesian phase, in which mathematics is taken as an explicit 
model for philosophical method (but continually violated in 
actual practice by Descartes and his followers by employing 
arguments that are not strictly speaking deductive and do not 
e(mploy first principles which are self-evident); and finally, 
4) the Kantian phase, in which philosophy is freed from math-
ematical methodology by recognizing that in philosophy there 
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of philosophical methodology culminates in the demand for 
a self-justifying kind of thinking. Justification in a 
philosophical context requires argument, argument means in-
ference, and inference suggests inductive and deductive rea-
soning. Since Collingwood has all along been comparing phil-
osophical method with the method of exact and empirical sci-
ences, it is not surprising that the culmination of this com-
parison occurs in a chapter which deals with inference. If 
philosophy is to escape scepticism and dogmatism it must show 
how its arguments can be self-justifying without being circu-
are no definitions, no axioms, and no demonstrations of a 
sort essentially mathematical (EPM, 4-6, 10-25, 155-56). The 
first chapter ends with a critical discussion of Kantian me-
thodology, which, Collingwood says, fails to adequately re-
concile the conflicting claims of the critical method (a) as 
a propaedeutic to philosophy proper (i.e. to metaphysics) and 
(b) as philosophy itself (EPM, 20-24). In Chapter VII ("Two 
Sceptical Positions"--a chapter which, like Chapter X, ap-
pears to be an aside but is not) Collingwood resumes his dis-
cussion of critical philosophy which he takes to be one of 
two related sceptical positions (the other being analytic 
philosophy) which dominate the contemporary philosophical 
scene. In essence his reply to the attempt to reduce phil-
osophy to the function of criticism is that it assumes posi-
tive standards of consistency from which it finds its subject 
diverging, and unless it undertakes to defend these standards 
it fails to justify itself and assumes a dogmatic stance with 
respect to its subject-matter (EPM, 140-41). Similarly the 
"analytic view" (of which he finds Moore and Russell repre-
sentative) cannot exempt the positive principles it assumes 
as true from common sense and/or science from its analysis 
without self-contradiction (EPM, 143-46; cf. 138-39, 142 n. 1). 
The upshot of this discussion of critical and analytic philoso-
phy is that if philosophy is to avoid both scepticism (the re-
sult of an unbridled exercise of destructive criticism) and 
dogmatism (the result of assuming certain principles to be 
true without justification), it must present positive grounds 
for its own activity; that is, it must be self-justifying. 
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lar. We might rightfully expect this to be the most crucial 
chapter in the Essay. 
Noting that (a) "in its demand for close and cogent 
reasoning, philosophy resembles exact science," i.e. "each 
alike works on the principle that no conclusions may be as-
serted for which valid and sufficient reason cannot be given" 
{EPM, 154); but also that (b) it resembles empirical science 
insofar as "it is supported throughout its texture by cross-
references to experience (EPM, 164), Collingwood raises the 
question whether and how philosophical inference can be de-
ductive {like exact science) and/or inductive (like empirical 
science--EPM, 151; cf. IH, 254-55). For the purpose of dis-
tinguishing philosophical inference from both deduction and 
induction, Collingwood analyzes inference into three compon-
ents: the data from which the argument proceeds, the prin-
ciples according to which inference takes place, and the con-
clusions to which the argument leads (EPM, 151). It is on 
these three that he compares the inferences of mathematics, 
empirical science, and philosophy. 
In exact science the data are suppositions, the prin-
ciples are axioms, and the conclusions are inferred in the 
sense of being demonstrated or shown to follow with perfect 
logical rigor from the data according to the principles. The 
axioms are of two sorts: those of logic, which do not belong 
to the body of mathematics proper and are properly speaking 
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not suppositions but presuppositions "in the sense that un-
less they were true the science could not take a single· step 
in advance;" and special axioms, which are part of exact sci-
ence, but are "self-evident" or indemonstrable, and known to 
be true by a kind of intuition (EPM, 151-52). 24 The argu-
ments of exact science are therefore irreversible--that is, 
"the conclusions are logically dependent on the axioms; 
there is no reciprocal dependence of the axioms on the con-
elusions" (EPM, 153). 
Empirical science, on the other hand, relies on a 
sort of inference known as inductive reasoning, in which in-
dividual facts empirically known by perception, or the his-
torical record of perceptions in the past, are the data from 
which conclusions in the form of universal propositions are 
24As is clear from the example he uses, Collingwood 
has Euclidean geometry in mind as a model for exact science. 
But he covers himself from attack on the grounds that no con-
temporary geometrician would accept "self-evident" as descrip-
tive of geometrical axioms. Collingwood writes that "the 
main lines of this view are not, for our purposes, affected 
if it is maintained that the special axioms are not known to 
be true, but only assumed ... ((because)) in that case we 
shall have to say that the entire body of the science con-
sists of assumptions, but that these fall into two classes: 
primary or fundamental assumptions, the so-called special 
axioms, and secondary or derivative assumptions, the so-called 
conclusions." In either case "the logical axioms cannot be 
merely assumed, for ... we cannot think as if the principles 
of thinking were true, for if they were not we should not be 
thinking" (EPM, 153). The contemporary geometer would have to 
agree that some sort of deductive inference-structure is pre-
supposed, and that this is not a part of the content ("body" 
as Collingwood puts it) of geometry itself. 
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to be derived (EPM, 165). The principles of induction are, 
like exact science, of two sorts: logical principles pre-
sumed as certain, and assumptions with the degree of certi-
tude only that they are known not to be untrue, and that it 
is expedient to use them--a certitude which increases in pro-
bability as the inductive inquiry proceeds, but never reverts 
to deductive certitude (EPM, 165-67). Comparing deductive 
and inductive inference, Collingwood concludes: 
The logical movement of inductive thought is therefore 
irreversible in the same sense as that of exact science. 
The principles on which induction rests receive in re-
turn no support from the inductive process itself . . . . 
The process of thought in exact science, though irrever-
sible as regards its principles, may be reversible as re-
gards its data .... In this respect, inductive argu-
ment is not reversible; for its data are what they are be-
cause they enjoy the status of facts vouched for by per-
ception; and although we can infer the existence of an un-
observed fact from reasons inductively established by the 
study of similar facts, we only infer it (where to infer, 
as always in the context of inductive thought, means to 
establish as probable) and do not perceive it. (EPM, 
167). 
Philosophical inference differs from both induction 
and deduction which as species of the philosophical genus, in-
ference, overlap. (a) In philosophical inference there is no 
division of axioms into those belonging to the science and 
those belonging to logic, since logical principles are part of 
philosophical thought itself. As a consequence philosophy 
cannot neglect its own logical presuppositions (EPM, 154-55). 
(b) What appears in philosophy as an axiom or indemonstrable 
Proposition serving as a starting point is, as philosophical 
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argument proceeds, justified by what follows it. In this 
procedure philosophical inference has the form of what Kant 
had called a "transcendental deduction." Thus the Cartesian 
cogito is neither a self-evident truth nor an assumption, but 
rather "in Kantian language the principle cogito ergo sum is 
•.. transcendentally deduced, that is, shown to be the con-
dition on which experience as it actually exists . is 
alone possible" (EPM, 156). (c) This means that philosophy 
is obliged to justify its own starting point. (EPM, 159). 
But (d): 
This can be done only if the arguments of philosophy, in-
stead of having an irreversible direction from principles 
to conclusions, have a reversible one, the principles es-
tablishing the conclusion, and the conclusions recipro-
cally establishing the principles. But an argument of 
this kind .•. is a vicious circle. The solution of the 
dilemma lies ... in the Socratic principle that phil-
osophical reasoning leads to no conclusions which we did 
not in some sense know already . . . . Establishing a 
proposition in philosophy, then, means not transferring 
it from the class of things unknown to the class of 
things known, but making it known in a different and bet-
ter way. (EPM, 160-61). 
(e) Philosophical knowing in this way differs from that of 
exact science inasmuch as the conclusions are in some sense 
known without any proof at all: the arguments of philosophy 
exhibit as a reasoned and ordered whole of interconnected 
knowledge what was already in substance known before the work 
of philosophical inference occurred at all: 
If philosophy differs from exact science in this way--the 
anticipation . . . of its conclusions by an experience 
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that possesses them in substance before its reasoning be-
gins--other differences will follow, the chief being that 
in philosophy the conclusions can be checked by comparing 
them with these anticipations, and that by this checking 
the principles at work in the reasoning can be verified. 
If this is so the direction of the argument in respect of 
principles and conclusions is reversible, each being es-
tablished by appeal to the other; but this is not a vi-
cious circle because the word "established"here means 
raised to a higher grade of knowledge: what was a mere 
observation is now not merely observed but understood; 
what was merely an abstract principle is verified by ap-
peal to facts. (EPM, 163). 
(f) Philosophy differs from empirical science insofar as the 
initial data of philosophy does not consist of individual facts 
apprehended by perception, but of universal propositions appre-
hended in the experience of thinking; and the conclusions of 
philosophical inference are not something new, but are the 
facts themselves more thoroughly understood (EPM, 168-69). 
"(I )n philosophy the knowledge . . . why things are so makes 
a difference to the knowledge that they are so" (EPM, 169). 
(g) The "experience" on which "conclusions" are philosophi-
cally based, and by appeal to which they are checked, is only 
"non-philosophical" or "pre-philosophical" in a relative 
sense: 
These two phrases ((i.e. experience and conclusions)) are 
names for any two successive stages in the scale of forms 
of philosophical knowledge. What is called experience may 
be any stage in this scale; in itself, as all human ex-
perience must be, permeated through and through by philo-
sophical elements; but relatively crude and irrational as 
compared with the next stage above it, in which these phil-
osophical elements are more fully developed . . . . But 
what is asked of the higher is not simply that it should 
agree with the lower, but rather that it should explain 
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it .... The accomplishment of this task is only the 
continuation of a process already begun; it was only by 
thinking that we reached the point at which we stand, for 
the experience upon which we philosophize is already a 
rational experience . . . . But the new and intenser 
thinking must be thinking of a new kind; new principles 
are appearing in it, and these give a criterion by which 
the principles involved in the last step are superceded. 
( EPM, 17 2-7 3) . 
The ultimate response to the charge of vicious circularity in 
philosophical reasoning is therefore that, since all experience 
is already somewhat systematic and rational, whenever its sys-
tematic connections are exhibited, the experience is "estab-
lished" in a higher sense of the term. (In the language of 
The Principles of Art, one might say that it is not merely a 
datum but an interpreted datum.) The "reciprocal" establish-
ment in philosophical inference is therefore not truly recip-
rocal or circular, but more like the coiled meanings in a 
scale of forms. (h) But this response seems to get us out of 
the Charybdis of vicious circularity only be dashing us against 
the Scylla of vacuous philosophical inference: for did Col-
lingwood not just tell us that the distinguishing mark of phil-
osophical inference was that it is reversible as deductive and 
inductive inference are not? Collingwood's reply is that 
philosophical inference is always deductive and inductive, 
just as it is always critical and analytical, but always with 
a difference. As deductive it is a complete system based on 
principles and connected throughout by strictly logical bonds; 
but as such its principles are open to criticism on the 
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grounds that they must succeed in explaining our experience. 
As inductive it seeks rational universality; but only by 
finding it already present in the activity of philosophizing 
which is already occurring. As critical it always seeks to 
refute theory; but only in order to leave an experience 
standing which can be interpreted in the light of the princi-
ples implied in the critical process itself. And as analyti-
cal it begins with a knowledge-datum and seeks to explain 
what this knowledge means; but in so doing we come to know 
that datum in a different way, and therefore as modified in 
the knowing of it. (EPM, 173-75). 
There is much left unexplained in this account of 
philosophical inference. For example we would like to know 
precisely how philosophy employs the logical principles which 
are a part of it, as stated in (a); and we would like to know 
more about what the conditional possibility in a "transcen-
dental deduction" in (b) consists of, and in what sense ne-
cessity is involved in such a deduction, and if this is the 
same as "justification" in (c); and we would like to know how 
it is possible to "know already" in (c) an experience which 
in (f) is called universal and non-perceptual, and in (g) is 
called rational; and most of all we would like to know what 
it means for this experience, and indeed all experience, to 
be permeated through and through with philosophical elements 
as stated in (g). 
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What appears to be presupposed in all this is a full-
blown epistemology that is only hinted at rather than e.xpli-
citly stated. Some of the outlines of this epistemology will 
appear in the next and succeeding section of this chapter 
when we come to examine the intellectual functions of mind 
and the analysis of language, where we shall find some hints 
towards the resolution of several of these problems (e.g. in 
the notion of a pre-reflective act of meaning at the first 
level of consciousness, and in the view that rationality it-
self--including rational inference--is an extension of con-
sciousness' demand for meaning, in this case what might be 
called "rational meaning" at the level of reasoned discourse). 
But before coming to this discussion and the implications 
for Q-A logic, we have one more "key concept" from the Essay 
to deal with. 
(8) It is in Chapter IX that Collingwood comes clos-
est to evaluating the dialectical logic of the Essay in terms 
of the criteria of consistency, completeness, and formality 
which we discussed in connection with Q-A logic in the pre-
ceding section. In this chapter Collingwood examines the 
claim of philosophy to be systematic and constructive rather 
than piecemeal and analytic--a claim that has been assaulted 
since the 19th century on the grounds that a system of thought 
claims for itself finality, completeness, objectivity, and 
Unity, and philosophy has none of these. Our philosophical 
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knowledge is always open to future developments, is beyond 
the terminable survey of any individual, is the expression 
of a personal and private point of view, and effectively 
solves its problems not by mass generalities, but by hand-
ling each problem individually (EPM, 176-78). 
Collingwood's reply in essence is that even if one 
concedes each of these points to the critic, the ideal of a 
system remains undaunted. (a) While not absolutely final, 
all knowledge in order to advance must take account of where 
it presently stands, and therefore retains a synoptic or sum-
marizing element. In philosophy this record of progress is 
intensified insofar as any new development does not merely add 
to permanent and unaltered assets, but requires that previous 
conclusions be re-examined in the light of new developments 
(EPM, 179-81). And (b) while not absolutely complete, every 
philosophy is a borrowing from past philosophies and a colla-
boration with present philosophical thought, so that there is 
not and never has been any such thing as a private, personal, 
self-contained system of philosophy (EPM, 181-82). 25 And (c) 
although each philosopher contributes only a part of a total 
. 
25This obviously does not answer the objection: some-
th1ng may be no less incomplete for having taken account of 
previous and contemporary discussion of an issue, or even for 
h~ving taken into account all such discussion, since all pre-
V1ous discussion may have missed the essential point. What 
~ust be shown is that all the relevant or pertinent issues are 
ealt with satisfactorily. 
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and hence his work is not that system but only a per-system, 
tion of it, in philosophy that contribution includes a theory 
of the whole of what philosophy is, and thus anticipates its 
objective conclusions (EPM, 182-84). And finally, (d) only 
an "anarchist of the mind" would fail to see that even a me-
thodical avoidance of rigidity is itself a system or method, 
and although a philosopher should avoid bondage to any ready-
made or rigid formula, a willingness to revise one's princi-
ples in the light of one's conclusions does not necessitate 
the rejection of all principles or of all conclusions (EPM, 
184-85). 
But Collingwood feels that the real answer to all 
these objections to systematic philosophy is made possible by 
regarding the topics or constituents of philosophy as com-
prising a scale of overlapping forms, wherein each topic dif-
fers from the rest not only in kind but also in degree. The 
universal subject-matter of philosophy differs intensively 
and specifically whether the genus is divided into the spe-
cies of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc.; or 
in the division of the subject into historical phases (an-
cient, medieval, modern); or at the contemporaneous level in 
the division between what may minimally pass for philosophy, 
what retains its coherence in being grouped into one or more 
schools of thought, and the final "common spirit" of the pres-
ent age; or finally in one's own philosophy, in the division 
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between unexamined opinions, criticized and defined asser-
tions held with greater conviction, and a fully articulated 
and systematic whole of philosophical judgments (EPM, 194-
98). In any of these arrangements of philosophical topics a 
systematic ideal is present as a scale of forms, which at 
each point sums up the scale to that point, showing how sub-
ordinate positions are opposed to and distinct from that 
point, and in error by comparison to a higher point on the 
scale (EPM, 190). In a scale of forms of philosophical know-
ledge any particular position is a non-final summary, an in-
complete termination, a subjective necessity, and uniformly 
or methodically flexible (EPM, 191-92). Each approximates to 
an ideal of a perfectly philosophical subject matter treated 
by a perfectly philosophical method (EPM, 192). 
Now although in this discussion of system in Chapter 
IX of the Essay there is no clear correspondence with the cri-
teria for systematicity which we examined under the titles of 
consistency, completeness, and formality, in connection with 
our comparison of Q-A and F-logics, we can nevertheless see 
a rough correspondence between the description of a system 
which Collingwood here employs and those used to evaluate 
formal axiomatic systems in F-logic. Thus the criterion of 
consistency (that within the system propositions containing 
formal contradictions are not provable) roughly corresponds 
to the claim of unity in a philosophical system; completeness 
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(that all true statements within the system are derivable from 
the axioms and rules of method within the system) correspond 
roughly (but with considerable overlap) to Collingwood's 
terms "finality" and "completeness"; and formality (that the 
construction of well-formed statements within a system is car-
ried out by the strict application of its rules, and not by 
the interpretation of specific meanings of the terms within 
the statement--i.e. that there be a purely formal way to de-
cide which statements are well formed within the system) 
roughly corresponds to what Collingwood is calling ''objecti-
"t .. 26 Vl. y. 
But the points of difference are more striking than 
the points of superficial similarity. It is obvious from the 
discussion of philosophical inference in Chapter VIII of the 
Essay that, as Collingwood conceives it, D-logic is not sim-
ply a deductive system, and therefore to apply axiomatic cri-
teria for evaluating it as a formal, consistent, and complete 
system would not be altogether appropriate. A system in which 
principles are revisable in the light of conclusions obvi-
ously transgresses the requirements of an axiomatic system of 
F-logic, in which the axioms or principles are stated in an 
object-language and the rules in a meta-language, in which 
the rules and principles are never revisable in the light of 
26cf. Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought, 
pp. 35, 72-73. 
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conclusions. For (a) if the meaning of terms within the sys-
tem can form scales of overlapping forms, it is difficult to 
see how a criterion of strict consistency can be upheld, 
since the prerequisite of semantic identity of terms is vi-
olated every times such a term definable by a scale of forms 
is introduced. And (b) if the highest term in a dialectical 
system is summational or synoptic but not final, it is clear 
that a higher term (a statement that first appears as a de-
nial but implies the positive principles on which the criti-
cism is based) can always b·~ introduced which is not strict-
ly inferable from within the system (since its positive prin-
ciples do not yet lie within the system)--in short, the sys-
tem is always incomplete. And (c) if experience is the touch-
stone of a revision (or reversal) of an argument from conclu-
sions to principles, even if this experience is that of a 
thinker, it is clear that the ideal of a purely formal valid-
ity cannot be maintained. 
This brings us back to the question of circularity, 
which is all the more vicious in that it appears to escape ob-
jectivity altogether: for whatever "experience" is appealed 
to, it will always be merely someone's property unless what 
it means can be communicated in objective form. Collingwood's 
appeal to experience in both the discussion of philosophical 
inference in Chapter VIII and in his discussion of systematic 
Philosophy in Chapter IX casts a suspicion of radical subjec-
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tivity on the whole enterprise of the Essay. The issue raised 
by the entire argument of the Essay is this: if philosophical 
arguments are reversible on the basis of experience (and there-
fore its principles are corrigible), how does one know when 
one has successfully inferred in a philosophical sense? Col-
lingwood wants to say that a successful philosophical infer-
ence is one which increases our understanding of experience at 
the same time it changes it (or makes a difference to it). 
But if the criterion of success appealed to here is the fact 
of "philosophical experience" or "the experience of a thinker," 
then the argument of Chapter VIII is truly and merely circu-
lar: we know that philosophical inference is successful be-
cause we know we draw successful philosophical inferences. 
But the appeal to experience is inadequate as a criterion of 
success, since not all or just any philosophical inference 
will do. Some are better than others, some contradict others, 
some (as in Plato's dialogues) are meant to be understood as 
logically fallacious. 
Another way of stating the problem is that if the cri-
terion of successful philosophical inference is epistemologi-
cal (one form of knowledge explaining another), how are we to 
decide what is good epistemology? Will any old theory of 
knowledge do? What about a realist's epistemology? We have 
seen that Collingwood argues that a realist epistemology is 
unsuccessful, but he argues that it fails not because it is 
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not epistemology (which it is: it purports to explain what oc-
curs in knowing--that is, it makes knowing an object of know-
ledge), nor because it does not explain experience (which it 
does: it puts forward a theory of how objects are known), but 
because it fails to be good epistemology. It contradicts it-
self by talking formal nonsense about unsensed sensa, knowing 
what is simultaneously declared to be unknown, etc. On the 
"experience" of realist epistemology alone, on Collingwood's 
grounds, we could not say that we have successfully inferred 
in a philosophical sense. 
But if we take seriously Collingwood's remark that 
when we talk about "establishing principles" it is in a dif-
ferent and higher sense of the term "establish" than when we 
talk about "establishing experience," then we may have a way 
out of this vicious circularity while retaining a legitimate 
sense of philosophical inference--and this is the only hope 
that the entire argument of the Essay has. Collingwood's com-
mitment to the assertion that philosophical concepts are ar-
ranged as a scale of overlapping forms, also commits him to 
the conclusion that the principles employed in philosophical 
argument are increasing both in generality (taking in more of 
our experience) and in intensional reference (stating more of 
what is in that experience in terms of significance). This 
"higher knowledge" is systematic knowledge as articulated and 
related in a system of discourse bound by logical relations 
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and (inasmuch as it is not merely formal) categorically refer-
ential. If this "higher knowledge" is the same thing as what 
he meant by "real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle, 
then it is possible that the criterion of success in philoso-
phical inference may be the same as the criterion of a success-
ful epistemology; it is the articulation of our own knowledge 
as a system of discourse, logically related and categorically 
referential. In the next section we shall pursue this lead 
into Collingwood's philosophy of mind and his analysis of 
language, and in so doing catch sight of logic as an exten-
sion of meaning at the rational level. 
But before proceeding with this analysis we must make 
good a previous promise. We are now in as good a position as 
we shall ever be to evaluate the standpoing of the Essay. We 
noted in a previous chapter and also at the beginning of this 
section that (a) the Essay claims both conditional and uncon-
ditional validity for itself, and (b) that its treatment of 
pre- and non-philosophical methods cannot be taken as liter-
ally true for mathematics and empirical science. But within 
this present section we have also seen that Collingwood (c) 
extended philosophical concepts to include all experience (all 
human experience is "permeated through and through by philoso-
phical elements" (EPM, 172); (d) declared that philosophical 
thought is never devoid of ontological reference (EPM, 125); 
(e) criticized analytical and critical philosophy for failing 
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to justify themselves by presenting the positive principles 
from which their critical and analytical methods proceed (EPM, 
145, 148-49); (f) insisted that philosophy is obliged to pro-
duce a theory of itself and to be constructive and systematic 
(EPM, 1, 198); and finally, (g) stated that what he is doing 
in the Essay is to discuss the nature of philosophy by dis-
cussing not only what it is or has been, but also what it is 
trying to or ought to be (EPM, 2, 4, 7). 
From (e), (f), and (g) it follows that the Essay is 
stating a theory of philosophy that is nonetheless itself 
philosophy, and is stating what philosophy is and what it 
ought to be by presenting its positive principles. From these 
and (d) it follows that, ideally speaking, what is true of 
philosophy must also be true to some extent for reality (i.e. 
philosophy cannot be content with constructing a mere ens ra-
tionis or formal system, but must have ontological reference). 
And from these together with (c) it follows that (once more 
within unspecified bounds) what is true for philosophy is 
true to some extent for all experience. 
Now the reason that we must hedge these conclusions 
with qualifiers like "to some extent" and "ideally speaking" 
is that we cannot simply apply the concepts of the Essay in 
a wholesale manner either to experience in general or to re-
ality. Obviously not all concepts overlap in a scale of form~ 
nor is everything in reality arranged in hierarchical fashion. 
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Furthermore if the classificatory ideal of exact and empiri-
cal science is retained as a legitimate way to organize ex-
perience (which is never denied in the Essay), then either 
one must deny to it the title of true experience, which is 
then reserved for philosophy alone, or else state that there 
are valid experiences not subject to the characteristics of 
philosophical experience. 
But if we approach the Essay from the perspective pro-
vided by Speculum Mentis we can say that Collingwood would 
choose the first alternative: although it is quite possible 
to adopt the scientific point of view on experience, such a 
viewpoint cannot be ultimately and finally true (i.e. true un-
conditionally or absolutely), but only true in an abstract way. 
If, as Speculum Mentis proposes, all knowledge is truly or-
ganized in a scale of forms, and if the doctrine of the Essay 
concerning the relative standing of successive terms in this 
scale as "experience" and "conclusion" be taken seriously, 
then it follows that the relative position of empirical sci-
ence and philosophy are such that empirical science is "ex-
perience" to philosophy's "conclusion." Furthermore if this 
conclusion is already present as an experience which "anti-
cipates" its conclusion before reasoning about it begins, then 
empirical science is an experience which anticipates the con-
clusions that are first stated explicitly by philosophy. 
Philosophy "explains" science only by incorporating its posi-
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tive content, and rejecting its negative aspect (i.e. its ab-
stractness). From the point of view of Speculum Mentis, then, 
the closest that we can come to saying what the Essay's evalu-
ation of exact and empirical science is, isthat they are not 
what philosophy explicitly states itself to be. Philosophy is 
self-justifying; exact and empirical sciences are not. (Cf. 
Rubino££, CRM, 26-27). 
Unfortunately this gets us into difficulties concern-
ing our original statement that the Essay utilizes an essen-
tially Kantian strategy--i.e. it assumes the fact of certain 
experiences and goes on to ask on what necessary and suffi-
cient conditions such an experience is alone possible. We are 
left, as we were in Chapter VII above, confronting something 
resembling the "absolute knowledge" of an Hegelian sort ra-
ther than confronting conditional schematized categories with-
out which experience would not be intelligible. The Essay 
leaves us in unresolved puzzlement about this matter, except 
to the extent that Collingwood makes it clear that he is not 
content with leaving philosophical method where Kant had left 
it in the Critique of Pure Reason: philosophy cannot be con-
tent with viewing itself as merely critical--it must go fur-
ther and state what the positive grounds are from which cri-
ticism proceeds. But the positive grounds that he provides, 
as we shall see in a moment, are not a repetition of his con-
flicting remarks about "absolute knowledge" in Speculum Mentis, 
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but a development of the theme of language that we first dis-
covered in germ in Speculum Mentis. 
But where does all this leave us in our discussion of 
1 . ? Q-A ogle. In the previous section of this chapter we found 
that although Collingwood proposed Q-A logic as an alternative 
to F-logic, on examination it turns out either to presuppose 
it or to presuppose what F-logic presupposes; meaning, vali-
dity, and truth appear to be establishable independently of 
Q-A or P-Q-A complexes, and Q-A logic (either as Q-AA or 
Q-AM) fails to meet criteria of consistency, completeness, or 
formality. In this section we have been primarily concerned 
with discussing D-logic and its relationship to F-logic, from 
which it differs in a number of important ways (employing 
overlapping classes, reversible inferences, etc.). Q-A logic 
has hardly entered into the discussion. In the next section 
we shall see that rather than being an oversight on Colling-
wood's part, it is an indication that in his view these three 
logics are related primarily by locating them in an epistemo-
logical context--i.e. through the intellective, linguistic 
functions of mind. 
As we noted above, the clue to the discovery of the 
nature of philosophical thinking in the Essay is the overlap 
of classes, and this is described in essentially semantic 
terms: it is an overlap ofintensional meaning, and meaning 
is a function of mind at the linguistic level of conscious-
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ness. The final step in our analysis of Collingwood's views 
on logic must therefore take us back to the philosophy of 
mind in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. After 
surveying the functions of intellect and reason in these two 
works, we shall attempt a final evaluation of the roles of the 
three logics we have been discussing. 
4. Language and Logic in The Principles of Art. 
In our exploration of Collingwood's views on logic we 
have noted not only a certain informality to his presentation 
of both Q-A and D-logics, but also a tendency to describe 
these logics in epistemological terms--concepts, judgments, 
suppositions made by acts of choice, Q-A correlativity de-
fined in terms of persons, etc.--in short, terms which retain 
a reference to mental activities as part of their essential 
meaning. While any practitioner of contemporary formal logic 
would find this to be archaic flaw, we find Collingwood in 
his correspondence with Ryle insisting on the propriety of 
this epistemological informality, and even suggesting (as in 
the passage where he states that he understands the universal 
to be that which makes a class a class) that there is somehow 
a priority of the epistemological to the formal: that there 
can be an F-logic depends on the fact that there are certain 
"element-types" of which thought is capable, and it is on the 
basis of these that F-logical systems are constructable. 
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Now all this leans heavily on a philosophy of lang-
uage and mind for its justification, and we left our examina-
tion of Collingwood's philosophy of mind at exactly the point 
where we now wish to resume the discussion. Whatever else 
Q-A logic, F-logic, and D-logic may have in common, they are 
varieties of discourse, and hence linguistic functions of mind 
at the level of intellect. Consequently we must return to 
~ Principles of Art (and in the next section to The New 
Leviathan) to examine as best we can the functions of mind at 
the conceptual, propositional, and rational levels, in order 
to see if we can find a clue to unscrambling some of the puz-
zles we have thus far encountered in our examination of the 
three logics with which we are presently concerned. This will 
eventually lead us into a discussion of Collingwood's views 
on abstraction, which has been such a sensitive issue for Col-
lingwood's interpreters, and which we have thus far avoided. 
Once more, at the risk of oversimplification, we shall 
first present an outline of Collingwood's major conclusions on 
language in The Principles of Art. 
L 
2. 
3. 
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TABLE 11 
LANGUAGE AND EXPRESSION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF ART 
Expression is the fundamental practical act of mind in 
which emotions are manifested by bodily acts. It is by 
the same act that we express an emotion and become con-
scious of it. When a man expresses an emotion what is 
meant is that he finds himself in a feeling-situation of 
emotional excitement from which he attempts to extricate 
himself by doing something, where that doing is both a 
conscious activity and a linguistic act. Expression in 
its primitive state is non-descriptive because it is not 
a process of conceptualization or classification: it is 
completely individualized and oriented to the felt situa-
tion. It is also primarily addressed by the person to 
himself, and secondarily to an audience of persons like 
himself, and in both cases the expression is intended to 
make his audience (including himself) understand how he 
feels. (PA, 109-14). 
Psychical expression (e.g. grimacing, blushing, cringings) 
are primitive expressions at the psychical level. It con-
sists in the doing of involuntary and perhaps even totally 
unconscious bodily acts, related in a single experience 
but analyzable into the elements of a sensum, its emotion-
al charge, and the expression of that emotion. There are 
no unexpressed emotions, because every kind and shade of 
emotion at this level of experience has its expression in 
some change of the muscular or circulatory or glandular 
system of the organism. (PA, 228-30, 238). 
Language in its wider sense, or imaginative expression, 
consists of bodily actions expressing certain emotions in-
sofar as we are conscious that controlling them is our way 
of expressing these emotions. These emotions are minimal-
ly those which arise only through the consciousness of 
self (e.g. hatred, love, anger, shame). Language in its 
widest sense is the bodily expression of emotion dominated 
by thought in its primitive form as consciousness. Within 
such a system there is a synthesis of material elements 
consisting of psychical expressions, but organized accord-
ing to a formal principle provided by the corresponding 
mode of consciousness (i.e. primitive consciousness of 
self). (PA, 231-35). 
4. 
5. 
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speech (vocal language or language proper) is a system 
of gestures having the peculiarity that each gesture pro-
duces a characteristic sound. Every kind or order of 
speech is an offshoot from an original language of total 
bodily gesture, that is, a language in which every move-
ment and stationary poise of every part of the body has 
the same kind of significance which movements of the vocal 
organs possess in a spoken language. This total bodily 
gesture is the one and only real language: it is the mo-
tor side of our total imaginative experience (or total 
activity of imaginative consciousness). Speech is a func-
tion of self-consciousness: the discovery of myself as 
a person is the discovery that I can speak. But this self-
discovery is also the experience of myself as a listener, 
and the consciousness of our own existence is also the 
consciousness of the existence of other persons as speak-
ers in the community of language. Understanding the 
speech of others involves an act of imaginative, recon-
structive consciousness in which mistakes can occur, both 
in expressing one's own emotions (the corruption of con-
sciousness) or in mistaking the speech of others (misunder-
standing or misinterpretation). (PA, 242-51). 
Intellectualized speech is language specifically suited 
to expressing thought and its attendent intellectual emo-
tions. It differs from imaginative expression in the 
same way that the object of imagination differs from that 
of intellect, i.e. as something presented as one, indivis-
ible, self-contained and complete in itself (imagination) 
and as a manifold of such objects with determinate rela-
tions between them (analytic thought), or again as are-
lation between something determinate and something inde-
terminate (abstract thought). Intellectualized language, 
even when modified by the grammatical and logical analy-
sis of language, never loses its emotive expressiveness. 
In its final form as artifical symbolism invented for a 
purely scientific purpose, it has both expressiveness and 
meaning, whereas in its imaginative form it has express-
iveness but not meaning. (PA, 252-61, 268-69). 
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As in the previous sections of this chapter, we will 
group our comments around these summarized topics. 
(1) We notice first that in his discussion, language 
is located on a scale of forms, the minimal form of which is 
what he calls "expression," and which consists of species that 
are themselves concrete (i.e. having their own form or princi-
ple of organization) but are further determined by successive 
forms (i.e. are "matter" or "experience" for the "synthesis" 
of their elementary parts by a higher mental act) (PA, 230-
34). Collingwood even calls attention to this sort of struc-
ture when he insists that "each level must organize itself 
according to its own principles before a transition can be 
made to the next, for until that has been done, the raw ma-
terial needed for the creation of the next is not forthcom-
ing" (PA, 234). Thus the emotions of consciousness (emotions 
that presuppose a consciousness of self) must be formally or 
linguistically expressed before a transition can be made to 
the level of intellect. 
One consequence of defining language by means of a 
scale of forms is that successive levels incorporate the po-
sitive content of all that precedes them in the scale--each 
is a summary of what went before it. Consequently, true to 
his description of such a scale in the Essay, Collingwood in-
sists that the element of expressiveness is never lost when 
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language develops into the forms expressive of intellectual 
functions. Consistent with his Law of Primitive Survivals, 
Collingwood therefore insists that there exists something he 
wishes to call "emotions of intellect," which intellectualized 
language, even in its symbolic form as mathematics or logic, 
continues to express: intellectualized language has both ex-
pressiveness and meaning, whereas imaginative language has 
expressiveness, but not meaning as distinct from it. Unfor-
tunately, aside from his brief suggestions that this is what 
is involved in the excitement of intellectual discovery, and 
that it is intellectual emotions that are involved when one 
values a thought to the point that he feels it important 
enough to utter in a given situation (PA, 164, 267), Colling-
wood does not develop this interesting suggestion in The 
Principles of Art--at least not beyond the point necessary 
for the elaboration of his esthetic theory (it plays an im-
portant role in his discussion of esthetic truth--cf. PA, 
282-88). 27 As we shall see in the conclusion to this chapter, 
27This is not the only frustration for an interpreter 
seeking to understand Collingwood's idea of language in The 
Principles of Art: the chapter on language is the most exas-
perating chapter in the whole book. While it is the apex of 
t~e entire argument of his esthetics (art is ultimately de-
f1ned as imaginative expression or language) and laced with 
P7egnant suggestions, it never fulfills its promise in a sa-
t1sfying analysis of the phenomenon of language. And what is 
~orse is that it presents examples which are not only mislead-
1ng but downright abusive. As an example of the emotive ex-
pressiveness of intellectualized language Collingwood conjures 
up for his readers the image of the "fastidious Cambridge 
mouth" of I. A. Richards (whose theory of language in art he 
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is concealed in the vagaries of this discussion an im-there 
portant clue to the understanding of his Q-A logic and .its 
relation to F-logic and D-logic--i.e. the heuristic intellec-
tive function of questions as anticipations of answers. 
(2) A second consequence of defining language by 
means of a scale of forms is that each level presupposes the 
materials presented to it by a lower level: psychical expres-
sion is presupposed by language as imaginative expression; 
the language of imaginative gesture is presupposed by speech; 
clearly opposes); and he compares grammarians to primitive 
African butchers who slice steaks from living animals (PA, 
259, 264). Worst of all, he relies for many of his major 
conclusions on arguments that are utterly contingent, gra-
tuitous, and unconvincing. The most notable instance of this 
is his argument in support of the thesis that all language, 
even in the symbolic, intellectualized language of the mathe-
matician, is emotively expressive. He states baldly that 
"every mathematician knows" that a symbolism re-acquires the 
emotional expressiveness of language proper. He then goes as 
far as to say that in expressing a perfectly definite in-
tellectual emotion a perfectly definite act of thought is ex-
pressed too, so that a visiting physicist seeing Archimedes 
racing naked from his bath down the streets of Syracuse shout-
ing "Eureka!" would, if he had himself made Archimedes' dis-
covery and knew how to read this expression of intellectual-
ized emotion, be able to understand the whole scene, even 
that it was the discovery of specific gravity that caused 
Archimedes' excitement (PA, 267-68). It is no wonder that 
intelligent readers like Susanne Langer accuse him of "philo-
sophical malpractice" (Feeling and Form, p. 384), since ar-
guments like these are utterly unconvincing. On such grounds 
a~ these one might prove that the earth is flat and that pre-
C1se scientific information may be passed from mind to mind 
by mental telepathy. Unfortunately such diversions as these 
~ay also distract the reader from supplying his own convinc-
n~ e~amples and arguments for the serious suggestions and 
pr1nc1ples he is advocating. 
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d speech is presupposed by symbolic language. It is there-an ' 
fore just a consequence of defining language by a scale of 
forms when Collingwood states that one of the presuppositions 
of F-logic (which occurs at the level of symbolic expression) 
is the "propositional assumption" which presupposes the gram-
matical and lexicographical units (words, phrases, sentences) 
constructed at the level of speech: propositions or state-
ments (that which can be true or false) are isolated from a 
group of expresions called sentences which are presumed to be 
already grammatically well-formed. (Cf. PA, 260). 
Unfortunately, for his readers, Collingwood appears 
so bent upon emphasizing the artificiality of forcing the liv-
ing language of imaginative expression into the categories 
devised by the grammatical and logical analysis of language 
that the positive point that he is making is submerged under 
what appears to be an abusive assault on grammarians and lo-
gicians for doing what he admits to be their proper jobs. 
But if Collingwood's description of grammarians as "butchers" 
is meant to be merely abusive, why would he bother analyzing 
this abusiveness any further? But he does, distinguishing be-
tween the grammatical functions of lexicography (the catalogu-
ing of recurrent units of speech, called words, and the list-
ing of their respective meanings as relations of synonymy), 
accidence (rules governing word inflection), and syntax (rules 
governing words as functional units in sentences) (PA, 256-
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S7)? And further, why would he feel obliged to describe the 
three stages (actually three presuppositions) in the gramma-
tical analysis of speech, viz. (a) the reduction of language 
as an activity to the product of this activity, "speech" or 
"discourse"; (b) the division of this product into units 
(words, idioms, phrases, sentences, etc.); and (c) the divis-
ing of a schema of relations between these units (syntax or 
the rules of grammar)--these presupposing respectively the be-
lief in a "metaphysical fiction" of the finished product of 
speech-language, the existence of self-sustaining atomic 
word-units that comprise this product, and fictional rules 
governing their relationships (PA, 254-56)? May we not safe-
ly assume that having taught himself half a dozen languages 
and demonstrated his proficiency both as a translator and as 
a celebrated user of English, that he was well aware of the 
importance of such grammatical analysis and of lexicography 
and the science of linguistics in general, but that he felt 
constrained to warn his readers against a certain reduction-
istic tendency which results from an overtly idolatrous atti-
tude towards the teachings of such sciences? And are his re-
marks in opposition to this attitude not indicative of his 
continuing struggle against what he understood to be the re-
al ~st· th · 28 · h" th t t t f 1 • ~c es~s --~n t ~s case, e rea men o anguage as 
28Th" . 1 ~s ~s c ear 
scribes the activity of 
presumed "thing" called 
from a passage in which he first de-
the grammarian as a cutting up of a 
language into pieces called words. 
"thing"? as a 
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(3) Of more direct concern to this chapter is his dis-
cussion of "the logical analysis of language"--by which he un-
derstands "a certain technique, first systematically expounded 
... in Aristotle's Organon" and subsequently developed by a 
long line of logicians culminating in "the logical analysts 
and positivists of the present day" (PA, 259). The aim of 
this technique, he says, is to make language into a perfect 
vehicle for the expression of thought--that is, to remove the 
"Some readers will object to this phrase on the ground that I 
have used a verb of acting when I ought to have used a verb of 
thinking; a dangerous habit, they will remind me, because when 
you get to the point of saying 'thought constructs the world' 
when you mean 'some one thinks how the world is constructed,' 
you have slipped into idealism through mere looseness of lang-
uage; and that, they will add, is the way idealists are made. 
There is much that might be said in answer to this objection; 
as, that philosophical controversies are not to be settled by 
a kind of police-regulation governing people's choice of words, 
and that a school of thought . . . which depends for its exist-
ence on enforcing a particular jargon is a school which I nei-
ther respect nor fear. But I prefer to reply merely that I 
said cut because I meant cut. The division of the 'thing' 
known as language into words is a division not discovered, 
but devised, in the process of analyzing it" (PA, 255). In 
the immediately succeeding passage, Collingwood also declares 
his refusal "to be frightened by the bogy of idealism" when 
he states that grammatical rules are devised rather than dis-
covered (PA, 256). We might add that the reason that Col-
lingwood meant to say "cut" when he could have said "dissect," 
and "butcher" when he could have said "anatomist" (for after 
all, grammarians do cut up language "at its joints" as Aris-
totle would say, rather than hacking them across muscle bun-
dles for sale as steaks at a market), is that his intention 
Was polemical as well as analytical. He wished to warn us of 
wh~t he regarded as a dangerous tendency. What else would 
th1s be but realism? 
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frustrations of expressions due to the inaccuracies and am-
biguities in speech, and to do so by replacing them with lo-
gical forms (either of the subject-predicate form of Aristo-
telian logic or the propositional forms of what Collingwood 
calls the "modern analytic school" of logic) (PA, 259-60). 
Once again Collingwood distracts the reader from his 
positive treatment of the subject by his emphasis on the ar-
tificiality of the logician's project, i.e. proposing a modi-
fication of language rather than a theory of it. What a con-
temporary logician would be surprised at is not the accusa-
tion that he is proposing a modification of language (for af-
ter all, most contemporary logicians would agree that what 
they are doing is constructing formal systems, which may or 
may not have a similarity or applicability to natural lang-
uages). On the contrary he would be surprised by the sugges-
tion that what he might be mistaken to be doing is the con-
struction of a theory of any natural language (which is taken 
to be the province of a science of linguistics). 
But he might further not only be surprised by, but 
also take issue with, Collingwood's list of the "assumptions" 
of the logical analysis of language. In addition to assum-
ing that the grammatical transformation of language has been 
successfully accomplished, the logician, Collingwood says, 
makes three further assumptions: 
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First comes what I shall call the propositional assump-
tion. This is the assumption that, among the various 
"sentences" already distinguished by grammarians, ti:tere 
are some which, instead of expressing emotions, make 
statements. It is to these that the logician confines 
his attention. Second, the principle of homolingual 
translation. This is an assumption about sentences cor-
responding to the lexicographer's assumptions about words 
(or ... lexicographical units) when he "defines the 
meaning" of a given word by equating it with that of an-
other, or of a group of words taken together. According 
to the principle of homolingual translation, one sentence 
may have precisely the same meaning as another single 
sentence, or group of sentences taken together, in the 
same language, so that one may be substituted for the 
other without change of meaning. The third assumption is 
that of logical preferability: namely that, of two sen-
tences or sentence-groups having the same meaning, one 
may be preferable, from a logician's point of view, to 
the other .... The preferred version is preferred be-
cause it is one which the rules of the logician's tech-
nique enable him to manipulate. (PA, 260-61; cf. A, 35-
36). 
We suspect that a contemporary logician would object to this 
description of the assumptions he makes in his logical in-
quiries: (a) he would object to the confinement of his atten-
tion to statements alone, and worse still to statements as 
sentences already distinguished by grammarians; (b) he would 
say that homolingual translation or substitutability is not 
dependent on identity of meaning alone, but on the logical 
form or structure of language as well; and (c) he would ar-
gue that logical preferability is not something dependent 
solely on the logician's point of view, but rather is pre-
supposed by the logical employment of sentences in a language 
and merely displayed by translation into formal structures. 
But rather than presuming to speak for contemporary logicians, 
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we are more interested in what Collingwood has to say about 
these assumptions, and in this connection it is noteworthy 
that he never denies that they are valid assumptions. He 
says only that as proposals for the modification of language, 
they can never be carried out in their entirety. Language 
proper, even as an artificial symbolism, can never lose its 
emotive-expressive aspect. Once mastered, a symbolic lang-
uage, invented to serve a technical purpose, reacquires the 
emotional expressiveness of language proper (PA, 262, 268). 
The principles of homolingual translation and logical 
preferability provide us with some supporting evidence for 
the suggestion we made in considering the "variable" (which 
the Essay on Philosophical Method declared to be extrinsic to 
the generic essence in non-philosophical concepts, but identi-
cal with it in philosophical concepts) in terms of the substi-
tution-relations of a logic based on abstract class concepts. 
As we noted in our discussion of the Essay, when Speculum Men-
tis described the abstract universal of logic as one which is 
"indifferent" to the variation of its instances, and when the 
Essay described the classes of F-logic as one in which the 
variable is not identified with the generic essence, what he 
seems to have in mind is the fact that in F-logic replacement 
instances of a class (whether this be of terms or propositions) 
are indifferent to whatever other properties these instances 
may have: their identity is based solely on the criteria for 
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their membership in the class. They are therefore substitu-
table one for the other. In Speculum Mentis and in the Essay 
Collingwood deliberately contrasted this sort of replacement-
relation with another in which the differences of the instan-
ces of a class are relevant to the class itself. In Speculum 
Mentis this was called a "concrete universal," or one in which 
the variable element between the instances of the universal 
is not ignored, but makes a difference to the generic univer-
sal itself; in the Essay this was expressed by saying that for 
philosophical concepts, the variable (presumably what allows 
one instance of a concept to differ from another instance of 
the same concept) is identified with the generic essence (i.e. 
is related to the meaning of the concept in a necessary and 
essential manner). We suggested that if such differences be-
tween individual instances of a universal are essential to the 
identity of the concept as such, then they must be regarded as 
part of that concept's meaning--which brought us to the brink 
of a discussion of the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
What we wish to point out here is that in an explicit 
discussion of the assumptions of what is undoubtedly F-logic, 
Collingwood states the replacement-relation of substitutability 
of instances for one another in a class as essential to the F-
logical analysis of language. 
(4) Another interesting corollary of the definition 
of language by means of a scale of forms is that in the speci-
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fication of the genus "expression" into the species "symbolic 
language," the essential functions of emotive expression and 
intentional meaning are both retained in the same act. This 
has a peculiar outcome: since no matter how artifactual a 
symbolic language becomes it retains or "reacquires" the emo-
tional expressiveness of language proper, in Collingwood's 
view it never loses contact with the emotional life of the 
29 
speaker. 
As his remarks about interpersonal self-consciousness 
and the community of speakers and hearers indicates (PA, 247-
52), he does not believe that such an admission leads to a 
form of linguistic solipsism in which a "private language" is 
employed which no one can understand but the speaker (since no 
one can "read" the emotional life internal to a user of a pri-
29computer analysis and programmers reading this to-
day might be startled by such a conclusion, since machine-
communication languages like COBAL seem to work quite effec-
tively for the tasks which they are designed to perform. What 
Collingwood might say about the development of such languages 
as these is hard to say, since it would be peculiar to predi-
cate "emotional expressiveness" to a computer print-out, while 
one would also be forced to admit that there is some sort of 
communication occurring between man and machine by means of 
such languages. Our guess is that Collingwood would not take 
computer-language to be language at all, but a sort of book-
keeping aided by mechanical and electronic devices, not any 
more expressive of thought than the noises emitted from a 
tape-recorder or the typescript emerging from a typewriter. 
The computer operator is still engaging in linguistic expres-
sion at the input and interpretation ends of the process of 
machine communication: the rest is automatic book-keeping, not 
thought. 
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vate language). On the contrary Collingwood goes to the op-
posite extreme and declares that at a primitive level total 
communication can and does occur--as in the spread of emotion 
like a kind of contagion from person to person, e.g. panic in 
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a crowd. Although this occurs directly only at the psychi-
cal level (and this is the level at which even animals can be 
said to communicate), at levels above this, in which emotions 
require consciousness of self, such communications occur 
usually only through "language" in its broadest sense (as to-
tally bodily gesture--cf. PA, 238, where Collingwood baldly 
states that there are no unexpressed emotions). 
Collingwood does not spell out in detail how the in-
tentional meanings of a speaker are bound to his expression of 
emotion, but it is clear that he wishes to retain both func-
tions in all levels of linguistic activity. For Collingwood 
30 rn speaking of psychical emotions which are always 
expressed as some change in the muscular or circulatory or 
glandular system, Collingwood writes that "nothing but lack 
of skill ((in observing such changes and correctly interpret-
ing them)) prevents us from reading like an open book the 
psychical emotions of every one with whom we have to do. But 
observing and interpreting is an intellectual process; and 
this is not the only way in which psychical expression con-
veys a meaning. There is a kind of emotional contagion which 
takes effect without any intellectual activity; without the 
presence even of consciousness" (PA, 230). Collingwood cites, 
in addition to the spread of panic through a crowd, the ex-
amples of the sympathetic feeling of pain or joy, and the ter-
ror transmitted from prey to preditor. 
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meaning never loses its aspect of being something that a 
speaker does (where "speech," of course, is taken in a broad 
sense to include not only vocal utterance but any suitable 
substitute for it--e.g. the sign language of mutes; it in-
cludes anything in which a physical gesture can be tied to a 
meaning). Meanings are bound to what have more recently been 
called "illocutionary acts," or what a speaker intends to con-
vey by what he says. They are not something contained in a 
dictionary, with fixed relations of synonymy, but are part of 
a living process linked to the emotional life of speakers, 
whose intentions to convey meanings have a career in which 
meanings are born, develop in a context of relations, and may 
even die. Meanings, on Collingwood's view, are not something 
words have, but something that speakers do with words. (cf. 
PA, 269). 
This is as far as Collingwood takes us on the path to 
language. Whether or not a case can be made for a language 
that is purely symbolic or has meaning without being expres-
sive, such a thing would not be regarded as a true language 
by Collingwood. 
(5) One final aspect of Collingwood's discussion of 
language needs to be mentioned before going on to relate lang-
uage to the levels of consciousness, and that is the global 
or comprehensive aspect of each level of the linguistic scale 
of forms. Each has what Collingwood calls its own principle 
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of organization or form, although he is not always careful to 
make explicit what that principle is. In the final analysis 
it might not be possible to do so, since any one level may be 
capable of a virtual infinity of forms with no apparent unify-
ing communality between them: imaginative expression in art, 
for example, encompasses everything from dancing (Collingwood 
calls dance the mother of language) to drama to painting--the 
list is only arbitrarily broken off, every work of art being 
a "monad" and even the everyday acts of human life being to 
some extent works of art. 
But in attempting to characterize them as essential 
structures, Collingwood points continually toward a completed, 
global activity--in the case under discussion, the "language 
of total bodily gesture," which he calls the only real (imag-
inative) language (PA, 246-47). He correlates this "total 
bodily gesture" language with the corresponding mental func-
tion of "total imaginative activity" (AP, 247). There is a 
similarity here to what we have seen Collingwood advocating 
concerning the organizational unity of the "logical structure 
of real thinking" in his correspondence with Ryle: in any ex-
ample of real thinking there is contained an example of every 
kind of proposition as so many "element-types" (CRC-I, 18). If 
any level of consciousness has its own organizational unity, 
and if this unity must be complete before a transition to a 
higher level of consciousness may occur (cf. PA, 233-34), then 
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the explicit articulation of the "logic" or coherence of any 
level of consciousness is a matter of making explicit or ex-
pressing what is already a completed whole, insofar as that 
unity is viewed from a higher level. 
We may speculate, in terms of our discussion of 
logic, that the systematic unity of F-logic (or what we may now 
call a symbolic language in which what we say can be disting-
uished--but not separated--from what we mean, and artificial 
symbols can be devised and stipulated for a particular mean-
ing) is exhibited only by the assumption of a higher view-
point (what might be called today a "meta-language") for which 
F-logic is an object. In Speculum Mentis we observed Colling-
wood making just such an argument: F-logic is the unifying 
principle of a form of experience which he called "scientific 
thinking," in which the distinction between what we say and 
what we mean is first made manifest (SM, 128-30, 154-57; cf. 
PA, 269); but if the principle of organization of such an ac-
tivity is not already somehow complete, the transition could 
not be made to a higher viewpoint for which the lower is re-
garded as an object. Philosophy is such a higher viewpoint, 
according to Speculum Mentis, and its logic is dialectical. 
Can we conclude for Collingwood that D-logic is a meta-
language for the discussion of objects that have F-logic as 
their unifying principle? 
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Perhaps. But once more we must point out where Col-
lingwood leaves the discussion and where we resume it. He 
never called D-logic a metalanguage, nor did he ever expli-
citly work out the relationship between D-logic and F-logic 
other than to point out in the Essay the salient ways in which 
D-logic differs from F-logic in their respective ideals. We 
have also tried to remain alert to the fact that the existence 
of something which meets the description Collingwood gives of 
D-logic depends on his ability to provide us with concrete, 
irreducible, and convincing instances of such a logic. So 
far the instances of D-logic that we have encountered are 
those which stress the overlapping layers of meaning in cer-
tain terms used by philosophers, the unity of meaning and re-
ference in universal categorical philosophical judgments, and 
the reversible inference structures employed in typical philo-
sophical arguments. But in the final analysis the issue of 
whether there is anything which meets the criteria for D-logic 
described by the Essay rests, as we saw in our analysis of 
the Essay, on whether or not there can be a kind of knowledge 
which is self-justifying. 
But in the meantime we have already seen that for Col-
lingwood the issue of logic is always bound to that of lang-
uage, and language is a function of a conscious mind. Before 
concluding our survey of the topic we therefore must attend to 
final discussion of logical mental functions in The New Levia-
than. 
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5. Language and Mind: The New Leviathan. 
We are now in as good a position as we shall ever be 
to mount a final assault on the heights of Collingwood's phil-
osophy of mind--i.e. the functions of intellect and reason. 
we must remind ourselves once again of the difficulties we en-
countered in Chapter VIII in reconciling the conflicting term-
inology between The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. 31 
Some of these terminological ambiguities, we noted, can be 
cleared up by recognizing wider and narrower senses that Col-
lingwood allows for terms like "consciousness" and "thought;" 
and some of them can be reconciled by paying careful attention 
to the differing approaches of the two works, which helps put 
such unannounced shifts in the comprehension of its terms in 
their methodological contexts. 
Although we did not call attention to this fact in 
the immediately preceeding section of this present chapter, 
this shift in approach between the two works is even apparent 
in the discussion of language in each of the two works. The 
Principles of Art considers language in terms of the dialec-
31The principal discrepancy is that in The Principles 
of Art consciousness, even in its most primitive-form, is 
·called thought, and its function as attention is selective 
without being abstractive; in The New Leviathan "simple con-
sciousness of feeling" is not considered to be thought, and 
selective attention functions only at the secondary level of 
consciousness and is abstractive (cf. PA, 204-06, 215-17; NL, 
4.13-4.5). 
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tical array of forms of expressiveness from psychical expres-
sion in physiological changes to symbolic language; The New 
Leviathan considers language as an abstraction from, or re-
-
striction of, "discourse" or "the activity by which a man 
means anything" (NL, 6.1-6.11). An unwary interpreter might 
conclude from a superficial comparison of these two treatments 
of language that Collingwood had "changed his mind" or "re-
pudiated" his earlier treatment of the subject. Our own in-
clination is to see the later work in the light of the earlier 
one, and hence as an analytic discussion, from a restricted 
point of view, of a topic which has a broader context and re-
presents one portion of a "scale of forms"--in this case, the 
scale of forms of expression. 
However this does not resolve all the interpretative 
difficulties posed by The New Leviathan on the issue of lang-
uage and logic. We shall attend to some of the more import-
and of these problems after our summary of the doctrines of 
~ New Leviathan on language and the levels of mental func-
tions. 
2. 
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TABLE 12 
LANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND MENTAL ACTS IN THE NEW LEVIATHAN 
Discourse is the activity by which a man means anything: 
it is the activity of meaning something (a) by something 
else (b), where meaning (a) is an act of theoretical con-
sciousness, and (b) is a practical activity, the produc-
tion in oneself or others of a flow of sounds or the like 
which serve as the vehicle of that meaning. Discourse is 
continuous, so that even the rests or pauses of silence, 
immobility, or the like which punctuate it are significant 
parts of it, not interruptions of it. But selective at-
tention breaks it up into words; vocal words if it is 
speech, gesture-words if in gesture, etc. Once discourse 
is broken up irito units it is the lexicographer's business 
to determine the meaning or various meanings which a giv-
en word bears whenever it is used. The phonetic or other 
vehicle of discourse is physical in the sense of being a 
succession of feelings or sensations with their emotional 
charges produced by the activity of speech or the like. 
(NL, 6.1-6.19). 
Language is an abstraction from discourse: it is the sys-
tem adopted, the means employed, the rules followed in 
the activity of discours~. It is a system of sounds or 
the like as having meanings, these meanings being what a 
person using that word means by making that sound or ges-
ture. Language is not a device whereby knowledge already 
existing in one man's mind is communicated to another's, 
but an activity prior to knowledge itself, without which 
knowledge could never come into existence. As conscious-
ness develops, language develops with it. (NL, 6.11, 
6.18, 6.41, 6.58). 
a. Language in its simplest form is the language of con-
sciousness in its simplest form; the mere register of 
feelings, irration31, unplanned, unorganized, uncon-
scious. At this level of consciousness thought is 
merely apprehensive, or capable of taking what is 
"given" to it. (NL, 6.53, 10.51). 
b. When consciousness becomes conceptual thought, lang-
uage develops abstract terms. At this level of con-
sciousness thought is capable of framing abstract-
ions from what is given. Selective attention breaks 
up continuous discourse into words. A word is a ling-
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uistic habit of the community using it; the habit of 
conveying a special meaning by using any member of a 
certain class of auditory and visual vehicles, of 
which any member is an example of that word. (NL, 
6.12, 6.17' 6.58, 10.52, 34.12). 
c. When consciousness becomes propositional thought, lang-
uage develops the indicative sentence as the standard 
verbal form in which to state the proposition. At 
this level of consciousness thought is capable of dis-
criminating truth from error. (NL, 6.59, 10.51). 
d. When consciousness becomes reason language becomes de-
monstrative discourse wherein sentences are so linked 
together as to state verbally the consequences of one 
proposition in relation to another. At this level of 
consciousness thought is capable of understanding both 
itself and other things. (NL, 6.59, 10.51). 
3. Conceptual thinking or selective attention is an act of 
practical consciousness by which a man emerges from the 
state of feeling and simple consciousness of feeling. A 
man makes himself conscious of his feelings by naming them, 
either by the language of gesture (e.g. by an expressive 
shiver) or by the language of speech (saying "cold"). To 
name the feeling awakens consciousness of the feeling: 
until it is named, the feeling is preconscious; when it 
is named it becomes conscious. (NL, 6.2-6.28, 7.2-7.23). 
a. 
b. 
Selective attention is the act in which a person at-
tends to some element or group of elements within the 
simple consciousness of a confused mass of feeling. 
The act of attending is doing something to oneself as 
well as doing something to the object being attended 
to; it is focusing one's own consciousness on a cer-
tain part of the field of feeling and repressing the 
rest; but it is also circumscribing it, drawing a line 
between it and the rest of the field (NL, 7.23-7.24). 
The act of classifying is the practical activity of 
consciousness invo ved in "drawing the line" between 
objects (sensa) in a field of feeling, i.e. the point 
at which one decides to stop calling the color seen 
"red" and begin calling it "purple" or whatever. On 
acts like this classes depend for their existence; 
all classes being artifacts, depending on practical 
activities for their existence and depending for their 
publicity as between various persons on these persons 
performing practical activities of similar kinds; for 
4. 
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many classes are private to the persons who made them. 
A class is a collection of many things into one, in 
virtue of their resemblance. The distinguishing mark 
of a class is that it is a whole whose parts, its 
"members," are mutually related by way of resemblance. 
Membership in a given class demands a certain kind 
and degree of resemblance. The settlement of what the 
degree and kind of resemblance is for membership in a 
class is an act of practical consciousness called clas-
sifying. (NL, 19.22-19.35). 
c. Evocative thinking is the act of arousing in oneself 
by the work of thought feelings not found as given in 
oneself; it is an act which goes with the act of se-
lective attention. Feelings thus aroused, called 
evocations, form a context inseparable from any selec-
tion, and are connected with it by logical relations. 
Evocations are feelings felt but not given, produced 
by the same act of practical consciousness that pro-
duced the selection or abstraction from the given 
field of conscious feeling. (NL, 7.32-7.38). 
d. A concept (notion) is a selection together with its 
context of evocations. Any logical relation may pre-
side over the birth, from a given selection, of an 
evocation forming part of its context. It is not pos-
sible to compile a list of such logical relations, al-
though contrast and comparison are two such relations. 
(NL, 7.34-7.36, 7.39). 
e. Abstractions are determinate in some ways, indetermin-
ate in others (as in a triangle, which is determinate 
in having three sides, but except for what is implied 
in this, it is indeterminate in everything else). Ab-
stractions are only second-order objects made by the 
mind out of its immediate or first-order objects. Ab-
straction is a necessary part of thought; an abstrac-
tion is false if the elements abstracted are judged 
to be mutually independent entities. (NL, 7.56-7.57, 
7.67, 26.18-26.19). 
Propositional thinkin~ is the set of mental acts that are 
involved in asking an answering questions, and disting-
uishing truth from error (and good from evil). Asking a 
question implies contemplating alternatives. A question 
that offers no alternatives is a bogus question, from the 
point of view of knowledge proper. The technique of know-
ing proper or scientific method depends on replacing 
vague or confused questions, which are unanswerable, with 
real questions which have a precise answer. (NL, 4.34-
4.35, 11.12). 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
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Let a man have a certain form of consciousness, C1. 
To that form of consciousness let ~, y, ~ be imme-
diate objects. Let him call into being in himself 
another form of consciousness, C2, the consciousness 
of C1. Then to C2, C1 is a first-order object, and 
x, y, ~ are second-order objects. For the form of 
consciousness, C2, the second-order objects ~, y, z, 
are abstractions from the first-order object C1 made 
by C2. and the knowledge of these abstractions is me-
diated by c1 . (NL, 5.26, 11.34). 
The subject of a proposition or what the proposition 
is about is never a first-order object. (NL, 11.34). 
The predicate of a proposition is never a first-order 
object, but always a concept (NL, 11.35). 
Logic applies to propositions because the predicate 
of a proposition is a concept, and logic applies to 
concepts. Because the predicate of a proposition is 
a concept, any proposition may theoretically involve 
a mistake, though there are mistakes that people do 
not make. (NL, 11.35). 
5. Rational thinking, or reason as a mental function or form 
of consciousness, is thinking one thing x because you 
think another thing y, where y is your reason or ground 
for thinking x. A piece of rational thinking involves at 
least two propositions standing to each other as ground 
and consequent. Rational thinking begins when a man ac-
customed to propositional thinking starts making a dis-
tinction not made in propositional thinking as such: the 
distinction between "the that" and "the why." The distinc-
tion is preconscious until it is reflected upon. (NL, 
14.1-14.2). 
a. Simple knowledge is the knowledge that arises when a 
man reflects upon a piece of propositional thinking 
and asks himself whether he has really done it, and 
answers in the affirmative. Such a judgment is falli-
ble, i.e. errors can be made about it. (NL, 14.21-
14.25). 
b. Reflection on the fallibility of such a "that" judg-
ment prompts one to seek out a second proposition 
which offers reassurance of the trustworthiness of the 
first. It is the practical act of trying to alleviate 
the distress caused me by the untrustworthiness of my 
knowledge that gives rise to the distinction between 
"the that" and "the why." (NL, 14.25-14.29). 
c. 
d. 
e. 
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Practical reason (making up one's mind to, or forming 
what a moralist calls reasons for an intention) comes 
into existence when a man forms an intention, re-
flects on it, and asks himself whether he really means 
it. In this reflection he seeks another intention y 
to confirm the original intention x, something from 
which the x may follow as a necessary consequence, or 
stands in relation to it as ground to consequent. 
Reason is essentially practical and hence prior to 
theoretical reason, because to be reasonable means to 
be interested in questions beginning with "why"; and 
this happens because people crave for reassurance 
against the fallibility of their knowledge. (NL, 
14.31-14.5). 
Theoretical reason (making up one's mind that, or seek-
1ng reasons for a proposition) comes intole:Xlstence 
when a man first, by propositional thinking, makes up 
his mind that something is so, and then, seeking to 
confirm this piece of propositional thinking, looks 
for a reason why he should think so. Theoretical rea-
son is based on the presupposition that a certain kind 
of propositional thinking, viz. that about which ques-
tions beginning with "why" can be legitimately asked, 
is a matter of free will (i.e. it is not the mere ac-
ceptance of something as given, but is a voluntary de-
cision to think this and not that). (NL, 14.35-14.37). 
Questions beginning with "why" cannot be legitimately 
asked about first-order objects, but only about ob-
jects of the second and higher orders (i.e. abstrac-
tions). If xis an intention, any ground for it, y, 
must be another intention. One intention supporting 
another both form part of the same intention, which 
includes them both and perhaps other things. Let us 
call this larger intention I. Similarly if s is a 
proposition about whose truth someone desires reassur-
ance, it follows that t, the ground of that reassur-
ance, must be a proposition of whose truth he is sa-
tisfied; and s and t are here abstractions from a 
first-order proposition P which includes them both and 
perhaps other things as well. As long as I and P are 
first-order objects they are matters of immediate con-
viction or resolution. To demand confirmation of ei-
ther would be to place it in a context of other inten-
tions or other propositions that might afford grounds 
for it; that is, to reduce it tothe level of, or to 
make of it, an abstraction. An intention is made into 
an abstraction by surrounding it with a context of 
other intentions; a proposition by surrounding it with 
a context of other propositions. (NL, 14.39-14.44). 
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With the advance warning that this section will con-
tain, of necessity, some rather thorny exegetical discussion, 
which we shall try to confine so far as possible to the doc-
trines summarized in this table, we shall again group our 
comments around these topics. 
(1) Corning to The New Leviathan fresh from the dis-
cussion of language in The Principles of Art, one cannot help 
but notice some evident similarities which render the appar-
ent differences in the discussion of consciousness in the 
later work less paradoxical. (a) In both works we find a 
fieldof feeling at which a primary consciousness (called 
"simple consciousness" in the earlier work and "diffuse con-
sciousness" in the later) is directed. In this "first state 
of mental life" consciousness is merely "apprehensive" (NL, 
10.51) or "appreciates" (PA, 203) what is presented to it in 
feeling. The expression of this level of consciousness is 
loosely called "language" but it is of an illogical, ejacu-
latory sort of gesture language and not yet speech. (b) The 
second stage of mental life begins with selective attention, 
an act of second-order consciousness (i.e. the consciousness 
of first-order consciousness) in which attention is directed 
towards some sensa and away from others in a field of first-
order, conscious feelings. Second-order consciousness is ex-
pressed in an act (pointing, speaking, making designating 
gestures, etc.) which is the same as the act of consciousness 
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by which he makes himself aware of some designated entity or 
feeling as that which he is conscious of, or what he "means" 
(in the widest sense of the term "meaning" which includes the 
roost rudimentary act of reference). This is the level of 
conceptual thought. (c) At higher stages of mental life the 
expression of conscious functions include what we know as 
language proper--indicative and interrogative sentences at 
the level of propositional thought, demonstrative discourse 
for rational consciousness. The terms "intellect" and "know-
ledge" generally apply to the second level of consciousness 
and the mental functions above it, which as forms of reflec-
tive consciousness presuppose primary consciousness without 
which it would have nothing to reflect on (NL, 9.54). 
In all this we seem to be on familiar territory, just 
as we are in the discussion of discourse as a continuous sys-
tem of bodily movements, only later broken up by "selective 
attention" and made into words that are subsequently cata-
logued by a lexicographer (NL, 6.1-6.18). Is this not what 
we have become acquainted with in The Principles of Art as 
the "one real language of total bodily gesture" which is 
transformed into speech and then "cut up" by the "butchers" 
who practice lexicography and grammar? Even Collingwood's 
penchant to phrase all his definitions in terms of conscious 
acts of human agents (especially noteworthy in his descrip-
tion of reasoning, where the terms "inference" and "implica-
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tion" are conspicuous by their absence) takes us back to the 
beginning of the present chapter, where we found his defini-
tion of "logical efficacy" and Q-A correlativity formally ob-
jectionable precisely because they introduce this personal 
and epistemological dimension. 
But there are also some important differences which 
cannot be overlooked, these tending to group themselves around 
the three major intellective functions of conceptual, propo-
sitional, and rational thinking. Leaving aside the latter 
two for a moment, we notice fir9t that there is no precise 
analog in The Principles of Art to correspond to the discus-
sion of "naming" in The New Leviathan. In fact in the later 
work Collingwood appears to be putting forward a radical ling-
uistic thesis that it is Qy naming something that we become 
selectively aware of it: language is "prior to knowledge it-
self" and knowledge could not come into existence without it. 
How are we to reconcile this with The Principles of Art, where 
Collingwood says that simple or first-order attention is the 
"act of appreciating something, just as it stands, before I 
can begin to classify it," and that this is done by "identi-
fying" something as having just the qualities we find it to 
possess before naming it (PA, 203)? And what of the passage 
from the Essay on Philosophical Method where he writes: 
It is only in some dark and half-conscious way that we 
know our thoughts before we come to express them. Yet 
in that obscure fashion they are already within us; and, 
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rising into full consciousness as we find the words to 
utter them, it is they that determine the words, not vice-
versa. (EPM, 200). 
The astute reader will note that if indeed what he 
calls the "diffuse consciousness" of feeling in The New Levia-
than is the same mental function as "simple consciousness" 
----
and first-order attention in The Principles of Ar4 then there 
is no insoluble conflict: first-order attention divides a 
field of feeling into focal and penumbral regions, but it 
does not abstract (PA, 204). Therefore second-order atten-
tion could be abstractive and denominative, without violating 
first-order functions of consciousness. And surely this par-
allel is indicated when Collingwood writes that "thought is 
at first merely apprehensive, capable of taking what is 'giv-
en' to it, and then merely conceptual, capable of framing ab-
stractions from what is 'given'" (NL, 10.51). Similar dis-
crepancies in the use of the term "attention" in The New Le-
viathan can often be resolved by adding appropriate qualifiers 
in passages where the unqualified term "attention" is used 
without specifying whether it is referring to the first-order 
function of consciousness (which divides without abstracting) 
or second-order consciousness (which is selective and abstrac-
tive). Thus when he writes (in a passage which is directly 
preceeded by a discussion of selective attention) that "The 
act of attending is not merely a doing something to yourself, 
focusing your consciousness . . • it is also a doing some-
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thing to the object: circumscribing it, drawing a line be-
tween it and the rest of the field" (NL, 7.3; cf. 4.51), he 
appears to be locating both division and selective abstrac-
tion in the attentive act of second-order consciousness, but 
"act of attending" here may be referring to both levels, just 
as "consciousness" may refer to a given level or to that level 
and all below it. 
(2) Unfortunately sorting out labels for levels of 
consciousness and adding qualifiers for functions of conscious-
ness does not settle the issue of how it is possible to "di-
vide" a field of feeling or to "circumscribe" something with-
in it without being "selective" about it, or contrariwise how 
first-order consciousness if it is not selective, can divide 
without abstracting. Granted that Collingwood's stated in-
tention in The New Leviathan is to take successive ''sound-
ings" at various levels of consciousness (NL, 9.4-9.42), and 
that he is therefore not committed to stating why one level 
gives rise to the next, or how they come into existence, or 
even how certain mental functions are possible at all; none-
theless difficulties like these pose problems for the reader 
even in understanding the descriptive sense of these "sound-
ings." In this case the problem is one of understanding the 
functions of division and abstraction in discourse, and es-
pecially as these pertain to the process of "naming." 
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Particularly confusing is Collingwood's discussion of 
naming as a mediating act of consciousness, which view he re-
jects with the following argument: 
Until you name it, the feeling is preconscious. When you 
name it, it becomes conscious. This does not mean that 
the act of naming it becomes conscious; it does not, ei-
ther as an act of your own or even merely as the sound 
of your voice or the like. It remains preconscious until 
you reflect upon it .... "If a man becomes conscious of 
a feeling only through finding a name for it, is not that 
a way of saying that his consciousness of the feeling is 
not immediate, as you said (4.22), but mediated through 
language?" The consciousness of B is mediate if you can 
only be conscious of B as an abstraction from something 
else, A, of which you are conscious. Let A be something 
of which you are immediately conscious; then A is a first-
order object and B, the abstraction from it, a second-
order object (5.25), and the consciousness of B is medi-
ated through the consciousness of A .... But the feel-
ing is not an abstraction from the name of the feeling. 
The man who names his feeling thereby becomes immediately 
conscious of it; he is not conscious of his name for it 
until he reflects on the act of naming it, and he proceeds 
to think of the name he has uttered in abstraction from 
that act. (NL, 6.28-6.39). 
It would appear from this passage that either (a) there is ab-
solutely no function to the "diffuse consciousness" of feel-
ing (since feeling presents itself directly to second-order 
consciousness and its function of selective attention by nam-
ing), or (b) naming it (a second-order function) makes us di-
rectly conscious not of the feeling but of the first-order 
consciousness of a feeling (that is, a feeling as ''apprehend-
ed" by first-order consciousness--or, as The Principles of Art 
puts it, a feeling as "appreciated" by being perpetuated and 
and domesticated by first-order attention). But if (b) is the 
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case, then what are we to make of the remark that feeling is 
not an abstraction from the name of the feeling--and especial-
ly when he defines abstraction in this context as the attain-
ment of a second-order object by means of a first-order ob-
ject, where the first-order object is what is immediately 
given to consciousness? 
Since (b) is the most likely alternative for making 
sense of both The New Leviathan and The Principles of Art on 
the issue of first and second-order consciousness, we must 
settle the problem of the peculiar usage of the term "abstrac-
tion"--which we shall in a moment. At this point we shall 
make two observations. First, it may be possible (although 
this possibility is not made explicit in The New Leviathan) 
that this may not be an "either-or" situation; i.e. it may be 
possible that even though second-order consciousness is con-
sciousness of first-order consciousness, it may also be di-
rectly conscious of the object of first-order consciousness 
as well, that object being feeling. This would be consistent 
with his remark in The Principles of Art that "attention (or 
... consciousness or awareness) has a double object where 
sentience has a single," that is, "a person who is said to be 
looking is described as aware of his own seeing as well as of 
the thing he sees," or again "(w)hat we attend to is two 
things at once: a sound, and our act of hearing it" (PA, 206). 
It is also consistent with his "Law of Primitive Survivals" 
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(which we will also deal with in a moment) in The New Levia-
than, which states that in any higher form of consciousness 
-
there must survive elements of a previous function in its 
primitive or unmodified state (NL, 6.52); in this case we sug-
gest that what he may be saying is that feeling is still di-
rectly present in first-order consciousness as a "primitive 
survival," and hence still an immediate object to second-order 
consciousness (the distinction between "apanage" and "con-
stituent" to the contrary notwithstanding). 
Secondly we wish to call attention to the fact that at 
the very lowest level of consciousness "meaning" is introduced: 
at the "first state of mental life" a man is said to be con-
scious of a confused mass of feeling because he has found a 
language of some kind by which he can "mean" it, albeit a very 
primitive, illogical, ejaculatory sort of language (NL, 7.24). 
Therefore abstractive or selective attention, the "second 
stage of mental life," presupposes the presence of some primi-
tive, pre-reflective "meaning" on which the naming function 
operates. But if "meaning" here refers to the level of 
gesture-language (which is included in what Collingwood calls 
"discourse"), i.e. the "system of bodily movements, not ne-
cessarily vocal, whereby the men who make them mean or signi-
fy anything" (NL, 6.1), then in its primitive function con-
sciousness can mean something without naming it. Using "dis-
cursive" as an adjective for Collingwood's use of "discourse" 
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in this broad sense, we can say that such pre-reflective "mean-
ing" in first-order consciousness is discursive without being 
properly speaking linguistic (cf. NL, 6.11). The conscious 
cry of a distressed infant (recognizably distinct from the 
random cries of the newborn--cf. PA, 235-37) might b~ an ex-
ample of an expression that means something (the infant is 
consciously signaling his distress) without naming it; it is 
an act that is discursive (carries meaning) without being ling-
uistic (using designated words in a spoken language). But 
such meanings are individualized expressions, and not general-
ized descriptions: the infant's cry of distress is an expres-
sion of his present emotional state, and not in any way a de-
scriptive generalization about a feeling or feelings not pres-
ent, or involving relations with these other feelings (PA, 
112; cf. IH, 314, 330). 
If we are on the right track, then when Collingwood 
writes that a man makes himself conscious of a feeling by nam-
ing it (NL, 6.25), and adds that this is an act of conceptual 
thought (NL, 7.23), and adds further that with this act goes 
an act of evocative thinking (defined as ''the act of arousing 
in yourself by the work of thought feelings you do not find 
as 'given' in yourself"--NL, 7.32), he is not by-passing or 
revising the function of first-order consciousness and its 
primitive, discursive meaning-act, but rather he is presup-
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. . t 32 pos~ng ~ · The very first act of consciousness (and it must 
be remembered that it is only second-order consciousness that 
is reflective and hence properly speaking thought) is an act 
of designating meaning, and this assignment of meaning is co-
extensive (and one might even say cointensive) with conscious-
ness itself. If the question were put to Collingwood, "Can an 
analysis of mind and consciousness get beyond or behind lang-
uage?" we suggest that he would answer, "Yes, but not by 
language proper; and if you were to succeed in getting there, 
what you would find would be meanings too primitive to express 
in words." But as Collingwood pointed out, reaching this 
primitive level is an experiment not easily made (NL, 6.56), 
so the function of assigning meaning is mostly unreflective 
32The interpretation we are offering of Collingwood's 
description of the functions of first- and second-order con-
sciousness differs sharply with that offered by Alan Donagan. 
Donagan argues for a reversal between The Principles of Art 
and The New Leviathan on the issue of selective attention, and 
postulates-that between the writing of the earlier and the la-
ter works Collingwood changed his mind: he came to hold that 
all thinking is conceptual and all concepts are abstract (LPC, 
pp. 14, 48-49). We have already argued that this view fails 
to hold without qualification for The Principles of Art, and 
we are now arguing that it does not hold even for The New Le-
viathan. We maintain that Donagan failed to appreciate-the-
function of first-order consciousness, and relies uncriti-
cally on what he (but not Collingwood) calls "The Principle 
of Order (LPC, 28, 52, 93, 105, 167-68). Cf. W. von Leyden 
in Krausz, CEPC, 27-29. 
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and pre-conscious (cf. IH, 330; Donagan, LPC, 43) 33 
Obviously this account is very vague, and leaves much 
to be said about the fundamental relations of language and 
consciousness. We do not know how to characterize this prim-
itive sort of pre-reflective, discursive meaning-act, or how 
language proper with its highly inflective, highly differen-
33collingwood's remarks in The New Leviathan on first-
and second-order consciousness pose-a8 many problems for an 
interpreter as do his remarks on feeling. Our own interpre-
tation can make sense of many passages, but then others pose 
problems. For example, Collingwood writes that Hobbes was 
right when he said that experience teaches us that it is a 
vulgar error to believe that you must first be conscious of a 
feeling before you can fit it with a name (NL, 6.56). Unless 
he means something idiosyncratic by "naming," this passage (as 
well as the discussion surrounding it--NL, 6.42-6.57) appears 
to support a radical linguistic thesis like the one Donagan 
proposes. But Collingwood provides us with enough clues to 
overcome his overstatement. He points out (a) that language 
is not always rational (NL, 6.57), and (b) that Hobbes' doc-
trine is that "language has become the pre-condition and 
foundation of knowledge so far as knowledge is scientific" 
(NL, 6.47; emphasis mine). In The Principles of Art, where 
Collingwood was more careful in distinguishing symbolic or in-
tellectualized language from its more primitive variety, he 
had pointed out this restriction on Hobbes' discussion of 
language: "When Hobbes ... says that the primary use of 
speech is for 'acquisition of science,' for which purpose 'the 
right definition of names' is the first requisite, clearly, 
he is identifying language in general with intellectualized 
language or symbolism'" (PA, 226). Therefore if one supplies 
the qualifier "intellectualized" before "language," in the 
passage under discussion from The New Leviathan (NL, 6.56), 
and "second-order" before "conscious," the passage can be 
brought into conformity to our own interpretation. Cf. IH, 
314, 330, where Collingwood speaks of artistic expression and 
"unreflective experience." 
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tiated grouping of sounds and meanings can arise from it, 
even though he leaves us with the hint that it has some~hing 
to do with presis or "art" (NL, 6.29). We have already noted 
that Collingwood's program of "taking soundings" of conscious-
ness at various depths does not commit him to any genetic ex-
planation of how one level of consciousness gives rise to an-
other. In fact in an important chapter he insists that there 
can be no laws for the progressive development of mind. This 
is stated in the chapter entitled "Retrospect" (Chapter IX), 
in which Collingwood sets forth the four principles that he 
says he has assumed throughout his discussion of mental func-
tions, one of which (the "Law of Primitive Survivals") we 
have already encountered. Before continuing our discussion 
it would be best to summarize these principles. 
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TABLE 13 
THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ANALYSIS OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS 
1. The Law of Contingency: the earlier terms in a series of 
mentar-functions do not determine the later. The terms 
in this case are mental functions called first-order con-
sciousness, second-order consciousness, etc. "Mental func-
tion: means not a single act but a type of activity, and 
"series" means an arrangement in which each term is a mo-
dification of the one before it. (NL, 9.3, 9.36, 9.48). 
((This law can be restated and clarified in two variant 
forms:)) 
a. The series of mental functions is an irregular series, 
i.e. it is not one in which the development of its 
terms is governed by a rule. All mental processes 
have an asymptotic or approximative character; they 
do not have real initial and terminal points, but al-
ways begin with a first term with a mixture of the se-
cond, and end at a second term qualified by the first. 
Every case of mental "being" turns out on examination 
to be a case of mental "becoming". (NL, 9.4, 34.58, 
34.63). 
b. The development of mind is not predictable. The logi-
cal development of a series of mental functions is in-
dependent of its temporal development. In the logical 
development of the series of mental functions ABCD 
(for first-order consciousness, second-order conscious-
ness, etc.), the relation between any two successive 
terms A and B is such that B renders A necessary or 
"presupposes" A as that out of which it develops, while 
A does not render B necessary. In a temporal develop-
ment of such a series A comes into existence at one 
time and its modification B at a subsequent time. 
But while the existence of the series ABCD presupposes 
NOTE: We take the liberty of assuming that the com-
ments from Chapter XXXIV cited in la are a clarification of 
the expression, "irregular series," which cannot consistently 
mean "not governed by any rule whatsoever,;, since at least 
one rule is applicable to it, namely that each term is a modi-
fication of the one before. 
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the existence of each of its terms, and each succes-
sor presupposes its predecessor, it is not the case 
that given the successor B, A must have come to exist 
before it in time, since A and B may have come ~o 
exist together or coexist in the same act. But whe-
ther mind develops from function A to B, or from AB 
to C, or ABC to D (a progressive development), or whe-
ther it degenerates from ABCD to ABC, etc. (called 
regression) is not predictable; it depends on the 
practical energy available to a mind at any given 
time. (NL, 9.43-9.48). 
2. The Law of Primitive Survivals: When ((a mental func-
tion_)_)_A-rs modified into B there survives in any example 
of B, side by side with the function B which is the modi-
fied form of A, an element of A in its primitive or un-
modified state. If A be consciousness and B second-order 
consciousness or reflection, then reflection is a modifi-
cation of consciousness, and unless there were a primitive 
survival of mere consciousness there would be nothing to 
reflect on, and no reflection would occur. (NL, 9.5, 9.51, 
9.54).1 
1Notice that in this summary of the principles stated 
in Collingwood's "Retrospect" there is nothing to correspond 
with Donagan's "Principle of Order"; in fact one might argue 
that Collingwood's explicit statement that a series of mental 
functions can coexist in a single act (NL, 9.48) essentially 
conflicts with it. The best evidence that Donagan can cite in 
support of his "Principle of Order" is NL, 5.91-5.92, which 
is extracted from a discussion of Freud on whether feelings 
can be unconscious (NL, 5.8), and is an account of the extent 
to which Collingwood agrees with Freud's usage of the terms 
"conscious" and "preconscious." Collingwood writes that "no 
man is conscious of any given form of consciousness, even 
though it is operating in him, until he 'reflects' on it or 
'calls into being in himself another form of consciousness, 
Cz, the consciousness of C1' ((NL, 1.73)) the form of con-
sciousness with which we started. Any form of consciousness, 
practical or theoretical, call it Cx, exists in what Freud 
calls a preconscious condition unless and until it has been 
reflected upon by the operation of a form Cx+l" (NL, 5.91-
5.92), cited by Donagan by references at LPC, 28 and 108). 
Notice that Collingwood says "form of consciousness." Now 
compare this with Donagan's formulation of this subsidiary 
principle, which he elevates into one of the four main pre-
suppositions underlying Collingwood's entire philosophy of 
559 
ind (LPG), 27): "if a man is conscious of one of his own 
mcts of consciousness, then it is not by that act itself, but 
~ another act of consciousness which may be said to be of a 
hlgher order" (LPG, 28). Notice that Donagan has substituted 
"act of consciousness" for "form of consciousness." In our 
view this is not a legitimate substitution; what may be true 
for a relation between forms or whole orders of consciousness 
~ (first-order, second-order, etc.) may not be true for indivi-
dual acts of consciousness which may be at the same level. 
On oonagan's "Principle of Order" it is difficult if not im-
possible to see how there might be a concept of a concept, 
or a proposition about a proposition, or inference about in-
ference; and certainly not without one of them being reduced 
to preconsciousness. But Donagan might have referred to IH, 
292, where Collingwood does say an act of thought may be an 
object to another act but not to itself. This might lend 
support to his "Principle of Order" were it not that Colling-
wood explicitly denies it in the next sentence. 
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It takes no great interpretative powers to recognize 
that this description of the relations of the series of men-
tal functions is a direct application of the "scale of forms" 
described in the Essay on Philosophical Method, and a fairly 
clear echo of the description of the dialectical relations 
between the "forms of experience" in Speculum Mentis. With 
this discussion of the dialectical structure of mind as a 
scale of forms of mental functions we find ourselves again 
confronting the relationship between F-logic, with its ab-
stract class-concepts, and D-logic with its overlapping uni-
versals.34 From Table 12, 3 a-b, we see that the abstract 
class-concept involved in second-order attention and naming 
is the sort that is used in classifying--the practical acti-
vity of "drawing the line" between objects in a field of feel-
ing (or presumably that field as prepared by first-order con-
sciousness). From Table 13 we see that the level of mental 
34I . . . h c 11" d . t 1s 1nterest1ng to note t at o 1ngwoo posl-
tions this "retrospective" chapter in the midst of his analy-
sus of the level of mind he calls "conceptual thinking." Why 
did he place it here and not after his chapters on proposi-
tional and rational thinking (i.e. between Part I on Man and 
Part II on Society)? Is it not because the "scale of forms" 
is a discussion of the relations of concerts in D-logic, and 
he felt obliged to call attention to theact that the series 
of mental functions (and notice that first-order conscious-
ness, second-order consciousness, etc. are concepts or "names" 
and not judgments, propositions, or inferences) are dialecti-
cally related as a scale of forms and not merely as abstract 
class-concepts? 
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function at which F-logical class-concepts operate is a whole 
(i.e. taken as an order or form of consciousness) related to 
other levels of mental functioning as one element in a scale 
of forms, where each term is a modification of the one before 
it, but contains a "primitive survival" of that previous form. 
Since Collingwood indicates that he is not restrict-
ing his discussion to mind only in its capacity as philosophi-
cal thinking, but rather states directly that he is talking 
about "the modern European mind" or the mind of a European man 
(or that which "has produced in itself the thing called mo-
dern European civilization"), 35 we may finally offer a general 
answer to a long-standing question concerning the applicabil-
ity of what we have been calling the D-logic of the Essay on 
Philosophical Method. Insofar as the several orders of func-
tioning of the human, civilized mind are arranged in a scale 
of forms, D-logic is applicable to the relations between these 
levels. Since Collingwood asserts in no uncertain terms both 
35Presumably Collingwood would regard other civiliza-
tions (e.g. American and some Far Eastern countries) as exten-
sions of "the modern European mind," since in the later parts 
of The New Leviathan he extends the term "civilization" to in-
cluae-any manifestation of civil behavior or what he calls 
"civility" (NL, 35.63; cf. 34.4-34.51, 34.7-34.79, and 35.22-
35.44)--essentially, the approximation to the ideal of re-
fraining from the use of force in relations with one's fellow 
man, and the spirit of agreement to teach and be taught (NL, 
35.44, 36.46-36.51). Therefore whatever civilization strives 
for such an ideal would be classifiable as possessing what 
Collingwood is calling the "modern European mind," which is 
not meant to be a primarily geographical epithet. 
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in ~ Principles of Art and The New Leviathan that the series 
of mental functions are so arranged, he would not regard this 
assertion as a tautology (i.e. that something having the struc-
ture of a scale of forms has the logical relations of a scale 
of forms). It is what he would call a universal categorical 
judgment (in this case, this means that it is self-instantiat-
ing). 
What we do not know is what Collingwood would accept 
as adequate restrictive conditions for the applicability of 
D-logic and F-logic respectively. That there are such restric-
tions is evident from the recognition that within a given le-
vel of mental functioning (e.g. propositional thinking) rules 
which would not be applicable for the relationship between 
that global level and its successor would be applicable for 
the elements within that level. Propositional logic and 
grammatical rules do not employ the rules of dialectical logic 
per se, and yet the former are legitimate and applicable with-
in certain levels of consciousness (cf. NL, 11.35). 
(3) But we are not yet finished with the issue of 
"naming," and we must now come to terms with the major dif-
ference between the analysis of mind offered in The New Le-
-----
viathan and all his previous writings on the subject. The 
major focus of this apparent reversal of opinion is what we 
may call the "linguistic-abstraction" thesis, i.e. that at 
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the second level of consciousness and above (everything in-
cluded by the term "reflective consciousness") all thought is 
the result or product of linguistic activity, and that all 
linguistic activity is necessarily abstract. 
We have already had to qualify a more radical version 
of this thesis (viz. one which extends the linguistic-
abstraction thesis to all consciousness) by pointing out that 
at the level of first-order consciousness there is a pre-
reflective, discursive, meaning-function, so that second-
order "naming" does not create meaning ex nihilo, it identi-
fies them by means of denominating gestures of some sort 
(speech or the like)--gestures that call attention (one's own 
as well as that of one's audience) to some specifically meant 
feeling. Compared to second-order selective attention, first 
order consciousness is not a function in which one act is com-
pared or contrasted with another as a present one compared to 
one not present, or as two presented feelings which are com-
pared as what one means as opposed to what one does not mean 
by a given expression. And we have also had occasion to note 
that Collingwood's account of language in The Principles of 
Art leads one to conclude that for him all meaning is inten-
tional, whereas all symbolic meaning is both intentional and 
conventional. But in The New Leviathan we find him adding 
that all meaningful language (i.e. speech) is abstract, and so 
are also all the expressions of consciousness which are found-
ed on it. 
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At issue here is what appears to be a major rever-
sal in Collingwood's final estimate of the nature of thought. 
In Speculum Mentis, it may be recalled, Collingwood made ab-
straction to be the ultimate source of all the errors that 
the mind makes about itself, and consequently also about its 
relation to the world: to abstract is to falsify (SM, 160, 
288). But in The New Leviathan abstraction is seemingly ele-
vated to the highest rank of thought: conceptual thinking and 
all thought above it (viz. propositional and rational think-
ing) is abstractive (NL, 7.63). In confronting this pair of 
claims it appears that the only two alternatives are either 
total scepticism concerning knowledge claims (if all abstrac-
tion is falsification and all intellectual thinking is ab-
stract, then all intellectual thinking is falsification), or 
a complete reversal in Collingwood's mature philosophy (re-
jection of the claim that all abstraction is falsification). 
Since Collingwood was steadfastly non-sceptical, the latter 
is the most obvious alternative (cf. Donagan in Krausz, CEPC, 
9-13). 
But as we have seen several times over in the course 
of our examination of Collingwood's philosophy, the easy and 
obvious interpretation is not always the correct one. The 
evidence we are confronted with is an apparent contradiction, 
not a documented "repudiation"; and an escape from the con-
tradiction may be found, as in other such cases, by a careful 
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analysis of the meaning of the mediating term--in this case, 
"abstraction." Our experience thus far in interpreting Col-
lingwood would support our anticipation that the term is not 
being used univocally, and that it has a layering of over-
lapping meanings not always specified explicitly, but discern-
able from careful comparison of the opposing uses of the term. 
In Speculum Mentis a concept is called abstract if it 
is used as a class-unifying term, and if it only defines mem-
bership in the class on the basis of a specifying criterion 
(the determining element) but leaves out of consideration all 
other qualifying characteristics of the members themselves 
(the indeterminate elements)--and this is the sense in which 
Collingwood means that something is abstract if it is thought 
as "separate" from its members and their individuating dif-
ferences. It is the unity of identity of a class "in spite 
of" (or indifferent to) the differences of its members. "Phy-
sical object", for example, includes rocks, fish, birds, men, 
planets, stars, etc. indifferently, and laws governing the 
motion of "physical objects" takes such a disparate and dif-
ferently organized group in their most general, generic as-
pect--as dead things, pushed and pulled by mechanical forces. 
But a live bird dropped from a leaning tower will not behave 
as a dead rock dropped from the same height. But for the pur-
pose of the abstract statement of the law which governs the 
free fall of physical objects, the differences between the 
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bird and the rock are ignored: the self-moving capacities 
involved in the flight of a bird are not taken into account 
in the law. 
This is not to say that such a motion cannot be "ex-
plained" in a much more complicated treatment of this situa-
tion (e.g. one which balances the forces exerted by the fly-
ing activities of the bird, generated by biochemical ener-
gies released and used by the mechanical movements of muscles 
and bones, etc., against the forces of gravity); but the clos-
er one gets to an adequate explanation of the differences be-
tween the linear downward acceleration of the rock and the 
curvilinear deceleration of the bird, the closer one gets to 
taking into account the specific differences between the 
"dead" rock and the living bird--and thus approximating to 
the ideal of a non-abstract or "concrete" universal, i.e. one 
in which differences are essential. 
But consider now Collingwood's use of the term "ab-
stract" in The New Leviathan--in this case in reference to 
concepts: 
The act of attending is not merely a doing something to 
yourself, focusing your consciousness on a certain part 
of the field and repressing ... the rest; it is also a 
doing something to the object: circumscribing it, draw-
ing a line between it and the rest of the field . . . . 
With the delimiting of the patch or other selection . . . 
goes the act of evocative thinking: the act of arousing 
in yourself by the work of thought feelings you do not 
find as "given" in yourself. These I call evocations: 
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they form a context inseparable from any selection and 
are connected with it by logical relations, logic being 
the science which studies the structure of concepts or, 
which is the same thing, the relations between them .. 
. . As not given but abstracted from the given, a selec-
tion is a product of practical consciousness; ... ((it)) 
is nothing found, it is something made .... A selec-
tion together with its context of evocations is a concept 
(notion) or a number of them. (NL, 7.3-7.39). 
What sort of "concept" meets the description here given--the 
"abstract concept" of Speculum Mentis or something closer to 
the "concrete universal"? Is it not the latter that is 
thought to be "inseparable" from the context from which it is 
selected and bound to it by logical relations? And is it not 
the abstract class-concept which is thought of as "separate" 
or "indifferent" to its contextual circumstances? 
It is possible, if a bit muddle-headed, to decide as 
an interpretative comment on this passage that in The New Le-
viathan Collingwood had broken with his earlier views on ab-
straction and conceptualization, and then foolishly allowed 
himself to backslide into "associationism" by defining a con-
cept as "a selection together with its context of evocations" 
--which is associationism insofar as it confuses what is se-
lected with the concept by which it is selected (Donagan, 
LPC, 54-55). But this is no different than assuming that all 
planetary motion is circular and then inventing "epicycles" 
to explain away retrograde orbits. Not only would the ordin-
ary association pyschologist not say that a selection is con-
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nected with an evoked context by means of logical relations 
which preside over the birth of a concept; he would on the 
contrary tend to derive all logical relations from the purely 
external and coincidental "constant conjunction" between a 
selected item and another, and to reduce logical relations to 
h . . . 36 t 1s constant conJunct1on. Quite the contrary, by defining 
"concept" in the way he does, Collingwood is stating as clear-
ly as he can, without using the term (and hence avoiding call-
ing attention to its previous use by Bradley, Bosanquet, and 
other idealists), that the concept he had in mind was one in 
which a universal is bound to a context by logical relations 
of necessity, or one to which differences are essential, or 
in short the concrete universal. 
But even if this were a "lapse" on Collingwood's part, 
one would have several other similar regressions to explain 
36cf. Howard C. Warren, ~History of Association~­
chology (New York, 1921), pp. 6-7: "All the writers belong-
ing to the association school admit the rise of ideas follow-
ing sensations, according to the same laws of association that 
hold where the antecedent is an idea. Some go further and re-
gard as a form of association the simultaneous presence of two 
or more sensations in consciousness, such as occurs in the act 
of perception. Others merely assume a nexus in such experi-
ences without explicitly classing them as instances of asso-
ciation. On the other hand, all agree in denying that one 
sensation can bring up another sensation by association; it 
is generally admitted that the rise of sensations depends on 
something outside of consciousness, or at least on something 
apart from the individual human experience. 
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in his discussion of the terms "abstract" and "abstraction" 
in The New Leviathan. In his discussion of rational think-
ing, for example, he states that to place an intention in a 
context of other intentions that afford grounds for it (where 
"grounds" are taken as an intention from which a consequence 
follows by necessity) is to make of that intention an ab-
straction (NL, 14.32, 14.43). And what holds for abstraction 
at the conceptual and rational levels also holds for the pro-
position level: "An intention is made into an abstraction by 
surrounding it with a context of other intentions; a proposi-
tion by surrounding it with a context of other propositions" 
(NL, 14.44). 37 Concepts, propositions, and intentions that 
are bound by logical relations to contexts of other concepts, 
propositions and intentions surely cannot be "abstract" in 
the sense that Collingwood had condemned as falsification in 
Speculum Mentis. 
Unfortunately rejecting one erroneous interpretation 
of these passages on abstraction does not mean that we have 
successfully resolved all the interpretative difficulties, 
nor that we can even be satisfied that we have understood 
37cf. IN, 130: "By a real abstraction I mean a real 
phase in a real process, in itself, and apart from the subse-
quent phase to which it is leading . . . . Bud and leaf are 
thus phases of one process, and the bud in itself is an ab-
straction from that process, but an abstraction made by nature, 
which everywhere works in this way through successive phases 
of the process, doing one thing before it goes on to the next:' 
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(much less confirmed) what Collingwood means by these dark 
sayings. We suspect that all of this has something to do 
with what Collingwood called "real thinking" in his corres-
pondence with Ryle, as well as the "total imaginative acti-
vity'' and "language of total bodily gesture" in The Princi-
£les of Art: all of these are various systematic wholes pre-
supposed by the elements or "element-types" that go to make 
them up. But as with the earlier instances we found of these 
systematic wholes, we do not know in anything more than a 
vague and abstract way what the relations are between their 
elements, how many such elements there are, if they are just 
variations of a single form, etc. 
In particular we do not know what the limits of de-
terminacy are for abstractions at any given intellectual level. 
Collingwood tells us in The New Leviathan that abstractions 
(by which we may understand him to mean the result of acts of 
selective attention) (a) are determinate in some ways and in-
determinate in others (NL, 7.56, 10.16; cf. PA, 254); (b) are 
always indeterminate--i.e. are never wholly determined (NL, 
11.54); and (c) are essential for thought beyond the primary 
level of consciousness (NL, 7.63). 38 Unfortunately he also 
38cf. Mink, MHD, 108: "Now the characteristics of 'ab-
straction' which Collingwood refers to in different places 
are three: selectivity, indeterminacy, and self-determination 
As a process, abstraction is the activity of consciousness 
(also called 'attention') directed on an object in such a way 
as to spot-light some features of the object and neglect oth-
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adds that (d) "abstractions are only second-order objects made 
by the mind out of its immediate or first-order objects as 
naturally and as unconsciously as bees make honey out of flow-
ers" (NL, 7.67). What can "naturally and unconsciously" mean 
here? Collingwood would probably answer that we cannot know 
what an abstraction is until we have made it, and then we can 
examine the product of the practical activity which produced 
it, but only be engaging in another conscious act (e.g. exam-
ining a concept by formulating propositions about it, and 
therefore engaging in an act of third-order consciousness). 
But isn't "selective attention" a deliberate act of conscious-
ness, and is it not selective attention that is the very pro-
cess by which abstraction is achieved? How can it then be 
"unconsciously" done? And if "classifying" is the practical 
activity of consciousness involved in "drawing the line" in 
ers; these features are thus 'abstracted' from the object, 
and they can be named and themselves made the objects of other 
and repeated acts of consciousness without the repeated pre-
sentation of the object . . . . However because second-order 
objects have been selectively abstracted from the totality of 
activity, they are indeterminate in all respects except those 
by which they have been constituted .... Finally, ... 
the activity of consciousness in abstracting is a free acti-
vity, determined by nothing except ... by itself-rn-ab-
stracting these features rather than those from its object . 
. . . ((But)) it might be said that the very existence of a 
verbal language determines the limits of abstraction: we can 
attend only to those distinguishable features of experience 
for which we have names." Mink fails to see any paradox in 
saying that abstraction can be free and indeterminate and yet 
determined and limited by names in language. 
572 
abstraction, did he not tell us that all classes are arti-
facts (NL, 19.22-19.35; see above, Table 12, 3 b)? How then 
can abstractions be make as "naturally ... as bees make 
honey"? 
The difficulty that. dogs Collingwood's heels is the 
same as the difficulty that. plagues any of the usual accounts 
of abstraction: as a theory of how we arrive at. concepts, it. 
appears to presuppose what it. attempts to explain. Ordinarily 
abstraction is described as a process of "leaving out" inci-
dental or extraneous elements in a field of what is being at.-
tended to, until o·nly what is "essential" remains, this being 
39 the abstracted concept. Whether this "leaving out" be re-
garded as extracting "form" from its original mixture with 
"matter," or a process of "separating in knowledge what. is 
inseparable in fact.," the essential act. is still a negative 
or eliminativ~ one and this raises serious difficulties. 
What allows the process to come to a halt. at. a certain point? 
Does this not. presuppose that one already has the concept. by 
39Peter Geach, Mental Acts (London, 1957), p. 18: "I 
shall use 'abstraction' as a name for the doctrine that a con-
cept is acquired by a process of singling out in attention 
some one feature given in direct. experience--abstracting it--
and ignoring the other features simultaneously given--abstract-
ing from them. The abstractionist would wish to maintain that. 
all acts of judgment are to be accounted for as exercises of 
concepts got by abstraction . . . . My own view is that ab-
stractionism is wholly mistaken; that no concept at all is ac-
quired by the supposed process of abstraction." 
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comparison to which the one emerging from this eliminative 
process is recognized as comparable and equivalent? And lack-
ing this prior concept, what is to stop the eliminative pro-
cess at anything short of pure nothingness? Do we not have 
to distinguish the selected item from the criterion by which 
it is selected (Donagan, LPC, 54-55)? Or to press the juice 
out of the matter-form metaphor, if we are "given" something 
in sensation or feeling, do we not have to possess something 
by which we can accept or apprehend or take hold of the gift? 
The closest that Collingwood comes to meeting these 
objections is when he engages in what appears to be a frankly 
pragmatic maneuver. His basic response to the charge of elim-
inative abstractionism would be to point out that concepts 
are not "found" (as naive empiricist.s might say), they are 
"made" (as subjective idealists say), but only by an act of 
practical consciousness prior to theoretical consciousness, 
and based on interest or practical concern with the object 
attended to (as pragmatists modify idealism) (cf. NL, 7.22, 
18.13). 40 In taking a basically pragmatic view of the pur-
posive character of concepts, Collingwood reaps the benefit 
40
cf. H. S. Thayer, Meanin~ and Action: A Critical 
History of Pragmatism (New York, 1 6~ pp. 429-51; and Mink, 
MHD, 7-8, 12, 111, 138. Collingwood would probably not be 
flattered by the comparison with pragmatism, but in later 
years he appears to be less hostile to this line of thought: 
cf. IH, 300. 
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of the pragmatic maneuver, which is precisely to eliminate the 
need to posit theoretical and ficitious extramental entities 
with which the mind is supposed to conform, on intramental 
entities with which it is supposed to be innately furnished. 
But in contrast to the pragmatists Collingwood appears to be 
saying that even though concepts are made for practical pur-
poses, they nonetheless have logical relations which preside 
over their birth within their "context of evocations"; and he 
nowhere says that such logical relations are matters of sci-
entific expediency or economic utility (cf. SM, 182). 
This is as far as Collingwood takes us, and we must 
note that it may put us down the road a bit from naive empir-
icism, but it does not take us the whole way towards a satis-
factory account of abstraction. Saying that concepts are made 
is well-tailored to the need--or why one concept "works" while 
another does not. And we are still not enlightened as to what 
these "logical relations" are that preside over the birth of 
concepts (although we are told that "resemblance" is one, and 
"contrast" and "comparison" are others (cf. NL, 7.34-7.36), 
which bodes ill for our defense of Collingwood against the 
charge of associationism). 
But as we pursue the development of meaning through 
the higher levels of consciousness, we shall try to watch for 
the way in which a relatively indeterminate meaning is modi-
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fied by conceptual, propositional, and rational thinking--or 
the way in which a meaning becomes more determinate as it be-
comes more "abstract," just as in The Principles of Art the 
uninterpreted sensum becomesready for interpretation by being 
perpetuated and domesticated by imaginative consciousness, 
and finally fully interpreted by acts of intellectual con-
sciousness. We do not know, on the basis of The Principles 
of Art and The New Leviathan, if Collingwood would accept that 
-- ----
there could be any such thing as a concept that is totally de-
terminate, but if there could be it would not be something ab-
stract, because something abstract always has an element of 
indeterminacy (NL, 11.54). 
Finally, we shall use the expression "real abstrac-
tion" to refer to Collingwood's description of abstraction in 
The New Leviathan, in order to distinguish it from other 
theories of abstraction, including the "false abstraction" he 
condemned in Speculum Mentis. 41 By "real abstraction" we 
shall understand the doctrine that abstraction is the pro-
cess of consciousness by which a selection is located in its 
"context of evocations," or a proposition in a context of 
41 There is an echo of Speculum Mentis in a later chap-
ter of The New Leviathan, where Collingwood writes: "Abstrac-
tion is-a-necessary part of thought. In thinking of a pro-
cess of change you must think of its positive and negative el-
ements in abstraction from the process. False abstraction is 
the same thing complicated by a falsehood, namely, that these 
two opposite elements are mutually independent and hostile en-
tities" (NL, 26.18-26.19). 
576 
other propositions, an intention in a context of other 
grounding intentions, etc. Having little to go on from Col-
lingwood's cryptic remarks about this process, we cannot, ex-
cept by employing inventive energies, amplify this weak sig-
nal concerning abstraction into a more articulate program for 
public broadcast. We are particularly annoyed by the distor-
tion in the original signal insofar as relating a concept or 
selection to other concepts or feelings, a proposition to 
other propositions, etc. is not straightforwardly the same 
process as subsuming concrete instances under a universal, or 
relating a proposition to its referrent, etc. We still have 
no adequate criteria for distinguishing between the referring 
and meaning functions of language and consciousness. But even 
lacking such criteria for this distinction we are still 
forced to recognize a significant difference between the 
simple or "false" abstraction rejected in Speculum Mentis, 
and the contextual or "real" abstraction advocated in The New 
Leviathan. 
(4) Collingwood also provides us with very few infor-
mative statements about what he means by "propositional think-
ing" in The New Leviathan. We are told (a) that it is at 
this level that truth and error are distinguished; (b) that 
in engaging in it we are involved in asking and answering 
questions; (c) that asking questions implies contemplating al-
ternatives; (d) that the subject of a proposition is never a 
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first-order object, and (e) neither is the predicate, which 
is always a concept. Since Collingwood's primary concern in 
The New Leviathan is with the emotional and practical sides 
---
of this level of thinking, it is not too surprising that the 
theoretical aspects of this order of consciousness are some-
what neglected. But for our purposes we cannot ignore it, 
and therefore we are obliged to flesh-out this skeleton to 
the best of our ability. 
The way this can be done is to make use of three clues 
which he has provided for us: the discussion of the levels of 
consciousness as a scale of forms in the "retrospective" chap-
ter; his discussion of "emotions of intellect" in The Princi-
ples of Art; and the placement of both of these in the con-
text of language as expressive discourse. Making use of these 
three clues we may reconstruct what we believe to be a modest 
version of what he intended us to understand about this level 
of consciousness. 
If we begin with the "first stage of mental life" in 
which a presented feeling is "apprehended" by a pre-reflective 
act of first-order consciousness, the "Law of Primitive Sur-
vivals" allows us to conclude that the primitive act of "mean-
ing" that is involved (what he might have described in Art as 
a "sensum prepared for interpretation") is preserved and modi-
fied by second-order consciousness by its act of selective 
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(abstractive) attention. In its modified form, first-order 
meaning is a designated and named entity (the first state of 
reflective consciousness, or what might be called the first 
-
stage in the actual interpretation of a sensum). At the pro-
positional level meaning is again modified to include the 
unity of meaning in an assertion, i.e. the unity of meaning 
of a subject and its predicate, where both parts of the asser-
tion are assumed to be themselves meanings derived from 
secund-order consciousness. Hence the subject of a proposi-
tion or what it is about is not merely an object as presented 
to first-order consciousness, but that object as modified by 
first- and second-order consciousness, and now further deter-
d h b . f h. d d . . 1 42 mine as t e su Ject o a t 1r -or er propos1t1ona act. 
42To the great dismay of the reader of The New Le-
viathan, Collingwood is not always as careful as he might be 
to indicate exactly what he means when he uses terms like "ob-
ject" in "object of consciousness." In the present instance 
concerning propositional thought, this leads to considerable 
unnecessary confusion. (a) Collingwood first described each 
level of reflective consciousness as being conscious of its 
immediately lower form, so that first-order consciousness, cl, 
is the "object." of second-order consciousness, C2, just as C2 
is to C3, etc. (NL, 1.73, 5.91). Furthermore, (b) he de-
fined "first-order object." and "second-order object." in purely 
relative terms, so that C1 is a "first-order object." to C2, 
as C2 is to C3; and C1 is a "second-order object." to C3 (NL, 
5.26, 5.91); and (c) he defined the terms "mediation" and 
"abstraction" (in one of its senses) in terms of this relative 
~chema, insofar as the consciousness of a second-order object. 
ls mediated by the consciousness of a first-order object (NL, 
6.31-6.34). But. then he muddies the waters when he discus-
ses each successive level of consciousness. (d) At the level 
~f second-order (conceptual) consciousness he says that feel-
log is not an abstraction from the name of the feeling (NL, 
6.35). (e) At. the level of third-order (propositional) con-
sciousness he states that the subject and the predicate of a 
proposition are never first-order objects, the predicate (at. 
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least) always being a concept. And (f) for fourth-order (ra-
tional) consciousness, first-order objects are things about 
which questions beginning "why" must not be asked, since 
questions beginning "why" are legitimately asked only about 
objects of the second and higher orders, or abstractions (NL, 
14.39). In each of the cases (d) through (f) Collingwood seems 
to be saying that the immediately lower level of consciousness 
is not the immediate or first-order object to its successor--
which contradicts (a). Driven by such paradoxical statements 
the reader may not be blamed for deciding that Collingwood is 
making one of his unannounced shifts of meaning between his 
defined, relative sense of the terms "first- and second-order 
objects" (b), and what we may call (g) the absolute sense of 
r:hese terms, i.e. the sense in which a "first-order object" 
would be the object of first-order consciousness, a "second-
order object" for second-order consciousness, etc. But even 
if the absolute sense of these terms may make passing sense 
of several confusing passages (e.g. the misleading examples 
offered at NL, 11.34), we think it would be a mistake. A bet-
ter interpretation, in our estimation, would be to recall that 
in The Principles of Art Collingwood told us that conscious-
ness has a double object, both of which are "present" to the 
conscious mind (PA, 206). Thus it is possible that a form of 
consciousness, say C3 (propositional thinking) may be con-
scious both of a lower form C2 (conceptual thinking) and of 
what he is calling its "first-order object"--in this case a 
proposition. Thus when he writes that the subject of a pro-
position is never a first-order object, the reason is that the 
first-order object of an act of propositional thought is a 
whole proposition, dnd not its subject. The subject of a 
proposition is, like the predicate, a concept, the product of 
a practical act of second-order consciousness, and hence a 
second-order object for third-order (propositional) conscious-
ness. Finally, it is important to point out once again that 
there is a difference between a "form of consciousness" like 
propositional thought, and an "act of consciousness," like 
the practical act of putting together a particular sentence. 
Having said all this, honesty requires that we admit that we 
find difficulties on any interpretation of these difficult 
passages from The New Leviathan; e.g. if we invoke the prin-
ciple of the double object of consciousness, both of which are 
present to it, then we are faced with difficulties in under-
standing not only what "abstraction" means (e.g. at NL, 14.2-
14.27) but also our earlier use of the "double object of con-
sciousness'' principle to account for the radical linguistic 
claim that naming a feeling makes us directly conscious of the 
feeling. If it is possible for a higher-order consciousness 
(say c3 to be directly and immediately conscious not only of 
580 
On this line of thinking a sentence would be the expression 
of the unity of meaning of an act of propositional thought, 
and truth and falsity apply minimally to this level of pro-
positional meaning. 
Unfortunately this leaves us without any way to ac-
count for the presence of questions at this level, since ques-
tions do not assert a predicate of a subject, nor are they 
true or false. But if questions are interrogative sentences 
and have something of a subject-predicate form, should they 
not belong to the level of propositional thought? Here we 
must take up our second clue from The Principles of Art. 
Just as we found that there are broader and narrower senses 
of the terms "thought" and "language•• for Collingwood, so al-
so we are now obliged to recognize broader and narrower sen-
ses for the terms "truth" and "falsity," the narrower sense 
being confined to the level of propositional thinking and 
those above it, and the broader sense extending not only to 
the level of conceptual thought (second-order consciousness) 
but even to the first stage of mental life, "apprehension" or 
simple attention. And here we note that Collingwood not only 
breaks with the traditional logic on the subject of truth and 
falsity, but even from his own earlier doctrine in Speculum 
its own object (for C3, propositions), but also of a lower 
level of consciousness and its object (C2 and its concepts), 
then how can there be a second-order objects (abstractions) 
at. all? 
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Mentis that art as imaginative expression has nothing to do 
with truth (or is "indifferent" to the distinction between 
truth and falsehood): 
This utterance ((of an artist)), so far from being in-
different to the distinction between truth and falsehood, 
is necessarily an attempt to state the truth .... Now, 
if any one thinks . . . that intellect is the only possi-
ble form of thought, he will think that whatever does not 
contain arguments cannot be a form of thought, and there-
fore cannot be concerned with truth. Observing that art 
does not argue, he will infer that art has nothing to do 
with the truth .... It is hardly worth while to refute 
this argument, by pointing out that truthfulness about 
one's emotions is still truthfulness .... Art is not in-
different to truth; it is essentially the pursuit of 
truth. But the truth it pursues is not a truth of rela-
tion, it is a truth of individual fact. The truths art 
discovers are those single and self-contained individuali-
ties which from the intellectual point of view become the 
"terms" between which it is the business of intellect to 
establish or apprehend relations. Each of these indivi-
dualities, as art discovers it, is a perfectly concrete 
individual, one from which nothing has yet been abstract-
ed by the work of intellect. Each is an experience in 
which the distinction between what is due to myself and 
what is due to my world has not yet been made. (PA, 287-
88). 
In a footnote to this passage Collingwood adds that "I am not 
so much criticizing anybody else, as doing penance for youth-
ful follies of my own," and informs the reader to see his Out-
line of a Philosophy of Art and Speculum Mentis. 
Now even bearing in mind that in The New Leviathan Col-
lingwood distinguishes between "linguistic activity in general" 
and "literature or poetry or in general art" (NL, 6.29), where 
the latter is conscious not only of names for feelings but of 
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the act of naming them, we are still obliged to recognize that 
there is a legitimate extension of the term "truth" below the 
level of propositional consciousness. If we recall his dis-
cussion of "corrupt consciousness" at this point it is not dif-
ficult to see that ••truthfulness" at the first level of con-
sciousness consists of apprehending feelings as one's own, ra-
ther than "disowning" them, the habit of which is the corrup-
tion of consciousness. At the second level of consciousness, 
at which "naming" occurs, truth is conceptual but non-rela-
tional; it is concerned with "the 'terms• between which it is 
the business of intellect to establish or apprehend relations.•• 
If truth has, as it appears from The Principles of Art, the 
structure of a scale of forms, then we may say that truth, 
like meaning, appears in the expression of all higher-order 
functions of consciousness, so that there are pre-reflective, 
conceptual, propositional and rational truths. 
But then what sort of a "truth" does a question have? 
We suspect that it is something between the fully proposi-
tional and conceptual levels of truth, but here we are forced 
to engage in a bit of reconstructive speculation. Collingwood 
tells us that "real" questions are those which offer alterna-
tives, and "bogus" questions are those which do not; he also 
tells us that scientific method depends on replacing unanswer-
able vague or confused questions with real questions which 
can have a precise answer (NL, 11.12). The "real-bogus" dis-
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tinction for questions is something like the "true-false" dis-
tinction for propositions, but with obvious differences which 
coll ingwood does not specify. ••offering alternatives" is 
something that propositions may do as well as questions, but 
the proposition "X is either Y or Z" expresses something quite 
different than the question "Is X Y or is it Z?" The alterna-
tives offered in a question are not offered as affirmatively 
or negatively stated, but rather as alternatives demanding or 
requesting or looking forward to some further linguistic or 
mental act which chooses between them--something that will sa-
tisfy the question or complete it in a propositional sense. 
With a question one is conscious of the fact that something is 
being left unresolved, and a completing act is being called 
for. 
But just as propositions, like "real'' questions, may 
ff 1 . 43 1 . . b . 1 o er a ternat1ves, so a so propos1t1ons may e 1ncomp ete 
or call for resolution: "Eric is going to ... •• is an in-
complete sentence, since the proposition "(x) is going to 
43What Collingwood also desperately needs to make 
sense of questions, but steadfastly refuses to provide, is 
some sort of categorial schema, or categorial designators, 
to set the limits of sense and nonsense for alternatives at 
the propositional level. "Which of the following two alterna-
tives is true, A, B, or C?" is a nonsense question, as is 
"What sort of train is this, red, yesterday, or singing 'Ce-
leste Aida'?" but not for the same reasons. Both appear to 
be well-formed interrogative English sentences, but the alter-
natives offered in the first case conflict with the conditions 
presupposed by the question, and in the latter case conflict 
With categorial schema ordinarily presupposed in ordinary 
English usage. 
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(y)" contains a predicate which calls for the presence of some 
value for the second variable (y) in order to make sense of 
the whole propositional sentence. But an incomplete sentence 
is not a question--it may merely be a sentence fragment. An 
incomplete sentence does not express the speaker's intention 
to put an interrogative sentence. What is required is some 
syntactic and/or semantic function which allows the incomplete 
proposition to be a completed interrogative sentence, so that 
a hearer (who may be the speaker himself) may know that com-
pletion is not only lacking but known to be lacking--i.e. that 
he has expressed his intended meaning in the form of a ques-
tion. In a natural language like English such ~ompleting in-
terrogative functions are available either by the use of "to-
ken" pronouns (who, what, how, when, whether, etc.) or by al-
ternations in word order, as when we put a verb in the first 
position in a sentence ("Is x y?" "Does x y?" "Can x y?" 
44 etc.) 
44There may ultimately be no foolproof way of desig-
nating linguistic structures which unequivocally indicate a 
questioning intention. "What fools are these mortals?" does 
not require an answer, and neither does "How many have fallen 
in this battle" when uttered in a circumstance which makes it 
clear that no answer is being sought (e.g. in a funeral ora-
tion). Furthermore a questioning intention may be indicated 
by nothing more than an alteration in tone of voice, or by 
stressing certain words or syllables: "These apples are 
~ifty cents each?" Of course we have no way of knowing, but 
lt may be considerations like these that inclined Collingwood 
to emphasize questioning as an intentional or conscious act 
rather than a linguistic entity in his Q-A logic. 
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Although such considerations as these are essential 
to the description of interrogative sentences in a language 
(which some may find to be a more fruitful line of inquiry), 
Collingwood would probably relegate it to the "grammatical 
analysis of language" about which he had such unflattering 
things to say in The Principles of Art. That his concern was 
not in this direction is indicated by the fact that he says 
nothing about such syntactical and semantical requirements in 
any of his writings. His interest was in what we might call 
the heuristic aspect of questioning as an intellectual func-
tion of consciousness. In this respect his main concern was 
to show that questions have not only a logical relation to 
assertions, presuppositions, and other questions in a systema-
tic inquiry (explored by Q-A logic) but that the reason ques-
tions can stand in such logical relations is that they are 
expressions of a certain level of consciousness, and there-
fore "constituents" of mind, achievements of thinking agents, 
and part of the emotional life of persons. 
Therefore when he says that "real" questions are those 
which offer alternatives, this is not the entire story. A 
"real" question is also a "truthful" question which truly ex-
presses the intellectual emotions of a conscious agent--emo-
tions like curiousity, wonder, interest, etc.; the emotions 
of inquiry. A question therefore stands not as an atomic en-
tity, but in a multiplicity of relations--logical, epistemolo-
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gical, emotional, and perhaps others. Its "truth" or truth-
fulness is a complex function depending on which context it 
is seen to belong in. Q-A logic is an exploration of ques-
tions in the context of other questions, presuppositions, 
and answers as employed in systematic inquiry. The require-
ment of offering alternatives therefore merely states what 
a question must be to be fully determinate at the level of 
propositional thought--i.e. for a question regarded as an 
epistemological entity. Other requirements may appear from 
the grammatical analysis of language, and still more from the 
logical analysis of language, the latter governed by the rules 
which preside (to extend Collingwood's metaphor) over the 
birth of questions and propositions by selection from a con-
text of propositional evocations--P-Q-A complexes bound to-
gether in a systematic inquiry. 45 (Cf. NL, 4.3-4.36). 
(5) If this reconstruction of Collingwood's intended 
analysis of third-order consciousness is correct, there is 
nothing to prevent us from extending it to fourth-order con-
sciousness as well. By the "Law of Primitive Survivals" mean-
ing survives even at the level of rational discourse, but at 
this level the meaning-seeking function of consciousness is 
45 In Q-AM Collingwood is careful to point out that in 
scientific inquiry when a question is answered it does not 
cease to be a question, but only an unanswered question (EM, 
24; see above, Table 9, Comment 4). We might add here that 
an intellectual emotion expressed in a question does not cease 
to be an emotion once the question is answered, but rather 
ceases only to be an unsatisfied emotion. 
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transformed into a unifying act in which one propositional 
meaning is related to another as ground to consequent--i.e. 
validity in inference. And since questioning survives at 
this level also, the questioning function at the level of 
rational discourse is the expression of the anticipation of 
meaning fulfilment in a validity relationship, i.e. that one 
propositional meaning actually will be related to another as 
ground and consequent. 
Fortunately we do not have to rely quite so heavily 
on our own reconstruction at this level, since Collingwood 
provides us with a few more informative remarks than he does 
for propostional thinking. Even a cursory reading of his dis-
cussion (Table 12, 5) makes clear that Collingwood is not re-
ducing rational discourse to the F-logical functions of impli-
cation: it is not a "truth-functional" relation that exists 
between propositional forms that he is concerned with, but 
rather the reason or reasons for thinking that something is 
the case or that something should be done--i.e. intentional 
inference rather than strictly formal implication. Colling-
wood unmist.akably makes the point when he insists that "rea-
son is always essentially practical; because to be reasonable 
means to be interested in questions beginning with 'why'; and 
this happens because people crave reassurance against the fal-
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libility of their knowledge" (NL, 14.31). 46 
But how do we know when one proposition or intention 
is the ground for another, or that one is a consequence of the 
other? Collingwood's answer brings us once again before his 
idiosyncratic usage of "abstraction." "One intention support-
ing another both form part of the same intention, which in-
cludes them both, and perhaps other things" (NL, 14.4). The 
relation of ground to consequent for Collingwood therefore ap-
pears to be the relation of part to whole, and is a relation 
46 In the passage just preceeding the one cited Colling-
wood asserts that "first-order objects are things about which 
questions beginning 'why?' must not be asked," since "such 
questions are legitimately asked only about objects of the se-
cond and higher orders (abstractions)" (NL, 14.39). Once 
again we are up against the application of his "Fallacy of Mis-
placed Argument" (NL, 4.73) which forbids us from arguing 
about any object immediately given to consciousness. Unless 
we bear in mind that the "first-order object" of fourth-order 
(rational) consciousness is a complex intention or proposition 
containing at least two intentions or propositions, one being 
the ground and the other its consequent, the proscription 
about why-questions seems paradoxical; since fourth-order con-
sciousness is reflection on third-order (propositional) con-
sciousness, it seems that it would be perfectly legitimate to 
ask why-questions concerning first-order objects of this sort 
--e.g. "Why should I mow the lawn?" is a question about the 
proposition "Ishould mow the lawn." But a proposition is a 
first-order object for third-order consciousness, and a second-
order object for fourth-order consciousness, so the rule 
holds. But notice that the "objects of the second and higher 
orders" puts "abstraction" in a downward occurring attitude 
("higher" merely indicating the numerical ordinals for orders 
of conscious objects--second-order object, third, etc.). For 
fourth-order consciousness, therefore, a proposition is an ab-
straction from (or second-order object to) its first-order ob-
ject, which is a ground~onsequent complex proposition, just as 
for third-order consciousness a concept is an abstraction from 
its first-order object, a (simple) proposition. (Cf. NL, 7.67). 
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of inclusion (cf. NL, 14.41). To demand confirmation of a 
larger, inclusive intention or proposition would be, he says, 
"to place it in a context of other intentions or other pro-
positions that might afford grounds for it; that is, to re-
duce it to the level of an abstraction," or in other words, 
"to make it an abstraction" (NL, 14.43). It would be, to ex-
tend the terminology drawn from the level of conceptual think-
ing, to place an intention or proposition in a "context of 
evocations" of other grounding intentions or propositions with-
in which it is included and to which it is related as part. to 
whole. 
And here once again we touch on not only what. Colling-
wood had called, in his correspondence with Ryle, "real think-
ing," in any example of which would be included all the 
"element-types" on which logical relations are founded, but 
also the pragmatic aspect we have already noticed in his analy-
sis of the functions of mind (e.g. when concepts are "made" by 
an act of practical consciousness). For fourth-order con-
sciousness both of these features are brought into play in a 
chapter on "Theoretical Reason": 
In all forms of rational thinking a distinction is made 
between the self and the not-self. Such thinking is pri-
marily practical; its first function is to ask and answer 
the question: "Why am I doing this?" It has, however, a 
secondary function, to ask and answer questions about what 
is not myself. These may be called "theoretical" ques-
tions; but they are never purely theoretical .... They 
arise out of practical problems concerning the self and 
other things . . . . Consider the place of experiment in 
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natural science. An experiment means an interference by 
a natural scientist with some process of nature. The "ex-
perimental method" in natural science is the method 
wherein a scientist. comes to understand a natural process 
by interfering with it .... Is there nowhere such a 
thing as "purely theoretical thinking"? There is; but it 
is not real thinking, and it. does not lead to real know-
ing . . • . Real thinking is always to some extent. experi-
mental in its method; it always starts from practice and 
returns to practice; for it is based on "interest" in the 
thing thought about.; that is, on a practical concern with 
it .... A man will have a different theoretical atti-
tude towards things other than himself according as his 
practical attitude towards them is different; and his 
practical attitude towards them will be different accord-
ing to differences in his attitude towards his own ac-
tions. (NL, 18.1-18.2). 
There are many avenues to explore in this extremely interest.-
ing passage and the chapter from which it. is drawn--e.g. the 
"experimental" aspect. to all rational thought. and its aspect. 
of "interference," which reminds us of his remark from the 
Autobiography concerning his interest in "obscure provinces" 
because of the challenge to invent new methods for studying 
them (A, 86). But we wish to note here that. we have a new 
dimension to add to the logical aspect. of "real thinking" 
that. Collingwood had divulged in his letter to Ryle: in ad-
dition to (a) containing in any example of itself all the 
"element-types" on which logical relations are founded, real 
thinking (b) is always to some extent experimental in its 
method, (c) starts from practice and returns to practice, and 
(d) is based on interest or practical concern with the thing 
thought. about. Furthermore one can dimly discern that (e) it 
depends on differences in "attitude" towards one's own actions 
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--such differences as are involved in the three different ways 
that a modern European answers the question, "Why am I doing 
this?"--viz. because it is useful, right, or my duty (NL, 
!4.65-14.69). Since each of these gives rise to a particular 
world view (utilitarian thinking giving rise to teleological 
Greek science, regularian thinking to classical modern science 
with its laws of nature, and duty to historical consciousness 
and its transformation of contemporary science (NL, 18.3-
18.92), it is not difficult to see that such "attitudes" are 
what Collingwood calls "absolute presuppositions" in the Essay 
on Metaphysics. 
Since this gets us beyond logic and into Collingwood's 
views on metaphysics, we must stop at this point, with the 
promise that we shall resume the discussion in Chapter X, 
where we shall do our best to clarify these views. But we 
must make one final remark before bringing this section, and 
chapter, to a close. We wish to call attention to the fact 
that questioning functions at both the third- and fourth-order 
levels of consciousness, and that at the fourth level (as 
might be expected, given the Law of Contingency for mental 
functions) it becomes a why-question which presupposes both 
that there is a level of propositional thinking (and all that 
this presupposes), and also that there is a relation of ground 
to consequent that can be established for propositions with-
in this level. This is an important observation for any 
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evaluation of Q-A logic, since questioning traverses the dis-
tinction between simple propositions (minimal units of truth 
and falsity in the narrower sense) and complex propositions 
(propositions related by logical connectives, and minimal 
units of truth-functional validity). 
6. Conclusion. 
We have come a long way since initiating our discus-
sion of Q-A logic at the beginning of this chapter, and it is 
now time to try to pull the strands of our investigation to-
gether. Unfortunately to try to summarize further what is 
already a summary would be to virtually repeat the chapter, 
so instead we shall limit our remarks to several observations 
on what we think are the more important central features of 
Collingwood's discussion of logic. 
(1) In the introductory section we recalled the work 
of previous chapcers in which we showed that Q-A logic is re-
cognized not only by Collingwood but also by his principal 
interpreters to be one of the major features of his overall 
philosophical outlook. This is explicitly stated by Colling-
wood in his Autobiography, and in subsequent interpretation 
of his thought one of the major controversies concerning his 
philosophy concerns the role of absolute presuppositions in 
metaphysics--presuppositions being part of the unique P-Q-A 
complex defined in Q-A logic. 
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We also recalled that in previous chapters we found 
that although in the Autobiography Collingwood presented Q-A 
logic as an alternative to F-logic and fails to mention 
D-logic at all, his early writings contrast F-logic not with 
Q-A logic but with D-logic. In this chapLer we proposed to 
examine the later writings to see not only if there is evi-
dence supporting Q-A logic as described in the Autobiography, 
but. also to find whatever enlightenment we could about the re-
lationship between these three logics in Collingwood's phil-
osophy. 
(2) When we took a close look at Q-A logic as it ap-
pears in the Essay on Metaphysics (Q-AM) we noticed that the 
P-Q-A complex remained central to his observations about lo-
gic, and that the elements of this complex retained a logical 
relationship to each other that is not merely reducible t.o a 
relationship of more co-location in subjective consciousness. 
However we noticed also that there were several differences 
between Q-AA and Q-AM, the most notable being the fact that 
Q-AA described the Q-A complex (or perhaps that complex as 
extended to include presuppositions, since every question has 
at least one presupposition) is the unit of meaning, truth, 
and validity, but in Q-AM meaning and validity are not dis-
cussed, and truth or falsity is assigned primarily to propo-
sitions (a point which seems to directly contradict Q-AA, 
which denies that truth or falsity is a property of proposi-
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tions as such). 
Using this shift as a starting point for our subse-
t investigation, we set out to examine the extent to quen-
which Q-A logic in either of its versions could meet the 
Q-AA claim to be an alternative to F-logic. We found that 
when analyzed with this claim in mind, far from being an al-
ternative to F-logic, Q-A logic seems on the contrary to pre-
suppose it, or to presuppose whatever F-logic presupposes; 
meaning, truth, and validity are establishable independently 
of the P-Q-A complex, and this independence is a necessary 
condition for deciding what counts for something to be a 
meaningful element in that complex, what can be true or 
false in it, and whether its elements are related in a valid 
or invalid way. Since from a logical point of view meaning 
is minimally a function of terms, truth a function of propo-
sitions, and validity a function of complex propositions 
linked by logical connectives, we deemed it unlikely that 
the P-Q-A complex could minimally meet the specifications of 
all three as Q-AA claimed it could. Furthermore Q-A logic 
fails to sustain itself as a systematic structure (at least 
in its Q-AA and Q-AM versions) since it fails to meet the re-
quirements for such a system--viz. consistency, completeness, 
and formality. 
But if Q-A logic fails as an alternative to F-logic, 
and can never hope to replace it as Collingwood proposes it, 
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we find that it has nevertheless a unique logical structure 
of its own, something we barely began to explore rather than 
conclusively demonstrated. Since Collingwood recognized at 
least a significant part of this structure (the central P-Q-A 
complex, the non-deductive relationship existing between pre-
suppositions and their questions and answers, etc.) we specu-
lated that perhaps the comparison with F-logic was mislead-
ing, and that he had a different intention in mind in describ-
ing it as an alternative logic. Since so much of it is de-
scribed in epistemological terms, we proposed to explore Q-A 
logic in its relationship to mental acts as described in his 
later philosophy of mind--the three acts involved in grasping 
the meaning of terms, the truth or falsity of propositions, 
and the validity of inferences. 
(2) The first step in this direction was the examina-
tion of D-logic as explicated in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method--which in its format suggested itself to us as a bet-
ter candidate than Q-A logic for being an alternative to F-
logic. We found that the Essay described characteristics of 
the philosophical concept, judgment, and inference vis-a-vis 
the non-philosophical concept, judgment and inference, and in 
so doing it described the structure of a D-logic as opposed 
to what we recognized to be an F-logic of an Aristotelean 
pedigree. With its overlapping classes, related in a scale 
of forms in which there is a "fusion" of differences of de-
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gree, differences of kind, relations of opposition and rela-
tions of distinction, the philosophical concept of universal 
differs from the class-concept employed by "exact and empiri-
cal sciences," or from that concept in its non- or pre-
philosophical employment. We noted that Collingwood makes a 
point of not stating this distinction in a way which excludes 
alternative presence of concepts which meet D-logical require-
ments, e.g. scalar overlap: concepts ·with such a structure ap-
pare in ordinary experience as well as exceptionally in sci-
ence. So also with philosophical judgments which, like those 
of science, are universal, but are also "categorical" (or 
have objective reference) rather than being merely hypotheti-
cal, and inferences, which are "reversible" rather than being 
merely deductive or inductive. 
Unfortunately we found several obstacles in the way 
of understanding Collingwood's discussion of universal cate-
gorical judgments and reversible inferences, and as an aid to 
understanding the views of the Essay on these matters we 
turned to the letters between Collingwood and Ryle on the 
subject of logic, and made some remarkable discoveries. We 
found Collingwood confessing to a viewoflogic that sets it in 
a frankly epistemological context, so that the deductive struc-
tures of F-logic are dependent upon or presuppose what he 
calls "real thinking," in any example of which is contained 
all the "element-types" of logical relations explored by F-
logic, and which the class-concepts of F-logic presuppose. 
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In the Essay and the ensuing correspondence with Ryle, then, 
we found Collingwood arguing in something of the fashion of 
a later-day Kant.ian, defending "transcendental deduction" in 
arguments, judgments that are synthetic and a priori without 
being merely hypothetically true, and universal concepts that 
appear to be similar to Kant's schematized categories. 
Noting that to pursue this discussion further would 
take us into Collingwood's views on metaphysics, we observed 
that the argument of the Essay culminates in a crucial chap-
ter on philosophical inference, which maintains that philoso-
phical arguments can be reversible without being viciously 
circular--a view which puts great pressure on the assertion 
that philosophy is a "self-justifying" enterprise. But this 
is only possible insofar as the conclusions of philosophy 
are "established" by an experience that anticipates them be-
forehand, so that the anticipating experience establishes the 
principles used to draw such conclusions, and the principles 
reciprocally "establish" the conclusions. The non-circularity 
of philosophical inference depends on the fact that the "es-
tablishing" of conclusions by principles is done by a higher 
form of thinking, one for which the lower states of thinking 
are "experience" to its "conclusion." Philosophy (which must 
be one form of what he had called "real thinking" in his cor-
respondence with Ryle) presupposes that experience is already 
somewhat systematic, and it is only because of this that its 
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arguments (and the argument of the Essay as a whole) escapes 
vacuous circularity. 
Furthermore we noticed that although D-logic in the 
Essa~ has the appearance of meeting the systematic require-
ments of F-logic for consistency, and completeness (discussed 
in the Essay under the rubric of "system") but. not formality, 
the claims of consistency and completeness are premissed on 
Collingwood's prov1ding convincing and unambiguous instances 
of D-logical analysis. And once again we noted that D-logic, 
just as had Q-A logic (and we can now say, on the strength of 
the Essay and the Collingwood-Ryle correspondence, F-logic as 
well) depends on a full-blown epistemology which is not pro-
vided by the Essay itself. This we proposed to examine in the 
next two sections in connection with the higher functions of 
consciousness in the philosophy of mind as discussed in The 
Principles of Art and The New Leviathan. 
(3) Taking up The Principles of Art first, we noted 
that in his discussion of levels of consciousness, the func-
tion of expression is minimally essential, and language, dis-
~ourse, and the grammatical and logical analysis of language 
are all located on a "scale of forms" of expression. Now al-
though there is nothing in The Principles of Art that could 
pass for a thoroughgoing examination of the relation of lang-
uage and logic, and although the higher regions of intellec-
tual consciousness remain in this work largely unexplored, we 
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found that defining language by means of a scale of forms of 
expression has important consequences for Collingwood's view 
of logic. 
The first of these consequences is that Collingwood 
insists that the minimum specification of the genus, i.e. ex-
pression of emotion, is never entirely lost when it reaches 
the level of symbolic language. Unfortunately Collingwood 
does not support this point with convincing evidence or argu-
ment, and does not develop it very far. But we recognize that. 
Collingwood struck a rich vein when he proposed that there are 
"emotions of intellect" which are expressed by intellectualized 
language--emotions which we recognized (through his example of 
Archimedes--improbably as he stated it) to be those involved 
in intellectual activities involved in the process of discov-
ery, for example--emotions like curiousity, interest, wonder, 
etc. And we suggested that the "anticipation" of answers in 
question is an expression of an intellectual emotion, but 
that this also remains unspecified by Collingwood. Even 
though this theme remains undeveloped in his writings, we 
noted that even at the highest level of language (which would 
have to include the grammatical analysis and F-logical ex-
tension of language) it retains its continuity with the emo-
tional life of a conscious agent--a thesis which appears to 
run directly counter to the formalistic claims to autonomy by 
most contemporary logicians. 
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We also examined several other secondary consequences 
of defining language within a scale of forms of expressive-
ness. One is the location of the grammatical and logical an-
alysis of language in a context which renders the more ex-
- treme forms of their claims less credible. The belief that 
language is a completed "thing" which can be cut up into self-
sustaining pieces (words, phrases, sentences, etc.), i.e. the 
assumption made in the "grammatical analysis of language," is 
8 mythical claim that is discredited when it is recognized 
that the "language of total bodily gesture" escapes grammati-
cal reduction to lexicographical entries and grammatical rules. 
Similarly the "logical analysis of language" relies on certain 
presuppositions (the propositional assumption, the principle 
of homolingual translation, and the principle of logical pre-
ferability), which may suit the logician's purpose to trans-
form language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of 
thought, but must be recognized as actually a proposal for 
the modification of language rather than a statement of what 
language actually is. In this context F-logic appears in the 
guise of what might be called today an "ideal language" con-
structed for the purpose of modifying a natural language to 
rule out the frustrations of its obstructing and misleading 
meanings. 
Finally, we noticed that there is a global or compre-
hensive aspect to each level of the scale of forms of expres-
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sion as Collingwood describes it in The Principles of Art, so 
that each has its own principle of organization whi~h is pre-
supposed by its successor on the scale. We saw a connection 
between this global or summarizing aspect and what he had 
called the "logical structure of real thinking".in his corres-
pondence with Ryle, as well as with the "total imaginative ac-
tivity" he discussed in connection with the mental life of the 
artist--in each of which there is a "whole-part" dialectical 
relationship. We suggested that perhaps logic is a systematic 
study of the relations existing within a given level of this 
scale, so that there is a logic of concepts, propositions, 
and inferences, which is nonetheless distinct from the logic 
of the overall relationships between these levels themselves 
--the former explored by F-logic, the latter by D-logic. (In 
a later section we noted that Q-A logic may transect both F-
logic and D-logic--but about this Collingwood says nothing.) 
(4) The last phase of our examination of Collingwood's 
views on logic brought us to The New Leviathan, where we pur-
sued the relationship between language and logic into Colling-
wood's analysis of the levels of mental functions. In so do-
ing we found that here too a "scale of forms" appears in 
which various orders of consciousness are related in the man-
ner that the forms of expressiveness had been in The Princi-
Eles of Art, and the division of these levels (conceptual, 
propositional, and rational thinking) parallels the division 
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of the subject-matter in the Essay on Philosophical Method. 
Logic, language, and consciousness appeared, therefore, each 
to have a parallel structure that meets the D-logical descrip-
tion of a "scale of overlapping forms" described in the Essay. 
But we also found certain obstacles and pecularities 
which make an exact parallel problematic. The most note-
worthy of these obstacles is what we called the radical ling-
uistic thesis--that from the level of conceptual thought and 
above all thinking is a linguistic function, so that language 
determines thought and not vice versa. Some of the more glar-
ing contradictions on this issue between the assertions of 
The New Leviathan and his previous writings can be cleared up, 
we found, by careful attention to functions of consciousness 
which are more fully described in his earlier writings--e.g. 
the function of first-order consciousness in "apprehending" 
or "appreciating" feelings before naming or classifying them. 
Still other discrepancies concerning language are similarly 
softened by attention to broader and narrower senses of terms 
like "language," "thought," "knowledge," etc., each of which 
appears at various levels in a scale of forms in which it ap-
pears. In passing we noted that even "truth" and "meaning" 
are defined by scales of forms, and consequently some of the 
apparent discrepancy between Q-AA and Q-AM can be cleared up 
by recognizing that there is "truth" even in concepts, so that 
it is the narrower sense of the term that applies to proposi-
tions alone (as in Q-AM); and there is some sense even in 
the Q-AA assignment of meaning and truth to Q-A complexes 
(for even questions have their "truthfulness"). 
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Other problems are less easily resolved, and in dis-
cussing them we found several novel concepts in The New Le-
viathan which are revealing, but remain, like some other 
themes we have turned up on this chapter, undeveloped. Two of 
these were (a) the relationship between what we called pre-
reflective "meanings" at the level of first-order conscious-
ness, and the function of naming at the second level; and (b) 
the paradoxical notion which we took the liberty of calling 
real (or concrete) abstraction which appears at the second 
and all higher levels of consciousness. What emerges from 
this discussion is an idiosyncratic but interesting view of 
the relationship between the various levels of consciousness 
which his "Retrospect" chapter explicitly relates to the D-
logical structure of a scale of overlapping forms. Therefore ra-
ther than "repudiating" his earlier views on the subject of 
ming, consciousness, and abstraction in Speculum Mentis (as Dona-
gan maintains) we find that much of his later work is an ex-
pansion and further examination of the dialectical views expressed 
'in that earlier work (as Rubinoff and Mink have argued). Every-
where we find D-logical structures and arguments, and every-
where we find Collingwood pointing out the limitations of an 
abstract, class-concept oriented F-logic in the analysis of 
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language and conscious mental acts. Even his discussion of 
the linguistic aspect of the analysis of mind is the develop-
ment of a hint we found him (in Chapter VI) making as early 
as speculum Mentis, where philosophy is viewed as "transla-
tion" into a languag·e where error is not eliminated, but re-
duced by recognizing the metaphorical nature of language. 
But in the final reckoning, what can we say about the 
autobiographical interpretation on the issue of Q-A logic? 
We have found much that supports Collingwood's claim that 
from an early date he argued that Q-A logic is a necessary 
antidote to the tendency of realists to interpret everything 
in the F-logical terms of what he calls the abstract class-
concept, and in this sense he sought even in his later writ-
ings to defend an "alternative" point of view, one which em-
ployed the principles of Q-A logic with its characteristic 
P-Q-A complex. But we have also found that he modified his 
logic as he developed his thinking, and the guiding princi-
ples shaping the major lines of this development were not 
those of Q-A logic either in its Q-AA or final Q-AM version, 
but rather those spelled out as D-logic in the Essay on Phil-
osophical Method. 
Does this mean that we must admit that the Autobiog-
raphy on this issue fails to be vindicated as an interpreta-
tion of his later philosophy? Our answer in all honesty must 
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be ambiguous: yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the Auto-
~iography fails to provide us with a clear sense of the ac-
tual relationship in Collingwood's thought and writings be-
tween what we have been calling Q-A logic, F-logic, and D-
logic, all of which appear to operate in his thinking and are, 
in one way or another, legitimate logics (in some sense of 
that abused word, logic). But also no, in the sense that in 
the Autobiography Collingwood (a) pointed to the Essay on 
Philosophical Method as his "best work in matter" (a clear 
indication that even at the time of writing of the Autobiog-
raphy he felt that the D-logical structures described in the 
Essay were sound), and (b) related F-logic to realism, against 
which a good part of his thinking was directed. 
Thus although we cannot reasonably expect that the 
Autobiography should say everything that could or should be 
said about his views on logic and their role in his own phil-
osophical development, we believe that in the matter of Q-A 
logic it remains in general (if not in every detail) a valid 
interpretation of what he subsequently achieved, and certainly 
more faithful to that achievement than any of the non-
autobiographical interpretations that have been offered thus 
far. We suspect that if he had lived longer he may have pur-
sued a resolution of the remaining ambiguities about meaning, 
truth, and validity; he may have developed the notion of the 
"categorical" or referential aspect of judgment more fully, 
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perhaps distinguishing it from the meaning function of lang-
uage; and he may have written a more detailed epistemology to 
provide us with a key to unlocking the Pandora's box of 
element-types contained in his "real thinking." These themes 
and more remain dangling threads in the unfinished carpet in 
which interpreters like Mink and Rubinoff see a common figure. 
But as we have not yet exhausted all that Collingwood 
has said of significance on these topics in his later writings, 
we may yet find more light shed on what sort of thinking he 
accepts as "real." One candidate may be provided from the 
writings that resulted from his lifelong defense of history as 
a philosophical subject matter; a second from his heretical 
views on metaphysics. The first is involved in his rapproche-
ment between history and philosophy which in the Autobiography 
he claimed to be his major goal as a philosopher-historian; 
the second is the extension of this endeavor at reconciliation 
to the central battleground of philosophy--metaphysics. In 
Chapter IX we shall examine the first, in Chapter X, the 
second. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
1. Introduction. 
In our traversal of the later writings we come now to 
the third great theme of the Autobiography, and the pattern 
of the last six chapters indicates sufficiently what our next 
general tasks must be. First, we seek evidence that Colling-
wood's autobiographical interpretation of his development is 
in its main lines carried out in his later writings on the is-
use of the relationship of philosophy and history. Secondly, 
we must take account of the major developments of his later 
thought insofar as these impinge on our present subject--i.e. 
the positions on logic and mind that we have been examining in 
the previous chapters of Part III. Thirdly we must take up 
the problems left unresolved on this subject from his earlier 
and later writings, paying special attention to those aspects 
of it which give the appearance of major reversal of opinion 
either in conclusions or presuppositions, but especially the 
latter. We may expect that in pursuing these general goals we 
shall see how Collingwood responds to some of the classical 
issues that arise in any discussion of the philosophy of his-
tory. 
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But in carrying out these tasks we encounter a spe-
cial textual problem which does not arise prior to this .point 
in our investigation. When it comes to the philosophy of his-
tory we cannot rely on simply outlining the conclusions pro-
vided by the evidence of his later published writings and then 
comparing them to those of the Autobiography. The problem is 
the nature of the evidence. Collingwood did not live long 
enough to complete The Principles of History, which he had 
hoped to be his major contribution to philosophy (IH, v-vi). 
What we inherit instead is the posthumous publication, The 
Idea of History, which is the result of the editorial labors 
--
of T. M. Knox. In his preface to that work Knox states that 
he assembled the resulting manuscript out of materials from 
three sources: (a) a set of thirty-two lectures on the phil-
osophy of history, written during the first six months of 
1936 and revised in 1940 in preparation for publication (note 
that this revision is after he wrote the Autobiography); (b) 
various lectures and essays written by Collingwood between 
1934 and 1939; and (c) a 1939 manuscript consisting of roughly 
the first third only of his incomplete work, The Principles 
of History. As this material is passed to us through Knox in 
the form of The Idea of History, from (a) we are left with an 
Introduction and Parts I-IV, which consists of the revised 
1936 lecture survey of historiography from ancient times to 
the early 20th century; and from (b) and (c) and some material 
from (a) we get Part V, the "Epilegomena," a set of terminal 
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essays outlining Collingwood's own philosophy of history. 
What remains is Collingwood's work, but as arranged and.se-
lected by Knox. The question arises, does this editorial ar-
rangement reflect Collingwood's autobiographical interpreta-
tion or Knox's editorial reinterpretation? 
Our problem is that we do not have access to the same 
material as did both Knox when he wrote his preface and Col-
lingwood when he wrote the Autobiography. Although Colling-
wood had authorized publication of the whole of (c), Knox saw 
fit to include only those three excerpts that appear in The 
Idea of History (IH, vi), along with a few very controversial 
quotes from it in Knox's preface. The rest is now lost. We 
have already found Knox's judgment faulty on this matter, not 
only because it is inconsistent with his own editorial policy 
in publishing the companion volume, The Idea of Nature, but 
also because it conflicts with Collingwood's explicit state-
ments in the Autobiography. Critical historiography would 
demand that when two authorities with access to the same ma-
terials disagree, one is obliged to suspend judgment until 
further evidence or convincing argument can be found to re-
solve the dispute. On these grounds alone it seems we are 
forced to fall back on more probable narrative arguments to 
reconstruct his thinking on the matter. 
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But we are not obliged to remain at this impasse, and 
thiS is precisely where our first general task blends with 
our second and third. In our own survey of Collingwood's de-
velopment we have found ample indication to support his thesis 
in the Autobiography that his starting point was located in 
his criticism of the errors of realism. In Chapter III we 
found Collingwood linking the errors of realists to the ne-
glect of history. These errors involved (among others) (a) 
the view of the past as so many dead, atomic events--the 
"data" of history; (b) a positivistic application of the me-
thods of natural science to history, based on the false anal-
ogy between historical and physical events; (c) the assimila-
tion of historical knowledge to natural science (culminating 
in historical positivism and philosophical psychologism); and 
(d) an abstract separation of knowledge of fact from know-
ledge of self. The correction of these erroneous views in-
volved developing his thinking to embrace (a) the notion of 
the past as a living process of becoming, leading to the pre-
sent and surviving as elements in that present (ultimately be-
coming his doctrines of re-enactment, incapsulation, and his-
torical evidence); (b) the concept of history as the science 
of human affairs, (c) with methods of its own not reducible to 
abstract deductive logic, but rather employing a Baconian Q-A 
logic for testing evidence; and (d) a philosophical rapproche-
~e~ with historical understanding insofar as knowledge 
achieved by historical inquiry is knowledge of the historian's 
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own situation which is at the same time knowledge of himself, 
i.e. philosophy. In this issue we therefore find joined to-
gether all of the principle themes we have found to be the 
guiding ideas in the autobiographical interpretation of Col-
lingwood's philosophy--themes which we have thus far confirmed 
to be the leading ideas in all his early and later published 
. . 1 
wn.t~ngs. 
In criticizing the errors of realism concerning his-
tory we also noticed at least one of the major issues from his 
later philosophy beginning to emerge. In Chapter VI we saw a 
1If we can ever expect to find a suitable instance of 
a form of thought displaying the "real thinking" which binds 
together in a single example all that Collingwood leads us to 
expect of it, we have good reason to suspect that it will be 
found minimally exemplified at the historical level in the 
scale of forms of knowledge. Cf. Re( contra, Mink and Rubin-
off. Mink's "figure in the carpet roughly the overall point 
of view which unites Collingwood's philosophy) is first en-
countered in art, which is "the basic form of the figure in 
the carpet to which every part of the rest of the design is 
related" (MHD, 237). For Rubinoff this would probably not be 
art but religion, because it is only with religion and espe-
cially the Christian religion with its doctrine of redemption, 
that theory and practice are unified and the theme of recon-
ciliation appears explicitly (CEPC, 106; cf. IH, 314-15). 
While each of them makes an impressive case in defense of 
their own interpretation, we wish to note that (a) art and re-
ligion hardly come in for mention in the Autobiography, where-
as there is a sizable discussion of the rapprochement of his-
tory and philosophy; (b) even in the early writings like ~­
culum Mentis, "concrete thought" (thought dealing with indi-
vidual facts and employing the concrete universal) does not 
occur prior to historical thinking; and (c) in his later wri-
tings the most noteworthy exercise of Q-A logic and the use 
of philosophical method of the sort he described as "real 
thinking" takes place in his discussion of history. 
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gradual refinement of the concept of history from its more 
realistic form in Religion and Philosophy (history dealing 
with "facts" independent of anyone's understanding of them) 
to the sort of view he sketched in the Autobiography. We 
noted that in his early writings we could find direct evidence 
that the principles of history we called LG and ARCH 1, 2, and 
3 are actually formulated in his essays on the philosophy of 
history. But although some of the principles we called HIST 
1-4 were indirectly detectable or exemplified in his earlier 
writings, they are explicit and literal only in his 1936 Bri-
tish Academy lecture, "Human Nature and Human History," at 
which point the development of his thought on the subject as 
outlined in the Autobiography may be said to be complete. 
Between these two points we noted that there was a gradual re-
finement of the concept of the object of history from one 
which (a) (in Religion and Philosophy) merely identified its 
object with factual becoming or the whole of changing reality 
(hence identifying history and philosophy as "the same 
thing"), to (b) (in Speculum Mentis) a form of knowledge di-
rected on an object grasped as "the concrete universal," ex-
pressed in categorical sincular judgments, but limited inso-
far as it sought to grasp an infinite world of fact which lies 
outside the consciousness of the historian; and finally, to 
(c) (in the Essays on the Philosophy of History written between 
1921 and 1930) a concept of history as a multi-levelled struc-
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ture in which, in its most precise form, its object is speci-
fied as the deeds of men, done in the past, known by critical 
evaluation of present evidence, and limited only by the his-
torian's own understanding of this evidence. Our question 
from Chapter VI is whether there is any room in this final 
concept of history as a scale of forms for the earliest stage 
in this development, i.e. the realistic element of "fact" as 
something which exists independently of anyone's knowledge of 
it ( RP , 4 9 ; FR , 8 3 ) . 
But if the work of reconciliation of philosophy and 
history is complete when we have shown that the object of his-
tory displays the structure of a philosophical scale of forms, 
why did Collingwood proceed, after his essays of the twenties, 
to think and write on the subject? Obviously he had something 
further to say, and we assume that this must have involved not 
only the question of the multiple layers of meaning to the 
philosophical concept of history, but also the question of the 
sort of truths that are embodied in history and the form of 
inference that historical thinking employs. In pursuing our 
third general task we therefore contact Collingwood's handling 
of the classic contemporary issues in the philosophy of his-
tory, viz. issues concerning (a) the meaning of history, (b) 
historical truth, and (c) the nature of historical explana-
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tion. 2 We have already met with Collingwood's response to 
the first issue, and we shall have more to say about it in a 
moment. We know at least that whatever else history might be, 
if it is a philosophical concept its meaning has the structure 
of a scale of overlapping forms. But thus far we have not 
found Collingwood saying much about the nature of historical 
truth and inference, and we anticipate that in The Idea of 
History these will be the issues that occupy the foreground of 
his concern. Therefore we expect to see that the task of re-
conciling history and philosophy is carried forward in his 
later writings by extending the dialectical logic of his Essay 
on Philosophical Method to history at the propositional and 
inferential levels of thought. 
These considerations provide some substance to the 
general tasks we have set for ourselves in this chapter. Our 
immediate concern in the next section will be to show, first, 
that in his overall reflection on the nature of historical 
2cf. W. H. Dray, "Philosophy of History," in The En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York, 
1967), VI, 247-54. In his article Dray distinguishes between 
speculative and critical philosophies of history, and within 
the latter identifies the three major problem areas as those 
dealing with historical explanation, the historical indivi-
dual, and historical objectivity. Since historical objectiv-
ity is basically the question of the nature of historical 
truth, two of the three of these issues in the critical phil-
osophy of history are directly addressed by Collingwood; the 
third is present, but in slightly altered form. As we shall 
see Collingwood takes as his historical individual the mean-
ing of an historical act, so that in this issue are bound 
both the speculative and critical aspects of the philosophy 
of history. 
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thinking Collingwood's orientation is always displayed by a 
critique of the fundamental presupposition which he called 
1 . " "rea l.Sm. This critique depends on a definition of history 
as a philosophical rather than a formal-logical concept--i.e. 
one having the structure of a scale of forms rather than that 
of a formally abstract class-concept. Secondly, this cri-
tique leads directly to the formulation of his famous 
"inside-outside" theory of historical events, i.e. that his-
torical events differ from physical events insofar as they 
are essentially expressions of thought which the latter are 
not. Thirdly, since the subject matter of history is thought, 
Collingwood develops a minimal notion of what is to be in-
cluded in that concept and, fourthly, how it is grasped by an 
of historical re-enactment. Fifthly, re-enactment presupposes 
the activity of an ~ priori imagination, the functions of 
which he sketches. And finally, this excursion from histori-
cal meaning to mental functions climaxes in a remarkable de-
bate in which Collingwood's critique is extended beyond real-
ism to the errors of idealism as well, showing how on either 
presupposition historical thinking, and hence historical 
truth, is not possible at all. 
It is at this point that we begin to see how Colling-
wood's later philosophy of history moves beyond the essays of 
the twenties. We encounter arguments that exhibit the sort 
of structure that he had described in the Essay on Philosophi-
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cal Method as peculiarly philosophical--arguments that are 
.;.---
reversible and conclusions that are reciprocally establ~shed. 
We also are made increasingly aware of the degree of his re-
liance on the theory of mental functions that we were at 
pains to describe in the previous chapter. And we see how, 
as might be expected, the issue of historical truth leads 
directly to the problem of historical inference. In section 
three we shall take up the topics of historical methodology, 
Q-A logic, and historical inference, trying once again to 
watch for hints that will help us to get a clearer idea of 
what Collingwood understo.od by "real thinking" and the rela-
tionship between Q-A, F-, and D-logics. 
Textually, what we are attempting is a reconstruction 
of The Idea of History. In section two we will take up the 
Introduction to The Idea of History and the first, second, 
fourth and fifth of the seven Epilegomena--all of these being 
works dating from around 1934-36 and preceeding his work on 
the unfinished Principles of History. In section three we 
shall be concerned with the remaining Epilegomena, but primar-
ily the third (which deals with historical inference)--all of 
these being extracts from the 1939 draft of the Principles of 
History. Our survey thus will have the effect of a counter-
balance to Knox's editorial arrangement of these essays, 
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since it approximates their actual chronological order. Whe-
ther it also establishes their logical order as well we 
leave to the judgment of the reader. 
2. Anti-Realism and History: (a) The Definition of History. 
The Introduction to The Idea of History presents, in 
admirably concise language, a sketch of the nature, subject 
matter, method, and aim of the philosophy of history--an ex-
3 position of which any scholastic philosopher would be proud. 
Collingwood sets out to answer the questions, what is his-
tory? what is it about? how does it proceed? and what is it 
for? (or alternately, what is its value?)--and his answers 
are as follows. (1) History is a kind of research or inquiry 
belonging to the sciences, that is, "the forms of thought 
whereby we ask questions and try to answer them"--an activ-
ity of "fastening upon something we do not know and trying 
to discover it." (2) The object of history or the kind of 
thing it finds out is "res gestae: actions of human beings 
that have been done in the past." (3) History proceeds by 
the interpretation of evidence, where evidence is a collec-
I 
tive name for things existing here and now and of such a kind 
3It is interesting to note that in spite of Colling-
wood's assertion in the Autobiography that in his early years 
as a tutor and lecturer at Oxford he became something of a 
specialist in Aristotle (the first lectures he gave were on De 
Anima) (A, 27), few of his interpreters have followed up on 
this lead. A case in point is the characterization of history 
as a science, given in the Introduction, and another Aristote-
lianism appears in his use of the potency-act distinction in 
connection with historical evidence. 
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that the historian, by thinking about it, can get answers to 
the questions he asks about past events. And (4) the aim of 
history, its value, is human self-knowledge, where knowing 
oneself means "knowing, first, what it is to be a man; se-
condly, knowing what it is to be the kind of man you are; 
and thirdly, knowing what it is to be man you are and nobody 
else is"--a knowledge achieved by knowing what one can do. 
(IH, 9-10). History is, to put it shortly, scientific, hu-
manistic, rational, and self-revelatory (IH, 18). 
Here in brief form is the sum, if not the entire sub-
stance, of Collingwood's philosophy of history, and the re-
mainder of The Idea of History consists of first a descrip-
tion of how this complete idea carne to take shape in the 
minds of working historians (Parts I-IV), and secondly a com-
mentary on what each of these points means (Part V-The £pi-
legomena). Corning to these four characteristics from the 
viewpoint of our recent study of Collingwood's development 
to this point it is not difficult to interpolate for ourselves 
how they are formulated in opposition to realism. (a) When 
Collingwood calls history a science and then describes sci-
ence as "asking questions and seeking answers" we recognize 
behind this assertion Collingwood's assault on formal logic 
as a static relationship between a completed set of proposi-
tions, and his "alternative" proposal for a Q-A logic of dis-
covery as the true instrument of historical science. (b) 
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When Collingwood says that the object of history is res ~­
tae, we recognize that he is calling attention not only to 
-
the fact that it is not knowable by direct observation or 
"acquaintance" (on which realist epistemology is based), but 
also that it requires a different description of knowing 
with an epistemology of its own, one for which the basic mo-
del of "explanation" by subsumption of particulars under a 
universal law is inappropriate. (c) When Collingwood states 
that history proceeds by the interpretation of evidence we 
cannot help recalling the critique of "sense-datum" empiri-
cism in The Principles of Art. The way in which historical 
events of the past are present to us requires the conscious 
act of interpretation even more necessarily than does the 
perception of objects which are immediately present before 
us. Although in perception we can apprehend or appreciate 
something just as it stands, before beginning to classify 
it (PA, 203), historical evidence is only actual evidence in-
sofar as it is known to be what it is, i.e. insofar as it is 
historically interpreted (IH, 247, 280). And (d) when Col-
lingwood insists that the aim of history is for human self-
knowledge, we hear the refrain of his lifelong theme of re-
conciliation between the ancient philosophical imperative 
to "know thyself" and the contemporary view of history as 
the critical knowledge of human events. In Collingwood's 
view the only way to effect this rapprochement is by ridding 
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philosophy of the notion that it can live up to the sort of 
objectivity proposed for it by the analogy with exact or em-
pirical sciences. The reconciliation is complete when both 
these errors are corrected, and both philosophy and history 
are understood to be forms of self-knowledge. 
Lest we be accused of reading too much into The Idea 
of History we hasten to add that this aspect of rapprochement 
is explicit in the Introduction where Collingwood writes that 
a subject matter is philosophical insofar as it deals with 
''the organized and scientific development of self-conscious-
ness" (IH, 4), and adds that it is history rather than other 
forms of knowledge that raises the peculiarly modern prob-
lems that shed new light on this development. 
The past, consisting of particular events in space and 
time which are no longer happening, cannot be apprehend-
ed by mathematical thinking, because mathematical think-
ing apprehends objects that have no special location in 
space and time . . . . Nor can the past be apprehended 
by theological thinking, because the object of that think-
ing is a single infinite object, and historical events 
are finite and plural. Nor by ((empirical)) scientific 
thinking, because the truths which science discovers are 
known to be true by being found through observation and 
experiment exemplified in what we actually perceive, 
whereas the past has vanished and our ideas about it can 
never be verified as we verify our scientific hypothe-
ses. Theories of knowledge designed to account for mathe-
matical and theological and scientific knowledge thus do 
not touch on the special problems of historical know-
ledge; and if they offer themselves as complete accounts 
of knowledge they actually imply that historical know-
ledge is impossible. (IH, 5). 
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It is noteworthy that although there is an indis-
tinct echo of the various forms of knowledge from Speculum 
Menti~, there is no explicit connection made between history 
-
as itself a philosophical scale of forms and as a form of 
self-knowledge along with others (art, science, etc.). Thus 
we are faced from the outset with a dilemma, if not an out-
right reversal from the standpoint of his earlier writings: 
it appears that one can either effect a rapprochement by 
pointing to a common element of self-knowledge in both his-
tory and philosophy, thereby defining both in terms of a uni-
versal and ignoring their structure as a scale of forms, or 
define history in terms of its object as part of a scale of 
forms of knowledge and lose its rapprochement with philosophy 
as both forms of self-knowledge. 
But this is less a problem than it appears. Colling-
wood has not abandoned his requirement from the Essay on Phil-
osophical Method of defining a philosophical concept by means 
of overlapping forms. In the Introduction he has merely giv-
en us a brief sketch of the highest exemplification of the 
concept (viz. scientific history) prior to showing how this 
concept has developed to this point from its prior stages. 
It is the burden of Parts I-IV of The Idea of History to 
trace this development through its manifestations in histor-
iography--a remarkable overview which we shall not attempt to 
examine here in detail. We wish to point out only that both 
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in Parts I-IV and in the Epilegomena of Part V, Collingwood's 
strategy is to show that history, in its development and in 
its present state, is the expression of mind in its several 
overlapping functions--presentative perception, re-presenta-
tive imagination, critical understanding and reconciling rea-
son. Each of these functions gives rise to a form of histor-
iography in which they form the guiding idea. Thus Colling-
wood traces the idea of history (a) from its pre-historic be-
ginnings in mythology and sacred literature, through (b) its 
first concrete manifestations in Greek histories with their 
emphasis on eyewitness accounts, (c) subsequently developed 
in the Christian era as "scissors and paste" history which 
relies uncritically on "authorities" who in turn rest on eye-
witness accounts; then (d) to critical historigraphy origin-
ating in the Renaissance but coming into its own in the 18th 
century with philosophers like Vico who recognized that the 
historian can and must employ his own reasoning to adjudi-
cate conflicting accounts of historical authorities; and 
finally (e) to the present era of scientific historiography, 
in which the active role of the historian is thoroughly re-
cognized as essential to the very process of historical think-
ing. It is not difficult to recognize in these stages of the 
concept of history a schema we have already encountered in 
The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan in the process of 
thought in general. Thus we have (a) history as the confused 
potential for bearing meaning (mythical and theological his-
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tory), (b) as events perpetuated and domesticated in percep-
tion by eye-witnesses (early Greco-Roman historiography), (c) 
as chronicles represented in imagination and memory ("scis-
sors and past"--e.g. Medieval historiography), (d) as criti-
cally constructed into coherent narratives by judgmental un-
derstanding (critical historiography), and (e) as fully re-
lated to self-conscious reason by recognizing and integrat-
ing the active role of the historian in the construction of 
his narrative account (scientific historiography). It is in 
this way that he offers recompense for the neglect of his-
tory by the realists, and it is in this way that he shows 
that history is a form of self-knowledge. 
This overview of the argument of Part I is not to-
tally free of the inaccuracies that arise whenever oversim-
plification occurs. Greco-Roman history, for example, is not 
completely or even primarily based on eye-witness accounts: 
much of it is mixed with legend, myth, and even outright in-
ventions by the historian (orations in Thucydides, for ex-
ample). In Speculum Mentis Collingwood made a point of de-
scribing how early historiography is mixed with dramatic and 
religious_elements, so that there is some confusion in the 
mind of an historian like Herodotus between the ideals of 
factual history ~ se and the artistic ideals of drama (SM, 
211-16). Collingwood was no less aware of such an overlap 
when he wrote Part I of The Idea of History: but he was not 
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concerned with showing the relation of history to other forms 
of experience (e.g. art), but rather with showing how the 
clear idea of scientific history grew out of a confused idea 
of it. Our point in bringing out the analogy between the de-
velopment of scientific history and the levels of mental func-
tions is meant to call attention to the shift in ideals of 
historiography, and to show how in that shift a scale of 
forms is generated. 
If the four elements of Collingwood's definition of 
history are formulated in opposition to realism, how do they 
form a challenge to the central realistic dogma on the rela-
tionship of knower and known? If the object known is not af-
fected by the knowing of it, then it appears that objectivity 
is retained for history, but self-knowledge is not; but if 
the events of history are altered in the process of corning 
to know them, then historical objectivity is itself threa-
tened. In showing how the concept of history is preserved 
in the truths of history, Collingwood will argue, as he al-
ready had in The Principles of Art for perception, that his-
torical events are not created ex nihilo by historical ima-
gination, but they are preserved and prolonged by historical 
consciousness, and this is based on the historian's operating 
presuppositions. As a first step in showing how he works 
this out in detail in the Epilegornena essays, we must clarify 
the notion of an historical event, the minimum exemplifica-
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tion of the concept of history, and the res gestae of his de-
finition in the Introduction. 
(b) The Outside and Inside of Historical Events.--It 
is interesting to note that the first two of these Epilego-
mena, both lectures, are directed against views of history 
by realists and idealists respectively. The first is Colling-
wood's 1936 British Academy lecture, "Human Nature and Human 
History," and it packs a double anti-realistic punch. It 
makes as its major thesis that "the science of human nature 
was a false attempt--falsified by the analogy of natural sci-
ence--to understand the mind itself, and that, whereas the 
right way of investigating nature is by the methods called 
scientific, the right way of investigating the mind is by the 
methods of history" (IH, 209). But rather than remaining 
content to refute an 18th century error, Collingwood carries 
the argument forward from empiricism to contemporary realism. 
He takes as his proximate target the essay "The Historicity 
of Things" by the avowed realist, Samuel Alexander. 4 Alex-
ander's essay identifies historicity with the universal "time-
fulness" of things, a tactic which results in resolving all 
knowledge to history (IH, 210). In order to preserve the 
autonomy of both history and science, Collingwood makes it a 
point to distinguish history not only from physical change 
4In Philosophy and History, The Ernst Cassierer Fest-
~chrift, ed. by Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford, 
1936), pp. 11-25 .. 
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but also from "timefulness"--both resulting from the confusion 
of the scientific conception of nature and the historical con-
ception of mind. 
First he tackles an older concept: 
Since the time of Heraclitus and Plato, it has been a 
commonplace that things natural, no less than things hu-
mand, are in constant change, and that the entire world 
of nature is a world of "process" or "becoming." But this 
is not what is meant by the historicity of things; for 
change and history are not at all the same. According to 
this old-established conception, the specific forms of na-
tural things constitute a changeless repertory of fixed 
types, and the process of nature is a process by which in-
stances of these forms . . . come into existence and pass 
out of it again. Now in human affairs ... there is no 
such fixed repertory of specific forms . . . . (H)uman 
history shows a change not only in the individual cases 
in which these ideals are realized or partially realized, 
but in the ideals themselves. (IH, 210-11). 
Collingwood recognized that the evolutionary conception of na-
ture has replaced the older concept of a physical universe of 
unaltered species, so that in the newer view, as expressed by 
Whitehead, "the very possession of its attributes by a natural 
thing takes time" and "the historicity of things" is proven by 
the fact that there can be no such thing as nature at an in-
stant (IH, 212). But this presents an even subtler danger, 
since history is still not reducible to science nor historical 
events to scientific ones: 
These modern views of nature do, no doubt, "take time 
seriously." But just as history is not the same thing as 
change, so it is not the same thing as "timefulness," whe-
ther that means evolution or an existence which takes time 
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.... According to him ((i.e. the historian)), all his-
tory properly so called is the history of human affairs 
. . . . There is a certain analogy between the archeolo-
gist's interpretation of a stratified site and the geolo-
gist's interpretation of rock-horizons with their associ-
ated fossils; but the difference is no less clear than 
the similarity. The archeologist's use of his stratified 
relics depends on his conceiving them as artifacts serv-
ing human purposes and thus expressing a particular way 
in which men have thought about their own life; and from 
his point of view the paleontologist, arranging his fos-
sils in a time-series, is not working as an historian, 
but only as a scientist thinking in a way which can at 
most be described as quasi-historical. (IH, 212). 
It is in order to distinguish these two classes of events and 
these two sorts of thinking activities that Collingwood in-
traduces his "inside-outside" theory of human acts. 
He distinguishes between physical events and human 
acts on the basis that physical events have only an "outside" 
consisting of "everything belonging to it which can be de-
scribed in terms of bodies and their movements," whereas hu-
man acts have in addition an "inside" or "that which can only 
be described in terms of thought" (IH, 213). If this appears 
to be a mere restatement of a kind of Cartesian dualism, Col-
lingwood is anxious to add that it is not the dualism of a 
pair of mutually exclusive classes. The historian, he insists, 
is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of 
the other. "He is investigating not mere events (where by a 
mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no in-
side) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside 
and inside of an event" (ibid.). While it is true that the 
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natural scientist goes beyond the immediate event by observ-
ing its relations to others and bringing them under a general 
formula or law of nature, to the scientist nature is always 
merely a "phenomenon" or spectacle presented to his intelli-
gent observation. But the events of history are never mere 
phenomena or spectacles, but "things which the historian looks, 
not at, but through, to discern the thought within them" (IH, 
214). 
This last remark underscores the importance of view-
ing Collingwood's inside-outside theory in the light of his 
philosophy of mind. When he says that the historian looks 
"not at but through" the outside of an event he is saying that 
the historian takes such acts as expressions of thoughts, i.e. 
as conveyers of meaning exactly like language (where language 
is taken in its extended sense as including that "gesture 
language" that Collingwood recognized as more basic than spo-
ken language). Acts, like sounds, ink-marks, gesture-signs, 
etc. are physical "bearers of meaning"--they express the in-
tentions of an historical agent in acts as his words do in 
sounds. It is because they have this character that they have 
the capacity or potential to be evidence to the historian; but 
it is also the reason that they require interpretation £y an 
historian. To paraphrase the situation for Collingwood, a 
physical event may or may not be whatever it is without human 
interpretation; but an historical event cannot. Sounds may or 
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'
,' not be bearers of meanings, but human actions, like words, 
maY r do not have this alternative. 
Unfortunately Collingwood's inside-outside doctrine 
generated a fair amount of misunderstanding, even among has 
his more sympathetic interpreters. Some of this appears to be 
the result of his own overstatement--as when he writes that 
"the processes of events which constitute the world of nature 
are altogether different in kind from the processes of thought 
which constitute the world of history" (IH, 217). It has led 
to the charges both that he over-intellectualizes history and 
that he draws an overly strict distinction between history 
and nature. Once again the first charge seems to be directly 
supported by Collingwood. Having said that history is not the 
same as change, natural process or timefulness, he further 
limits the range of historical research by insisting that it 
does not even include all human activities: 
It does not follow that all human actions are subject-
matter for history; and indeed historians are agreed that 
they are not. But when they are asked how the distinction 
is to be made between historical and non-historical human 
actions, they are at a loss how to reply. From our pre-
sent point of view we can offer an answer; so far as man's 
conduct is determined by what may be called his animal na-
ture, his impulses and appetites, it is non-historical; 
the process of these activities is a natural process. 
Thus, the historian is not interested in the fact that men 
eat and sleep and make love and thus satisfy their natural 
appetites; but he is interested in the social customs 
which they create by their thought as a framework within 
which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned 
by convention and morality. (IH, 216; cf. IH, 315). 
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The question immediately arises, does this not rule out a 
great deal of what is usually taken to be the subject-matter 
of history? What about the rages of Ivan the Terrible, Na-
poleon, or Hitler, or natural disasters like the Lisbon and 
san Francisco earthquakes? We shall see in the next section 
what Collingwood takes to be the true subject-matter of his-
tory, but we see from the above quote what his general answer 
to the objection is. Natural events are of interest to the 
historian only to the extent that they impinge on human events 
in the proper sense, or are incorporated into them as an as-
pect of thought. Passions, natural disasters and other physi-
cal phenomena are historical only to the extent that people 
thinkingly react to them--Hitler's rages as instrumental or 
obstructive to the discharge of Nazi warplans, the Lisbon 
earthquake causing decisions on relocation of populations or 
influencing government financial policies, etc. But regarded 
as entities in themselves, i.e. as not the expression of human 
thought, passions and feelings are the subject-matter for psy-
chology, land-mass shifts for geology, etc. 
The second objection is more serious, and takes a bit 
of sleuthing to uncover Collingwood's thought on the matter. 
We have already suggested that while historical events neces-
sarily involve thought, since they express human intentions 
in purposive acts, natural events do not. Does this mean they 
do not as a matter of fact, or as a matter of necessity? Col-
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lingwood appears to leave the question open, commenting only 
that "The only condition on which there could be a history of 
nature is ((on the assumption)) that the events of nature are 
actions on the part of some thinking being or beings, and 
that by studying these actions we could discover what were the 
thoughts which they expressed and think these thoughts for our-
selves. This is a condition," he adds cryptically, "which 
probably no one will claim is fulfilled" (IH, 302). 5 What 
5collingwood could not have anticipated that someone 
after his death would, in fact, make such a claim--but such is 
the argument of J. Blachowicz in "History and Nature in Col-
lingwood's Dialectic," Idealistic Studies, VI, 2 (January, 
1976), pp. 49-61. Although sympathetic to Collingwood's over-
all aims, Blachowicz finds that Collingwood failed to extend 
his dialectical analysis to nature itself, and is therefore 
guilty of drawing an overly strict distinction between events 
of nature and those of history--thus being open to an accusa-
tion of falling prey to his own "Fallacy of False Disjunction." 
Blachowicz argues that in order to extend his dialectical an-
alysis to nature Collingwood merely had to see that the "pre-
suppositions of nature ((may)) be disclosed by way of access 
into its 'inside' as well" (p. 56). But for Blachowicz the 
"inside" of physical events consist of their teleological as-
pect, which is contained in the fundamental parameter of com-
plexity or organization. "As the variable of internal organi-
zation assumes different values, the generic essence is quali-
tatively altered, generating the scale of forms which is the 
scale of nature," so that "the presuppositional logic is fully 
applicable" to development in nature" (p. 57). Now while we 
agree with Blachowicz in bemoaning Collingwood's failure to 
achieve a clearer rapprochement between Q-A and D-logics, we 
think it is alien to Collingwood's purpose to attribute 
thoughts to physical, non-human events. Presuppositions, what-
ever else they may be, are essentially a part of a P-Q-A com-
plex and essentially "linguistic" in the sense of expressing 
the thoughts of persons. Physical events do not ask questions 
(although they may, on human interpretation, "raiS'e"" questions 
in the minds of observers); therefore they do not "have pre-
suppositions in Collingwood's sense. But Blachowicz is right 
to point out Collingwood's curious neglect of the applicability 
of the scale of forms to nature--a deficiency not shared by 
some other contemporary cosmologies. 
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sort of "thinking" Collingwood has in mind in the expression 
"thinking beings" we shall see in a moment, but we have al-
ready seen that he has in mind the sort of problem-solving 
choices that embody the unification of theoretical and prac-
tical activities--what he has elsewhere called "real thinking" 
or "concrete thought." The outside and inside of an histori-
cal act are not themselves two separate events, but two sides 
to the same act--exactly like expressive language and thought. 
Thus when the historical agent is mistaken in his theoretical 
assessment of the situation in which he finds himself called 
upon to act, this mistaken thought cannot be ignored by the 
historian who attempts to understand the act: his mistaken 
thought is essential to understanding the significance of the 
agent's act (IH, 316-17). 
Now this point is crucial in understanding the inside-
outside theory: while Collingwood is willing to use the term 
"event" for both history and nature, he is not able to bring 
himself to do so for the term "action" because the latter term 
requires the essential element of self-consciousness in the 
awareness of alternative possibilities (IH, 215). Collingwood 
finds it highly questionable, if not downright repugnant, to 
predicate this state of affairs of nature. This becomes ap-
parent in an earlier portion of The Idea of History, in a dis-
cussion of teleology--that aspect of "acting for an end" that 
is teetering on the brink of the distinction between history 
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and nature. The issue arises in Collingwood's discussion of 
Kant's distinction between natural and human affairs, viz. 
that nature acts in accordance with law, but only man acts in 
accordance with the concept or consciousness of law. Nature, 
therefore, is the sum of processes governed by laws blindly 
obeyed, but the world of human affairs is governed not simply 
by law but by the consciousness of law (IH, 92). He then 
cites with apparent approval Kant's demonstration of why there 
should be such a thing as history. 
Nature's purpose in creating any of her creatures is, of 
course, the existence of that creature, the realization 
of its essence. The teleology of nature is an internal 
teleology, not an external: she does not make grass to 
feed cows, and cows to feed men; she makes grass in order 
that there would be grass, and so on. Man's essence is 
his reason; therefore she makes men in order that they 
should be rational . . . . Man is an animal that has the 
peculiar faculty of profiting by the experience of others; 
and he has this faculty because he is rational, for rea-
son is a kind of experience in which this is possible .. 
. . Consequently the purpose of nature for the develop-
ment of man's reason is a purpose that can be fully real-
ized only in the history of the human race and not in an 
individual life. (IH, 98). 
Now it is worth noting that while Collingwood faults Kant for 
locating the activating force for the plan of human history, 
i.e. progress in rationality in human irrationality, i.e. pas-
sion, ignorance, and selfishness (IH, 103), he does not fault 
him for the basic distinction between nature and the world of 
human affairs. Such is not the case with his discussion of 
Croce, whom he charges with blurring the distinction completely. 
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Collingwood quotes a passage in which Croce challenges his 
reader to an experiment: if you wish to understand the. true 
history of a neolithic man, become a neolithic in your mind; 
and if you wish to understand the true history of a blade of 
grass, become that grass in your mind--but if you cannot, con-
tent yourself with describing and arranging artifacts or mech-
anisms in an external way. Then Collingwood responds to 
Croce's challenge: 
As concerns neolithic man, the advice is obviously good. 
If you can enter into his mind and make his thoughts your 
own, you can write his history, and not otherwise .. 
When he made a certain implement, he had a purpose in mind; 
the implement came into being as an expression of his spir-
it, and if you treat it as non-spiritual that is only be-
cause of the failure of your historical insight. But is 
this true of a blade of grass? Is its articulation and 
growth an expression of its own spiritual life? I am not 
so sure. And when we come to a crystal, or a stalactite, 
my skepticism reaches the point of rebellion. The process 
by which these things form themselves appears to me to be 
a process in which, through no lack of our own historical 
sympathy, we look in vain for any expression of thought. 
It is an event; it has individuality; but it seems to lack 
that inwardness which, according to ... Croce, is made 
(and I think, rightly made) the criterion of historicity. 
(IH, 199-200). 
The upshot of this discussion is that while Collingwood 
is willing to grant an "internal teleology" to nature, he is 
not willing to abandon the distinction between natural and his-
torical events, because the latter cannot be understood except 
as the expression of human thought. It is less a matter of ne-
cessity than it is one of fact that nature is not so constitu-
ted; but it is a matter of necessity that history is, since, 
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on Collingwood's view, an historical event necessarily is an 
action of a human agent (one is tempted to say "by defini-
tion"), and this requires awareness of alternatives, or reflec-
tive thought. And it is this difference in essential constitu-
tion that he has in mind when he says that they are "altogether 
different in kind" (IH, 217--notice the wording: the processes 
of events which constitute the world of nature are altogether 
different in kind from the processes of thought which consti-
tute the world of history). 
The "inside-outside" terminology is therefore a meta-
phorical expression which Collingwood finds useful for de-
scribing what he takes to be an essential difference between 
historical and physical events--a distinction that he main-
tains both against positivistic6 historians who assimilate his-
tory to science as if the nature of the "facts" or events were 
basically the same (IH, 132-33), and against the idealistic 
historians who assimilate nature to history by assuming that 
one can re-think a physical event in the same way that one can 
6The successors to the English empiricist tradition in 
history are the positivistic historians, just as the succes-
sors to that tradition in philosophy are the realists of Ox-
ford and Cambridge (IH, 126-33, 142, 163-64, 173-74). As we 
have already noted, empiricism, naturalism, realism, positi-
vism, and even psychologism are products of the same frame of 
mind, and Collingwood often uses the terms synonymously. He 
recognized in all the root error of realism, i.e. the assump-
tion that knowledge consists of the confrontation of a mind 
With an object outside the mind, where the latter remains un-
affected by the knowing of it. 
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re-enact an historical one. The philosophy of history which 
is argued in the Epilegomena is hardly intelligible unl~ss it 
is understood against the background of this opposition be-
tween realistic or positivistic history and its idealistic 
counterpart--a theme we shall encounter again in the discus-
sion of historical re-enactment. 
(c) Individuality, Universality, and the Subject Mat-
ter of History.-- In analyzing the res gestae of history Col-
--
lingwood has been more concerned with the differences between 
historical acts and physical events than with the positive 
characteristics of the acts themselves. Thus far we know mini-
mally that history is concerned with acts of men done in the 
past, acts which have an "inside" consisting of thought. We 
know also that these acts are done self-consciously or "on 
purpose," and that they involve the practical resolution of 
situational problems expressing a thoughtful choice between 
alternatives (IH, 215, 283). And finally, they are experien-
tial--they are, as he phrases it, "not spectacles to be 
watched, but experiences to be lived through" (IH, 218). 
In the fifth Epilegomenon, "The Subject Matter of His-
tory," Collingwood reiterates these characteristics and adds 
another which sheds some light not only on the minimal unit 
presupposed for understanding historical processes, but also 
on our previous discussion of universal concepts and abstract 
classes. Reversing the order of the approach taken in the 
637 
fi.rst Epilegomenon, Collingwood this time proceeds from the 
subjective to the objective. The subject matter of history 
must first of all be experience and not the mere object of ex-
perience, i.e. the processes of nature that are the subject 
matter for natural science. But it is not even experience as 
such that the historian seeks, since immediate experience is 
a "mere flow of consciousness consisting of sensations, feel-
ings and the like" which are carried away in the flux of sen-
suous experience (cf. IH, 233). Nor is it even thought in its 
immediacy, i.e. "the unique act of thought with its unique 
context in the life of an individual thinker," since if this 
were so, in thinking an historical subject matter "the histor-
ian would be the person about whom he thinks, living over 
again ((acts)) in all respects the same" (IH, 302-03). What 
the historian apprehends is not the individual in all its in-
dividuality, but something essentially universal: 
The historian cannot apprehend the individual act of 
thought in its individuality, just as it actually happened 
((or in Ranke's words, wie es eigentlich gewesen--IH, 
130)). What he apprehends of that individual is only some-
thing that it might have shared with other acts of thought 
and actually has shared with his own. But this something 
is not an abstraction, in the sense of a common character-
istic shared by different individuals and considered apart 
from the individuals that share it. It is the act of 
thought itself, in its survival and revival at different 
times and in different persons; once in the historian's 
own life, once in the life of the person whose history he 
is narrating. (IH, 303). 
Thus far we recognize Collingwood's epistemological setting 
for the notion of a universal concept which "survives and re-
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vives" in mental activities; but he here goes on to give it a 
different perspective than we have heretofore encountered. 
The passage continues: 
Thus the vague phrase ((of Croce--IH, 199)) that history 
is knowledge of the individual claims for it a field at 
once too wide and too narrow: too wide, because the indi-
viduality of perceived objects and natural facts and im-
mediate experience falls outside its sphere ... ; too 
narr~w, because it would exclude universality, and it is 
just the universality of an event or character that makes 
it a proper and possible object of historical study, if 
by universality we mean something that oversteps the lim-
its of merely local and temporal existence and possesses 
a significance valid for all men at all times .... 
(T)hought, transcending its own immediacy, survives and 
revives in other contexts; and ... individual acts and 
persons appear in history not in virtue of their indivi-
duality as such, but because that individuality is the ve-
hicle of a thought which, because it was actually theirs, 
is potentially everyone's. (IH, 303; cf. IH, 247, 280). 
In this subtle and neglected theme we find Collingwood's un-
derstanding of universal concepts lit up from several direc-
tions simultaneously. (a) Not only does it contrast the in-
dividual (what he had called, in Speculum Mentis, the concrete 
universal) with the abstract universal (or the class-concept 
ofF-logic); and (b) not only does this universality take part 
in the survival and revival of a concept in the context of 
different mental acts, thus transcending the local and tem-
poral limits of immediate feelings; (c) but also it binds the 
universality of a concept to the individuality of the meaning 
of an historical act which expresses a thought which, as he 
says, is potentially everyone's because it was actually theirs. 
The universality of historical thinking is bound by Colling-
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wood to the notion of meaning expressed in historical acts, 
and ~ is the individuality with which history is minimally 
concerned. This theme will be renewed when we come to Colling-
wood's treatment of re-enactment, where it re-appears in the 
critique of the distinction between acts of thought and their 
objects. 
It is also here that we encounter the self-conscious-
ness that is essential not only to historical understanding 
but in the historical act of an agent in the first place. 
Both in his definition of history as consisting of acts of his-
torical agents with their inside consisting of thought, and in 
his definition of historical re-enactment on the part of the 
historian, the key term is, of course, "thought." Collingwood 
does not back away from stating what is included in this term. 
How much or how little is meant to be included under the 
term "thought"? The term "thought" ... has stood for a 
certain form of experience or mental activity whose pe-
culiarity may be negatively described by saying that it 
is not merely immediate, and therefore is not carried away 
by the flow of consciousness. The positive peculiarity 
which distinguishes thought from mere consciousness is its 
power of recognizing the activity of the self as a single 
activity persisting through the diversity of its own acts 
.... The peculiarity of thought, then, is that it is 
not mere consciousness but self-consciousness. The self, 
as merely conscious, is a flow of consciousness, a series 
of immediate sensations and feelings; but as merely con-
scious it is not aware of itself as such a flow; it is ig-
norant of its own continuity through the succession of ex-
periences. The activity of becoming aware of this con-
tinuity is what is called thinking. (IH, 306; cf. IH, 
222). 
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Collingwood follows this continuity-achieving activity briefly 
through its manifestations in perception, memory, and imagin-
ation--the stages of recognizing feelings as "mine," prolong-
ing them, etc. The account is a brief tour of the stages of 
mental functions that we have already encountered in The Prin-
£iples of Art and The New Leviathan. As before, it emphasizes 
the active role of thought at all levels of mental activity. 
But in this case Collingwood is anxious to draw the distinc-
tion between reflectively self-conscious thought and non-
reflective or "unconscious" thinking, and in so doing we again 
see it from a new angle than we have previously. 
(T)he thinking which we do in memory or perception as such 
may be called unconscious thinking, not because we can do 
it without being conscious, for in order to do it we must 
be not only conscious but self-conscious, but because we 
do it without being conscious that we are doing it. To be 
conscious that I am thinking is to think in a new way, 
which may be called reflecting. Historical thinking is al-
ways reflection; for reflection is thinking about the act 
of thinking . . . . But what kind of thinking can be its 
object? ... In order ... that any particular act of 
thought should become subject-matter for history, it must 
be an act not only of thought but of reflective thought, 
that is, one which is performed in the consciousness that 
it is being performed, and is constituted by that con-
sciousness. (IH, 307-08). 
Notice that Collingwood does not find the expression "uncon-
scious thinking" self-contradictory (cf. ~contra, Donagan, 
LPC, 271) and that he accepts without hesitation the pre-
sence of the activity of self-consciousness even at the level 
of perception--a point to which we called attention earlier. 
Nor is it a great surprise that he finds historical thinking 
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to be self-consciously reflective, although we find him for 
the first time stating that it is "constituted" by that con-
sciousness. But then he continues: 
The effort to do it ((i.e. think reflectively)) must be 
more than a merely conscious effort ... ; it must be a 
reflective effort, the effort to do something of which 
we have a conception before we do it. A reflective activ-
ity is one in which we know what it is that we are trying 
to do, so that when it is done we know that it is done by 
seeing that it has conformed to the standard or criterion 
which was our initial conception of it. It is therefore 
an act which are enabled to perform by knowing in advance 
how to perform it. ( IH, 308) . 
At this point it should be perfectly obvious why, on Colling-
wood's grounds, physical events cannot be regarded as histori-
cal actions: they are not acts performed with the foreknowledge 
of a "standard or criterion" which is their initial conception 
of it. To use Collingwood's lowly example, the blade of grass 
grows not in order that the cow should eat it, or with the 
conception of being food for herbivorous animals, but that 
there should be grass. But even that is not correct, for it 
has no conception at all of what it is to be grass rather than 
some alternative. But historical acts cannot be thus regarded; 
their universal character is part of their essential constitu-
tion: 
An act is more than a mere unique individual; it is some-
thing having a universal character; and in the case of a 
reflective or deliberate act (an act which we not only do, 
but intend to do before doing it) this universal charac-
ter is the plan or idea of the act which we conceive in 
our thought before doing the act itself, and the criterion 
by reference to which, when we have done it, we know that 
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we have done what we meant to do .... Reflective acts 
may be roughly described as the acts which we do on pur-
pose, and these are the only acts which can become the 
subject matter of history. (IH, 309). 
Now although Collingwood has phrased the distinction in temp-
oral terms, ("an act which we ... intend to do before doing 
it ... ") it is clear enough from the rest of the paragraph 
that what he has in mind is what is also reflected in the ba-
sic Kantian distinction between actions done in accordance 
with a law and actions done in accordance with the concept of 
a law; historical acts fall into the latter category, physical 
events in the former. What Collingwood has added is the ob-
servation that all such deliberate reflective acts are histor-
ical, that they involve criteria by which success or failure 
may be assessed, and that therefore these acts have aspects 
that are both individual (as experientially one's own) and 
universal (as reflectively intended). 
Here we encounter a problem. In historical thinking 
(in this case we mean the thinking of agents involved in the 
doing of historical deeds) we find the sort of thinking Col-
lingwood called "concrete" in Speculum Mentis and "real think-
ing" in The New Leviathan and his correspondence with Ryle 
concerning the Essay on Philosophical Method. We recall from 
our discussion of his philosophy of mind that all real think-
ing has both theoretical and practical dimensions, and that 
the latter is foundational to the former. In saying that his-
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torical acts are those which we plan to do before doing them 
Collingwood appears to be reversing this priority--conceiving 
a plan being a theoretical activity and executing it a practi-
cal one. Collingwood anticipated this objection and even drew 
from it the logical conclusion that acting is the only thing 
one can do on purpose, since thinking on purpose would involve 
conceiving your own act of thought before executing it, and 
having done so you would have executed it already. Theoreti-
cal activities, it follows, can only be non-purposive or, as 
he puts it, "done in the dark, with no conception of what is 
to come from engaging in them" (IH, 311). The reader familiar 
with the debate concerning Collingwood's views on absolute 
presuppositions (i.e. that they are not propositions, that one 
can make them without knowing that they are being made, etc.) 
will realize that we are on the verge of a crucial issue not 
only in his philosophy of history, but in his view of metaphy-
sics. 
We know already what part of his answer to this objec-
tion is: any theoretical activity is already practical inso-
far as it employs concepts that are made by acts of selective 
attention. But his actual reply is interesting insofar as it 
suggests a connection with Q-A logic which we shall have to 
bear in mind when we come to examine his thesis that metaphy-
sics is an historical science. 
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Today it is no longer necessary to argue that art, sci-
ence, religion, philosophy, and so forth are proper sub-
jects of historical study; the fact of their bein·g stu-
died historically is too familiar. But it is necessary 
to ask why this is so .... In the first place, it is 
not true that a person engaged in purely theoretical 
thinking is acting without a purpose .... (E)very ac-
tual inquiry starts from a certain problem, and the pur-
pose of the inquiry is to solve that problem; the plan 
of the discovery, therefore, is already known and formu-
lated by saying that, whatever the discovery may be, it 
must be such as to satisfy the terms of the problem .. 
. . In the second place, the difference between conceiv-
ing and executing a purpose was not correctly described 
as the difference between a theoretical act and a practi-
cal one. To conceive a purpose or form an intention is 
already a practical activity. It is not thought forming 
an anteroom to action; it is action itself in its ini-
tial stage. (IH, 311-12). 
Collingwood's reply, therefore, is based on his Q-A logic as 
grounded in his epistemology: thinking on purpose does in-
volve conceiving one's own act of thought before executing it, 
but as a plan of inquiry based on the presence of a problem-
situation or a question, whereas the execution of the plan 
involves answering the question, solving the problem, or sa-
tisfying the terms of the inquiry-initiator. 
It is not difficult to make the application to histor-
ical inquiry. In order for an event to be of interest to an 
historian it must be one which expresses the thought of an 
historical agent in a situation in which alternative courses 
of action are open to him, and in which he is responsible for 
determining the event by acting according to his conscious-
ness of a "plan" or "idea"--the alternative meanings he not 
only finds in the event-situation but gives to it by his cho-
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sen actions. It will be helpful to keep this in mind as a 
sort of archetype of what an historical event is--candidates 
for such events occurring in politics, warfare, economics, 
morals, art, science, religion, and philosophy (IH, 309-15)--
the list is stated as exemplary rather than exhaustive. The 
difficulty for the historian in each of these cases is to 
identify the problem from which the act proceeded, and to re-
construct the steps by which its solution was attempted (IH, 
312-13)--and not merely to repeat the conclusion. Until this 
step has been taken the historian cannot be sure that he has 
grasped the past at all--that is, he cannot be certain that 
historical thinking in the form of re-enactment or re-think-
ing has occurred at all. 
But re-enactment raises us to a new level of thinking, 
and to this issue we must now turn. 
(d) Historical Re-enactment.--The deeds of men which 
form the subject-matter of history must not only be known by 
seeing them to be expressions of thought, or seeing "through" 
them, they must be known as past deeds. The historian must 
therefore be aware of himself as distinct from the past he 
studies, while he is yet able to revive that past as thought 
in his own mind (cf. IH, 174). In order to meet this require-
ment Collingwood introduceshis widely misunderstood doctrine 
of historical re-enactment. The choice of the term "re-
enactment" to describe the relationship between a historical 
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event and a historiographical reconstruction of that event ap-
s to be deliberate; 7 it calls attention to the central pear 
concept of a purposive act as the irreducible unit of history, 
while yet locating it in an epiatemological structure similar 
to the presentation-representation schema of perception (the 
difference being, of course, that the act of an historical 
agent can only be re-presented through the intermediation of 
evidence and interpretative argument). Collingwood is even 
careful to vary his terms to bring out various aspects of re-
enactment, using synonyms like re-create (IH, 97), reconstruct 
(IH, 65), relive (IH, 172, 175), re-think (IH, 215), andre-
vive (IH, 164)--an assortment of expressions which can hardly 
be accidental (cf. EPM, 205-07 on the in-appropriateness of 
technical terminology in philosophy). 
In this classic statement of re-enactment Collingwood's 
approach is via the inside-outside doctrine: 
The processes of nature can therefore be properly de-
scribed as sequences of mere events, but those of history 
cannot. They are not processes of mere events, but pro-
cesses of actions, which have an inner side, consisting 
of process of thought .... All history is the history 
7
collingwood's first use of the term "re-enactment" in 
~ Idea of History occurs in Part I during his criticism of 
Tacitus, Where it is also linked to the discussion of the out-
side and inside of an event (IH, 39). It reappears in his 
discussions of Vico (IH, 65) and Hegel (IH, 97), both of whom 
are praised for recognizing the principle. In Part V it is 
re-introduced in the first Epilegomenon along with the inside-
outside theory of human acts (IH, 215). 
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of thought. But how does the historian discern the 
thoughts which he is trying to discover? There is only 
one way in which it can be done: by re-thinking them in 
his own mind. The historian of philosophy, reading· Plato, 
is trying to know what Plato thought when he expressed 
himself in certain words. The only way in which he can do 
this is by thinking it for himself. This, in fact, is 
what we mean when we speak of "understanding" the words. 
so the historian of politics or warfare, presented with 
an account of certain actions of Julius Caesar, tries to 
understand these actions, that is, to discover what 
thoughts in Caesar's mind determined him to do them. This 
implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Cae-
sar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought 
about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with 
it. The history of thought, and therefore all history, 
is the re-enactment of past thought in the historian's 
own mind. This re-enactment ... is not a passive surren-
der -.--.-. ; it is a labour of active and therefore criti-
cal thinking-.- The-historian-not only-r€-enacts past 
thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own know-
ledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, fOrms his own judg-
ment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern 
in it (IH, 215; emphasis mine) 
The lines to which we have called attention in the above pas-
sage are the principles of history cited in the Autobiography 
and outlined in our chapter on Collingwood's autobiographical 
interpretation as HIST -1, -2, and -3 (Table 4 ). Since these 
principles are explicitly stated in this essay, and the fourth 
(HIST-4) is the major thesis of the first Epilegomenon itself, 
it is clear that when Collingwood wrote that portion of the 
Autobiography he had these essays before him. 
But as if anticipating that his doctrine of re-enact-
ment would be misconstrued by assimilating it to an overly 
concrete meaning of one of its secondary senses, Collingwood 
takes pains to state what re-enactment is not before trying 
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to exhibit what it is. (1) We have already quoted the pas-
sage from "The Subject Matter of History" where he rejects a 
dramatic view of history in which "the historian would be the 
person about whom he thinks, living over again in all respects 
the same" (IH, 303). The historian in re-enacting the event 
is not restaging it by repeating its outside motions; he re-
enacts it by re-thinking that universal element that consti-
tutes its inside meaning. (2) But he is also not advocating 
an intuitionist view of history which relies on a mysterious 
union between the mind of an historian and that of the agent 
he is studying. In spite of contrary appearances, as when 
Collingwood uses expressions like "reliving" past experiences 
and "plunging below the surface" of our minds where we "be-
come" the person whose acts we are discovering (A, 113), Col-
lingwood has something more direct in mind than what these 
dramatic expressions might lead one to believe. Whatever else 
re-enactment might involve, it is not concerned with immediate 
experiences, nor is it a "passive surrender" but rather a 
"labour of active and therefore critical thinking," which en-
tails envisioning for oneself the situation in which the agent 
is called upon to act (IH, 215, 316; cf. A, 100). (3) This 
is also the reason that re-enactment is not a simple exercise 
of the memory. The past with which the historian is concerned 
is not simply recalled, since there is an essential difference 
between memory and the exercise of historical thinking. What 
Caesar's memory may provide for him are a series of outstand-
649 
ing images, but these he must present in a coherent account, 
which involves not just the images but reconstruction of the 
events. History is "a wholly reasoned knowledge of what is 
transient and concrete" (IH, 234), whereas "memory is not 
history, because history is a certain kind of organized or in-
ferential knowledge, and memory is not organized, not inferen-
tial at all" (IH, 252). 
But if re-enactment is neither a dramatic restaging 
of past events {1), nor an uncritical passive intuition of 
past thinking (2), nor a replay of the graphic record of the 
remembered past on the blank screen of the historian's mind 
(3), it is also not {4) the creation ex nihilo of a fictitious 
past. In the third Epilegomenon ("Historical Evidence"--a 
fragment from The Principles of History) he writes that the 
business of the historian is not to invent anything, it is to 
discover something (IH, 251); and in the second Epilegomenon 
("The Historical Imagination") he writes: 
As works of imagination, the historian's work and the 
novelists do not differ. Where they do differ is that the 
historian's picture is meant to be true. The novelist has 
a single task only: to construct a coherent picture, one 
that makes sense. The historian has a double task: he has 
both to do this, and to construct a picture of things as 
they really were and of events as they really happened. 
(IH, 246). 
Just as, in The Principles of Art, Collingwood rejected any 
radical theory of sensation which would allow for a creation 
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ex nihilo of sensa, so in The Idea of History he stops short 
----
of a creationist view of historical events. Re-enactment pre-
supposes that something remains of the original event, and 
this something (we have already identified it as the universal 
meaning of an individual act) is not simply created by an his-
torian's re-enactment. Historical reference to past events 
presupposes an object that retains some identity in both con-
texts, the original situation in which it occurred, and the 
historian's re-enactment of that event in the context of his 
own thoughts. 
The question is, is anything important altered by re-
enactment, and if so, how is historical objectivity possible? 
Since the issue is crucial not only for Collingwood's phil-
osophy of history, but also for rapprochement in general and 
his view of metaphysics in particular, 8 we must take care to 
present the issue carefully and completely. We must go beyond 
saying what re-enactment is not by giving a preliminary sketch 
of what it is (which we are about to do), and then showing 
both that it exercises some of the functions of ~ priori ima-
8It is crucial not only because re-enactment is the 
central thesis of his philosophy of history as described both 
in the Autobiography and in The Idea of History, but also be-
cause it is the key to unscrambling the central dilemma of the 
Essay on Metaphysics. If metaphysics is an historical science, 
and if history is the re-enactment of past thought, then meta-
physics is the re-enactment of past thought. But then, "re-
enactment" must be taken in the sense that Collingwood meant 
for it, which does not rule out critical thinking, as we have 
already seen. ---
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. ation and that it rests on the central insight of his en-g~n 
tire philosophy of mind as a resolution of the realist-
idealist dilemma (this will occupy us in the two succeeding 
sections). 
The preliminary sketch is presented as much by ex-
ample as by general description. The historian who sets him-
self the task of understanding the Theodosian Code not only 
undertakes to understand the document that he has inherited 
from the past, i.e. the written words, but also to discover 
what the person who wrote them meant by them, where the lat-
ter task also entails envisaging for oneself the situation 
with which the emperor was trying to deal: "he must see for 
himself, just as if the emperor's situation were his own, how 
such a situation might be dealt with; he must see the possible 
alternatives, and the reasons for choosing one rather than an-
other; and thus he must go through the process which the em-
peror went through in deciding this particular course" (IH, 
283). Until he is able to do this Collingwood insists that 
he cannot say that he has any historical knowledge of the 
meaning of the edict. 
In this description we have all the elements with 
which we have become familiar--the original historical event 
with its outside (the written code) and inside (the emperor's 
intentional meanings), the representation of this event in 
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the historian's understanding by re-thinking the universal 
element (the meaning of the code as understood by its author), 
and the necessity of reconstructing that thought by under-
standing the context in which it occurred (the emperor's situ-
ation with its possible alternatives) and the agent's reasons 
for choosing this mode of action rather than another (the em-
peror's choice of a legal code to establish order .rather than 
the use of military force under his direct command, for ex-
ample). Notice that this sort of thinking is conqrete (it 
never loses sight of its point of reference--the decision of 
the emperor expressed in the written code) at the 1same time 
that it is universal (it is concerned throughout with the 
meaning of the code as a work of human intelligence and pur-
pose). Notice also that it proceeds by locating its univer-
sal elements (the array of alternative meaningful acts avail-
able in the situation the emperor was facing). Are these not 
the embodiment of what we have encountered in previous chap-
ters as the "concrete universal" (Speculum Mentis), or "cate-
gorical universal" (Essay on Philosophical Method) in the 
first case, and the doctrine we called "concrete abstraction" 
(from The New Leviathan) in the second? 
Although we have not yet examined the grounds for Col-
lingwood's remark that it is only on the condition that his-
1 
tory is the re-enactment of past thought that historical un-
1 
derstanding is possible, we get a glimmering of his meaning 
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. this brief description. When he writes that unless and un-~n 
til the event can be reconstructed, it cannot be said to be 
historically understood at all, he is saying that re-enactment 
is the necessary and sufficient condition for thinking histor-
ically: necessary because without thinking out the meaning of 
the event in its context of situational alternatives, the sig-
nificance of the event as historical (i.e. as the action ex-
pressing the intentions of an agent) is impossible to grasp; 
and sufficient because once that is done nothing further is 
necessary--so that "historical explanation" by subsumption of 
the event under a law governing other similar events, as if 
it were a natural occurrence abstractly like others of a class, 
marks the point at which the event loses both its individual-
ity as this event at this time (viz. the emperor's situation) 
and its concrete significance (why the emperor chose this 
course of action rather than another). 
No doubt this leaves many loose ends, only some of 
which we shall gather together in succeeding sections. Al-
though we have not yet seen how Collingwood avoids the errors 
of the idealist's view of history as he moves in his accus-
tamed way within the realism-idealism polarity, we foresee 
that unless he expands on the role of the historian in view-
ing events a tergo, and therefore capable of seeing more in 
them than did the historical agent himself, his doctrine of 
re-enactment is in danger of appearing as nothing more than 
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a repetition of the thoughts of historical protagonists. 9 In 
emphasizing the role of thought in both the historical .event 
and the historiographical re-enactment Collingwood may have 
succeeded in damaging the realist's notion of events unaffec-
ted by thinking, but he has done this by emphasizing the way 
in which thoughts of agents and historians are the same, 
which leaves the serious problem of how they differ. This 
difference is apparent in their respective linguistic modes 
of address: Caesar says, "I shall cross the Rubicon;" the 
historian writes, "Caesar said that he would cross the Rubi-
con." He is aware of his own thought as distinct from that 
of Caesar. 
What is required is the doctrine of "incapsulation" 
which the Autobiography would have us believe he had worked 
out as the third "proposition" concerning history (A, 114), 
but which is not mentioned by that name at all in The Idea 
of History. If incapsulation refers to the manner in which 
the historian preserves a past thought within his own con-
sciousness without losing its aspect as past, and if this re-
9 J. B. Bury could retrospectively see, for example, 
that the Theodosian code and the founding of a university at 
Constantinople were the two most important acts of Theodosius 
II, because Bury saw in them the foundation that held civili-
zation together in the Eastern empire, while the Western fell 
under successive invasions by barbarian tribes (A History of 
~Later Roman Empire, quoted in The Historian's History of 
~World, ed. Hentry Smith Williams (New Yor~ 1907), vol.VII, 
p. 45). It is unlikely that such an event was anticipated by 
Theodosius, who nevertheless did not write the code--it was the 
Work of a committee of nine named by him for the purpose. 
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quires initial self-awareness, then it is clearly a function 
of what he calls the ~ priori historical imagination, the no-
of which we must therefore consider next, bearing in tion 
mind that what Collingwood must do is define the sense in 
which the historian's thought retains its autonomy vis-~-vis 
the object of his historical consciousness. 
(e) The A-Priori Imagination.--Just as in the Kantian 
critical philosophy, Collingwood felt that the first phase in 
answering the question, "How is historical knowledge possi-
ble?" is to show that there is a form of consciousness able 
to re-present or re-think past thoughts, but not as simple 
perception nor as memory nor even as abstract reasoning. From 
our survey of Collingwood's philosophy of mind we know that 
any sort of conscious re-presentation requires the functioning 
of imagination. The topic of the historical imagination was 
chosen by Collingwood as the subject of his Innaugural Lecture 
on being appointed to the post of Waynflete Professor of Meta-
physics in 1935, the text of that lecture being published by 
Knox as the second Epilegomenon in The Idea of History. 
We have already pointed out that while the first Ep-
ilegomenon (also a public lecture) is aimed at rejecting the 
errors of contemporary realists concerning a "science of hu-
man nature" on the natural model; the second is just as con-
cerned with correcting the errors of idealists on the sub-
ject--notably those of Bradley. Collingwood praised Bradley 
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as the leader of the movement in England away from the posi-
tivistic accumulation of facts and towards "scientific·his-
tory," i.e. history as a form of knowledge aware of itself as 
distinct from natural science and yet valid in its own right 
(IH, 134-35). But in his essay, The Presuppositions of Cri-
tical History10 Bradley mistakenly assumed that the criterion 
of history is experience as informed by the knowledge of the 
laws of nature--a relic of the positivism he sought to over-
come. Induction of laws of nature from observation can never 
give anything more than probable laws, which fails to serve 
as a universal criterion for what can or cannot happen in his-
tory, since much of history deals with improbabilities (IH, 
139). Collingwood points out that Bradley's proposed criter-
ion (a) does not adequately distinguish history from fiction, 
since it claims to decide not what did happen but only what 
could happen--which applies equally well to fictitious narra-
tives. (b) It leaves the historian completely reliant on 
authorities, so long as their accounts satisfy the negative 
criterion of being possible, which hence leaves critical his-
toriography unachieved. Finally, (c) it leaves the historian 
unable to accept any unusual or improbable experience not con-
sistent with his own--e.g. odd social customs, heroic deeds, 
improbable events, etc. (IH, 239-40; cf. IH, 139). 
10Recently reissued with introduction and commentary 
by Lionel Rubinoff: Quadrangle Books (Chicago, 1968). 
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The thrust of Collingwood's Waynflete Inaugural Lee-
is therefore to propose an alternative criterion to that ture 
offered by Bradley. It takes the form of an autonomous acti-
vitY of historical imagination different from perception 
(aisthesis) on the one hand and scientific understanding (noe-
sis) on the other, and yet not reducible to the sort of his-
tory proposed by "common sense" realists. Collingwood begins 
by distinguishing history from perception, primarily to show 
that accounts of knowledge that are based on the model of per-
ception (e.g. the acquaintance theory) make history impossible. 
No doubt, historical thought is in one way like percep-
tion. Each has for its proper object something individual 
.. But what I perceive is always the this, the here, 
the now . . . . Historical thought is of something which 
can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. 
Its objects are events which have finished happening, and 
conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no 
longer perceptible to they become objects for historical 
thought. Hence all theories of knowledge that conceive it 
as a transaction or relation between a subject and an ob-
ject both actually existing, and confronting or compresent 
to one another, theories that take acquaintance as the es-
sence of knowledge, make history impossible. (IH, 233). 
We have been told in Part IV of The Idea of History that the 
acquaintance theory of knowledge accepted one horn of the di-
lemma that Bradley bequeathed to his English successors: 
"either reality is the immediate flow of subjective life, in 
which case it is subjective but not objective, it is enjoyed 
but cannot be known, or else it is that which we know, in 
Which case it is objective and not subjective, it is a world 
of real things outside the subjective life of our mind and 
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outside each other" (IH, 141). Bradley accepted the former 
horn and realists (Cook Wilson and Oxford realism on the one 
hand and Bertrand Russell and Cambridge realism on the other) 
embraced the latter (IH, 141-42). Collingwood writes that 
samuel Alexander admirably expressed the acquaintance theory 
when he wrote that knowledge is a relation between two things, 
a mind and its object, and the mind therefore does not know 
itself, it only enjoys itself. Collingwood hastens to add 
that such a view makes history as the self-knowledge of mind 
(i.e. the philosophical concept of history) impossible (IH, 
142). 
But notice that while he rejects this view he does 
not deny that the object of history is something individual; 
he merely neglects to tell us what that individuality is. We 
have already found this designated as the individual meaning 
of an historical event expressive of the thought of an agent. 
He is also not denying that there is some sense in which the 
objects of history are events which are present, viz. as evi-
dence. To adopt a terminology that is not Collingwood's, 
evidence is not something in itself, it is only evidence for 
another, i.e. for an historian who recognizes it as such, so 
in this sense historical evidence is not something co-present 
with a mind, but is rather something dependent on it. 
If it is not "aisthesis" historical knowledge is also 
not "noesis," and in countering the latter Collingwood opposes 
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another tendency, one more prevalent today, in the guise of 
11 the "covering law model" of Popper and Hempel, than it was 
even in Collingwood's day. Collingwood rejects the thesis 
that historical events are "explained" like natural events by 
deducing them from antecedent conditions and general laws. 
In another way history resembles science: for in each 
of them knowledge is inferential or reasoned. But whereas 
science lives in a world of abstract universals, which are 
in one sense everywhere and in another nowhere, in one 
sense everywhere and in another nowhere, in one sense at 
all times and in another at no time, the things about 
which the historian reasons are not abstract but concrete, 
not universal but individual, not indifferent to space and 
time but having a where and when of their own, though the 
where need not be here and the when cannot be now. His-
tory, therefore, cannot be made to square with theories 
according to which the object of knowledge is abstract and 
changeless, a logical entity towards which the mind may 
take up various attitudes. (IH, 234). 
Notice again that Collingwood is not saying that history is 
not reasoned or inferential, but that its subject matter is 
not something abstract: it is something concrete and indivi-
dual, an act performed at a certain time and place. Later in 
this chapter we shall examine what Collingwood understands by 
both historical evidence and historical inference, but here 
we need to recognize only that historical understanding is 
neither "aisthesis" nor "noesis" nor a combination of the two, 
but rather "a third thing," i.e. "wholly reasoned knowledge of 
what is transient and concrete" (IH, 234). 
11 see Theories of History, ed. by Patrick Gardiner 
(New York, 1959) pp. 27~85, 344-56, 428-43. 
660 
Such a view of historical thinking also breaks with 
the "common sense" view of history, in which memory and.be-
lief in authoritative testimony are taken as the essential 
functions of the historian's thought. The scientific his-
torian does not merely repeat his acquaintance with the events 
first perceived by a witness, then remembered, recollected, 
and repeated to someone else and believed to be true. The 
contemporary historian is aware that he must tamper with his 
authorities by selecting what he considers important in the 
accounts of his authorities, by interpolating in them things 
which are not explicitly said, and by criticizing, rejecting, 
or amending what he recognizes to be misinformation or out-
right falsehood (IH, 235). In this work of selection, con-
struction, and criticism the historian exhibits his own au-
tonomy, showing that his thought possesses "a criterion to 
which his so-called authorities must conform and by reference 
to which they are criticized" (IH, 236) . And in all three of 
these functions he gives evidence of the working of an auton-
omous or ~priori imagination--that is, a form of consciousness 
that is ~ priori in the Kantian sense of being indispensable 
or necessary (IH, 240). 
Collingwood's portrait of the finctions of the a priori 
imagination is interesting for the light it sheds on the cri-
tical aspects of historical re-enactment. He points out that 
historical imagination differs from two other functions of 
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! £!iori imagination, namely artistic and perceptual imagin-
ation, not in being~ priori, since the artist's work has its 
own inner necessity, and in perception one cannot help supple-
menting the "data" of perception by presenting objects of pos-
sible perception which are not actually perceived (e.g. the 
underside of a table, the back of a cube, the inside of an un-
opened egg--imaginative functions well analyzed by Kant), but 
"in having as its special task to imagine the past: not an ob-
ject of our thought" (IH, 242). 
In this exercise the historian stretches his web of 
imaginative re-construction between points which are at first 
assumed to be fixed--the statements of "authorities" he uses 
as his sources (IH, 242). But on analysis these fixed points 
also resolve themselves into achievements of historical think-
ing itself; statements first accepted as settled for the pur-
poses of a given inquiry are themselves called into question 
in other contexts (IH, 244). It then appears that the fixed 
points are not accepted facts or authoritative statements but 
criteria used to justify the use of such authorities. But 
Collingwood insists that these criteria are also provided by 
the ~ priori historical imagination. 
The a priori imagination which does the work of histori-
cal construction supplies the means of historical criti-
cism as well. Freed from its dependence on fixed points 
supplied from without, the historian's picture of the 
past is thus in every detail an imaginary picture, and its 
necessity is at every point the necessity of the a priori 
imagination. Whatever goes into it, goes into it not be-
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cause his imagination passively accepts it, but because 
it actively demands it. The resemblance here between the 
historian and the novelist ... here reaches its culmin-
ation. Each of them makes it his business to construct a 
picture which is partly a narrative of events, partly a 
description of situations, exhibition of motives, analysis 
of characters. Each aims at making his picture a coherent 
whole . . . . The novel and the history must both of them 
make sense; nothing is admissible in either except what is 
necessary, and the judge of this necessity is in both cas-
es the imagination . . . . Where they differ is that the 
historian's picture is meant to be true. (IH, 245-46).12 
With the raising of the issues of historical coherence 
and truth it is clear that we have passed beyond discussing 
the concept of history as a scale of forms. Collingwood im-
mediately points out that "being true" in this context means 
that the historian abides by three "rules of method" in the 
construction of his historical narrative: (1) his picture of 
the past must be localized in space and time (i.e. it must re-
12
collingwood has been accused of emphasizing the ac-
tive role of the historian to the neglect of his passive func-
tion of relating received narratives--see W. B. Gallie, Phil-
osophy and the Historical Understanding (New York, 1964), pp. 
18-19. But Collingwood anticipated this objection. "The his-
torian, generally speaking, works at a subject which others 
have studied before him. In proportion as he is more of a 
novice, either in this particular subject or in history as a 
whole, his forerunners are, relatively to his incompetence, 
authorities; and in the limiting case where his incompetence 
and ignorance were absolute, they could be called authorities 
without qualification. As he becomes more and more master of 
his craft and his subject, they become less and less his auth-
orities, more and more his fellow students, to be treated with 
respect or contempt according to their deserts" (IH, 238). 
As the above passage also makes clear, Collingwood's use of 
the term "picture" of the past (part of which consists in a 
narrative of events) is obviously a synonym for Gallie's "nar-
rative;" cf. IH, 242, 245. 
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fer to a particular time and place); (2) it must be consistent 
with itself; and (3) it must stand in a relation to evidence 
such that the evidence, consisting of something here and now 
perceptible (written documents, artifacts, ruins, etc.), can 
be bound to the events by chains of historical inference (IH, 
246-47). All three of these are rules to which the novelist 
need not subscribe, and all three are criteria which are no-
where "given" to the historian along with his "facts." They 
are not among the statements of his authorities, but are 
rather criteria for accepting such statements as "historical" 
in the first place. They are, like Kantian categories, condi-
tions for the possibility of there being historical data at all. 
Several comments are in order here. First, Colling-
wood calls these three statements "rules of method," but it 
is clear that they are presuppositions of historical inquiry 
rather than procedural imperatives. They stand, relative to 
all progressive questions in an historical inquiry, as their 
ultimate presuppositions, and they are revealed only when the 
direction of the inquiry is reversed. The question of who was 
the victor of the battle of Waterloo arises only on the pre-
supposition (among others) that there was such a battle at a 
certain time and place, as indicated by interpretation of cer-
tain evidence. But if the historian were challenged (perhaps 
by a novelist who is free to cancel the event in his imagina-
tion and pursue the dramatic consequences) to state his rea-
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sons for assuming that there was such a battle he would haul 
out his evidence and begin constructing an elaborate argument 
aimed at the conclusion that it did indeed occur. Now it 
would take considerable Socratic cheek to force out the further 
question about why he presumes that a battle must either have 
occurred or not occurred, but if the interlocutor managed to 
do so, and in the process completely reversing the direction 
of the inquiry, the historian would (if he replied at all) say 
that history must after all make ''sense'' (i.e. be consistent 
with itself). He would, in short, be driven to display his 
presuppositions . 
. Secondly, it is noteworthy that these presuppositions 
occur in a discussion of the autonomous ~ priori imagination, 
even though it involves the relationship between propositions, 
questions, and presuppositions, and involves the necessary re-
lations between them. This is not accidental; it is what he 
means when he says that "the ~ priori imagination which does 
the work of historical construction supplies the means of his-
torical criticism itself" (IH, 245), and it is what is in-
volved when he insists that in his thought the historian is 
engaging in an autonomous activity of a priori imagination 
(IH, 249). This confirms what we suggested earlier, that the 
functions of imagination are not limited to the conceptual 
level of mental acts, or to the pre-propositional level of 
linguistic expression, but extend to higher intellectual func-
tions as well. 
665 
Thirdly, they are ~ priori criteria, and this term ap-
pears to encompass a number of meanings. Insofar as histori-
cal imagination is a priori it is said to be something not em-
pirically received (IH, 248) but rather "innate" or original 
to the mind (IH, 247); it is not arbitrary, but necessary--
something clear, rational, and universal (IH, 240, 242, 248-
49); it is a criterion brought to bear in judgments concerning 
matters of fact or evidence, and is used in interpolations and 
constructions about these matters of fact (IH, 138, 240-41, 
248); it is an original and fundamental activity of mind it-
self, and is therefore a self-determining, self-justifying, 
self-dependent form of thought (IH, 247, 249); and yet the 
principles it employs are not finally fixed, but are capable 
of change (IH, 248). 
Finally, we must note that in The Idea of History we 
are left largely unenlightened about the exact relationship 
between historical presuppositions and the ~ priori imagina-
tion. We do not know if the presuppositions of history can 
be regarded as ~ priori in the same sense that historical im-
agination is, or if on the contrary they can be regarded as 
products of the latter (and hence at least in this sense pos-
terior to its activity). It is not difficult to see that if 
history is to be an autonomous science, its presuppositions 
must be clear and rational, universal and necessary (in some 
senses of these terms acceptable to Collingwood). It is also 
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clear that they are not empirically received and that they are 
used as criteria in the judgments of history concerning. matters 
of fact. But we do not know in what sense Collingwood sees 
them as "innate" or original to the mind, or how they are part 
of a self-determining, self-justifying, self-dependent form of 
thought. 
Nor is this an extraneous issue for Collingwood's 
philosophy of history. We noted at the beginning of this sec-
tion that in this essay one of Collingwood's major goals was 
to state the "criteria" of history alternative to those pro-
posed by Bradley (IH, 238-89). The criteria he proposes turn 
out to be strangely enigmatic. On the one hand he says that 
the criterion of historical truth is "the idea of history it-
self: the idea of an imaginary picture of the past," which he 
calls innate in the Cartesian sense and a priori in the Kan-
tian sense (IH, 248). But as if he knew that this idea was 
insufficient to say not only how that idea differed from that 
of the novelist (who also has an "imaginary picture of the 
past"), but how one uses such an idea to judge historical evi-
dence, he also proposes his three "rules of method" or pre-
suppositions of history as a science. It is only the latter 
that serves to correct Bradley's earlier attempt to state such 
a criterion, and it is only such presuppositions which can in 
any real sense be said to "change." Once again, Collingwood 
seems to stop just short of the sort of questions that are 
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''metaphysical" in the sense of being ultimate: how are activi-
ties of imagination responsible for presuppositions or vice 
? versa. 
able? 
How can presuppositions be both necessary and change-
Why are facts and evidence necessary for an "imaginary 
f the Past il?. picture o 
(f) Re-enactment: Beyond Realism and Idealism.--Al-
though in Knox's editorialized version of The Idea of History 
we are left at this point without direct answers to these 
questions, there is an heroic assault on the question that Col-
lingwood regarded as the ultimate task of a philosophy of his-
tory to answer. Just as Kant in his Prolegomenon assumes that 
a certain kind or kinds of knowledge exists and goes on to ask 
the further question how it is possible, Collingwood in his 
Epilegomena assumes that his survey of historiography in Parts 
I-IV has sufficiently demonstrated that historical knowledge 
exists, and goes on to ask how it is possible. Hence the 
fourth Epilegomenon, entitled "History as Re-enactment of Past 
Experience," begins with the question, "How, or on what condi-
tions, can the historian know the past?" (IH, 282). His an-
swer to this question is his reasoned justification of histor-
ical thinking. In the fourth Epilegomenon this takes the 
form of a series of arguments put forward as answers to ob-
jections about re-enactment from realistic and idealistic 
standpoints. 
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In preceeding sections and chapters we have tried to 
indicate why Collingwood believed that historical thinking is 
not possible on realistic presuppositions. From his earliest 
publications Collingwood maintained that any epistemology 
which tried to justify historical knowledge by assimilating 
it to perception, as if historical events were present to con-
sciousness in the same manner as perceived objects, overly 
concretizes the past and is therefore utterly misleading. In 
the second sentence of the present essay he calls our atten-
tion once again to the fact that the past as past simply does 
not exist--its events are not present but past: "the past is 
never a given fact which we can apprehend empirically by per-
ception" (IH, 282). Nor does the historian merely repeat what 
is said by an eyewitness of the facts, since the facts he is 
concerned with are past events mediated by critical evaluation 
of evidence, involving inference on the part of the historian 
--inference about the value and reliability of his evidence. 
His knowledge is not direct or immediate in an empirical or 
perceptual sense, but rather is mediated or inferential. 
But if the past known by an historian is mediated by 
historical thinking, it is not simply absorbed by that think-
ing, and in the attempt to preserve historical objectivity we 
find Collingwood taking the unusual tack of granting the real-
istic devil his due. Collingwood agrees that the past must be 
Preserved in its aspect as past, and not utterly assimilated 
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into the present. He therefore finds it necessary to take a 
. stand opposed to views of history offered by some of his 
idealistic contemporaries. Although he agrees that a more 
fruitful line of inquiry is initiated when it is recognized 
that our imaginary picture of the past is an a priori idea, 
so that justification of historical thinking takes the form 
of showing on what grounds such an idea is possible, he finds 
himself unable to accept those proposed by some idealists. 
we have just seen why Collingwood rejected Bradley's presup-
positions of critical history as inadequate for grounding sci-
entific history. In his review of historiography in Parts I-
IV Collingwood also criticized idealistic philosophers of his-
tory like Croce and Oakeshott for absorbing the past into the 
present: by overemphasizing the role of historical thinking 
in the construction of historical narratives they made the 
past merely an aspect of the present thinking of the histor-
ian (IH, 154-55, 202, 289). 
So where the realist is forced, by his assumption that 
all true knowledge is based on immediately perceived objects, 
to overly concretize the past and underplay the role of his-
torical thought in re-creating that past, the idealist makes 
the complementary error of dissolving the past altogether by 
reducing it to an aspect of present consciousness. What makes 
the essay we are presently concerned with such a remarkable 
Piece of thinking is Collingwood's care to avoid both of these 
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errors. The key to understanding the complex argument of 
this essay is to bear in mind that in it he is trying to over-
come the dilemma that Bradley bequeathed to his successors 
and which, in his treatment of scientific history in Part IV, 
Collingwood had singled out as crucial (IH, 141). His escape 
from this dilemma takes the form of three arguments in the 
fourth Epilegomenon--one overall argument aimed at overcoming 
Bradley's dilemma, and two subsidiary arguments aimed at re-
futing objections to re-enactment by realists and idealists 
respectively. All three arguments draw on Collingwood's theory 
of mind and his analysis of acts of consciousness, and bril-
liantly illuminate its central insight. 
Since the arguments are complex, and since in the es-
say the main argument is reserved until the end, we shall 
give here a brief synopsis of all three arguments, and then 
take them up again in the order that Collingwood gives them 
in the text. 
Bradley's dilemma, as Collingwood states it, is that 
reality is either the flow of subjective life, in which case 
it is subjective but not objective, or else it is that which 
we know, in which case it is objective but not subjective, a 
world of real things outside the subjective life of our minds. 
Collingwood answers that historical reality escapes this dis-
junctive description because it is both subjective and objec-
tive. This is so because the object of history is itself 
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thought, i.e. the intentional meaning of an historical agent 
expressed as an event localized in space and time (its "out-
side") and having an "inside" consisting of thought. Because 
this object is thought it can be re-thought or revived or re-
enacted in further acts of thought by the agent himself or by 
another, e.g. by an historian critically interpreting evidence. 
But to be truly historical a re-enacted thought must 
be known to be both the same thought as that of the historical 
agent, and yet distinguishable from that of the historian; for 
if it were not the same then the historian could never be sure 
that he has grasped his object (and hence historical objectiv-
ity would be sacrificed), and if it were not different he 
could not distinguish it from his own thought (and the past 
would be absorbed into the present thought of the historian). 
The realist denies that two acts of thought can be the same 
(for no two acts of thought can be literally identical) and 
the idealist denies that they can be different. On either pre-
mise historical thinking is impossible. 
But an act of thought is not something wholly immedi-
ate, like the flow of consciousness involved in mere feeling. 
Our experience as thinkers shows us that an act of thought is 
inseparable from its object, i.e. meanings as expressed in 
physical acts, statements, arguments, etc. An act of thought 
is something someone does deliberately, and it is not irre-
trievably carried off in the flow of feelings; on the contrary 
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it is that which has the power to survive and revive over 
time (two characteristics of all thought from his philosophy 
of mind), and in various contexts. Nor is an act of thought 
something wholly mediate, totally dependent on its context 
for its meaning. An act of thought is capable of retaining 
its identity of meaning in various contexts. Therefore 
thought is both mediate and immediate. Historical thought 
as re-enactment is thus possible because the historian is con-
cerned with an object which has the power to revive in other 
contexts, and the historian has the power to re-think that 
thought in the context of his own thoughts. Historical 
thinking is therefore both objective (the historian can dis-
tinguish himself from his object because the object can re-
tain its identity in various thought-contexts) and subjective 
(the historian's re-enactment occurs in the context of his 
own thinking and he knows it as his own experience). History 
is possible because re-enactment of thought is possible, and 
re-enactment presupposes an object that is both mediate and 
immediate, objective and subjective. Such an object is with-
in our own experience as thinkers, and such a reality escapes 
Bradley's dilemma. 
Now one cannot help but notice from this synopsis 
that there are several key concepts on which the whole argu-
ment is hinged, and that the success of the argument depends 
on how Collingwood handles these concepts. Ultimately, as we 
shall see, they depend on his description of the several 
functions of mental activity. 
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(1) In particular the success of the argument depends 
on the meaning of the expression, "act of thought," and in 
the first objection to re-enactment Collingwood calls atten-
tion to the controversy surrounding this phrase. The first 
objector (invented by Collingwood, but evidently a realist) 
assaults re-enactment as an ambiguous concept which ignores 
the act-object distinction: 
To re-enact an experience or re-think a thought, he might 
argue, may mean either of two things. Either it means en-
acting an experience or performing an act of thought re-
sembling the first, or it means enacting an experience or 
performing an act of thought literally identical with the 
first. But no one experience can be literally identical 
with another, therefore presumably the relation intended 
is one of resemblance only. But in that case the doctrine 
that we know the past by re-enacting it is only a version 
of the familiar and discredited copy-theory of knowledge 
.... In every experience, at any rate so far as it is 
cognitive, there is an act and an object; and two differ-
ent acts may have the same object . . . . The two acts 
are different acts but acts of the same kind. They thus 
resemble one another, and ... hence the conclusion that 
the doctrine we are considering is a case of the copy 
theory of knowledge. (IH, 283-85). 
As an example of a thought that can be re-enacted Collingwood 
suggests Euclid's proposition that the angles at the base of 
an isosceles triangle are equa1 13 --which we shall abbreviate 
13
collingwood's examples are not always felicitious, 
and in this case one might, with some justice, accuse him of 
c~oosing a judgment that prejudices the argument by dealing 
Wlth mathematical entities. Why not a more typical case like 
Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon? In Collingwood's de-
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as EP. An objector upholding the act-object distinction, he 
argues, would naturally enought understand re-enactment as a 
case of a relation between two thoughts such that the enacted 
thought and its re-enactment are numerically different but 
specifically identical. Since they have the same object in 
mind (EP) they are instances of a single species or class (the 
class of all instances of EP); but since they occurred at two 
different times or to two different persons, they are numeri-
cally different. But this is not the only sort of identity-
in-difference relation that can exist between mental acts, and 
in order to demonstrate another variety of this relation Col-
lingwood suggests considering three cases: 
Case 1: I think EP for five seconds continuously. 
Case 2: I think EP for five seconds continuously, 
then cease thinking about it for three se-
conds, then think EP. 
Case 3: Euclid thinks EP and after a lapse of sever-
al centuries I think EP. 
Collingwood argues on the basis of the first case that the 
fense it might be pointed out that the case is not exception-
al, since an historian of geometry could very well be re-
thinking EP in rethinking Euclid's contribution, and in Col-
~ingwood's view, intellectual history is just what history 
ls--all history is the history of thought. Furthermore the 
example is chosen for its appeal to just those who regard ma-
t~ematical propositions as exemplary of the act-object dis-
tlnction (Frege, Russell, etc.). Finally, it would not be 
difficult to rephrase the argument using an example of a more 
:ecognizably typical historical act instead of EP, as he does 
ln the fourth Epilegomenon, where he uses the example of the 
Theodosian Code. 
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unitY of the act of thinking EP is not dependent on the dura-
tion of time during which it is thought. "There is no .more 
reason to correlate the unity of a single act of thought with 
the time-lapse of one second, or a quarter of a second, than 
with any other. The only possible answer is that the act of 
thought is one sustained through five seconds"--that is, it 
has the "identity of a continuant" (IH, 286). From the second 
case Collingwood concludes that if one is to say that EP is 
the ~ act of thought then one is forced to say that the act 
of thought is not merely sustained, but revived after an in-
terval. (Presumably, to deny this would involve one in an in-
finite regress similar to Plato's "third man" argument.) 
Now where the act-object distinction fails adequately 
to describe the sort of experiences we have as thinkers in the 
first two cases, its defenders would argue that the third dif-
fers significantly from the previous two, and for this case 
Collingwood puts forward his anti-realist argument in the mo-
dified form in which we stated it in Chapter VII: 
The objector ... maintains that although the object of 
two people's acts of thought may be the same, the acts 
themselves are different. But in order that this should 
be said, it is necessary to know "what someone else is 
thinking" not only in the sense of knowing the same object 
that he knows, but in the further sense of knowing the 
act by which he knows it: for the statement rests on a 
claim to know not only my own act of knowing but someone 
else's also, and compare them. But what makes such com-
parison possible? Anyone who can perform the comparison 
must be able to reflect "my act of knowledge is this"--
and then he repeats it: "from the way he talks, I can see 
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that his act is this:--and then he repeats it. Unless 
that can be done, the comparison can never be made. But 
to do this involves the repetition by one mind of another's 
act of thought: not one like it (that would be the copy-
theory of knowledge with a vengeance) but the act itself. 
(IH, 288). 
Therefore in order to affirm that the third case is not like 
the first two, one would have to presuppose that one simultane-
ously claimed to deny, i.e. that one act of thought can be 
shared by two different people separated by a span of time. 
Collingwood concludes that thought can never be a mere object, 
since to know what someone is thinking or has thought involves 
thinking it for oneself, and to deny that this is possible is 
to back onself into a solipsistic corner in which it only pas-
sible to think one's own thoughts (IH, 288-89). Collingwood 
is content to leave his realistic objector parked in this cor-
ner. 
Before taking up the objection to re-enactment by the 
idealist, we would like to pause for several observations 
about the course of this argument so far. 
Notice first that Collingwood does not further pursue 
the issue of abstract universality (specific identity with nu-
merical difference), nor does the argument based on the three 
cases of re-enacting acts of thought really depend for its 
conclusion on this incomplete discussion. What Collingwood 
left unsaid was that the kind of identity-in-difference that 
is involved in re-enactment is a case wherein the second 
677 
thought is not merely a copy of the first, nor is it another 
replacement instance of the class of thoughts that includes 
the first, but rather the second includes the first as part 
of its content. It is almost trivially true to note that when 
as an historian I assert "Euclid thought that EP" the second 
proposition (HP) includes the first (EP) as part of its con-
tent. What Collingwood is trying non-trivially to point out 
is that when someone asks how this expression is possible and 
answers it, as the realist does, by denying that the EP used 
in the first assertion can be identical to the EP mentioned in 
HP, he has explicitly contradicted himself. 14 
But of course the realist does not assert that they 
are unqualifiedly not identical, but only that they are not 
identical acts of thought; they are identical in having iden-
tical objects. Therefore Collingwood bears down on the phrase 
"set of thought," and our second observation pertains to this 
phrase. When the realist insists on the abstract distinction 
between an act of thought and its object he opens himself to 
the criticism that the act of thought as a mere event has no 
direct relationship to the object of the act, and Collingwood's 
14
collingwood gives no indication that he is cognizant 
of the use-mention distinction as such, but the argument ad-
dressed to the realist objector presumes that the historian 
thinking HP does not merely mention EP but also uses it in the 
s:nse of enacting the proposition for himself. Although the 
h1storian is not using EP to make a geometrical point as part 
of a systematic inquiry in that subject, he must understand it 
sufficiently to grasp its meaning for the development of geo-
metry, the history of which he is narrating. 
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strategy is to call attention to this epistemic gap and its 
necessary presupposition that somehow the event and the object 
both belong to the same thought. In the ensuing argument 
with the idealist objector Collingwood will make an equivalent 
and complimentary point about the object of an act of thought, 
and displaying the unity of these two sides to thought--as an 
act and as an object--is the way in which he resolves the 
Bradleyan dilemma. 
Thirdly, we wish to note in passing that Collingwood 
appears to be employing the sort of argument that he had char-
acterized as philosophical in the Essay on Philosophical Me-
thod. Even though the argument is incomplete at this point 
we are aware that, for example in the three cases of a re-
enacted thought, a conclusion (the impossibility of re-enact-
ment) is being checked by comparing it to experiences that 
should anticipate it (the three cases of our experience as 
thinkers); and the principle from which the conclusion is 
drawn (the act-object distinction) is as a premise being re-
vised (it is not, as an abstractly universal principle, defen-
sible vis-a-vis our actual or concrete thinking, and is in 
need therefore of revision). We are witnessing an argument 
in the process of reversing itself (revision of the act-object 
distinction)--not an abstract reductio ad absurdum that merely 
negates a premise, but one which aims at revising a starting 
Point in the light of its conclusions so that it can explain 
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hoW experience as it actually exists is alone possible (EPM, 
l56). How the premise is revised we are about to see. 
Finally we have to call attention to Collingwood's 
phrasing of the anti-realist argument in the quotation above, 
where he says that the assumption that two acts of thought can-
not be the same rests on the ability of the objector to per-
form a comparison which involves asserting in addition to 
one's own act the further one, that "from the way he talks, I 
can see that his act is this" which he then repeats (IH, 288). 
Is there not some significant qualification overlooked in this 
deceptively simple argument, and is this not disguised under 
the simple phrase, "from the way he talks I can see that . . 
.. "? It appears that I can know what I mean by an act of 
thought, my own thought, by simply repeating it and examining 
it; calling it an "act of thought" in the context of Colling-
wood's philosophy of mind precisely means that it is something 
that I can do on purpose--it is an achievement. But how is it 
possible to achieve someone else's act of thought, or do his 
thinking "on purpose"? It seems I can only know what someone 
else means by his act of thought by interpreting what he says 
he means, and in that interpretation I may be mistaken, since 
meaning for Collingwood is intentional. Can I miss another's 
intention in a way that I cannot miss my own? 
We must keep this in mind as we proceed, but if there 
is an assumption here it is the same assumption that is made, 
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Collingwood would surely say, in re-thinking my own thoughts, 
since I may be mistaken in interpreting my present intentional 
meaning as the same one I had several moments ago. Colling-
wood's point is that to say that it is not the same is to pre-
sume that one knows what that act was, i.e. "not this," and 
for that difference to be sustainable one must see it as a 
meaning difference, one graspable by a comparing act of 
thought which holds both together and declares them to be non-
identical or different in some discernible or meaningful fash-
ion. The mere temporal counting is not a meaningful differ-
ence between EP as thought by Euclid and as re-thought by me. 
To say it is the same meaning is to say something essential 
about the act of thought, not its accidental temporal corre-
lation. 
Nonetheless, one wishes to persist against Collingwood, 
is there not some significant difference in the fact that Euc-
lid thinks EP and I think EP? For this we turn to the next 
phase of the argument. 
(2) Having disposed of one aspect of the act-object 
distinction, Collingwood proceeds to take up the cudgels 
against the idealist objector to re-enactment. Where the 
realist would claim that re-enactment proved too little (be-
cause it failed to show how two acts of thought can be iden-
tical), the idealist would claim that it proved too much. 
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It has shown that an act of thought can be not only per-
formed at an instant but sustained over a lapse of time; 
not only sustained but revived; not only revived in the 
experience of the same mind but (on pain of solipsism) re-
enacted in another's. But this does not prove the possi-
bility of history. For that, we must be able not only to 
re-enact another's thought but also to know that the 
thought we are re-enacting is his. But so far as we re-
enact it, it becomes our own; it is merely as our own that 
we perform it and are aware of it in the performance; it 
has become subjective, but for that very reason it has 
ceased to be objective; become present, and therefore 
ceased to be past. (IH, 289). 
In order to leave no doubt in the reader's mind that this is 
an idealistic objection, Collingwood points out that this is 
just what leading idealistic philosophers of history were main-
taining when they asserted that history is one's own experi-
ence arranged sub specie praeteritorum (Oakeshott) and that 
all history is contemporary history (Croce) (cf. IH, 151-59, 
190-204). 
What is at issue here is the very pastness of the 
past. Collingwood is willing to grant the idealist's demand 
that in order for a re-enacted thought to be historical it 
must be known that it was thought not only by myself but or-
iginally by the historical agent. Prepositionally this is 
the demand that the difference between the assertions of EP 
and HP must be preserved, since merely to re-think EP would 
be to think geometrically rather than historically. Colling-
wood goes even further down the path toward idealism insofar 
as he affirms that thinking historically is a self-conscious 
Process: "unless he knows that he is thinking historically, 
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he is not thinking historically. Historical thinking is an 
activity ... which is a function of self-consciousness, a 
form of thought possible only to a mind which knows itself to 
be thinking in that way'' (IH, 289). This much he had to admit 
on the grounds of his own philosophy of mind, which argued 
that reflective thought is criteriological, i.e. contains 
within itself the criterion for judging itself to be a suc-
cessful or unsuccessful piece of thinking. 
But Collingwood insists that the idealist objector is 
making a second point, that this necessary condition for his-
torical knowledge cannot be fulfilled if historical thinking 
is re-enactment because re-thinking a thought for oneself pre-
vents one from recognizing it as another's. On the basis of 
our abbreviated propositions, the idealist appears to be say-
ing that because one asserts EP one cannot also assert HP, be-
cause thinking EP prevents one from doing so (in becoming my 
thought it becomes subjective and therefore ceases to be ob-
jective or something shared with someone else). Collingwood 
adds that if the idealist were maintaining that one of the 
conditions for historical knowledge to occur is that the his-
torian first mistakes his agent's thinking for his own and 
and then overcomes this error by recognizing that his own 
thought is distinguished from that of Euclid's, then it might 
be of interest as showing one way that re-enactment could be 
a pre-condition for historical thought. ''But the re-enactment 
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of past thought is not a pre-condition of historical knowledge, 
but an integral element in it; the effect of the ((idealist's)) 
contention, therefore, is to make such knowledge impossible" 
15 (IH, 290). If we cannot know ourselves to be engaged in re-
enacting the thought of historical agents, we cannot be said 
to be thinking historically, and the idealist's contention is 
that we cannot have such knowledge. 
Collingwood sees the objection as hinging on the im-
possibility of an act of thought being both subjective and ob-
jective. Being subjective means being aware of an experience 
as my own; therefore, since "experience" may mean several 
15collingwood is here tacitly rejecting the view he 
held in Speculum Mentis concerning the way in which the mind 
attains to truth. In the earlier work he argued that history, 
like all other forms of experience, proceeds through the via 
dolorosa of error to truth. "The progressive alienation of 
the mind from its object is in history complete. The world is 
triumphantly unified as ((an individual, concrete, infinite)) 
object, only to find itself separated from the mind by a gulf 
which no thought can traverse. But in this process, which 
seems to travel at every step further from that intimacy of 
subject with object which constitutes knowledge, the indispen-
sable condition of knowledge is progressively and inversely 
realized .... For an infinite given whole of fact cannot at 
any point be grasped by the mind." (SM, 238-39). Although 
he adds that this gulf is bridged from both sides (which fore-
shadows a doctrine about evidence in The Idea of History, as 
we shall see), these passages seem to point to the zero-line 
of complete scepticism, saved only (so the early Collingwood 
thinks) by the existence of absolute knowledge. But in the 
present essay, and in The Idea of History in general, Colling-
wood gives not the slightest indication that re-enactment is 
~n exercise of the "absolute standpoint," or that absolute 
l~ealism had found the solution to the problem of necessary 
h1storical error. Cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 292-306. 
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things, "being aware of an experience" is also an equivocal 
expression. It may mean (1) the immediate feeling of some-
thing such as a pain; or (2) the perception of objects; or 
(3) the self-conscious awareness that is involved in acts like 
being aware of losing one's temper--the third sense being the 
most proper English use of the term (IH, 291). We here recog-
nize Collingwood's analysis of consciousness as a scale of 
forms of mental acts. In this case he is interested in the 
sense of the term "awareness" as it applies to historical 
knowledge, where at least that degree of self-consciousness 
must be present which allows the historian to distinguish his 
own thought from that of the historical agent he is studying. 
Historical thought must have at least that degree of subjec-
tivity that allows one to recognize an act of thought as not 
merely an experience, but~ experience; and it must have that 
degree of objectivity that allows one to recognize this same 
act of thought as having a certain cognitive character, a de-
terminate meaning, etc. (IH, 291). Collingwood's justifica-
tion of this kind of thinking takes the form of exploring the 
contradictions that arise from attempting to deny that a 
thought can be both subjective and objective. 
Indeed to say that would be to contradict oneself. ((1)) 
To say that an act of thought cannot be objective is to 
say that it cannot be known; but anyone who said this 
would be claiming thereby to state his knowledge of such 
acts. ((2)) He must therefore modify it, and will perhaps 
say that one act of thought may be an object to another 
act, but not to itself. But this again needs modification, 
for any object is properly the object not of an act but of 
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an agent, the mind that performs the act. True, a mind 
is nothing except its own activities, but it is all these 
activities together, not any one separately. ((3)) The 
questions is, then, whether a person who performs an act 
of knowing can also know that he is performing or has per-
formed that act. Admittedly he can, or no one would know 
that there were such acts, and so no one could have called 
them subjective; but to call them merely subjective, and 
not objective too, is to deny that admission while yet 
continuing to assume its truth. (IH, 291-92). 
Notice that in both (1) and (3) Collingwood tacitly 
appeals to his anti-realism argument and uses it against an 
idealist objector--thus supporting Post's suggestion that the 
argument cuts both ways. But the "together" in ( 2 ) calls for 
special comment, since it is revealing about Collingwood's 
grasp of the relationship between individual acts of conscious-
ness and the contexts in which they occur. In Collingwood's 
philosophy of mind it is axiomatic that "thought is not mere 
immediate experience but always reflection or self-knowledge, 
the knowledge of oneself as living in these activities" (IH, 
297)--a principle quite contrary to any view of conscious acts 
which attempts to analyze them as atomically distinct from one 
another. Nevertheless, Collingwood insists, they do retain a 
certain identity. Although an act of thought occurs at a giv-
en time, and in a context of certain other acts of thought, 
of emotions and sensations and memories, etc., the peculiar-
ity of thought is that it can sustain itself through a change 
of context and revive in a different one. As true as it may 
be that the immediacy of thought in its given context cannot 
be re-enacted, the self-identity of an act of thinking is in-
dependent not only of its context of feelings and emotions 
but also its context of other thoughts. 
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This has sometimes been denied. It has been said that 
anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and 
falsified . . . . Others . . . have embraced the opposite 
doctrine that makes it both easy and legitimate to detach 
them from their context; for there is no context; there 
is only a juxtaposition of things standing to one another 
in merely external relations. On this view, the unity of 
a body of knowledge is only that kind of unity which be-
longs to a collection: and this is true both of science, 
or system of things known, and of a mind, or system of 
acts of knowing. (IH, 298-99). 
We do not have to be told that the view that holds 
that "anything torn from its context is thereby mutilated and 
falsified" is that of the idealists from which Collingwood 
wishes to distinguish himself. In criticizing this view he 
indicates as plainly as one might expect that he could no 
longer affirm a view accepted in unregenerate days by himself 
(cf. IH, 299)--for this in fact is the position he maintained 
in Speculum Mentis, where abstraction and falsification are 
identified. 16 But notice that he immediately castigates the 
16cf. Rubinoff, CRM, 112-13, 147-49, 297-99. Rubinoff 
recognizes the problem of the difference between Speculum Men-
~' in which history is a knowledge of facts independent of 
mind and therefore abstract and false, and The Idea of His-
tort, in which history is the "knowledge of a part ofmind it-
" (CRM, 297). But Rubinoff's solution strikes us as fan-
tastic and ungrounded: he sees both works as part of his grand 
scheme of the "three ontological levels of consciousness" and 
therefore bound together in the necessity of "the dialectic." 
~e writes: "This dialectical requirement is a result of the 
lnherent contradiction which . . . pervades the whole of ~­
culum Mentis, between the presuppositions of realism (for 
WEich there is a distinction between subject and object) and 
the presuppositions of idealism (for which this distinction 
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opposite view that all acts of thought are atomically distinct 
from one another. He writes that such a view "by substituting 
locical analysis for attention to experience . . . overlooks 
the immediacy of thought, and converts the act of thinking, 
from a subjective experience, into an objective spectacle" 
299). 17 (IH, Whatever Collingwood's familiarity was with lo-
is overcome). When this conflict is dialectically resolved, 
consciousness elevates itself to the third ontological level 
of existence. Once having arrived at this level, history re-
constitutes itself, this time under the influence of philoso-
phy which is the final consummation of the ra¥prochement be-
tween subject and object" (CRM, 298). Aside rom the unre-
stricted use of the misleadingly florid language of Hegelian-
ism in passages like this one (in talk about the dialectic, 
consciousness elevating itself or arriving somewhere where his-
tory reconstitutes itself and reaches its final consummation 
--metaphors inadequately resolved by Rubinoff and nowhere found 
in The Idea of History), one wonders why, if Collingwood had 
such a scheme in mind, he nowhere said so explicitly--a remark 
which Knox, himself a Hegel scholar, would certainly have 
passed on to us. We find it more likely that the reconcili-
ation between idealism and realism which Collingwood, judg-
ing from the essay we are considering, surely aimed to achieve, 
did not occur by absorbing the one into the other or both in-
to the "absolute standpoint" (itself an abstraction) or a 
"third ontological level" but rather by the correct analysis 
of historical thought as the re-enactment of expressions of 
acts of thought in which meaning grounds both its subjective 
and objective dimensions--its aspects as my experience and as 
universally comprehensible language. In fairness to Rubinoff 
we must add that on occasion he makes it clear that his "tran-
sition" resolving the "dialectical opposition" between Specu-
lum Mentis and The Idea of History is his own reconstruction 
TaS at CRM, 297), but the distinction between Collingwood's 
assertions and Rubinoff's reconstruction is not always clearly 
maintained. 
17Donagan's "Principle of Order" (LPC, 28) commits him, 
in our opinion, to interpreting Collingwood's philosophy of 
mind in an atomistic fashion, since Donagan appears to take an 
act of thought as an event occurring in the mind: in order 
that it be an object of consciousness (on Donagan's "Principle 
of Order") it requires another act--a second event--of a high-
er order, for no act of consciousness is self-illuminating. 
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gical atomism and its successor, logical positivism (and the 
~ on Metaphysics indicates that he was at least knowledge-
able with Ayer's version of the latter, which he traced to its 
pedigree in John Stuart Mill--see EM, 143, 163), we know he 
rejected its approach not only to historical experience but 
to the reductionistic analysis of mental acts as well. 
Collingwood's rejection of rigid adherence to either 
an atomistic or an equally untenable context-bound view of 
mental acts raises once again the problem of "incapsulation" 
from the Autobiography. For it appears that not only is the 
term not used in The Idea of History, but on the present ac-
count of re-enactment there appears to be no need for a cri-
tique (or any other argument) to "incapsulate" or confine the 
the historical past from the superficial or obvious present of 
A literal adherence to this principle would render re-enact-
ment impossible; it is simply epistemological atomism. We 
have already argued that Donagan's "Principle of Order" as he 
phrases it (a) is an illegitimate modification of what Col-
lingwood has said about the hierarchy of forms of mental acts, 
and (b) that it is not itself a tenable principle concerning 
mental acts, because it appears to rule out the possibility of 
having a concept about concepts, propositions about proposi-
tions (since the act which reflects must be of a higher order). 
We wish to add now that (c) it cannot be regarded as a pre-
supposition of Collingwood's entire philosophy of mind, be-
cause it ignores the sort of knowledge Collingwood calls self-
knowledge, the "knowledge of oneself as living in these activi-
ties" of thought (IH, 297), as well as his explicit assertion 
that it is by that act itself that one knows that he is per-
~orming it (IH, 292). Although Collingwood is saying that it 
ls the person who knows it, he has stated plainly that the 
mind of that person is all the acts of thought together, not 
separately. Such a holistic assertion is incompatible with 
epistemological atomism. 
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the historian (what might be called by other philosophers the 
world of the historian's lived experience or his Lebenswelt). 
This would be the attempt to mediate an immediacy, the immedi-
acy of experience as one's own, or subjective. It appears, 
in short, to be an example of what Collingwood called the Fal-
lacy of Misplaced Argument, since there is no initial confu-
sion between one's own experience and that of another in the 
first place, nor is there any initial loss of identity of the 
enacted meaning or the re-enacted thought in its several con-
texts. 
But as Collingwood stated in the Autobiography, in-
capsulation is not an occult entity; it refers to the reten-
tion of an identity of meaning (or what he calls an "uncon-
verted residue'') in more inclusive acts (A, 141)--in our mo-
del, the unaltered presence of EP in HP. Therefore incapsula-
tion is not excluded from the theory or re-enactment, but is 
rather its negative side. It is merely a short-hand way of 
calling attention to the necessary bi-valence of all thought 
(a) as acts of meaning embedded in the immediate experience 
of one's own life and forming part of the continuity of the 
personal consciousness of that life, and (b) as capable of re-
taining an identity of meaning in other contexts, and especial-
ly in the thoughts of historians. To press the juice from the 
metaphor, the "capsule" is the preservation of the objective 
identity of meaning (usually the plan of the historical agent 
690 
in its context of alternatives) from being simply absorbed in-
to the subjective life of the historian by an awareness that 
that meaning as historically re-enacted is not merely the so-
lution to a problem in the personal life of the historian. 
(3) Several pages later Collingwood sums up his major 
argument against both realists and idealists and relates them 
to Bradley's dilemma: 
To disentangle ourselves from these two complimentary er-
rors, we must attack the false dilemma from which they 
both spring. That dilemma rests on the disjunction that 
thought is either pure immediacy, in which case it is in-
extricably involved in the flow of consciousness, or pure 
mediation, in which case it is utterly detached from that 
flow. Actually it is both immediacy and mediation. Every 
act of thought, as it actually happens, happens in a con-
text out of which it arises and in which it lives, like 
any other experience, as an organic part of the thinker's 
life. Its relations with its context are not those of an 
item in a collection, but those of a special function in 
the total activity of an organism. So far not only is the 
doctrine of the so-called idealists correct, but even that 
of the pragmatists who have developed that side of it to 
an extreme. But an act of thought, in addition to actual-
ly happening, is capable of sustaining itself and being 
revived or repeated without loss of identity. So far, 
those who have opposed the "idealists" are in the right, 
when they maintain that what we think is not altered by 
alterations of the context in which we think it .... 
Because it is a thought and not a mere feeling or sensa-
tion, it can exist in both these contexts ((i.e. the con-
text of my own thoughts and those of another)) without 
losing its identity, although without some appropriate con-
text it could never exist. (IH, 300-01). 
The example that Collingwood uses for a thought that is both 
mediate and immediate is Plato's argument in the Theatetus 
against the view that knowledge is merely sensation (a preg-
nant example, incidentally). The argument as it can be de-
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veloped either in Plato's mind or mine or anyone's is what he 
calls thought in its mediation; the argument in the context 
of discussion and theory as Plato placed it in his own think-
ing is the thought in its immediacy--i.e. the immediate 
thought-context in which Plato conceived it as part of his 
own project of thinking out the problem (IH, 301). We assume 
for Collingwood that it is possible to re-enact a proposition 
or a concept as well as an argument, so that the meaning be-
ing re-enacted extends not only to the inferential but also 
to the propositional and conceptual levels of thought as well. 
Here we have Collingwood's final reply to both real-
ists and idealists on the act-object distinction. It rests 
firmly on an insight foundational not only to his philosophy 
of history but his entire philosophy of mind, the insight 
that meaning is the irreducible and indivisible unity of an 
act of thought, and that both an act of consciousness and the 
object of the act are two aspects to, or contexts for, one 
and the same entity. Calling the enactment or re-enactment 
of a meaning an "act" means calling attention to its personal, 
experiential, immediate presence in the mental life of a per-
son (something that someone does "on purpose"), whereas call-
ing attention to this same meaning as social, communicable, 
and mediate means calling it an "object" of consciousness. It 
is not a matter of trying to find a way of putting together an 
"event" occurring in the mind, an event called an "act of con-
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sciousness," and an object of such a point-occurrence; they 
are two sides to one and the same reality--a meaning whose 
identity survives alteration in context and is capable of be-
ing revived (or re-enacted) after a lapse of time. Colling-
wood's rejection of both an atomistic realism and an absolute 
idealism, as we have just encountered it, does not display any 
need for an absolute identity of subject and object, nor does 
it retreat into an endless order of acts of consciousness ex-
ternal to and atomically distinct from one another--neither an 
absolute experience nor a schizophrenic hall of mirrors. On 
the contrary it takes its stand on the unity of meaning of 
singular acts of consciousness, and its ability to survive and 
revive in various contexts, so long as that context is part of 
the life of thought of someone capable of doing things "on 
purpose." 
But successfully defending re-enactment against attacks 
from hypothetical objectors is not the same as demonstrating 
that it is the necessary and sufficient condition for histori-
cal thinking, and therefore we have not finished with Colling-
wood's demonstration of how history as a science is possible. 
Suppose we accept his argument that for history to be possible 
as knowledge the past must be capable of being re-thought or 
re-enacted, and that re-enactment presupposes an invariance of 
meaning in several contexts without loss of experiential imme-
diacy. Is this sufficient to show that historical knowledge 
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is reliable? Obviously not, since we do not yet know under 
what conditions we can say that a re-enactment has been suc-
cessfully carried out, historical error being, we presume, 
possible. 
If we return to Collingwood's three presuppositions 
for historical thought, we appear to have three candidates for 
a possible sufficiency criterion. A historical account may 
thus be said to be a successful re-enactment (a) when it refers 
to human acts localized in space and time; (b) when it is a 
coherent narrative; and (c) when it stands in a relation to 
evidence such that it can be bound to historical events by 
chains of historical inference. Both (a) and (b) have been 
more or less specified by Collingwood: (a) refers to the res 
gestae that form the subject matter of history as distinct 
from the study of merely physical events in nature; and (b) 
is a restatement of the requirement that the subject matter 
of (a) be handled as part of a systematic inquiry. But these 
alone would fail to distinguish history from good fiction. In 
order that there be that degree of certitude necessary to call 
historical narrative knowledge, and not the literary expres-
sion of someone's artistic fantasy, there must be a way to 
decide when (a) succeeds in actually referring to a publicly 
accessible past. What distinguishes history from romance is 
(c), and to this double issue of historical evidence and his-
torical inference we must now turn. 
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3. Evidence, Inference, and Necessity: (a) Historical Evidence. 
Why is it a double issue? From our present perspec-
tive this should not be a difficult question to answer. It 
depends on the view of history that it being presupposed by 
someone for whom evidence is one thing and thought about it is 
another, and their conjunction requires an argument. It is the 
sort of question which assumes that historical thinking occurs 
when a mass of facts, contained in documents called "testimony" 
(ultimately resting on eyewitness accounts) is examined with a 
view to constructing a written history of the period or event 
under consideration. The work of the historian would then be 
one of selecting relevant testimonial assertions, arranging 
these propositions into a coherent narrative, and engaging in 
reasoning only when there is a break in the continuity of the 
narrative--conflicting testimony, gaps to be filled, or his-
torical peculiarities which require the intervention of the 
narrator to "explain" something unusual to the reader. 
This is the historiography that Collingwood disparag-
ingly calls "scissors and paste" (IH, 257), and "evidence" on 
this view of history is merely the mass of records or "sources" 
pertaining to the period the historian is considering (IH, 
278). In this sort of historical thinking the "data" are thus 
external to the mind itself: they are contained in the set of 
all relevant documents preserved in archives, libraries, and 
museums. The need for inference arises only when various 
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authorities disagree, and the only issue is whether to accept 
or reject a piece of evidence as a true account of what.hap-
pened. But even though the audience to which Collingwood's 
remarks are addressed is one which assumes that historical 
thinking and its object are independent of one another--hence 
exhibiting the realistic outlook on the relation of mental 
acts to their objects--it is also an audience Collingwood 
hopes to convince that the role of historical reasoning is 
far more intimate and interdependent than is being presumed. 
We can therefore anticipate that in the essay entitled 
"Historical Evidence" (a fragment from The Principles of His-
tory and the longest of the seven Epilegomena) his strategy 
will be to propose an alternative account of historical rea-
soning, and this in fact is what he does. Instead of begin-
ning with a definition and classification of historical evi-
dence--i.e. starting out as if one began with a ready-made ob-
ject--Collingwood first characterizes scientific historical 
thinking and then describes its special relation to evidence, 
where evidence is decidedly the derivative concept. The 
thrust of his argument in this essay is to show that history 
is a science in the sense of being an organized body of know-
ledge. But it is organized in a way different from the exact 
or empirical sciences, insofar as it approaches its data and 
constructs its conclusions using a kind of inference that is 
unique to history and different from that of the other scien-
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ces, while yet being compelling in its conclusions and having 
a necessity of its own. Evidence in this schema of historical 
inference is correlative to the historian's questioning activ-
ity and is not simply a property of certain sets of proposi-
tions. Evidence is not the set of "facts" which verify or 
falsify our historical propositions by "corresponding" to 
them; it is whatever serves as a locus for the historian to 
answer the questions which allow him to re-enact past acts of 
thought. 
Now although we have made the case in previous chap-
ters that Collingwood's use of Q-A logic suggests that it is 
more favorably compared to a logic of discovery than to a for-
mal deductive system (in spite of his own misleading rhetoric 
that Q-A logic is an "alternative" to F-logic), it is note-
worthy that in the Introduction to The Idea of History when 
he asks how history proceeds or what its method is, his an-
swer is not "by the application of Q-A logic" but rather "by 
the interpretation of evidence" (IH, 9-10). Q-A logic ap-
pears in the answer to the first question he asks, i.e. "What 
is the nature of history?" the answer to which is "a kind 
of research or inquiry"--a form of thought whereby we ask 
questions and try to answer them (IH, 9). What any science 
does is to employ Q-A logic; what historical science does is 
answer questions by the interpretation of evidence. 
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Since we already have some idea of what he takes his-
torical thinking to be, it may be well briefly to characterize 
what Collingwood has to say about evidence in this and the 
other Epilegomena. We recall that the universality of an his-
torical event is an act expressing an intentional meaning in 
the context of an array of situational alternatives confront-
ing an historical agent, and that this universal meaning is 
the individuality sought by the historian who would re-enact 
the event. Furthermore in describing the process of re-think-
ing the past Collingwood leaves room for a contribution made 
by the object--in this case the past thought. In discussing 
history as re-enactment in the fourth Epilegomenon, for exam-
ple, he writes that "historical knowledge is that special case 
of memory where the object of present thought is past thought, 
the gap between present and past being bridged not only by the 
power of present thought to think of the past, but also by the 
power of past thought to reawaken itself in the present'' (IH, 
294). Nor is this an isolated remark; it is a recurrent theme 
in The Idea of History. In discussing the subject matter of 
history in the fifth Epilegomenon we have already quoted the 
striking passage where he speaks of the individuality of a 
particular historical act being something that ''eversteps the 
limits of merely local and temporal existence and possesses a 
significance valid for all men at all times," and adds that 
this act transcends its immediacy because "that individuality 
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is the vehicle of a thought which, because it was actually 
theirs, is potentially everyone's" (IH, 303). And in the sec-
ond Epilegomenon Collingwood expands further on this "poten-
tial-actual" distinction as it pertains to evidence: 
Everything is evidence which the historian can use as evi-
dence. But what can he so use? It must be something here 
and now perceptible to him: this written page, this spoken 
utterance, this building, this fingerprint .... The 
whole perceptible world, then, is potentially and in prin-
ciple evidence to the historian. It becomes actual evi-
dence in so far as he can use it ((as evidence on some 
question)) .... Evidence is evidence only when someone 
contemplates it historically. Otherwise it is merely per-
ceived fact, historically dumb. (IH, 247; cf. 203). 
It should be clear at this point why Collingwood be-
gins a discussion on evidence with a discussion of the nature 
of historical thinking: it is the thinking that determines 
what is evidence, and not the other way around. It should 
also be clear that while historical thinking makes the dif-
ference between a perceived fact being merely that or histori-
cal evidence, there is a contribution being made by the "per-
ceived fact" inasmuch as it has a "power to re-awaken itself" 
in the present. Once again the difference that historical 
thinking makes to its object is not creational but constitu-
tional; it does not create the fact but determines it as evi-
dence. "His business is not to invent anything, it is to 
discover something" (IH, 251). 
In the third Epilegomenon this useful distinction be-
tween actual and potential evidence is redefined in terms of 
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scientific history. 
If history means scissors-and-paste history . . . a source 
is a text containing a statement or statements about the 
subject .... If history means scientific history, for 
"source" we must read "evidence." And when we try to de-
fine evidence in the same spirit in which we defined "sour-
ces," we find it very difficult . . . . In scientific his-
tory anything is evidence which is used as evidence . . . 
. Let us put this by saying that in scissors-and-paste 
history, if we allow ourselves to describe testimony--
loosely, I admit--by the name of evidence, there is poten-
tial evidence and there is actual evidence. The potential 
evidence about a subject is all the extant statements 
about it. The actual evidence is that part of these 
statements which we decide to accept. But in scientific 
history the idea of potential evidence disappears; ... 
everything in the world is potential evidence for any sub-
ject whatever. (IH, 278-80). 
The obvious question is, how does the historian manage 
to restrict this infinite domain? Once again Collingwood 
seems to be overstating his case. It is clear that his inten-
tion is to display the active role of the thinking historian 
in constructing his narrative. To this extent there is an 
exact parallel between Collingwood's historian, whose task is 
to re-enact past acts of thought in his own mind, and Colling-
wood's artist, for whom the act of expressive imagination 
takes place "in his head." But just as the latter tends to 
render art inaccessible to public examination (how do you ex-
amine the inside of someone else's head?), so also the scien-
tific historian's "evidence" appears to be not only thought-
dependent but inseparable from the infinite array of everyday 
artifacts. 
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Collingwood's reply is that this is only a problem 
for the scissors-and-paste historian, who relies on there 
being a manageably small amount of testimony (IH, 278). For 
the scientific historian evidence is strictly correlative to 
the questioning activity, and it is his arrangement of ques-
tions that guides what the historian chooses to consider as 
evidence. In an extended example (one that has often been 
excerpted in collections of essays on the philosophy of his-
tory) Collingwood uses the fictional example of an inspector 
investigating a murder ("Who Killed John Doe?") as a paradigm 
for what a scientific historian does. The example is too fa-
miliar to require repeating here, but it is important to note 
the lessons that Collingwood derives from it. (1) Each step 
of the investigation is dependent on the asking of a question, 
and each question is asked in the right order (IH, 273). One 
assumes that "the right order" here, based on the example, is 
one in which the answer to one question is the presumed basis 
for the next question, and that the whole series is governed 
by the intention to solve a single problem. (2) The questions 
are put by the investigator to himself--a process which calls 
attention to the autonomy of the historian's inquiry, "where 
by autonomy I mean the condition of being one's own authority, 
making statements or taking action on one's own initiative 
and not because these statements or actions are authorized or 
prescribed by anyone else" (IH, 274-75). 
701 
What distinguishes the scientific historian from his 
predecessors is precisely this ability to act on his own with-
out waiting for statements to be made to him. In this the 
historian is in the position of a Baconian cross-examiner, who 
puts evidence to the test (IH, 269), and it is this activity 
which determines what actual evidence is. 
Question and evidence, in ((scientific)) history, are cor-
relative. Anything is evidence which enables you to an-
swer your question--the question you are asking now. A 
sensible question (the only kind of question that a scien-
tifically competent man will ask) is a question which you 
think you have or are going to have the evidence for an-
swering. If you think you have it here and now, the ques-
tion is an actual question . . . . If you think you are 
going to have it the question is a deferred question .. 
(IH, 281). 
One might say for Collingwood that in this context actual evi-
dence is determined by actual questions, potential evidence by 
deferred questions. 
Once again, this account leaves serious questions un-
answered. What counts for a relevant question in this series, 
and what dictates the choice of observable evidence? Colling-
wood's response tends to be circular: the historian chooses 
those questions which his evidence permits him to answer (IH, 
281). But since the evidence is chosen on the basis of the 
questions, the process seems to be one of chasing one's own 
tail. What makes the circularity all the more glaring is that 
two pages previous to this discussion of the correlativity of 
question and evidence Collingwood had charged that the scis-
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sors-and-paste man, like the nineteenth century landscape 
painter, protects himself by choosing subjects that he is able 
to "get away with" (IH, 279). In either case--Collingwood's 
or the sub-scientific scissors-and-paste man--one chooses 
one's questions to suit the evidence, and the evidence to suit 
the question. 
In his zeal to put forward his thesis that scientific 
thinking is more of a question and answer process than it is 
one of deriving logical inferences from ready-made statements, 
has Collingwood failed to make important distinctions--e.g. 
between the way a piece of evidence first presents itself and 
the way it is subsequently treated in an investigation? Has 
Collingwood once again lost sight of the real contribution of 
the object in his efforts to counteract the presumed realistic 
bias of his readers? Or have we overlooked something? 
Now it is in a section entitled "Statement and Evi-
dence" that Collingwood provides us with a hint of a missing 
element in this entire discussion. The way out of the circu-
larity of the correlativity of evidence and question has to 
do with the sort of question that the scientific historian 
asks as opposed to that of the scissors-and-paste man. 
Confronted with a ready-made statement about the subject 
he is studying, the scientific historian never asks him-
self: "Is this statement true or false?" ... The ques-
tion he asks himself is: "What does this statement mean?" 
And this is not equivalent to the question "What did the 
person who made it mean by it?" although that is doubtless 
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a question that the historian must ask, and must be able 
to answer. It is equivalent rather to the question "What 
light is thrown on the subject in which I am interested 
by the fact that this person made this statement, meaning 
by it what he did mean?" This might be expressed by say-
ing that the scientific historian does not treat state-
ments as statementsbut as evidence: not as true or false 
accounts of the facts of which they profess to be accounts, 
but as other facts which, if he knows the right questions 
to ask about them, may throw light on those facts. (IH, 
2 7 5) 0 
When Collingwood writes that the historian treats 
statements as other facts the reader is obliged to recall that 
the irreducible datum of history is the universal meaning of 
an intended event--the "inside" of an action. If the histori-
an is limited by the truthfulness of the statements of his 
sources, then his efforts to construct a coherent narrative 
by stringing together true propositions about the past are 
seriously threatened by testimony which contains conflicting 
accounts of the same event (IH, 257). What Collingwood is ar-
guing is that if history is not bound by this presupposition 
it is not in danger of such a loss of coherence. By treating 
testimony as factual in the sense of seeking interpretation 
of it just as one does of all evidence, i.e. by asking what it 
historically means, the historian may preserve the coherence 
of his inquiry while at the same time preserving evidence as 
evidence rather than simply discarding it as useless. In Col-
lingwood's view this is precisely what makes history scienti-
fie: instead of being the passive spectator--a condition in 
which thought is barely occurring, as Collingwood often says 
--the historian is providing a measure of control over his 
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subject matter. The historian's laboratory is his own a pri-
ori imagination, and he is only limited by his ability to ex-
-------
ercise that imagination in the form of revealing questions 
aimed at eliciting meaning from present evidence. 
(b) Historical Inference.--If historical thinking oc-
curs by means of an ordered sequence of questions, what is 
the role of inferential reasoning? If we were correct in our 
reconstruction of Collingwood's functions of higher-order con-
sciousness in the last chapter, then can we find confirmation 
here that by an application of the Law of Primitive Survivals 
the meaning-seeking function of consciousness is extended to 
the level of inferential thought in the form in which one pro-
positional meaning is related to another as ground to conse-
quent? 
At first glance this does not seem to be the function 
that Collingwood assigns to it. What historical inference 
does is to form a bridge between present evidence and past 
events--the former being question-correlative and perceptible, 
the latter being answer-correlative and imperceptible, but 
re-thinkable (IH, 251-52). But at the same time that he is 
preoccupied with saying what historical inference is not, he 
lets slip the opportunity to say more explicitly what it is. 
We shall first let Collingwood tell us what it is not, and 
then try to reconstruct what it is. 
705 
History has this in common with every other science: that 
the historian is not allowed to claim any single piece of 
knowledge, except where he can justify his claim by exhib-
iting ... the grounds upon which it is based. This is 
what was meant ... by describing history as inferential. 
. . . Different kinds of science are organized in differ-
ent ways; and it should follow ... that different kinds 
of science are characterized by different kinds of infer-
ence. The way in which knowledge is related to the grounds 
upon which it is based is in fact not one and the same for 
all kinds of knowledge. That ... a person who has stu-
died the nature of inference as such--let us call him a 
logician--can correctly judge the validity of an infer-
ence purely by attending to its form, although he has no 
special knowledge of its subject-matter, is a doctrine of 
Aristotle; but it is a delusion, although it is still be-
lieved by many very able persons who have been trained ex-
clusively in the Aristotelean logic and the logics that 
depend upon it for their chief doctrines. (IH, 252-53). 
What is worth noting in this passage is the positive 
assertion disguised as a negative one, i.e. Collingwood's in-
sistence that it is a delusion that knowledge of the subject-
matter has no bearing on the validity of scientific inference 
and that it depends solely on its form. Positively stated 
this means that the subject-matter does have a bearing on de-
termining the validity of inference. It is also worth noting 
that throughout this and the subsequent discussion of infer-
ence, everything is phrased in epistemological terms; infer-
ence is a kind of thinking rather than a formal relationship 
between propositions, assertions, or the like. Finally it 
must be recalled that when Collingwood refers to the logic of 
Aristotle ''and the logics that depend upon it for their chief 
doctrines" he has in mind all F-logics of a propositional pe-
digree, as we noted in the previous chapter. 
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Now in this inferential process of justifying know-
ledge by exhibiting the grounds upon which it is based, Col-
lingwood contrasts historical inference to deductive and in-
ductive inference in a manner very reminiscent of the Essay 
~Philosophical Method, but this time with emphasis on the 
"compulsion" with which the conclusion follows from the pre-
misses. Proof, he writes, 
might be either compulsive, as in exact science, where 
the nature of inference is such that nobody can affirm 
the premisses without being obliged to affirm the con-
clusion also, or permissive, as in "inductive" science, 
where all a proof can do is to justify the thinker in af-
firming its conclusion, granted that he wishes to do so. 
An inductive argument with a negative conclusion is com-
pulsive, that is to say it absolutely forbids the think-
er from affirming what he wishes to affirm; with a posi-
tive conclusion it is never more than permissive. If 
history means scissors-and-paste history, the only kind 
of proof known to the historian is of this latter kind 
.... If criticism leads him to a negative conclusion, 
viz. that the statement of its author is untrustworthy, 
this forbids him to accept it, just as a negative result 
in an "inductive" argument . . . forbids the inductive 
scientist to affirm the view he hoped to affirm. If 
criticism leads him to a positive conclusion, the most 
it gives him is a nihil obstat. (IH, 261). 
One has to wince at calling a conclusion to a proof a view 
someone "hoped to affirm," for why could a proof not be one 
that concludes to a view that the author either has no hope 
for whatever, or even is one he hopes to deny? Yet with some 
correction (e.g. replacing dispositional terms like "hoping" 
with logically relational or at least more neutral terms) the 
line of thought is clear enough, and poses no particular prob-
lem to the reader. Since he has just been told what consti-
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tutes subscientific historical inference, he is led to ex-
pect that he will next be enlightened about actual scientific 
inference. What he gets instead are more dispositional terms 
--the "compulsion" that is contrasted with "permissive" in-
ductive arguments. 
One hears it said that history is "not an exact science." 
The meaning of this I take to be that no historical argu-
ment ever proves its conclusion with that compulsive force 
which is characteristic of exact science. Historical in-
ference, the saying seems to mean, is never compulsive, 
it is at best permissive; or ... it never leads to cer-
tainty, only to probability. Many historians ... must 
be able to recollect their excitement on first discovering 
that it was wholly untrue, and that they were actually 
holding in their hands an historical argument which left 
nothing to caprice, and admitted of no alternative conclu-
sion, but proved its point as conclusively as a demonstra-
tion in mathematics. (IH, 262). 
An argument that admits of no alternative conclusion and proves 
its point conclusively is one whose compulsive force must be 
that of necessity. Once again the reader anticipates that he 
will be enlightened about the special nature of the necessity 
involved in historical inference. What follows next is utter-
ly astonishing. 
If any reader wishes to rise here on a point of order and 
protest that a philosophical question, which ought there-
fore to be settled by reasoning, is being illegitimately 
disposed of by reference to the authority of historians, 
and quote against me the good old story about the man who 
said "I'm not arguing, I'm telling you," I can only admit 
that the cap fits. I am not arguing; I am telling him. 
Is this wrong of me? The question I want settled is whe-
ther an inference of the kind used in scientific history, 
as distinct from scissors-and-paste history, yields compul-
sion or only permission to embrace its conclusion . . . . 
(T)he only way of knowing whether a given type of argument 
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is cogent or not is to learn how to argue that way, and 
find out. Meanwhile, the second best thing is to take 
the word of people who have done so for themselves. (IH, 
263). 
If this is the manner in which the historian exhibits the 
grounds upon which his knowledge is based, then surely one may 
be excused from affirming the claim that history is a science. 
For how can it provide anything but an authoritative criterion 
for successful historical inference? On such grounds as these 
one could excuse anything that even pretends to be an infer-
ence; if it is true that whatever I do is historically valid 
inference, then any inference is valid so long as it is what 
I do. One could hardly ask for a more blatant example of what 
Knox called Collingwood's dogmatism. 
What has happened to the role of philosophy which, in 
Speculum Mentis, judges whether a particular form of knowledge 
explicitly lives up to its implicit promise? Do we not rather 
appear to be in the full grip of a form of thought that is at-
tempting to justify itself from within--what he had once him-
self called historical dogmatism? Has Collingwood abandoned 
the role of philosophy as outlined in the Essay on Philosoph-
ical Method of being a self-justifying form of thought which 
avoids dogmatism or assuming certain principles to be true 
without justification? Are we not now in the more cloistered 
atmosphere of The New Leviathan, where the "Fallacy of Mis-
placed Argument" forbids us to argue about objects given di-
rectly to consciousness? 
709 
If we try again to look past what Collingwood said to 
what he meant, where that meaning is informed by what is un-
deniably his overall intention in these essays, a mitigating 
argument can be put forward to soften the apparent intransi-
gence of this remark. We have noted in passing the episte-
mological orientation of the entire discussion of inference--
just as in the Essay on Philosophical Method. When Colling-
wood calls history a science and then defines science as an 
organized body of knowledge, and finally states that knowledge 
is organized when it can exhibit the grounds on which it is 
based, one cannot expect that a formal account of historical 
inference is what will follow. If one were to succeed in for-
malizing an historical inference Collingwood would surely say 
that not only was it historically unenlightening to focus on 
the function of logical connectives and their formal meanings 
(if-then, and, or, all, some, etc.) rather than the content 
of the expressions being linked together, but also that what 
was peculiarly historical about it would be completely left 
out in the interest of showing how it was isomorphic with 
other forms of inference. The sort of coherence aimed at in 
historical thinking is not formal validity but narrative con-
tinuity. This continuity is demonstrated when the meaning of an 
act is related to the meaning of another act as historical 
ground and consequent. 
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Furthermore Collingwood often repeats the point that 
in order to be history it is a necessary condition that par-
ticular events be related in a coherent fashion, and not as 
instances of a class of similar events. If this requirement 
is added to the previous observation it follows that an his-
torical inference is the establishment of coherence in the 
form of narrative continuity between the meaning of one par-
ticular historical act and another such that the one is the 
historical ground and the other its consequence. What Col-
lingwood's dogmatic assertion amounts to is a statement of an 
historian's autonomy in this context, so that in order to find 
out if such a narrative has a coherent continuity one has to 
repeat the process of re-thinking it for oneself, which neces-
sitates re-thinking the meaning of this act as grounds for the 
meaning of another particular act, not another like it in its 
class. Rehearsing another argument like it will not do either, 
for the argument is meaning-dependent. If a would-be histori-
an is unable or unwilling to re-enact the argument for him-
self, he can only rely on the testimony of another (which 
means that he ceases to be a scientific historian at this 
point), in which case Collingwood, the Roman-British histori-
an, announces that his testimony is as good as any other, and 
he finds that such narrative coherence does exist, and is com-
pelling. 
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There are many difficulties with this reconstruction, 
as well as with Collingwood's entire handling of the question 
of historical inference. For starters there is the need for 
a clearer distinction between the kind of inference that the 
historian uses to link evidence to his proposed or received 
narrative events, and the inference that occurs when the his-
torian links events to other events within his narrative. All 
of this borders on a discussion of the issue of historical ex-
planation, around which has grown an extensive secondary liter-
ature for the last thirty years (cf. CEPC, 331-48). To deal 
with this in even a cursory way would require a separate 
treatise. Our concern here is first with evaluating the phil-
osophy of history expressed in The Idea of History as legiti-
mately interpreted in the Autobiography; and secondly under-
standing this philosophy of history in the light of develop-
ments of his ideas in the other later writings, especially 
concerning epistemological logic and the philosophy of mind. 
But it is precisely here that our major difficulty 
withCollingwood's handling of the issue of historical infer-
ence arises. For just as the Essay on Philosophical Method 
leaves us wondering when a philosophical inference is unsuc-
cessful, so The Idea of History does not provide us with 
grounds for determining when historical inference fails to 
achieve coherent narrative continuity. For if, lacking Col-
lingwood's assurance on any particular historical inference, 
we decided to be scientific historians ourselves, what assur-
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ance do we have that the "compulsion" to a given conclusion 
is not an utterly subjective conviction that is merely shored 
up by the evidence we choose to consider as governed by the 
questions we ask, which are in turn based on our own presup-
positions? And if the shade of Collingwood were to retort, 
"what assurance do you require?" the reply is the quite Col-
lingwoodean requirement that it be first and foremost a self-
assurance. How is that achieved? 
(c) Historical Necessity.---The issue is one of valid 
vs. invalid historical inference, and such a de jure issue is 
not settled by a de facto exemplification or description (we 
are not asking Collingwood, we are telling him). The answer 
that seems appropriate to the argument as Collingwood has been 
developing it is that historical inference succeeds when it is 
grounded in evidence. But we have just seen that there is an 
apparent circularity here inasmuch as evidence and questions 
are, in Collingwood's view, strictly correlative. It simply 
postpones the inevitable need to state the missing criteria, 
since not just any sequence of completed questions and answers 
nor any haphazard choice of evidence will satisfy an intelli-
gent historian. 
Although the challenge may seem unfair, it would be 
enlightening in this regard to conduct a thought-experiment 
in which Collingwood's canons of scientific history would be 
applied to an outrageously bad piece of historiography, such 
713 
as Erich von DMniken's Chariots of the Gods? 18 Von DMniken 
exasperates the learned and delights the ignorant by declar-
ing that he has sufficient evidence to demonstrate that an-
cient astronauts visited the earth in prehistoric times, and 
that the legends of gods descending from the skies in fiery 
chariots are merely a dim memory of these events. Von DMni-
ken plies himself and his readers with hundreds of questions, 
constructs historical arguments linking his evidence to these 
astronautical events, and uses his ~priori historical imagin-
ation to construct a narrative of events which refer to deeds 
of men (?) done in the past--events he is trying to re-enact 
in his own mind. He engages in this historical reconstruc-
tion for the purpose of self-knowledge, and especially in the 
light of pre-suppositions drawn from 20th century science and 
its expansion by space exploration. He even appears to cross-
examine evidence by putting questions to it, and chooses evi-
dence that he thinks will allow him to answer the questions 
to it, and chooses evidence that he thinks will allow him to 
answer the questions that he has. And some--presumably him-
self included--would say that his historical arguments are 
compelling and admit of no other rational conclusion. 
What is missing here? It appears that Collingwood's 
criteria of scientific history is superficially well suited to 
18Translated by Michael Heron (New York, 1969). 
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justify the work of both respectably orthodox practitioners 
and disreputably heretical dilettantes. In order to demon-
strate that "history" like that of Erich von Dgniken is spur-
ious and fantastic it would be necessary to take into account 
the reaction of the community of historians and their own work 
interpreting the same evidence pertaining to the same "events." 
Collingwood, of course, know this quite well, as indicated by 
his requirement that second-order history, the history of his-
toriography, is itself an integral part of the historian's 
task. He would also have found Von Dgniken's books beneath 
contempt and quite acceptably dismissed by equally amateurish 
rebuttals like that of the Christian fundamentalist, Clifford 
W'l 19 1 son. Nevertheless the serious question remains: on Col-
lingwood's grounds, how is bad history--history that fails to 
be scientific--eliminated? 
Evidently by critical historiography. But then scien-
tific history presupposes critical history rather than replac-
ing it, just as critical history builds on scissors-and-paste 
while yet modifying and correcting it. Collingwood's efforts 
to proclaim a historian's version of the Copernican revolu-
tion may have led him to express himself in a way that mis-
leads the reader into overlooking Collingwood's discovery that 
history is a philosophical concept and therefore defined as a 
scale of forms in which two successive stages in the scale are 
19
crash Go the Chariots (New York, 1972). 
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related by opposition and distinction, and have differences 
of both degree and kind. Scientific history may be opposed 
to critical history in the sense that it rejects any attempt 
to make historical objects independent of the historian's 
questioning thought (therefore ignoring the essential ideality 
of the past); but it is also distinct from critical history 
insofar as it is self-consciously aware that when it replaces 
the concept of "evidence" for the critical historian's 
"sources" and the scissors-and-paste historian's "testimony" 
the concept of evidence includes the lesser forms in its mean-
ing. It is therefore not only a different kind of history but 
is a more perfect embodiment of the generic concept than is 
critical history, just as critical history is a more perfect 
f th . d 20 orrn an sc1ssors-an -paste. 
But it is not obvious that the same can be said for 
the necessity that Collingwood claims for historical inference. 
Since Hume it has been natural to suppose that the only sort 
of necessity admissable in inference is strict logical neces-
20Wh . th . . . f. t. f h 1 f at 1s e m1n1mum spec1 1ca 1on o t e sea e o 
forms of the concept of history? It cannot be direct observa-
tion, because to be history at all it must deal with res ~­
~ incapable of present perception. Can it be memory? While 
Collingwood rejects memory as grounds for history because his-
tory is organized and memory is not (IH, 252), this is from 
the point of view of scientific history--the highest point on 
the scale of forms of history. The generic concept must be 
minimally specified by an act that re-enacts, and by a thought 
about thought. Minimally what else can this be but an act of 
memory? That an act of memory is not organized and not infer-
ential means only that it has the status of a confused poten-
tial for interpretative acts of meaning. 
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sity--what Collingwood is calling deductive compulsion, with 
some allowance made for inductive inference (yielding the 
"virtual compulsion" due to preponderant probability). But in 
the strict sense, when the meaning of an event is related to 
the meaning of another event as ground to consequent, how can 
this be a necessary relation? In the realm of human affairs 
it is always possible that the outcome could be otherwise than 
the way it was. And if the historian's work of exhibiting the 
evidence as grounds for the coherence of his narrative of these 
events is also an inferential process, in what sense is the 
conclusion--the particular narrative of events--a necessary 
conclusion from the evidence? It is clearly this latter ques-
tion that occupies the foreground of Collingwood's concern in 
The Idea of History, and our question at this point concerns 
the nature of a "compulsion" which is neither deductively ne-
cessary nor inductively permissive, but is yet just as binding 
in its conclusion as is a mathematical proof. It is also 
clearly not Collingwood's intention to reduce this compulsion 
to a subjective or psychological state. He means to assert 
that historical inference compels like all scientific inter-
ence compels--i.e. with necessity. 
When historical inference refers to the ground-conse-
quent relation between narrated events there is a sense of ne-
cessity in which it is understandable to say that past events 
cannot be other than the way they are. Necessity has a human-
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based usage wherein some event or state of affairs is said to 
be necessary if it cannot be made by me or anyone else to be 
other than the way it is. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
this is the way Collingwood analyzes the term "cause" in the 
~ssa~ on Metaphysics. In this sense the past is beyond human 
causality: it cannot now be made by me or by anyone else to be 
other than the way it is. But this is not the interesting 
sense of the term so far as the argument of The Idea of His-
tory is concerned. We are interested in the relation of evi-
dence to reconstructed events of the past, and reconstruct-
ing or re-enacting that past is within the non-necessary realm 
of causable or alterable events. 
But there is one way that I can see to salvage Colling-
wood's treatment of historical inference. When the question-
evidence correlation came up for discussion in the previous 
section we noted that the kind of question that the historian 
asks aims not at "the truth" but at the meaning of the evi-
dence. It is this hermeneutical preoccupation that provides 
us with a way of understanding a non-deductive but necessary 
inferential compulsion. 
The missing link in this entire discussion is a pro-
per elucidation of the term "interpretation"--an axial pro-
cess since it is by means of the interpretation of evidence 
that the historian draws his inference about the meaning of 
past events. It follows that the correctness of the infer-
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ence is dependent on the correctness of the interpreting pro-
cess. Now in the interpretative process there is one sense of 
"necessity" that is both legitimate and appropriate for Col-
lingwood's use in this connection. Collingwood seems to have 
in mind a view of inferential necessity that is parallel to 
his notion of conceptual truth. Just as truth is not only a 
property of judgments or propositions but extends to concepts 
as well in the sense that a concept may truly or falsely ex-
press an intended meaning, so also necessity extends to con-
cepts, statements, and inferences in the sense of "fitness" 
(like the elements in a Gestalt are seen as necessary to the 
interpretation of the pattern). In the hermeneutical sense 
something is said to be necessary when it cannot be other 
than the way it is without losing its identity of meaning. 
In the historical sense the hermeneutical demand for meaning 
proposes an a priori necessity in the sort of fitness that 
makes a conclusion necessary only when it makes both narra-
tive and evidential sense, so that the meaning of both the 
evidence and the event are fused together so tightly that 
nothing essential is left out of account. The necessity is 
one of referential narrative meaning, i.e. by means of this 
argument (a set of well interpreted pieces of evidence) such 
a conclusion (the re-enacted event) makes historical sense. 
This is what Collingwood seems to mean when he says 
that the necessity of the historian's picture of the past 
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(i.e· his narrative account) "is at every point the necessity 
of the ~ priori imagination" (IH, 245-46) whose functions are 
selection, construction, and criticism (IH, 236). 
4. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we have had the opportunity to examine 
how Collingwood carried out the rapprochement between philos-
ophy and history, and although we were left with several un-
answered questions and some serious problems in understanding 
what Collingwood meant us to understand by historical infer-
ence, it is clear enough that the autobiographical interpre-
tation in its main lines is carried forward into The Idea of 
History, even though it is a posthumous publication and is the 
product of the editorial re-arrangement in its present form. 
We saw that in Part I of The Idea of History the scale of 
forms of mental functions is reflected in the development of 
the concept of history as it is expressed in historiography. 
We also saw that the Epilegomena provide some striking illus-
trations not only of Collingwood's mature philosophy of mind, 
but also of the kinds of judgments and arguments that were de-
scribed, but not exemplified, in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method. And finally we saw how Collingwood attempted to free 
himself not only from the errors of realism but from those of 
idealism as well. And in the process we had a glimpse of Col-
lingwood's use of a basically interpretative approach to his 
subject matter, an approach that allowed for the self-conscious 
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control by the historian of his narrative by means of infer-
ence based on the interpretation of evidence. The reconcili-
ation of history and philosophy does not merely take the form 
of a reduction of both to forms of self-consciousness--al-
though that is, in Collingwood's view, generically the case. 
It takes the form of a demonstration that self-knowledge (the 
goal of philosophy) is possible only on condition that mean-
ings can be re-enacted in such a way that they retain both 
their objectivity (their identity as meanings) and their sub-
jectivity (as experience). 
What we have not shown is what the limitations of 
this reconciliational process are. Does history simply ab-
sorb philosophy without remainder in this re-enactment? What 
is the independent role of philosophy? 
CHAPTER X 
METAPHYSICS AND RAPPROCHEMENT 
1. Introduction. 
With this chapter we come to the end of our journey 
through the published writings of R. G. Collingwood, and to 
the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphysics, which has 
been the cause of so much critical discussion among the stu-
dents of Collingwood's philosophy. 
In Chapter I we noted that it was this work (and 
those portions of the Autobiography that support it) which so 
scandalized Knox, who argued that at the end of his life Col-
lingwood "turned traitor" to his philosophical profession by 
absorbing philosophy into history. According to Knox, until 
1936 Collingwood still held that metaphysics as a separate 
study of the One, the True, and the Good, a study distinct 
from history, was still possible; but after 1938 he did not, 
as evidenced by the historicism of the Essay on Metaphysics 
and the Autobiography. Knox concluded that sometime between 
1936 and 1938 Collingwood's philosophical standpoint radically 
changed, and while the major evidence for this change is taken 
by Knox from unpublished manuscripts, he makes an impressive 
case for it from the published writings themselves (IH, x-xi). 
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The fact that there is no mention of a major reversal of opin-
ion in the Autobiography is one of the main reasons Knox re-
jects it as a legitimate interpretation of the development of 
Collingwood's philosophy. 
In Chapter I we also noted that this is the major dif-
ficulty to which most of Collingwood's subsequent interpreters 
addressed themselves. Donagan grounds his interpretation of 
Collingwood's later philosophy on the disparity that he finds 
between the earlier idealistic philosophy, in which all ab-
straction is rejected as falsification, and the later analy-
tic philosophy of mind which "repudiates" this position by re-
cognizing that all thinking is conceptual and that all con-
cepts are abstract (LPC, 14, 18). While we have had occasion 
to question Donagan's analysis of the abstractness of thought 
in Collingwood's later philosophy, it is difficult to escape 
his conclusion that the Essay on Metaphysics represents an 
abandonment of views expressed earlier, in which philosophy is 
said to consist of universal judgments: for if historical 
statements concern particular matters of fact, how can meta-
physics as an historical science preserve its universal as-
pect as philosophy? Donagan argues that Collingwood came to 
think that it was impossible to have a non-abstract idea of 
pure being, and therefore attempted to save metaphysics by 
giving it an orientation away from ontology and towards the 
history of science. But what he proposed was a contradictory 
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and indefensible science of truth-neutral absolute presuppo-
sitions, which is incompatible with his later philosophy of 
mind ( CEPC, 15) . 
It is this reformed metaphysics which Walsh, Roten-
streich and others have also found to be neither conceptually 
justifiable nor historically accurate, representing what Walsh 
has called "metaphysical neutralism"--the refusal to take a 
metaphysical position (CEPC, 149, 197). The attempt to ex-
tricate Collingwood from this blind alley has led at least two 
of Collingwood's gifted defenders--Mink and Rubinoff--to en-
gage in feats of interpretative excess, which we spent part 
of Chapter I examining. While we have learned more from these 
studies of Collingwood than we can accurately and adequately 
acknowledge, we decided that there was still room for a study 
of Collingwood's public philosophy based on the guidelines 
provided by the autobiographical interpretation. 
In Chapter II we laid the groundwork for this self-
interpretative study by locating the four major themes around 
which Collingwood organized his Autobiography: his opposition 
to realism, Q-A logic, the philosophy of history, and the 
philosophy of rapprochement. In Parts II and III we have 
verified that the autobiographical interpretation is a remark-
ably concise overview of themes that recur constantly through-
out Collingwood's early and later writings, and often enlight-
ens the strategy of argumentation in these works. We have 
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had occasion to find fault with what Collingwood maintained 
at one place or another; we have witnessed apparent contra-
dictions not only between one publication and another but 
within the same treatise; and we have found themes latent in 
these writings that help to overcome puzzling and frustrat-
ing obscurities in some difficult passages--themes that were 
not explicitly discussed in the Autobiography. But we have 
found no evidence thus far of a major reversal on any of the 
central issues of the autobiographical interpretation. 
But with the Essay on Metaphysics we face our great-
est challenge. Approaching this work from the background of 
our survey of the other published writings we find both strik-
ing parallels and equally striking reversals. We observed in 
Chapter III that even before Collingwood's opposition to real-
ism hardened during World War I, his outlook on many substan-
tial philosophical issues was already formulated. Thus it is 
noteworthy that seven of the ten chapters of Religion and 
Philosophy are assembled under the sub-headings, "Religion 
and Metaphysics" (Part II) and "From Metaphysics to Theology" 
(Part III), and contain discussions about proofs for the 
existence of God, materialism and idealism, personality, iden-
tity and difference, the Absolute, the problem of evil, and 
God's self-expression in man (RP, viii-xii). In this earliest 
work Collingwood writes as if there is a legitimate function 
of metaphysical analysis not merely in locating and propound-
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ing absolute presuppositions, but in deciding which of them 
are acceptable and which are not. For example, when he ex-
amines the three presuppositions (he calls them "hypotheses") 
that "(e)ither the world is entirely material, or it is en-
tirely spiritual, or it is a compound of the two" (RP, 73), 
he reaches some conclusion concerning the issue: he rejects 
both materialism and a crude idealism in favor of a modified 
form of idealism which accepts "mind as the one reality" in 
the sense that "the world is the place of freedom and con-
sciousness, not of blind determinism" (RP, 94-95). 
Surely "the world is entirely material•• is as much a 
metaphysical presupposition as "all events have causes" (EM, 
51), and in rejecting this "hypothesis" Collingwood is not 
merely stating that it is no longer an absolute presupposi-
tion of science (although he does indicate that this is the 
case--cf. RP, 82), but is deciding the issue in favor of ideal-
ism--which is hardly remaining neutral on its truth or falsity. 
Nor is this an isolated case. When he analyzes the immanence-
transcendence dualism with respect to God•s identity in the 
universe, he does not leave the matter in unresolved conflict, 
but reconciles them through the "concrete identity of activ-
ity"--i.e. "the identity of two minds which think the same 
thing" in the sense of sharing the same thoughts and voli-
tions: •• so far, that is, as they know any truth or will any 
good" (RP, 117-18). Thus in stating that God cannot be simply 
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itntnanent in the world or transcendent to it, but rather pres-
l.·n it in the same sense that personality is self-identical ent 
and yet inter-personal in action, he is not merely stating 
what thinking Christians believe, he is affirming the truth 
of a theological presupposition and rejecting two heretical 
versions. 
But it is also in this early work that we found the 
following passage in which there is a striking anticipation 
of the rejection of metaphysical on to logy in the Essay on Me-
taphysics: 
It is often maintained that ultimate truths are incapable 
of proof, and that the existence of God is such an ulti-
mate truth. But I venture to s~ggest that the impossibil-
ity of proof attaches not to ultimate truths as such, but 
only to the truths of "metaphysics" in the depreciatory 
sense of the word; to truths, that is, which have no de-
finite meaning. We cannot prove that Reality exists, not 
because the questionis too ulti~ate (that is, because too 
much depends on it), but because it is too empty. Tell 
us what you mean by Reality, and we can offer an alterna-
tive meaning and try to discover which is the right one. 
No one can prove that God exists, if no definite signifi-
cance is attached to the words; not because ... the re-
ality of God transcends human knowledge, but because the 
idea of God which we claim to have is as yet entirely 
indeterminate. (RP, 64). 
This is essentially the same argument that we find Collingwood 
making in the Essay on Metaphysics to reject an ontology of 
"pure being," and the existence of "truths" which are incapa-
ble of proof is remarkably close to the later concept of abso-
lute presuppositions. It is clear from this early work that 
at this time Collingwood accepted a legitimate function to me-
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taphysics and rejected some metaphysical arguments as vacuous 
and therefore illegitimate. 
Eight years later Collingwood appears to have less 
hope for the legitimacy of the enterprise of metaphysical an-
alysis. In Speculum Mentis metaphysics is described as the 
scientific form of experience abstractly (and therefore falsely) 
extended into philosophy: it is that form of dogmatic philos-
ophy in which scientific thinking justifies its objective vali-
dity "by showing that the real world is constructed in such a 
way that, in thinking it scientifically, we are thinking of it 
as it really is" (SM, 272). But this involves showing that 
the laws of thought (logic) are really the laws of being (me-
taphysics), and this cannot be done. 
Metaphysics is impossible; for its task is to vindicate 
the objective validity of the ways in which we think, and 
if there are any flaws in our methods of thought, these 
will affect our metaphysical theory of reality and intro-
duce into it the very mistakes which by its help we had 
hoped to eradicate. Hence the theory of being as distinct 
from thinking (metaphysics) will only be the theory of 
thinking as distinct from being (logic) expressed in a 
different terminology but subject to the same fatal weak-
ness, namely that just as logic can never analyze real 
thinking--the thinking that, going on in the logician's 
mind, always lies behind his analysis--so metaphysics can 
never analyze real being, being as it is in itself un-
tainted by thought. (SM, 274). 
Thus as we have seen in these two early works, Collingwood's 
antipathy to metaphysics defined as a science of "pure being" 
has its origin in his early philosophy, and the Essay on Me-
taphysics does not represent a departure from this tendency. 
728 
Where they part company appears to be over the recon-
ciling role of philosophical thought. Speculum Mentis leaves 
open the possibility that as the exercise of "absolute know-
lege" philosophy can achieve, by unification of subject and 
object, what cannot be achieved by scientific metaphysics. 
In the Essay on Metaphysics the role of philosophy seems to 
be restricted to the discovery and analysis of absolute pre-
suppositions by historical means, and the gap between the me-
taphysical subject and his historical object is measureable 
by the attitude of natural piety or even numinous terror that 
surrounds absolute presuppositions. From Part II we are 
therefore left with the problem of trying to understand how 
history can establish what science cannot, and how philosophy 
can be content with leaving absolute presuppositions in an 
unreconcilably truth-neutral state. 
Part III has provided us with the means for resolving 
this issue at the same time it deepens our understanding of 
the problem. On the one hand our view of history from Col-
lingwood's analysis of it, as we reviewed that analysis in 
The Idea of History, helps us to understand why the obstacle 
of infinite factuality, which wrecked the historical enter-
prise in Speculum Mentis, is no longer a difficulty for the 
scientific historian. On the other hand, the scale of forms 
of conscious acts that provides the foundation for historical 
thought seems to leave no place for the absoluteness of pre-
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suppositions. Not only is there no upper limit to the levels 
of consciousness to correspond to the "absolute knowledge" of 
Speculum Mentis, but the very facticity of evidence is gener-
ated by the questioning activity of the historian--so that ab-
solute presuppositions appear to be neither absolute nor, 
from an historical perspective, truly ~-supposed. 
To add to this distressing situation we are confronted 
with a statement from the Essay on Philosophical Method, which 
has the highest blessings from Collingwood in his Autobiogra-
£Qy, about the nature of metaphysics--a statement which seems 
to run directly counter to the rejection of metaphysical on-
tology both in the earlier works and in the Essay on Metaphy-
sics. He writes: 
metaphysics, even if it is regarded as only one among the 
philosophical sciences, is not unique in its objective re-
ference or in its logical structure; all philosophical 
thought is of the same kind, and every philosophical sci-
ence partakes of the nature of metaphysics, which is not 
a separate philosophical science but a special study of 
the existential aspect of that same subject-matter whose 
aspect as truth is studied by logic, and its aspect as 
goodness by ethics. (EPM, 127). 
It is also in the Essay on Philosophical Method that the dis-
tinction is made between "the categorical singular judgement 
which composes the body of historical thought and the categor-
ical universal of philosophy" (EPM, 136), where categorical 
thinking means thought which "in fact is never devoid of ob-
jective or ontological reference" (EPM, 125). It appears that 
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the Autobiography overlooks this distinction and that it is 
denied altogether in the Essay on Metaphysics. 
Is it possible that Knox was correct on this matter, 
and that it was only in his mature middle period that Colling-
wood succeeded in freeing himself from the scepticism and dog-
matism of his earlier and later periods? In the light of the 
evidence we called forth in Part III this seems hardly cred-
ible. On all the major autobiographical themes that we have 
examined thus far Collingwood shows a steady and continuous 
development. Nevertheless we cannot easily integrate the po-
sitions expressed in the Essay on Metaphysics with the rest 
of Collingwood's philosophy as we have investigated it thus 
far, nor can we simply refuse to consider it or relegate it 
to a lower status than the rest of his published writings--
and especially not in the light of the agreement between this 
essay and the Autobiography. For when we read in the former 
that "All metaphysical questions are historical questions, 
and all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions" 
(EM, 49), and that "The problems of metaphysics are histori-
cal problems; its methods are historical methods" (EM, 62), 
and even that "Metaphysics has always been an historical sci-
ence" (EM, 58), we are certainly inclined to the opinion that 
Collingwood has reduced, if not all of philosophy, at least 
all of metaphysics to history. And when one considers that 
it was Collingwood's judgment that metaphysics is the very 
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heart of science and civilization, which stand or fall with 
it (EM, 22, 46, 103, 224, 233), it is difficult not to draw 
the conclusion that history has replaced philosophy as the 
central reconciling force, and that therefore the role of 
philosophy has indeed been "liquidated by being converted in-
to history" (IH, x). 
Even if we were to accept this as Collingwood's com-
plete and final judgment on metaphysics, our thesis concern-
ing the autobiographical interpretation as we developed it in 
Chapter II would not be entirely wrecked, because the Autobi-
ography largely agrees with the Essay on Metaphysics on this 
matter: 
What 
This was my answer to the rather threadbare question "how 
can metaphysics become a science?" If science means na-
turalistic science, the answer is that it had better not 
try. If science means an organized body of knowledge, 
the answer is: by becoming what is always hasbeen; that 
is, frankly claiming its proper status as an historical 
inquiry .... (A, 67; cf. EM, 77). 
seems to be called into question is rather the role of 
philosophical rapprochement, which plays a large part in the 
Autobiography, but is not even mentioned in the Essay on Me-
taphysics. It is for this reason that we have chosen to con-
sider both of these issues in our final chapter: it is our 
belief that when examined together these two issues--rapproche-
ment and metaphysics--will illuminate one another in a way 
that examining either alone will not. 
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But in pursuing our inquiry to this final point we 
will be, in our own way, undergoing an experience not unlike 
one which Collingwood describes in the Autobiography. For it 
was in our second chapter that we encountered those peculiar 
passages in which Collingwood described the turning point in 
his early thinking--the closest thing to a "conversion" that 
is even hinted at in the Autobiography. In two crucial chap-
ters--the ones in which Collingwood writes about his discov-
ery of Q-A logic and his rejection of the realist philosophy 
he had been taught at Oxford--he writes about his experience 
of the Albert Memorial which, though he describes it in gro-
tesque terms, became an event the assimilation of which re-
shaped the direction of all his future thought. 
A year or two after the outbreak of war, I was living in 
London and working with a section of the Admiralty Intel-
ligence Division in the rooms of the Royal Geographical 
Society. Every day I walked across Kensington Gardens 
and past the Albert Memorial. The Albert Memorial began 
by degrees to obsess me. Like Wordsworth's Leech-Gatherer, 
it took on a strange air of significance; it seemed 
Like one whom I had met with in a dream; 
Or like a man from some far region sent, 
To give me human strength, by apt admonishment. 
Everything about it was visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, craw-
ling, verminous; for a time I could not bear to look at 
it, and passed with averted eyes; recovering from this 
weakness, I forced myself to look, and to face day by day 
the question: a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly, 
so indefensibly bad, why had Scott done it? ... What re-
lation was there, I began to ask myself, between what he 
had done and what he had tried to do? . . . If I found the 
monument merely loathsome, was that perhaps my fault? 
Was I looking in it for qualities it did not possess, and 
either ignoring or despising those it did? (A, 29-30). 
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In a later passage Collingwood relates this experience 
to his rejection of the realists' attitude toward the history 
of philosophy, leading to his rejection of the view that there 
are "eternal problems" in philosophy (A, 60). It led to the 
discovery that every philosophical problem has its history in 
which the sameness of an issue is not the sameness of a uni-
versal but that of an historical process, and the difference 
that between two phases of this process (A, 62). Two pages 
later Collingwood writes about his reform of metaphysics 
based on both the non-existence of eternal problems and the 
uncovering of the absolute presuppositions of science (A, 66-
67). 
Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics is our Albert Me-
morial. It is a grotesque piece of work, and like the young 
Collingwood we must force ourselves not to avert our gaze from 
it, and to ask ourselves what relation there is between what 
he did and what he was trying to achieve. For one cannot 
avoid the embarassment that arises when faced with its seem-
ingly intemperate and radically simplistic assertions. It 
seems to be a work that is indefensibly and incontrovertibly 
bad, unworthy of the subtle and sometimes vigorous mind of 
the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics, the archeologist of 
Hadrian's Wall, and the author of the Essay on Philosophical 
Method. 
734 
But it is here that we must also take our cue from 
Collingwood's reflections on the Albert Memorial, for we must 
ask ourselves if we are looking in it for qualities it does 
not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it has. 
Thus we will be wary of accepting even Collingwood's own as-
sessment of what he is doing in this essay. Our examination 
of the Essay on Philosophical Method forewarns us against ac-
cepting at face value any advance disclaimer at the beginning 
of a work of what he is not going to do; so when he writes in 
the Preface to the Essay on Metaphysics that "This is not so 
much a book of metaphysics as a book about metaphysics," and 
adds that it does not expound his own metaphysical ideas nor 
criticize those of others (EM, vii), we can be reasonably sure 
that he will violate this contract with the reader just as he 
did in his essay on method. To talk about philosophy in any 
meaningful way is to philosophize, and this is no less true of 
metaphysics, as the examples in Part III of the book make 
clear. 
Nevertheless to a degree not necessary up to this 
point we must rely on the latent principles that we have 
found coming to light in our survey of the later writings thus 
far in Part III. These themes may yet provide us with a 
means for uncovering the consistent core of meaning underly-
ing the paradox of metaphysics as an historical science. For 
we may anticipate that metaphysics, like history, is a phil-
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osophical concept and therefore is defined by a scale of 
forms in which occur oppositions such as those between a sci-
ence consisting of categorical universal statements and the 
same science defined as dealing with individual matters of 
fact. In a scale of forms such an opposition is reconciled 
when it is shown that the two forms are phases of the same 
generic concept, one being a more perfect embodiment or ex-
pression of the other. Furthermore our analysis of the func-
tions of consciousness and language in Collingwood's philoso-
phy of mind leads us to suspect that the priority and irre-
ducibility of the meaning-seeking role of unifying conscious-
ness will have considerable impact on any discussion of abso-
lute presuppositions. And finally, as we saw the concept of 
history being refined and re-shaped in the last chapter, we 
could not help but recognize the profound importance of un-
derstanding what Collingwood means by "historical thinking" 
when considering what it means to say that metaphysics is an 
historical science. For if at the heart of historical think-
ing is re-enactment, then calling metaphysics an historical 
science means calling it a re-enactment with all that that 
implies--especially the recasting of the act-object distinc-
tion as Collingwood envisions it. 
This provides us with our strategy for the rest of 
this chapter. In the next section we will attempt a brief 
outline of the Essay on Metaphysics, especially attending to 
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the way in which it reflects the four major themes of the Au-
tobiography. In section three we shall continue this "forced 
look" at the essay by analyzing the obstacles that Colling-
wood has placed in the path of first philosophy in the first 
two parts of the Essay on Metaphysics. In section four we 
shall attempt to reconstruct the unity of the four autobio-
graphical themes prefatory to returning to the obstacles to 
first philosophy, the overcoming of which is the aim of our 
fifth and final section. 
We must add a final word on the limitations of this 
chapter. Our program necessitates restricting our discussion 
to the four major autobiographical themes. For this reason 
we are not attempting a complete discussion of the contents 
of the Essay on Metaphysics, which involves passing over a 
good deal of interesting and perhaps even relevant material. 
A complete treatment of Collingwood's metaphysics will only 
be possible after a thorough study of the unpublished manu-
scripts, especially those on cosmology, epistemology, logic, 
and, of course, metaphysics itself. This chapter is to be re-
garded as a prolegomenon to such a study--as is the entire 
dissertation. 
2. The Autobiographical Themes in the Essay on Metaphysics. 
If we are to accomplish even the first stages of this 
"forced look" at Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics we must 
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disabuse ourselves of several pre-conceptions that we may 
bring to the discussion--some of which arise from our own pre-
vious investigation. It is only in this way that we will pre-
vent ourselves from looking in it for qualities it does not 
possess. For if we are expecting that the Essay on Metaphy-
~ will place a capstone on the arch of thought that we 
have seen Collingwood erecting for the last eight chapters, 
we will be sadly disappointed. Ontology is dismissed. There 
is no discussion of the nature of categorical universal propo-
sitions, no analysis of the nature of "real thinking," and no 
final synthesis of formal, dialectical, and Q-A logics. Real-
ism and idealism are left in a state of unresolved opposition. 
And while some of the traditional concepts of metaphysics 
come up for discussion, others are ignored altogether. Thus 
the existence of God is discussed, but in a way which ortho-
dox Christians would find alien at best and heretical at 
worst; and while various senses of the term "cause" are ex-
amined, other concepts like substance, matter, activity, pro-
cess, etc. are not. And where we might have wished for clari-
fication, in "first philosophy" that explicates the presuppo-
sitions of historical science, of terms like event, evidence, 
reference, inference and necessity (cf. A, 77), such hopes 
are left unfulfilled. In short, the Essay on Metaphysics is 
not the First Philosophy of Collingwood we might have hoped 
for, and to this extent his warning in the first sentence of 
the Preface is precise: it is not a book of metaphysics. 
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As we have already noted, where the lack is most 
sorely felt is in the area of rapprochement. Where we might 
be led to expect that a work on metaphysics by the author of 
the Autobiography might have important things to say about 
the identity that is sought by a reconciliational philosophy 
--what in another context he might have called an object that 
would completely satisfy the mind--there is not a word on 
such a desperately needed topic to complete the recapitulation 
and form an apotheosis of the four autobiographical themes in 
the later writings. A glance at the contents of the essay 
tends to confirm this observation insofar as there is consid-
erably reflection of the other three autobiographical the~es--
which makes rapprochement conspicuous by its absence. 
The first three chapters are devoted to examining 
several senses of the term "metaphysics" as indicated by the 
three names that Aristotle gives to "first philosophy" in the 
' ' ' collection of treatises following the physics (T~ I-4ETO( T'« c$v-
/ 
a{H~ ). In these chapters Collingwood rejects the Aristote-
lian proposal for metaphysics as ontology on the grounds that 
a science of pure being would be so general that it would be 
lacking in any determinate subject matter. But Aristotle's 
description of metaphysics as a science of the first princi-
ples of physics is defended by Collingwood as the true sub-
ject matter of metaphysics, which is a study of the absolute 
presuppositions of science. Chapters IV and V present the 
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version of Q-AM logic which we examined in detail in our chap-
ter on logic, language, and mental acts, in which absolute 
presuppositions (APs) are located at the apex of P-Q-A com-
plexes in a systematic inquiry. Chapters VI and VII develop 
the concept of metaphysics as an historical science of abso-
lute presuppositions--the radical thesis of the Essay on Meta-
physics. Chapters VIII through XVII are devoted to what Col-
lingwood calls anti-metaphysics. Chapter VIII defines anti-
metaphysics as metaphysics done out of a motive of either re-
sentment or fear, by an amateur thinker whose attitude toward 
actual metaphysics appears as hostility to it. Chapters IX 
through XVI examine two versions of anti-metaphysics--psychol-
ogy as the pseudo-science of mind, and positivism from J. S. 
Mill to A. J. Ayer. Chapter XVII, which concludes Part II, 
contrasts Collingwood's view on absolute presuppositions with 
those of the modern realist, Samuel Alexander, whose attitude 
of "natural piety" or unquestioning acceptance toward APs Col-
lingwood approved, but whose epistemology failed to appreciate 
the degree to which APs are historically grounded. 
Part III is a collection of examples of metaphysical 
analysis of the sort that Collingwood proposes as acceptable, 
and presumably illustrating the principles of metaphysical an-
alysis as he outlined them in Part I. Chapters XVIII through 
XXI take up the problem of the existence of God, especially as 
the statement "God exists" is analyzed by the logical positi-
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vists. Collingwood analyzes the statement not as a verifi-
able or falsifiable proposition, but as an absolute presuppo-
sition of 20th Century science, which could not exist without 
the AP that there is one God or "in other words, that there 
is one world of nature with one system of laws running all 
through it, and one natural science which investigates it" 
(EM, 213). Chapters XXII through XXVIII set forth a radical 
re-interpretation of Kant's metaphysics as contained in the 
Transcendental Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Rea-
son. According to Collingwood this is "an historical study 
of the absolute presuppositions generally recognized by na-
tural scientists in Kant's own time" and for some time after-
wards (EM, 245). And finally, Chapters XXIX through XXXIV 
are a slightly altered version of the article on causation 
that he had published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society for 1939. In it Collingwood distinguishes three de-
veloping senses of the term "cause": as a motive for the 
free and deliberate act of a conscious agent (the historical 
sense); as the way in which a natural event can be produced 
or prevented by human intervention (the engineering science 
sense), and as the relation between two events or states such 
that one is related causally to another called its effect (the 
theoretical science sense) (EM, 285-87). Collingwood argues 
that the first is the true sense, the second a legitimate but 
restricted extension of the first, and the third an abandoned 
presupposition of natural science (EM, 289, 327). 
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From this bird's eye view it is an easy matter to lo-
cate three of the four autobiographical themes. The chapters 
rejecting metaphysics as ontology as well as the whole of the 
section on anti-metaphysics are directed against current forms 
of realism. Ontology as Collingwood describes it is the ulti-
mate product of universal abstraction--the limiting case when 
everything determinate that can be said of an object is left 
out of account and a subject matter is reached which is totally 
lacking in any distinctions whatever--"pure being." There be-
ing no definite subject matter, there is consequently nothing 
for science to investigate (EM, 13-14). We recognize the view 
of abstraction here that Collingwood attributes to the real-
ists, and "pure being" is an object so unaffected by the know-
ing of it that it remains entirely indeterminate and hence un-
knowable. Similarly the sort of psychology that Collingwood 
takes to be anti-metaphysical is the behavioristic attempt to 
reduce mental processes to mechanical events--a "pseudo-
science of mind" which adopts a materialistic and mechanistic 
attitude towards thought and deliberately ignores its "criter-
iological" aspect (generally its truth or falsity)--in short, 
treating thought as an inert object (EM, 114-15). And the lo-
gical positivism of Ayer is faulted for its simplistic and 
erroneous description of observation in science, which assumes 
that "facts" are simply observed without recognizing that ob-
servation itself presupposes interpretation (EM, 143-46, 163). 
Positivism is guilty of the error of assuming, as does Samuel 
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Alexander, that the process of knowing is a simple apprehen-
sion of "compresence" of two things, one of which happens to 
be a mind (EM, 170, 177)--the root error of realistic episte-
mology. 
It is also not difficult to find many of the perni-
cious consequences of realism cited in the Autobiography also 
represented in the Essay on Metaphysics. In the form of anti-
metaphysics,realism provides the propaganda for the spread of 
irrationalism in science, religion, and civilization (EM, 133-
42, 234). Where the survival of each of these requires the 
responsible agency of human intelligence--the belief that a 
person's knowing can have an effect on the outcome of a syste-
matic inquiry or a series of actions--anti-metaphysics denies 
such agency, and therefore threatens the survival of the sort 
of civilization that Collingwood portrayed in The New Levia-
than. 
Similarly Q-A logic--the second major autobiographical 
theme--is not only made the groundwork for the revision of 
metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions, but is 
formulated in conscious opposition to the pronouncements of 
the logical positivists, whose acceptance of an F-logical cri-
terion for deciding truth claims (at least for analytical 
statements) is well recognized. In fact it is apparent that 
the peculiar form that Q-A logic takes in the Essay on Meta-
physics is due to the fact that it is being formulated with 
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one eye fixed on the pronouncements of logical positivism, 
and if it were not for this polemical tendency we might have 
been offered a Q-A logic better able to stand on its own mer-
its rather than those it has by not being some other unaccep-
table thing. Therefore Collingwood tells us only enough about 
absolute presuppositions to allow us to escape the trap laid 
for metaphysical statements by the logical positivists--that 
they are neither tautologous (F-logically analytical state-
ments) nor empirically verifiably/falsifiable, and are there-
fore meaningless. Collingwood charges them with failing to 
ask the further question of what else they might be before de-
claring them to be meaningless (EM, 162-65), and when he asks 
the question for them he concludes that while it is true that 
they are not verifiable or falsifiable propositions, they 
nonetheless retain an inquiry-dependent function as the 
grounds from which questions proceed--the function he calls 
presupposition (EM, 29-31). But were it not for this preoccu-
pation with escaping from the positivistic trap Collingwood 
might well have gone on to say in what sense absolute presup-
positions can be said to be true or false in a way which does 
not mean verifiable or falsifiable in the empirical sense. 
Instead we are left with metaphysical statements that are not 
propositions (as the term is understood by positivists), not 
tautologous, but yet not meaningless--all negative character-
istics. All that is left of a positive nature to absolute 
presuppositions is their role in logically grounding questions 
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in a systematic inquiry. This is precisely the role assigned 
to them in the Autobiography. 
Of course it is the third autobiographical theme that 
is dominant in the Essay on Metaphysics, since the reconcili-
ation of history and philosophy is made the template upon 
which is forged a reformed metaphysics. When the questions, 
propositions, problems and methods of metaphysics are said to 
be those of history, the identification of the two is as 
plainly stated as one can expect. In fact the identity is so 
lacking in qualification that the reader is obliged to think 
as far back as Religion and Philosophy to find a reconcilia-
tional identity of equivalent unsophistication. But if what 
is overlooked in the reconciliational identity is, like the 
earlier identities of religion, philosophy, and history, the 
sense of how they are related in a process of development or 
in a scale of forms, is it not the logical outcome of the 
line of thought in the Autobiography whereby Collingwood de-
cided that there are no eternal problems? For if it is true 
that there are no timeless truths, then all truths are in-
deed historically relative, and the Essay on Metaphysics is 
an attempt to explore what that would mean for scientific in-
quiry. 
Nevertheless we cannot be content with this state of 
affairs. In Part II and Part III we have observed how the 
earlier version of reconciliation, based on the rather sim-
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plistic orientation of religion, science, history, etc. to a 
common object ("all of reality"), gave way to the more sophis-
ticated but unstable dialectical scale of forms of knowledge 
which distortedly approximated to an ideal of Absolute Know-
ledge, expressed as philosophy. We followed this progression 
to the Essay on Philosophical Method, where opposition and dis-
tinction are relations accepted as normal staging between two 
phases of a developing concept, one being not merely different 
from the other but also a more perfect embodiment of it. And 
finally we found that such hierarchical scales were found ex-
emplified in Collingwood's analysis of mental functions and 
expressive linguistic acts. In the last chapter we found that 
the concept of history exhibited this structure, and in recon-
ciling conflicting historiographical traditions Collingwood 
locates them on a developing scale culminating in scientific 
history. 
It was when Collingwood sought to go beyond reconcili-
ation by means of a scale of forms, and to explore the senses 
in which higher levels of mental activity were expressed in 
historical thinking that he reached both the high and low 
points of his philosophical career: the high point being the 
demonstration that history is possible only on the basis of 
re-enactment--an argument which balances realism and idealism 
in a remarkable re-interpretation of the act-object distinc-
tion; and the low point being the collapse of his defense of 
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scientific history as a separate discipline for lack of a 
sufficiently unique characterization of "historical infer-
ence." It is exactly at this critical juncture that we must 
pick up the thread of our interpretative reconstruction once 
again. 
Before doing so we must press our "forced look" to 
its final stage by extracting the discomfitting features of 
the Essay on Metaphysics and confronting the obstacles to 
first philosophy which these features present for us. To help 
us with this task we end this section with a tabulated synop-
sis of the principal ideas of Parts I and II of the essay. 
747 
TABLE 14 
METAPHYSICS AND ANTI-METAPHYSICS 
1. A metaphysics of the sort indicated by Aristotle in the 
treatises by that name may be regarded either as onto-
logy, i.e. the science of pure being, or as the organized 
knowledge of the presuppositions underlying ordinary sci-
ence, where science is a body of systematic or orderly 
thinking about a determinate subject matter (EM, 11). 
a. But it cannot be ontology, since there cannot be or-
derly thinking about an indeterminate subject matter, 
and pure being is a completely indeterminate subject 
matter because it represents the limiting case of the 
abstractive process, where abstraction is the ignor-
ing of differences between individual things and the 
attending only to what they have in common. When ab-
straction is pushed to the limiting case in which 
everything determinate is left out, there is nothing 
left for science to investigate. (EM, 12-15). 
b. Metaphysics may therefore be the science of the pre-
suppositions that are logically prior to, or form the 
underlying ground for, ordinary science, where ordin-
ary means not a constituent part of metaphysics (EM, 
11-12, 20). 
2. To think scientifically is to be aware that every state-
ment made is in answer to a question which is logically 
prior to its own answer. What is stated is a proposition 
which can be either true or false. Every question in-
volves a presupposition. To say that a question "does not 
arise" is the ordinary English way of saying that it in-
volves a presupposition which is not in fact being made, 
and the fact that something causes a certain question to 
arise is the logical efficacy of that thing. The logical 
efficacy of a supposition does not depend on the truth of 
what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but 
only on its being supposed. To assume is to suppose by 
an act of free choice. A presupposition is either rela-
tive or absolute. A relative presupposition is one which 
stands relatively to one question as its presupposition 
and relatively to another question as its answer. An ab-
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solute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to 
all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, 
never as an answer. Absolute presuppositions are not 
propositions; the distinction between truth and fals~hood 
does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all. (EM, 
21-32). 
3. The discovery of presuppositions and the distinction be-
tween relative and absolute presuppositions is not accom-
plished by low-grade thinking, such as apprehension or 
intuition (as in realist theories of knowledge), nor by 
simple introspection. It is accomplished by high-grade 
thinking, a skillful mental effort which brings about not 
only a difference of degree in the intensity of thinking, 
but also a difference of kind in its quality. Instead of 
passive apprehension, high-grade thinking is an active 
process of asking questions in a systematic and orderly 
fashion. The thinking that is involved in the disentang-
ling and arranging of questions is called analysis, and 
the analysis which detects absolute presuppositions is 
called metaphysical analysis. Since analysis is what 
gives science its scientific character, and since in their 
method of operation science and metaphysics are the same 
(i.e. insofar as they both distinguish between relative 
and absolute presuppositions), science and metaphysics 
stand or fall together. (EM, 34-41, 170-71). 
4. All metaphysical questions are historical questions, and 
all metaphysical propositions are historical propositions. 
The problems of metaphysics are historical problems; its 
methods are historical methods. Metaphysics is the at-
tempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been 
made by this or that person or group of persons, on this 
or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of 
this or that piece of thinking. The metaphysical rubric 
preceeding an absolute presupposition is: "In such and 
such a phase of scientific thought it is (or was) abso-
lutely presupposed that .... " (EM, 47, 49, 55, 62). 
5. The historian makes his own statements on his own author-
ity according to what he finds the evidence in his poses-
sian to prove when he analyzes it with a certain question 
in mind. The subject matter of metaphysics is about a 
certain class of historical facts, namely absolute pre-
suppositions. Its methods are the methods of history, 
i.e. to get at the facts by the interpretation of evi-
dence. In its form metaphysics is systematic in the sense 
in which all historical thought is systematic, i.e. as ex-
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hibited in the clear and orderly manner in which it states 
its problems and marshals and interprets evidence for 
their solution; but it is not systematic in the sense of 
being a deductive science. As an historical science, me-
taphysics shares the presuppositions of all history. (EM, 
59-65). 
6. Absolute presuppositions, like historical facts, do not 
occur singly, but in sets or constellations. The presup-
positions in a constellation are logically related as a 
single fact; they are made at once in one and the same 
piece of thinking, and each is consupponible with all the 
others. To be consupponible means that it must be logi-
cally possible for a person who supposes any one of them 
to suppose concurrently all the rest. Within the con-
stellation each presupposition taken separately is also a 
single historical fact, and is not deductively related to 
the others. The metaphysician's business is not only to 
study the likenesses and unlikenesses of several different 
constellations of absolute presuppositions but also to 
find out on what occasions and by what processes one of 
them has turned into another. One phase changes into an-
other because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium 
in which its fabric was under strain, and the historian 
analyzes the internal strains to which a given constella-
tion is subjected, and the means by which it takes up 
these strains or prevents them from breaking into pieces. 
(EM, 66-67, 72-74). 
7. Anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken by an amateur 
who does not consider it his proper job, but is impelled 
to do so for various motives. It takes three forms. (a) 
Progressive anti-metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken by 
someone whose proper job (science) demands it, but be-
cause it has been neglected by the professionals he has 
to undertake it, and his resentment makes him feel himself 
to be the professional metaphysician's enemy, and his own 
work as an attack on their work. (b) Reactionary anti-
metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken because one wishes 
to do metaphysics consistent with the principles of obso-
lete pseudo-metaphysical doctrines, but inconsistent with 
contemporary metaphysics, which he fears as a danger to 
his own work, and therefore his fear of this inconsistency 
makes him regard his own work as an attack on metaphysics 
in the contemporary sense. (c) Irrationalist anti-
metaphysics is metaphysics undertaken because one wishes 
to abolish scientific thinking itself in order to bring 
into existence a form of life in which all the determining 
factors should be emotional. (EM, 82-83, 88, 99-100). 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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Positivistic (progressive) anti-metaphysics fails because 
it presupposes what it simultaneously denies. What it de-
nies is that metaphysics is possible, because the state-
ments of metaphysics are actually propositions which are 
not empirically verifiable or falsifiable, and are there-
fore pseudo-propositions. But the position which states 
that metaphysical assertions are true or false propositions 
is not the true science of metaphysics (i.e. the histori-
cal science of absolute presuppositions) but pseudo-
metaphysics, and is the result of the logical mistake of 
confusing presuppositions with propositions, and of assum-
ing that it is only propositions that can have logical ef-
ficacy in causing questions to arise in scientific in-
quiry. What positivistic anti-metaphysics presupposes is 
that scientific thinking is possible and legitimate, which 
means that thinking which makes absolute presuppositions 
(science) is possible. But since absolute presuppositions 
are the assertions that are truly metaphysical, the denial 
of metaphysics is the denial of scientific thinking. 
Therefore the only way that positivistic metaphysics can 
survive its own criticism is by confusing true metaphysics 
with pseudo-metaphysics. (EM, 148-49, 162-64, 169-71). 
Reactionary anti-metaphysics (Samuel Alexander's realism) 
fails because it does not recognize that absolute presup-
positions are not timeless truths, but have a history of 
their own. This position recognizes both that the subject 
matter of metaphysics is absolute presuppositions and that 
these are not proven but recognized as facts and held with 
an attitude of unquestioning acceptance. But what it 
fails to acknowledge is that absolute presuppositions are 
not facts apprehended by compresence of a mind with an ob-
ject, or even perceived as a pervasive set of characteris-
tics of everything that exists. They are arrived at by 
analytical questioning aimed at discovering what is pre-
supposed in a particular case of scientific thinking. 
These presuppositions are not truths recognized semper, 
ubigue, ab omnibus, but are presupposed by scientific 
thinking at a particular time, and are themselves subject 
to change and development. (EM, 172-80). 
Irrationalist anti-metaphysics (psychology as the pseudo-
science of mine) fails because it confuses thinking with 
feeling, and refuses to recognize that all thought is cri-
teriological. metaphysics is one branch of the science 
of thought, because it aims at discovering absolute presup-
positions, which are thoughts. If psychology is the sci-
ence which tells us how we think, its claim to be the sci-
ency of absolute presuppositions appears to be legitimate. 
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But psychology treats thought not as criteriological (i.e. 
as including as an integral part of itself the thought of 
a standard or criterion by reference to which it is_ judged 
to be a successful or unsuccessful, or true or false, 
piece of thinking), but as an empirical (non-criteriologi-
cal) feeling--a relic of 18th century materialistic epis-
temology. But to treat thought without regard to its 
truth is to treat scientific thought in the same way, 
which makes science itself a meaningless word. Since the 
conclusions of empirical psychology with respect to thought 
are not established by its methods (experimental observa-
tion of feelings), they must arise elsewhere, and such 
prejudice that teaches by precept that thought is only 
feeling serves as the propaganda of irrationalism. (EM, 
101-03, 107, 111-14, 117, 120, 129, 142). 
3. Obstacles to Understanding Collingwood's 
Reformed Metaphysics. 
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If the architecture of the Essay on Metaphysics pre-
sents us with a design that is at least three-quarters famili-
ar, the interior is an alienating nightmare. The reader en-
counters difficulties understanding the strategy of arguments, 
the absence of satisfying conclusions to a line of thought, 
what appears as abusive insults rather than convincing criti-
cal elenchi, and failure to define adequately key concepts in 
a way that alleviates the reader's growing sense of puzzlement. 
(a) The first obstacle one encounters is Collingwood's 
unhistorical and unscholarly treatment of Aristotle's meta-
physics, which is misrepresented as a science of "pure being" 
--a term that Aristotle did not use, and would not be accept-
able to him as an equivalent to his own expression, "being as 
' ,, "(" ,, 
being" ero 0~ l\. O'J ) • As a prologue to a study of metaphysics 
as an historical science it is startling to find Collingwood 
ignoring the obvious orientation of Aristotle's metaphysics 
., I I C ?I 
towards individual substance ( ov et l~ or Too~ 'T"'l. O"i) that has 
I ' 
a separate existence as opposed to an attribute (Trot eos KGI("'tOl 
/ ~UfA~~}}.I"<OS) which can only exist secondary to, or dependent 
1 
upon, a substance. Furthermore it is axiomatic with Aristo-
1Hippocrates G. Apostle, tr., Aristotle's Metaphysics 
(Bloomington, 1966), 1017b 23-26, p. 83; cf. 1003b 5-10, p. 54. 
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rle that universals are incapable of separate existence, and 
Collingwood need not have read far into Aristotle's treatise 
, I 
to find it stated as a major obstacle (OlTTopccx.) and a defini-
rive objection to Plato's theory of forms that being cannot 
be a genus, because to be is to be a this or something partic-
2 
ular but something general. In fact what Collingwood is de-
scribing when he writes of pure being is what Aristotle would 
recognize as matter--its only characteristic being its corn-
plete indeterminacy. 
The reader is also puzzled when Collingwood, with 
slightly more accuracy, cites the three titles Aristotle gave 
to the kind of inquiry presented in the collection of treatis-
es known as the metaphysics, i.e. First Science, Wisdom, and 
Theology, and then, after paraphrasing what these terms mean 
(presumably for Aristotle), ignores or slightly glosses over 
the reasons why Aristotle considered these different names 
for one and the same science with the same object. 3 Instead 
he arbitrarily chooses to consider only two definitions of 
2 Ibid, 998bl5-35, p. 45: "Thus if 'unity' or 'being' 
is indeed a genus, no differentia will be either a being or 
one." Cf. 1038al-30, p. 128: definition by downward division, 
i.e. by differentiae, leads to substance. 
3 In fairness to Collingwood it must be added that the 
triple orientation of Aristotle's Metaphysics has proven re-
sistant to two millenia of attempts at unification until Fr. 
Joseph Owens' monumental study, The Doctrine of Being in the 
Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1951). 
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metaphysics: as the science of pure being, and as the science 
of the presuppositions underlying ordinary science (EM, 11). 
Since it is not transparent that these two senses are mutually 
exclusive alternatives, why does Collingwood assume that re-
jecting the one, i.e. metaphysics as ontology, necessarily af-
firms the other? In fact they seem to overlap, since it is an 
absolute presupposition of ordinary science that its objects 
exist, and conversely an absolute presupposition must exist to 
be a fact. And what of metaphysics as theology, which is not 
further discussed in Parts I and II, but appears again as the 
first example in Part III ("The Existence of God")? 
(b) Of course Collingwood can be forgiven for what 
might turn out to be a creative misinterpretation of Aristotle, 
as well as for an arbitrary starting point for his essay, if 
they were justified by subsequent maneuvers. If metaphysics 
is not the ontological analysis of pure being, perhaps it 
can still survive as the grounding science of first princi-
ples that Aristotle thought it could be (EM, 19-20). Unfor-
tunately this presents us with a second set of obstacles. 
For Aristotle such a First Philosophy was grounded on an an-
7 I 
alytic of scientific knowledge in general (ETrc 6"'T'l )A 11) as pre-
sented in the Organon. For Collingwood this involves first 
redefining science as a Q-A process of on-going inquiry ra-
ther than a deductive system of propositions (EM, 22-24), and 
then identifying the first principles for such a system as 
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the absolute presuppositions which underly all its questions 
(EM, 25-28). The third stage is to distinguish between rela-
tive and absolute presuppositions, where the former are them-
selves answers to questions and the latter are not (EM, 29-33). 
The province of metaphysics is the discovery, comparison, and 
organizational structure of absolute presuppositions (EM, 37-
40). 
The force of this argument for a science of metaphy-
sics depends on Collingwood's ability to maintain successfully 
the distinction between relative and absolute presuppositions, 
for without it there is only an arbitrary stopping point for 
a regressive inquiry from answer to question to presupposition 
to question to presupposition ... (etc.). But if an abso-
lute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all 
questions to which it is related, as a presupposition and ne-
ver as an answer (EM, 31), and if every statement that any-
body ever makes is made in answer to a question (EM, 23), then 
how can absolute presuppositions ever be discovered? For 
surely discoveries are made by asking questions, in this case 
of the form, "What is the absolute presupposition of this and 
all other questions in this inquiry?" 
Perhaps Collingwood meant us to understand that an 
absolute presupposition is never the answer to a question in 
a progressive inquiry--something one comes upon along with 
other answers to questions in a systematic inquiry. Thus the 
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absolute presupposition that "every event has a cause" (EM, 
50, 52, 179) is not something a scientist discovers while 
pursuing the answer to a question about the cause, for exam-
ple, of an eclipse. It occurs when he leaves off investigat-
ing particular causes and asks the metaphysical question, 
"Why do I assume that there is a cause of this or that or any 
event?" This is a retrogressive question--one which is not 
progressing toward an answer but retrogressing from a question 
to its presupposition. There would thus be two inquiries, one 
being that of progressive ordinary science and the other the 
retrogressive metaphysical science, and the restrictions con-
cerning absolute presuppositions would refer to questions in 
the former inquiry, not the latter. 
If this is what Collingwood meant us to understand, 
then we might say that once again he has expressed himself in 
an unfortunate manner, and this failure is not mitigated by 
his poor choice of examples to illustrate his reformed meta-
physics. The issue of causality, for example, is a metaphy-
sical issue of great antiquity, yet still a contemporary prob-
lem and suitably general enough to be a subject for reformed 
metaphysical analysis. But as an example of an absolute pre-
supposition, as Collingwood presents it, it creates more prob-
lems that it solves. In Chapter VI Collingwood gives the fol-
lowing three versions of the principle of causality as exem-
plary of Newtonian, Kantian, and Einsteinian sciences respec-
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tively: (i) some events have causes; (ii) all events have 
causes; and (iii) no events have causes (EM, 51-52). Setting 
aside difficulties with accepting this as an histonically ac-
curate assessment of the principle of causality for the phas-
es of physical science mentioned, the reader is still puzzled 
by the apparent non-absoluteness of these presuppositions. 
Surely any one of them is an answser to the question, "Do all, 
some, or no events have causes?"--a question which Aristotle 
may well have pondered. And are there not questions of even 
greater priority, which Aristotle definitely did ponder, viz. 
"What is a cause?" and "Are there any causes?" Is not Col-
lingwood's analysis of causality in the final example of the 
Essay on Metaphysics itself an examination of these two ques-
tions, insofar as (in Chapter XXIX) he discusses the three 
meanings of the term "cause" and rejects the third as an 
abandoned AP of contemporary (Einsteinian) science? 
And even these three senses of "cause" as Colling-
wood defines them are not primary, since they can themselves 
be the answer to further questions. For example in Sense I, 
"that which is 'caused' is the free and deliberate act of a 
conscious and responsible agent, and 'causing' him to do it 
means affording him a motive for doing it" (EM, 285). If a 
cause is a kind of motive, what is a motive? Are there vari-
ous motives, of which cause is but one, or are cause and mo-
tive equivalent terms in every sense? Are there free but not 
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deliberate acts of agents, or not-free but deliberate acts? 
Etc. If to have an attitude of unquestioning acceptance 
toward APs is to stifle as illegitimate questions such as 
these, then Collingwood's reform of metaphysics takes on the 
appearance of an intellectual purge, an example of an anti-
metaphysics which inhibits scientific inquiry rather than pro-
moting it. And if it is possible for an historian as acute 
as Collingwood to be mistaken about the absoluteness of pre-
suppositions in a case as relatively simple as this one, what 
about more complex ~nd subtle systems of APs in science? What 
is the measure of the absoluteness of presuppositions? 
But even accepting some friendly modifications of his 
Q-A logic as applied to his metaphysical program, there are 
further difficulties with the doctrine of absolute presupposi-
tions. The problems start with the fact that Collingwood ne-
ver says what an absolute presupposition is. Is it at least 
a statement? One assumes it must be, since it has a senten-
tial form, and is made in answer to a metaphysical question, 
or during a metaphysical analysis. But why does Collingwood 
then forbid us, on penalty of lapsing into metaphysical ab-
surdity, from asking the further question, "Is this statement 
(we do not call it a proposition, since propositions are 
statements made only in answer to progressive questions in an 
inquiry) true or false?" For if it is not true or false in 
the same sense that a proposition in the progressive inquiry 
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is, does that mean that it is not true or false in any sense 
whatever? 
The problem becomes acute when it comes to constella-
tions of presuppositions, since Collingwood allows that meta-
physical analysis can uncover absolute presuppositions in 
groups called constellations, and can furthermore determine 
if within that constellation one or more presuppositions can 
be "con-supponible" with the others (EM, 66, 76, 287). If 
not, then there will be "strains" in the constellation, which 
will make it "unstable" and therefore eligible for the process 
of transformation into another constellation (EM, 48 n.l; 74, 
76). But how is it possible to recognize that one AP is not 
con-supponible with another without deciding which APs within 
the constellation are more stable, or at least less stressful, 
than the others? Does that not assume that because one group 
of APs are what they are, a given AP or group of APs cannot 
consistently be included in the con-supponible group? And is 
not consistency one acceptable sense of the term, "true" and 
inconsistency of "false"? 
And even if we ignore Collingwood's own statement that 
the "strains" in a constellation of APs is due to their "mutu-
al incompatibility" (EM, 287) and suggest that such strains 
be analyzed solely on the grounds of their decreased adequacy 
or efficacy in causing questions to arise, the problem is not 
resolved--only shifted to even more obscure territory. Cer-
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tainly a presupposition such as the perfection of circular ce-
lestial orbits was "efficacious" in causing questions to a-
rise, and that is not the sense in which it caused "strains" 
in the constellation of presuppositions which led to the pas-
sage from Ptolemaic to Keplerian astronomy. 
What we are left with is a situation in which the me-
taphysician-historian, lacking adequate definitions of terms 
like "absolute presupposition," "constellation," "con-
supponible," "strain" etc., is set a seemingly impossible 
task. Lacking any clear idea of his subject matter, we must 
ask, like Plato's Socrates, how he is to know when he has suc-
ceeded in finding an instance of what he is looking for? 
(c) Which brings us to our third set of problems. 
Even if we could accept a non-ontological metaphysics of ab-
solute presuppositions, the announcement that these are dis-
covered by historical methods, and that all metaphysical pro-
positions are historical propositions is an expression of his-
toricism extreme enough to warrant assigning Collingwood a 
paradigmatic position in the checkered career of the subject 
or radical revisions of traditional metaphysics. As we have 
already pointed out, the doctrine that metaphysics is an his-
torical science is the positive version of the principle 
stated negatively in the Autobiography that in philosophy 
there are no eternal problems (A, 60; cf. EM, 64-65). But 
when coupled with the remarkable statement that metaphysics 
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has always been an historical science (albeit not fully con-
scious of the fact and for that reason never fully scientific) 
it appears to be a revision not compatible with even the ac-
ceptable version of Aristotle's metaphysics. For it certainly 
cannot be denied that when Aristotle tried to uncover the 
first principles of physics he did not have in mind a science 
bound to 4th century B.C. Greek culture, but one which would 
, / 
achieve the status of~TTlO"TI'JfAl'} --science as a stable under-
standing of change based on unchanging first principles. And 
when Kant set himself the task of discovering how metaphysics 
as a science is possible, he did not think its possibility 
rested on truth-neutral presuppositions which would change 
with time (CEPC, 137). On the contrary, every indication is 
that he thought himself to have discovered all the true prin-
ciples of scientific thought, and that synthetic ~ priori 
judgments have a necessity that is not historically contin-
gent but is rooted in the structure of the knowing mind. 
Of course, Collingwood was aware that his predeces-
sors did not explicitly say that what they were doing was 
history, and he merely chides them for not understanding what 
they were in fact doing (EM, 18-20, 58). Our difficulty with 
Collingwood's historical metaphysics is deeper than a factual 
error on the matter of what metaphysics has "always" been. 
It has to do with the sort of "facts" that the metaphysician 
is setting out to discover. In the last chapter we found 
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Collingwood arguing that what makes history scientific is 
precisely the degree to which the historian decides what is 
to be accepted as a fact, and that this is dependent on the 
historian's questioning activity. Now we find Collingwood 
taking just the reverse position: it is a certain kind of 
fact (AP) that determines what questions are asked. Approach-
ing the Essay on Metaphysics from this perspective we are 
forced to conclude that as a fact to be discovered, an AP must 
be the answer to a question. Collingwood appears to acknow-
ledge this himself when he indicates that the "metaphysical 
rubric" (i.e. "In this or that piece of scientific thinking 
by this person or group of persons at such and such a time it 
was absolutely presupposed that ... ") is necessary for the 
factuality of an AP to be established. 
But this appears to involve Collingwood in a contra-
diction: if it is an historical fact, an absolute presupposi-
tion is determined by questions; and if it is metaphysically 
absolute,a presupposition is not determined by any question, 
but is that which specifies which questions sensibly arise in 
a systematic inquiry. This time the avenue of escape by pos-
tulating the hi-directionality of inquiry has been cut off by 
the fusion of both routes: the methods of metaphysics are 
the methods of history, and the presuppositions of metaphysics 
are those of history. Therefore if history has presupposi-
tions (and Collingwood admits that it does), there is at least 
763 
one case where absolute presuppositions are the answers to 
questions in a progressive inquiry, namely the case of his-
tory. Is Collingwood prepared to defend the thesis that the 
absolute presuppositions of history are determined to be 
facts by the questions of history? Can the serpent swallow 
its own tail? 
The issue of the presuppositions of history brings us 
up before another aspect of the obstacle, and this one joins 
with the first to form the beginning of a barricade. In the 
Autobiography Collingwood has told us that the re-enacted his-
torical event is prevented from becoming confused with the 
present thinking of the historian by being "incapsulated in a 
context of present thoughts." In the last chapter we found 
Collingwood arguing that the historian is able to keep his own 
~ priori imagination from becoming unglued, so that the his-
torian is prevented from confusing himself with Admiral Nelson 
at the Battle of Trafalgar. But to deny ontology its day runs 
the risk of being incapable of distinguishing such realms as 
these in anything but a hypothetical way. By what presupposi-
tions does the historian distinguish between his own "real" 
life (the ordinary world of lived experience or lebenswelt) 
and the "real" world of his historical protagonists? Aside 
from the practical observation that any bonafide confusion be-
tween these realms may make life-sustaining decisions rather 
poorly grounded, the theoretical implications for Collingwood's 
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reformed metaphysics threaten to be equally tragic. For it 
will not do to define the domain of history as the "deeds of 
men done in the past," and then refuse to deal with the-on-
tological question of how past and present are distinguished 
in one's "real" situation. Somehow the presuppositions of 
what we are calling ordinary experience are the ground from 
which and within which the presuppositions of history are lo-
cated. That distinction and that relationship are not well 
served by the simple identification of history and metaphysics. 
(d) Having raised the spectre of an a priori imagin-
ation run amuck, we turn to our final group of obstacles, 
those centering on his discussion of anti-metaphysics, and 
especially his vituperation on psychology. For while he cas-
tigates psychology as the pseudo-science of thought, in the 
entire section on anti-metaphysics he himself engages in the 
crassest kind of popular psychologizing. When he describes 
those philosophical "amateurs" who are thrust into doing me-
taphysics in the guise of anti-metaphysics, he says that they 
take an attitude opposed to metaphysics because they either 
fear or resent the subject matter. On what grounds does he 
make this assertion? In this imputation of motives, is not 
Collingwood out-psychologizing the psychologists? Completely 
ignoring any positive benefit which behavioral science has 
had on civilization, Collingwood's assault appears to itself 
contribute to the "propaganda of irrationalism" that he at-
tributes to psychologists: for certainly there is a kind of 
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irrationalism to rationalism--i.e. reason which fails to pro-
vide reason with respect to un-reason or sub-reason--and this 
is where psychology has made its greatest inroads, racing in 
where philosophy feared to tread. 4 But at best Collingwood's 
diatribe is anti-metaphysics in the sense that it not only 
discovers an absolute presupposition of what is generally ac-
cepted to be a contemporary science (psychology) but also de-
clares this presupposition to be false; for what else would 
it mean to call psychology a "pseudo-science" of thought? 
Does the Greek prefix succeed in disguising the fact that a 
false-science is one which proceeds from a false absolute pre-
supposition? 
What is worse, the criticism that Collingwood levels 
at psychology appears to be equally applicable to his own re-
formed metaphysics--i.e. that it fails to treat though as 
criteriological, meaning that it ignores the aspect of thought 
as true or false (EM, 107, 115). For are not absolute pre-
4rs there any place in Collingwood's version of civi-
lization, or in his philosophy of mind, for the less-than-
fully rational man? Surely children have a place, according 
to The New Leviathan, since they are in process of becoming 
fulry-rational. But what about those who never will--the men-
tally handicapped and the mentally ill? Collingwood comes 
close to aristocratic arrogance when he sets standards below 
which what is occurring does not deserve the name of thought. 
Psychology, whatever its faults, has made advances in the un-
derstanding and treatment of sub-rational behavior, and Col-
lingwood's failure to acknowledge this progress in the Essay 
on Metaphysics is not to his credit. 
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suppositions thoughts? And treating them as true/false neu-
tral--does this not mean treating them as "data" or facts on 
a par with feeling and its objects? To say that they may be 
something of which one may not be aware either dodges the 
question or severs absolute presuppositions from their logical 
function--their efficacy in causing questions to arise, a 
function that Collingwood is anxious to maintain. Once an ab-
solute presupposition is discovered it is invalid to ask if it 
is true, or on what evidence it is accepted, or how it is to 
be demonstrated, or by what right it is presupposed (EM, 47). 
In short, the acceptance of an absolute presupposition as a 
truth-neutral fact precludes any question of treating it as 
a thought, and therefore renders it on a par with objects of 
feeling. It reduces a thought (an absolute presupposition) 
to something that is not thought (something that is not cri-
teriological) and is therefore as much a pseudo-science of 
thought as psychology. By what right does Collingwood then 
declare that metaphysics is one branch of the science of 
thought (EM, 101)? 
And while he appears to be less vulnerable in his as-
sault on A. J. Ayer and logical positivism, one still cannot 
help but notice that Collingwood is guilty of some of the 
same charges that he levels against them. The most serious 
is that after conceding the victory to them by admitting that 
absolute presuppositions are not verifiable or falsifiable, 
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he then counterattacks with the weaker charge that they did 
not ask what metaphysical assertions are before declaring 
them to be either tautologous or meainingless (EM, 165). But 
has Collingwood not made the same mistake? Instead of asking 
what absolute presuppositions are if they are not true or 
false as answers to questions, he leads the reader to believe 
that they are not true or false in any other sense either. He 
never really tells us what absolute presuppositions are. 
4. The Unity of the Autobiographical Themes. 
Is there some standpoint from within the framework 
provided by the autobiographical interpretation that will 
allow us to overcome these obstacles, or at least to soften 
some of these harsh features of the Essay on Metaphysics? 
Having forced ourselves to face the paradoxes of Collingwood's 
reformed metaphysics, if we are determined to assimilate our 
experience of this grotesque memorial we must ask ourselves 
what relation there is between what Collingwood did and what 
he was trying to achieve. But this requires understanding it 
not just in the negative and partial sense in which it is an 
expression of his opposition to "realism" as a philosophical 
movement that (arguably) threatened to disrupt science and 
civilization, but in the positive sense of a work that issued 
from the unified center of his thought. 
768 
For another thinker this might not be necessary or 
even possible, since it might not be considered an ideal 
worth striving for. A philosopher who conceives of his role 
in a more analytic or critical vein, for example, might be 
content to put forth his thought in a series of vignettes on 
various subjects, and it may be of no concern to him what the 
relationships are not only between the subjects chosen but 
even among the conclusions reached by his analysis--so long 
as it was done in a craftsmanly manner. But for the Colling-
wood of the Autobiography, for whom the goal of philosophy is 
rapprochement, this is not a satisfactory state of affairs. 
To this extent Collingwood was never an analytic philosopher. 
Nor did he set out to be. One of Collingwood's first 
public addresses was delivered at the 1919 Ruskin Centenary 
Conference held near his home in Coniston--where he also spent 
his final days. In this address, given at the beginning of 
his intellectual career, Collingwood laid out, with his char-
acteristic self-assurance, what is to be expected of a phil-
osopher. Speaking of Ruskin's failure to achieve a fully 
philosophical outlook (and bear in mind that Collingwood's 
father was Ruskin's biographer and close friend), he then 
distinguished between "having a philosophy" and "being a 
philosopher." Ruskin had a philosophy, but he was not a phil-
osopher (EPA, 11). What does this mean? 
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When I speak of a man's philosophy, I mean something of 
this sort. I see a man living a long and busy life; ·I 
see him doing a large number of different things, or 
writing a large number of different books. And I ask my-
self, do these actions, or these books, hang together? 
Is there any reason why the man who wrote this book 
should have gone on to write that one, or is it pure 
chance? Is there anything like a constant purpose, or a 
consistent point of view, running through all the man's 
work? Now if you ask these questions about a particular 
man, you will generally find that there are certain cen-
tral principles which the man takes as fundamental and 
incontrovertible, which he assumes as true in all his 
thinking and acting. These principles form, as it were, 
the nucleus of his whole mental life: they are the cen-
tre from which all his activities radiate. You may think 
of them as a kind of ring of solid thought--something in-
finitely tough and hard and resistent--to which everything 
the man does is attached. The ring is formed of a number 
of different ideas or principles, welded together by some 
force of mutual cohesion. This ring of thought ... is 
what I mean by a man's philosophy .... The fact seems 
to be that a man's deepest convictions are precisely 
those he never puts into words .... (E)verybody has a 
philosophy, but only the philosopher makes it is his bus-
iness to probe into the mind and lay bare that recess in 
which the ultimate beliefs lie hidden. (EPA, 9-11). 
Here we have the basic program for the discovery of absolute 
presuppositions that only came to fruition twenty years later 
in the Essay on Metaphysics. But can we apply this standard 
to Collingwood himself? Are there certain central principles 
which he takes as fundamental and incontrovertible, and which 
he assumes as true in all his thinking? 
Throughout both cycles of our carrousel excursion 
through Collingwood's published writings we have repeatedly 
tried to catch hold of this "ring of thought" and to measure 
the degree to which it conforms to the autobiographical in-
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terpretation. We have examined the four autobiographical 
themes as they occur and re-occur in the earlier and later 
writings. But we have examined them separately rather than 
as a coherent system, and the weakness of this strategy is 
now apparent; for as we confront the obstacles to first phil-
osophy in the Essay on Metaphysics it is not clear how the 
four themes form a "consistent point of view" from which van-
tage point we can measure the strength of his self-interpre-
tation by its ability to aid us in untying the knots and lay-
ing claim to Collingwood's metaphysical inheritance for our-
selves. 
In particular it is not apparent why an anti-realist 
position necessarily implies an anti-F-logic, or why the lat-
ter gives rise to either the Q-A logic of the Autobiography 
and the Essay on Metaphysics, or the D-logic of Speculum Men-
tis and the Essay on Philosophical Hethod. Nor is it evident 
how either of these themes is related to an ideal of rapproche-
ment, which seems to have more to do with resolving experien-
tial alienation than with formal contradiction or dialectical 
opposition. Nor again is it clear how a reconciliation be-
tween history and philosophy can be regarded as a paradigma-
tic for rapprochement philosophy in all its forms, or finally 
how such a philosophy can remain opposed to realism root and 
branch, given its orientation toward unification of opposing 
viewpoints like that of realism and idealism. So while we 
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have steadfastly resisted the temptation to provide the miss-
ing "figure in the carpet" where Collingwood has not done so 
himself, this unfortunately leaves us with a badly fractured 
Collingwood who remains for the most part true to the autobi-
ographical self-interpretation, but at the expense of a clear 
understanding of the unity of his thought, by which standard 
he would surely wish his own philosophy to be judged. 
Therefore we pause at this point to take a final over-
all look at Collingwood's philosophy as we have examined it 
to this point, trusting that by compressing it into the span 
of a few pages we can reveal its architectural strengths and 
shed its decorative weaknesses. 
We began our survey with his earliest published book, 
Religion and Philosophy, the highlight of which, Collingwood 
recalled (some twenty-two years later in the Autobiography), 
was a passage in which he criticized psychological studies of 
religion for their treatment of mind as an external phenomenon 
or thing. Such an approach to mind renders religious con-
sciousness opaque, because it refuses to participate in the 
thought processes it claims to be studying, which leaves "the 
cold unreality of thought which is the thought of nothing, ac-
tion with no purpose, and fact with no meaning'' (RP, 42; FR, 
77). With the unbalanced negativism typical of much of his 
later philosophy, he failed to tell his readers in the Autobi-
ography what the positive phase to this criticism was. This 
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we found for ourselves by examining the argument of Religion 
and Philosophy, which pivots on the reality of communication 
and inter-personal identity: for it was in this earliest 
work that we found Collingwood already arguing that the start-
ing point of any investigation of mind or any theory of know-
ledge is the fact that persons do communicate their knowledge, 
and this means that two or more persons can actually share the 
same knowledge (RP, 98-99; FR, 170-71). He goes so far as to 
say that since the esse of mind is de hac re cogitare, when 
two minds think the same thought they become actually one 
mind, sharing between them the unity of consciousness which is 
the mark of the individual (RP, 101; FR, 173), and by de hac 
re it is clear that he did not mean primarily a material en-
tity but a meaning. His argument about re-enactment in The 
Idea of History is the final refinement of this very same line 
of thought: re-enacting someone else's act of thought means 
thinking that same thought for oneself, not one like it (IH, 
286-92). The proper context for his early rapprochement phil-
osophy is therefore to be found in the communicative relation-
ship of minds with one another, the failure of which (as er-
ror) calls forth the effort of reconciliation. 
But so much cannot be said without saying more, since 
it is evident that a mind can communicate with itself--or 
fail to do so. This becomes the overall concern of his second 
philosophical work, Speculum Mentis, which expands the ideal 
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of rapprochement to include the overcoming not only of the 
communication gaps in meaning between persons but also the 
same kind of disunity within oneself. The forms under which 
we interpret our own experience--as imagined, believed, ob-
served, inferred, etc.--are in the modern world alienated 
from one another, which tends to render the unity of self-
consciousness in need of internal rapprochement (SM, 30, 41-
42). The basis for achieving this inner reconciliation is 
modelled on the same process that occurs when failure to com-
municate makes the reconciliation between persons necessary. 
This cannot be by the kind of knowing that occurs in art, 
where the mind contemplates monadic imaginary objects (SM, 
60-61); nor by religious consciousness, where the mind asserts 
as true a sacred object (God) as a symbol, the meaning of 
which it can never literally translate (SM, 119, 128-29); nor 
yet by scientific thinking, which leaves its object always 
separated from mind by the distance measurable by the differ-
ence between universal and particular, law and instance (SM, 
185-86). The kind of reconciling knowledge we seek to repair 
the torn fabric of self-consciousness is first fully exempli-
fied in historical thinking, which is the first truly non-
abstract or concrete knowledge, because it is the first form 
of experience in which the object is individually recognizable 
as something wholly the same as the mind which seeks it--i.e. 
thought as an active agency. 
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While the concept of history and its philosophy has a 
long and compex development in Collingwood's career, he never 
abandoned this insight. He always returned to the historical 
act of an agent as the model for sense-location in thinking, 
the active dimension of mind stressed by the Italian and 
other post-Kantian idealists, with whom he felt a spiritual 
kinship. 5 With historical thinking there is no feature of ex-
perience, no attitude of mind towards its object which is 
alien (SM, 218), because it is all the work of mind itself. 
And where history appears to set itself the impossible task 
of understanding the infinite whole of fact (SM, 239), it is 
relieved from this impossible burden by the limiting reflec-
tion of itself in each of its objects, each being a "mirror of 
the mind." This is where historical thought provides a chal-
lenge to typically sensation-bound empiricist epistemologies. 
Where the "plain man's metaphysic" places mind and matter out-
side one another, and then finds itself unable to bridge the 
gap that it has postulated (RP, 73), empiricist epistemology 
provides an intermediary in the form of sensation, but is 
equally baffled by the lack of unifying meaning in the flux 
of sensation (SM, 188). In both cases that which is known is 
an object presumed to be indifferent to the act which seeks 
5
cf. "The Present Need of a Philosophy," Philosophy, 
9 (1934), 262-65: "What is needed to-day is ... a philosophy 
showing that the human will is of a piece with nature in be-
ing genuinely creative, a vera causa, though singular in being 
consciously creative." 
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to grasp it. But in the case of history the object is itself 
a thought which seeks understanding (IH, 294). Historical 
thought is saved from the ultimate frustration of trying to 
penetrate the infinite and unknowable realm of the "thing in 
itself" by the recognition of itself in each of the objects it 
studies, each of these being a "concrete universal" or indivi-
dual meaning expressed as a deliberate act--a "part" in which 
the whole mind is present and in which the whole agent is re-
flected (SM, 218-19). 6 With historical understanding the gap 
between mind and its object is bridged from both sides, the 
object reaching out to be understood (as evidence), and con-
sciousness reaching to grasp the same act in its aspect as 
past thought (as historical interpretation) (IH, 304). Recon-
ciliation at this point is successful because the mind has 
found something wholly intelligible: that which is object is 
also subject (SM, 242-45, 249). 
In the essays on the philosophy of history which Col-
lingwood wrote in the decade of the twenties we find him con-
tinually trying to reverse the naturalistic or empiricistic 
bias of his readers, including that of some of his idealistic 
6
caesar's crossing the Rubicon was not the mere physi-
cal passage of a body across water, nor was it the mere act 
of his legs. It was also not an imaginary or hypothetical 
crossing. It was an expression of the reality that was Cae-
sar, and expressed that which Caesar represents in history. 
But it also is only a "part" of Caesar's life--but a signifi-
cant part, a part that reflected the whole of it: his courage 
and daring, his foresight and confidence in risking the for-
tunes of Rome. 
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contemporaries (like Croce, whose work he admired). In these 
essays it becomes increasingly more obvious that in maktng 
the history-philosophy reconciliation paradigmatic for all 
other kinds of rapprochement between forms of experience, he 
is suggesting that rather than using the mind-thing or mind-
object polarity as the primary instance of knowing and then 
extending this to historical events (which tends to render 
events thing-like or objective, but at the expense of always 
remaining distantiated from the event by the same attitude of 
abstract objectivity) the exact reverse of this situation is 
what is called for in 20th Century thought. In historical 
thinking the mind-mind polarity is regarded as primary, and 
as paradigmatic for thinking; the mind-object situation is 
secondary or derivative. Collingwood's entire philosophical 
development is an attempt to carry out the program implicit 
in this paradigm shift. 
But if the mind-object dichotomy is overcome by tak-
ing the mind-mind identity exemplified in historical under-
standing as the primary instance of what it is to successfully 
know something, and if Collingwood found himself allied with 
the Italian idealists in such a fundamental standpoint, his 
articulation of this conviction took a direction all its own. 
It has both realistic and idealistic dimensions. Its realis-
tic moment is in the recognition of the factuality of history 
and its bonds with evidence; its idealistic moment is in an-
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alysis of the thought processes that are involved in inter-
preting that evidence, and the criteria for deciding when the 
interpretative effort results in the unification of thought 
that is being sought. As we traced his thought through its 
development in the essays of the twenties into the period dur-
ing which he composed the Essay on Philosophical Method, we 
found Collingwood showing a growing awareness of the levels 
of meaning to the concept of history, and an increasing sen-
sitivity to the criteria whereby one can decide not only when 
minds are reconciled, or even when forms of consciousness with-
in a mind have attained rapprochement, but when individual 
acts of consciousness are unified as an achievement of the 
overall nisus of consciousness toward meaning at all levels of 
thought. (a) In Religion and Philosophy reconciliation is re-
garded as complete when it is shown that two forms of thought 
(such as religion and philosophy) intend the same object, or 
mutually co-imply (or presuppose) one another--without recog-
nizing any difference of degree or kind in the resulting iden-
tification (RP, 107-19; FR, 178-88). (b) In Speculum Mentis 
this "concrete identity of cooperation" becomes a reconcili-
ation by means of a developing "dialectical series" in which 
each of the reconciliata is a modification of its predecessor, 
but in which relations of opposition and differences of kind 
do not yet entail relations of distinction and differences of 
degree (SM, 55, 206-208). (c) In the Essay on Philosophical 
Method Collingwood completed this line of thought in his 
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"scale of forms" in which the rapprochement (or "overlap") of 
concepts entails that between the reconciliata are relations 
of both opposition and distinction, and differences of both 
degree and kind (EPM, 73-76). The ultimate grounding of~­
Erochement at this point is dependent on the inclusive and ex-
clusive relationships that are involved in the intensional 
structures of meaning. 
But while we have found that there is an increasingly 
more prominent awareness of the meaning-component to knowledge 
in Collingwood's later philosophy we have been careful to note 
in our survey of the earlier works that this is neither an un-
heralded arrival nor a novel idea. Thus in addition to being 
his point in common with the Italian idealists, before that 
alliance became explicit we find Collingwood (in Religion and 
Philosophy) arguing that the true task of historical theology 
is to find out not only what was said by the historical Jesus, 
but what was meant (RP, 43; FR, 78), and that proving the e4-
istence of matter or of God requires understanding first what 
meanings are attached to the words (RP, 62-63). And in Specu-
lum Mentis Collingwood carries this thought one step further 
by arguing that each of the forms of experience is character-
ized not only as a form of consciousness but by its typical 
form of expression in language--questioning, asserting, gen-
eralizing, referring, inferring, etc. He went as far as to 
say that the (unifying) activity of philosophy is its "trans-
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lation" of various forms of experience into language literally 
true--an activity which is called forth especially where there 
is a fusion of symbol and meaning, as in art and religion (SM, 
128-30). The process of translating, interpreting, or develop-
ing truth out of the partiality and abstractness of error is 
the dialectical self-criticism of thought, and the task of 
philosophy as absolute knowledge (SM, 252-53). 
Of course it was only in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method that the idea of dialectical development is made expli-
cit, and rapprochement is linked to the overlap of concepts 
and their relationship in a developing scale of forms. Here 
we found Collingwood contrasting philosophical and non-phil-
osophical concepts as two phases in the development of an 
idea, and stressing how one can recognize when the concept 
has been typically worked out philosophically (EPM, 59-61, 
73). This rapprochement of the inner alienation between con-
cepts is now made the basis for deciding how and when the 
process of reconciliation is complete, and carries the unity 
of philosophical meaning forward from the conceptual to the 
propositional and inferential levels of thought (EPM, 100-101, 
161-63). It was the closest that Collingwood would be able 
to come to developing a complete philosophical logic based 
on the ideal of rapprochement, and the key to understanding 
it is to fully grasp the clue that he himself provided at the 
beginning of the investigation: philosophical reconciliation 
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is recognized by the overlap of concepts, which is an overlap 
of intension between meanings rather than an overlap of exten-
sion between classes. 
The Essay on Philosophical Method called attention to 
the characteristic way in which a philosophical concept is de-
fined by means of a scale of overlapping forms, in which any 
point on the scale intensionally includes all the meainings 
in the scale up to that point (EPM, 90, 101). It also pointed 
to the peculiarity that in such a scale there is no zero-
point--no point at which a concept's meaning vanishes alto-
gether (EPM, 81). In Part III we have encountered both of 
these principles--definition by means of a scale of forms and 
the irreducibility of meaning structures--exemplified in his 
philosophy of mind at all levels of consciousness. In The 
Principles of Art the development of feeling is described 
first as the uninterpreted flux of sensa, then as prepared 
for interpretation by being perpetuated and domesticated by 
consciousness or attention, and then finally as explicit 
thought, where thinking about a sensum means interpreting it 
(PA, 194, 212-13). And in that same work language is defined 
as a scale of forms of expression, where psychical expression, 
gestures, speech, and intellectualized or symbolic language 
form a dveloping series in which each term sums up and inten-
sionally includes those which preceed it (PA, 228-61). In 
The New Leviathan the fundamental parameter of meaning is re-
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affirmed when language is defined as any system of bodily 
movements whereby the men who make them mean or signify some-
thing (NL, 6.1), and is described as an abstraction from dis-
course--a system of sounds or the like as having meanings (NL, 
6.11, 6.18). The ensuing scale of forms of consciousness is 
the product of language (NL, 6.4-6.41). And finally in The 
Idea of History the meaning of an historical act is the in-
dividuality aimed at in historical understanding (IH, 303), 
and is at the center of his radical re-interpretation of the 
act-object distinction on the grounds of which he showed how 
history as re-enactment is alone possible (IH, 282-302). 
However it is the realistic moment to this process of 
thought that has haunted our reflections on Collingwood's 
thought, and this is the ghost that confronts us once again 
as we approach the central paradox of historical metaphysics. 
For in the previous chapter we wondered if the essential ide-
ality of the past left any room for factuality as something 
not only made but also found, not only accepted but also giv-
en. But the factuality of history is not an abstract, brute 
givenness, it is itself a thought and therefore mediated by 
meaning. The reconciliation between ideality and factuality 
is an extension of the rapprochement between persons and con-
cepts: it is carried out by an act of interpretation. Just 
as the reconciliation between persons is premissed on the 
fact of communication, the rapprochement between the historian 
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and the thoughts which constitute his subject matter is medi-
ated by historical inference, which takes the form of cr.i tical 
reflection on evidence (IH, 133). It is by the interpreta-
tion of evidence that we communicate with the past: history 
is the knowledge of a significant present (evidence) by means 
of acts of interpretative thought informed by principles which 
govern all evidence as such (philosophical principles, such 
as the distinction between universal judgments of the form, 
"All S is P," particular judgments of the form, "Some S is P," 
and individual judgments "This S is P," this last being the 
interpretative judgment of history (EPH, 136)), and principles 
which govern specific groups of evidence (scientific princi-
ples, such as this historical presupposition that events of 
the past are localized in space and time, and that historical 
narrative must be consistent with itself (IH, 246-47)) (EPH, 
136-37). The act of interpretation is not a process extrin-
sic to the fact itself: interpretation is only the historical 
fact further specified (RP, 46; FR, 80; EPM, 170), because a 
common meaning is the irreducible basis of them both. In 
this the process of historical interpretation is not differ-
ent from the general interpretative processes of all percep-
tion and thought. Perception is nothing other than the inter-
pretation of sensa (SM, 204-05), and to think a concept is to 
interpret a fact in terms of it (EPH, 28-29; PA, 194). There-
fore it is but an extension of the reconciliational process 
of interpretation when from potential historical evidence (the 
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whole perceptible world) actual evidence is selected and per-
petuated by means of historical inference based on the exer-
cise of~ priori historical imagination (IH, 246-47, 280-81). 
But how is such knowledge achieved? How is evidence 
interpreted and individual narrative judgments formulated? 
Here again we must return to Collingwood's paradigm for re-
conciliational thinking, the mind-mind polarity and the fact 
of inter-personal communication--but this time the trail of 
evidence is less distinct. Closest to us are the unmistakable 
assertions in The Idea of History that evidence is interpre-
ted by the systematic placement of intelligent and informed 
questions (IH, 273-75), and in the Essay on Metaphysics and 
the Autobiography that all scientific knowledge is an applica-
tion of Q-A logic (EM, 22-24, 38; A, 30-37). But as we traced 
this evidence into Collingwood's earlier philosophy, in the 
direction indicated in the Autobiography, we were startled by 
several unexpected (and autobiographically unindicated) de-
velopments. Where the Autobiography leads us to believe that 
Q-A logic was meant to be an alternative to F-logic, the lat-
ter being the only methodic tool of the realists, our own 
findings indicated not only that in his early writings the al-
ternative to F-logic is not Q-A logic, but dialectic or D-
logic, but also that Q-A logic is not a defensible substitute 
for F-logic. In the case of dialectic, the appearance of de-
liberate concealment in the Autobiography was dispelled by 
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the recognition of D-logic as the final form of the criteria 
for reconciliational completion in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method. But what of the indistinctness of Q-A logic in the 
early phases of his thought, and how does Q-A logic relate 
to the unity of that thought as we have been developing it in 
the last few pages? 
Part of the answer to these questions is available to 
us from the published writings, but part of it remains for us 
to reconstruct for ourselves. In our examination of the early 
works in Part II we found Collingwood identifying logic with 
the theory of knowledge: abstract logic deals with processes 
of the subject and does not consider differences of the ob-
ject (RP, 15; FR, 53). It is contrasted with concrete or di-
alectical logic, which considers thought in its relation to 
its object (SM, 274-77), and it is the latter that is the 
true instrument of philosophy. However if thought is regarded 
as a process rather than as a product, the way in which it 
comes to be is by questioning or supposal--the process where-
by assertion develops from non-assertive (hypothetical or 
questioning) thought (SM, 186-89). In Part III we traced 
this argument forward into the Q-A logic of the Autobiography 
and the Essay on Metaphysics (Q-AA and Q-AM respectively), 
where the ambiguity of hypothesis as non-assertive and as pre-
assertive is resolved by the distinction between supposing 
and questioning, which ultimately issued in the distinction 
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between presuppositions and questions (A, 30-39; EM, 27-29). 
In Part III we also found that when taken as a whole his views 
on logic indicate that Q-A logic is not a competitor to, or 
substitute for, F-logic, but is rather an informal presenta-
tion of some of the rules that pertain to the elements of ra-
tional inquiry as an application of the reconciliational pro-
cess of interpretation. We thus found ourselves with a strik-
ing example of Collingwood's irony: a philosophical logic 
posing as a work on philosophical method, and a philosophical 
methodology described as Q-A logic. But if we resist the 
temptation to be misled by such labels, it is clear (a) that 
for Collingwood all logic pertains primarily to the meaning-
dimension of thought rather than to any sort of meaning-
independent formal system; (b) that the criteria for deciding 
when thought has become philosophically consistent or recon-
ciled with self-knowledge are presented by the D-logic of the 
Essay on Philosophical Method; and (c) that Q-A logic is the 
methodology for acquiring knowledge, and the means by which 
the interpretative processes of thought are directed at 
achieving unified meanings. 
The part of this process that remains indistinct, and 
which we are left to reconstruct for ourselves, is the logi-
cal genesis of these ideas within Collingwood's overall plan 
for rapprochement philosophy. Here we have only a few scant 
hints from the Autobiography to guide us. We are told there 
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that Q-A logic, the primacy of historical thought as the ~­
Erochement paradigm for all forms of experience, and the re-
jection of realist epistemology are all recalled by him as 
having occurred during the period, and as an outcome, of his 
reflections on the Albert Memorial (A, 30, 60, 67). But we 
are not told how the monument served to focus these lines of 
thought, how the coalesced to form a pattern, or what central 
idea allowed him to think that the solution to one of these 
problems is tied to the solution of all of them. The only 
clues he leaves for us are the questions that he began to put 
to himself during his daily communings with the Albert Memor-
ial--why Scott had created such an aesthetically offensive 
monstrosity, if its true purpose is masked by asking the 
wrong questions about it, and if such questions arise due to 
false expectations which prevented him from appreciating its 
true worth. 
Unless there are, in the unpublished writings and 
diaries, indications of how these ideas evolved, we shall 
probably never know what went through Collingwood's mind dur-
ing these encounters. Without knowing what particular fea-
tures of the monument he found offensive, or what his expec-
tations were, or the insights that he had that allowed him to 
overcome his revulsion, we can only surmise a framework for 
this intellectual and personal event. But we do know what 
feelings the Albert Memorial invoked in him, and we believe 
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we are in possession of the general way in which he overcame 
these feelings. The monument not only was a representation of 
the alienating distance that collingwood felt between himself 
and Scott, it was also the only piece of evidence that could 
serve as a bridge by means of which Collingwood could recon-
cile himself with Scott by re-enacting the thoughts which are 
embodied in the monument itself. Were the architect a con-
temporary the question might be addressed to him, since (short 
of third party intermediation) the ordinary way to overcome 
the space between estranged people is for them to converse, to 
put questions to each other, to elicit answers. But in this 
case, as in the case of all historical artifacts, direct di-
alogue was not possible, and intermediation is necessary. 
Collingwood's reflections on the Albert Memorial must have 
focused on this acute problem: how does one communicate with 
the past? For the living, traces of the past surviving in 
the present are the only expressions by means of which his-
torical conversation can continue, and in this process of in-
terpretation it is the historical understanding which asks 
questions, and it is present evidence--like the mute yet im-
mensely expresive Albert Memorial--which the only source of 
assuring ourselves that our answers and our interpretative 
efforts have been successfully carried out. Somehow the gap 
is bridged: the memorial speaks, the observer is moved, the 
dialogue takes place. 
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How is this possible? On what model of thought can 
such an event occur? Collingwood was convinced that it was 
not possible on the grounds of empirical or realistic pre-
misses (IH, 208-209), nor even by the principles of subjective 
idealism. It is not accomplished by using the tools of objec-
tive thinking employed in the natural sciences, nor by dis-
regarding such methods altogether and adopting an intuitive 
or subjective approach, which still assumes the mind-object 
polarity, but opts for the primacy of the subjective pole over 
the objective one (IH, 124, 292-97). It is accomplished by 
adapting for history the usual method employed to cross the 
gap between persons in the mind-mind situation, i.e. questions 
and answers eliciting unification through shared meanings. 
If I wish to learn something about someone it is not achieved 
by inventing him like a character in a novel, nor by observ-
ing him like a bug on a pin, nor by experimenting with him 
like a ball on an inclined plane, nor even by seeing in him 
the symbol of the creator. While all these approaches may be 
helpful in one way or another, they tend to make something of 
the person that he is not--an imagined entity, an abstraction, 
a thing, a creature. And the same is true in learning about 
oneself--this much we take to be the final message of Speculum 
Mentis. If I wish to find out what a man is, I have to do so 
by finding out what he thinks, for this is what he is (IH, 10, 
218-20; NL, 1.61); and the ordinary way to do this is by ask-
ing him questions aimed at responses whichwill help to find 
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out what he means, where he stands, what he stands for, what 
he means to do, what he means for us to do, etc. And if one 
wishes to find out what a man was, one has to do so by asking 
questions aimed at eliciting responses from existing evidence 
which will help to find out what his intentions were, how he 
perceived his situation, what he stood for, what he meant to 
accomplish, etc. In the latter case one must overcome the 
distance of historical time, and the way this is done is by 
examining and cross-examining present evidence. The scienti-
fic historian is an intelligent, inquisitive interpreter of 
evidence. 
And just as a person may minimally be said to be act-
ing rationally not when he can show that his actions follow 
deductively from some general principle, nor when he can re-
late it to some other act as a reaction, but when he can in-
telligently answer questions about why he did one thing rather 
than another, so also one may minimally be said to know some-
thing not when he can show that it is the conclusion of a de-
ductive inference, nor when he can show that it is disting-
uishable from its opposite, but when he can intelligently an-
swer questions about it (NL, 4.31-4.35, 11.1-11.12, 14.1-
14.37). Q-A logic, as Collingwood informally schematizes it, 
is the linquistic expression of the living process of seeking 
out and establishing meaning, exhibiting both phases in the 
discovery of meaning--as consciously known to be incomplete 
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(the question) and as having sense-completion (the answer). 
To ignore the aspect of the conscious nisus for meaning by 
presenting answers as propositions, as if they were only re-
lated by formally explicit logical connectives, is a falsi-
fication of the true, humanly grounded process of inquiry. 
In this sense Q-A logic is the true logic of thought, and 
"replaces" F-logic, which does not recognize the process of 
passing from incomplete to completed meaning. It is only 
Q-A logic which calls attention to the active role of the con-
scious agent in the process of inquiry, for it is only per-
sons who ask questions and seek meaningful answers. Q-A logic 
is the logic of interpretative inquiry, and as a meaning-
seeking function cuts across all levels of consciousness; it 
is not bound to the conceptual, propositional, or inferential 
levels of thought. 
Finally, historical events themselves have a Q-A logi-
cal structure: in the world of practical affairs the para-
digm for sense-location is the historical act of an agent, in 
which a questionable situation is resolved by the answering 
act of a protagonist aware of alternatives and conscious of 
the possible consequences of his acts. To act is to endow a 
gesture with meaning and at the same time to express that 
meaning as an act (cf. IH, 212). Because such an act is ac-
tually the agent's (his experience) it is potentially every-
one's (a shared experience)--that is, it is capable of being 
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re-enacted (IH, 247, 280, 303). That which can be re-enacted 
is an historical event, so that the historian, in discovering 
what it is to think historically (to re-enact a meaning) re-
alizes at the same time, and Qy this act, what it is to be a 
man. It achieves the philosophical mandate given by the or-
acle at Delphi: it is knowing himself, i.e. knowing what it 
is to be a man (an enactor of meaning), to be the kind of man 
he is (the enactor of meaning in the context of his own ex-
perience) and to be the kind of man he is and no one else is 
(the enactor of meaning in this situation with these per-
ceived alternatives). Historical action therefore constitutes 
meaning by bringing it into the world--a primacy that super-
cedes the merely theoretical sense of meaning as something 
latent in the world (e.g. verbal or lexicographical meaning). 
A historian re-enacts this primal activity, and the coher-
ence of his narrative is built upon the historical meaning 
which is both found by the historian in the evidence of the 
act, and made by the historian through interpretation of that 
evidence. 
If history is a kind of understanding in which no pro-
duct of human action is foreign, and if it is posited as the 
science of human nature and therefore as a model for reconcil-
iation of all alienation situations in which understanding is 
called forth to mediate between self and not-self, it does not 
appear to be alone in this effort. Behavioral science makes 
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the same claim, and from his earliest writings Collingwood re-
cognized it to be his natural enemy (RP, 40-42; FR, 75-77; SM, 
274-78; A, 92-95). It claimed to deal with the same subject, 
but employed a methodology drawn from an empiricistic episte-
mology which takes the mind-object polarity as primary. This 
is a vestige of the "naturalistic" viewpoint, which he recog-
nized in historical positivism, and from which he struggled to 
free both himself and his readers (cf. EPH, 12-20, 25, 31; IH, 
126-33). It is characteristic of this viewpoint that facts 
are independent of anyone's knowledge of them; that objects 
are active and mind is plastic and passive; that in the act 
of knowing the object is therefore unaffected by the knowing 
of it; and that individual acts of knowledge are both atomi-
cally distinct from one another and capable of being analyzed 
like objects in the perceptible world. Collingwood denied all 
of these assertions, and did so on the strength of the mind-
mind paradigm for reconciliational philosophy: for historical 
thinking provides an instance of successful understanding in 
which the object is another thought. It exemplifies a case in 
which, without the activity of thought, the object would cease 
to be what it is--instead of being a metal arrowhead, a Gre-
cian shard, or an Egyptian manuscript, without historical in-
terpretation it becomes a piece of metal, a chunk of clay, 
black marks on flattened papyrus. The past is therefore so 
far from being indifferent to its being known that it would 
cease to be past at all if it were not for the exercise of 
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the historical a priori imagination. 
But Collingwood did not stop there, and in generaliz-
ing this principle he came to regard all knowing as entailing 
an act of interpretation not basically different from that 
which is involved in historical thought. He came to realize 
that meaning is never something merely found, it is something 
made by the act of attention (PA, 213-16; NL, 4.5, 6.1-6.21, 
7.2-7.22). Just as an ambiguous historical situation is re-
solved by the decisive act of an agent, the field of sensual 
flux is stabilized by acts of attention which domesticate and 
perpetuate sensa, allowing them to survive and revive in other 
contexts (PA, 209-10; IH, 303). Meaning is an achievement of 
personal consciousness, the means whereby a person appropri-
ates not only his own experience but that of others. it is 
also the source not only of all perceptual and imaginative 
unity, but of the continuity of all unified acts of thought 
(IH, 306). 
The deliberate effort to achieve reconciliation by 
the act of interpretation aimed at the unity of meaning, 
therefore, runs contrary to the effort to define by atomic 
dissolution into non-meaning elements, or by subsumption of 
such elements into arbitrary sets or classes viewed as col-
lections of inter-changeable terms indifferent to their gen-
eric essence. It presupposes that the object of knowledge 
(meaning) cannot be unaffected by the knowing of it, because 
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it is only human knowing that seeks and creates meaning in the 
world through intentional acts, without which there is nothing 
definite to be known. It has, therefore, an opposite orienta-
tion to any philosophy which makes as its fundamental presup-
position the assumption that the object of knowledge is unaf-
fected by, or indifferent to, the knowing of it. Such a pre-
supposition has been made by some philosophers who have been 
known as realists (Cook Wilson, Samuel Alexander, G. E. Moore, 
and Bertrand Russell being some examples). Whatever places 
the object of consriiousness over against it as something be-
yond its ability to absorb creatively by the medium of mean-
ing, is the natural enemy of that consciousness: it is the 
originator of non-meaning not as that from which meaning 
arises, but as that which is forever beyond meaning, unassimil-
able, the "thing-in-itself" which is not a thing, not an it, 
and not a self. It is the "pure being" which Collingwood re-
jected as a subject matter unsuitable for any science, be-
cause it is utterly undifferentiated and lacking in all spe-
cification, and hence indistinguishable from nothing. 
And at this point we arrive where we set out from--
with the critique of realistic epistemology. We also find 
ourselves at the doorstep of the Essay on Metaphysics. 
795 
5. The Rehabilitation of Reformed Metaphysics. 
We should now be in a position to clear the obstacles 
to first philosophy that we presented in Section three. If 
our reconstruction of the unity of Collingwood's thought is 
correct, it should remain as a solid ring of thought when 
brought up against the barriers that are presented in the Es-
~ on Metaphysics. 
But to begin we must ask ourselves why Collingwood un-
dertook to write on metaphysics at all, for as we have seen 
he certainly gives indication in the early writings of a typi-
cally British antipathy to the subject. It appears to be just 
as accidental that Collingwood should find himself named to 
the chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in 
1935 as it was that he should have worked for the British Ad-
miralty Intelligence in World War I and found himself walking 
past the Albert Memorial. Are his reflections on metaphysics 
as much the result of a coincidence as his reflections on 
logic? What is required is not to account for an accidental 
feature of his biography but an essential feature of his 
thought. The situation in which any philosopher is placed 
is always to some extent fortuitous. But as Collingwood 
notes, it is not so much what happens to a figure in history 
but what he does with what happens to him that creates his-
torical interest. Collingwood chose to reflect on the Al-
bert Memorial, and he chose to reflect on metaphysics, and 
796 
our question is how that reflection is a product of the unity 
of this thought rather than a response to something that is 
thrust upon it, as it were, from without. 
For someone committed to the primacy of historical 
thinking and the mind-mind paradigm in epistemology, which is 
it to do metaphysics? Traditionally metaphysics has always 
been thought directed at uncovering the stable basis for 
change--not only that which "follows the physics" in the lit-
erary sense of a set of treatises attributed to Aristotle, 
but also that which seeks to discover the principles which 
lie beyond the changing physical world. Very early in his 
career Collingwood decided, with the Italian idealists, that 
change is a realistic concept and history an idealistic one, 
since what changes is a material thing, but that which his-
torically develops is a mind. If a philosopher with a 
strong inclination toward epistemology were to begin, like 
Kant did, with the assumption that the mind has a definite 
structure which determines its active construction or syn-
thesis of the world of experience, metaphysics would take the 
form of discovering what that unchanging structure of mind is. 
But Collingwood also decided early in his career that a mind 
is what it does, and therefore that there is no such thing as 
a fixed "human nature" for all time and all men, so far as 
mind is concerned--so this is not a promising direction in 
which to find the object of metaphysics. And finally, we have 
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seen that Collingwood ruled out an ontology of pure being not 
only because it is arrived at by abstraction from the mind-
object situation, but also because in his study of cosmology 
he found that modern physics had abandoned the notion of sub-
stance altogether, replacing it with the concepts of function, 
process, and motion. 
What is left? For Collingwood what remains is pre-
cisely the fact of interpersonal communication within the 
field of mental phenomena. What grounds change within this 
domain of reality is whatever provides the basis for reconcil-
iational identity between minds, or within mind, and that is 
whatever is being presupposed. What grounds change in a 
world of developing thought is the assumed shared meanings 
that make diachronic and synchronic communication possible, 
and the reestablishment of significance by a question-and-
answer process is the work of reconciliational philosophy. A 
metaphysics of rapprochement is therefore an inquiry into the 
presuppositions of questions on the basis of which inquiry 
proceeds: metaphysics is the science of absolute presupposi-
tions. 
(a) From Anti-Metaphysics to Reformed Metaphysics.--
Collingwood makes it easy for his readers to grasp the nega-
tive element in his critique of anti-metaphysics (itself a ne-
gation of a negation), but difficult to get beyond that to 
what the positive basis is for this critique. It is therefore 
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quite possible to overlook the fact that his elenchus may be an 
utter failure without touching the positive thought from which 
it springs, and which it ultimately disguises. From the per-
spective of rapprochement philosophy we may now be able to see 
past the disguise. 
Collingwood examined in detail two forms of anti-
metaphysics: psychologism and logical positivism. 7 His ob-
jection to psychologism is basically that as "materialistic 
epistemology" it treats all thought as if it were a datum--
i.e. as if it were a feeling or an aggregate of feelings, and 
consequently as non-criteriological (EM, 109, 114-15); and his 
objection to positivism is that it refuses to recognize that 
7collingwood distinguished three forms of anti-meta-
physics, which he called progressive, reactionary, and irra-
tionalist (EM, 82-84). If we are correct in assuming that 
positivism is the progressive form of anti-metaphysics, and 
psychology is the irrationalist form, what is the reactionary 
form? Probably the sort of philosophy represented by Samuel 
Alexander's realism, examined in Chapter XVII of the Essay on 
Metaphysics, since he accuses Alexander of being "influenced 
by the quaint, characteristic eighteenth-century dogma" that 
there is an underlying or pervasive character of everything 
which exists--expressivle as the law of universal causation 
(EM, 175, 179). This is the way he described reactionary 
anti-metaphysics (EM, 93-94). But both of these sections are 
excessively vague, full of broad historical generalizations, 
and fail to satisfy the reader's desire for a clear presenta-
tion of the viewpoing being opposed. A perfect candidate for 
reactionary metaphysics would be twentieth-century Thomism (cf. 
EM, 91, where the reactionary anti-metaphysician "embraces x 
as his own 'doctrine,' claims X was 'right,' and professes 
himself an 'Xist"'). But astonishingly, Collingwood does not 
draw a bead on this elephantine target, but instead takes pot-
shots at Watt's steam engine and Locke's political views in 
the 19th century. 
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thinking rests on presuppositions, and assumes that all gener-
alization is based on observation of matters of fact (E~, 146-
47). What are the positive equivalents to these critical re-
marks? In the matter of thought, it is clear that Collingwood 
wishes to maintain that all thought is "criteriological," mean-
ing that in every act of thought it is necessary that the 
thinker himself should judge its success or failure--a self-
critical judgment that Collingwood distinguishes from the 
(real but irrelevant) possibility that one man's thought may 
be judged successful or unsuccessful by someone else (EM, 109, 
115). In the matter of presuppositions, it is clear that Col-
lingwood wishes to maintain that there are such thoughts, and 
that they are to be distinguished from empirical generaliza-
tions which are verifiable or falsifiable by induction from 
observable facts (EM, 147). Our difficulty arose from trying 
to conjoin these two ideas: for if presuppositions are nei-
ther true nor false, they do not appear to be able to retain 
their criteriological aspect--i.e. the use of "a criterion, 
the double notion of truth or falsehood, by reference to which 
he judges a thought" (DM, 115); and if all thought is based on 
presuppositions, then thinking is based on that which is non-
criteriological, i.e. that which is not thought. 
The first step toward resolving this difficulty is 
one which we have already suggested: to expand the notion of 
truth so that it is not bound by the propositional criterion, 
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i.e. by that which is verifiably true in answer to a question. 
Now in Chapters VII and VIII we took considerable effort to 
demonstrate that Collingwood recognized levels of mental func-
tioning that could definitely be called thought, and were not 
yet at the propositional level of truth. While the early Col-
lingwood recognized that questions themselves were non-asser-
tions, he failed to distinguish various kinds and degrees of 
non-assertive thought--a deficiency that was remedied in his 
later writings, where concepts are described as the entertain-
ment of meanings in imagination, having the status of thoughts 
which are non-assertive and pre-propositional in the logical 
sense. One function of conceptual imagination is precisely 
to consider a meaning in isolation from, or indifferent to, 
any reference to anything else (i.e. any predication): 8 ima-
8ro consider a meaning in isolation from, or indiffer-
ent to, any reference to anything else is to consider it ab-
stractly. Since all thinking is based on pre-suppositions, 
does this mean that Collingwood had come to believe that all 
thinking is conceptual and hence abstract? Was Donagan right 
after all? We think there are several decisive reasons for 
believing that this is not the case. (1) Collingwood never 
denied that it is possible to think abstractly: he merely ar-
gued that such abstract thinking cannot bear the weight of un-
conditional truth that we wish to place on it (SM, 252-53; NL, 
26.18). (2) He also argued that it is only a phase in our 
thinking (like the bud is an abstraction of the flower), and 
that in thinking abstractly we are not condemned to remain at 
this point--or as he says, to live in Ezekial's Valley of Dry 
Bones (NL, 7.65). Our release from such confinement occurs in 
the form of further acts of propositional thinking, where a 
proposition is an answer to a question, and a question offers 
alternatives (NL, 11.22, 11.34-11.35). (3) Abstraction always 
occurs in what Collingwood calls a "context of evocations," 
over which preside acts of evocative thinking governed by logi-
cal relations (NL, 7.32-7.39). As we have pointed out in pre-
vious chapters, this is a very different description of ab-
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gination is essentially the "suspension of the activity of 
asserting" (SM, 78), and in this activity it "is indifferent 
to the distinction between the real and the unreal" (PA, 136). 
Yet there is a kind of truth that is involved in the act of 
imagination, and this pertains to its expressiveness--the very 
function which relates imagination in an essential way to art. 
The truth of art is not a truth of relation but a truth of 
fact: its truths are concrete individual experiences, and the 
truth of art is the truth of its expressiveness of these ex-
periences (PA, 288). Its opposite--its untruth--is the "cor-
ruption of consciousness" which disowns a feeling by expressing 
it misleadingly or self-deceptively (PA, 219-20). The func-
tion of imagination is the perpetuation and domestication of 
meaning as the ground or material out of which further acts of 
consciousness will shape questions, propositions, inferences, 
and other expresions of higher-order thought. 
Here we have a relation of presupposition which fits 
the description Collingwood has for it in the Essay on Meta-
physics. It is thought, but in the form of imagination; it 
is criteriological in the sense that it has its own standard 
of success or failure, as the true expression of a felt mean-
ing,9 but not in the sense of true or false propositions; and 
straction than the one he had condemned as falsification in 
Speculum Mentis. 
9It should be recalled that Collingwood found nothing 
absurd about there being such things as "emotions of intel-
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it is a function prior to, and the logical ground of, further 
acts of higher-order thinking--e.g. the verificational acts 
involved in scientific inquiry, within which absolute presup-
positions are embedded as primitive survivals. Absolute pre-
suppositions are ~ priori, concrete meaning-concepts of ima-
gination, not unlike the Kantian categories. 10 This conclu-
lect" (PA, 267), and that there would therefore be nothing ab-
surd about there being an "emotional charge" on a presupposi-
tion. In fact, Collingwood's remarks about being "ticklish 
in one's presuppositions (EM, 44), as well as about the numin-
ous terror that may surround them (EM, 46) confirms this ob-
servation. What would be interesting is what Collingwood 
might have had to say on the manner in which questions arise 
due to the causal efficacy of absolute presuppositions: has 
this anything to do with the emotions of intellect? 
1 0o h . . f b 1 . . n t e lnterpretatlon o a so ute presupposltlons 
as ~ priori concepts there is considerable agreement by Col-
lingwood's commentators: cf. Mink, MHD, 144-48; Rubinoff, CRM, 
234-35; and Toulmin, CEPC, 205-08. With respect to their 
similarity to the Kantian categories, we suspect that not all 
would agree--particularly Rubinoff, who adopts a basically 
Hegelian interpretation of Collingwood. Our own reading is 
that Collingwood had more Kantian leanings: in spite of such 
passages as that in The New Leviathan, where he denies the 
"German" believe that it is possible to compile a list of the 
logical relations which govern conceptualization (NL, 7.34), 
what he is describing in that process is the Kantian schema-
tism of the categories. His rejection of any categorical com-
pilation os consistent with the passages in the Essay on Meta-
physics, where Kant's transcendental analytic is treated as an 
attempt to state what the presuppositions of physics were in 
Kant's own time (EM, 231-81). Collingwood is not denying that 
there are such relations (as even his remarks about the "ele-
ment types" of logical thought, in his correspondence with 
Ryle, would indicate), but only that Kant's list is not defin-
itive, exhaustive, or independent of the state of thinking on 
physics at that time. On absolute presuppositions as a priori 
concepts, see also David Rynin, "Do nag an on Coll ingwooa: Abso-
lute Presuppositions, Truth, and Metaphysics," The Review of 
Metaphysics, XVIII (December, 1964), 301-33. It is interest-
ing that Rynin, who claimed to be the last living logical po-
sitivist (ibid., 331), would undertake a defense of Colling-
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sion evidently relies on the theory of meaning that we have 
extracted from Collingwood's writings only in bits and pieces, 
an incomplete but pervasive view of inter-relating acts of 
consciousness and linguistic expressions, some of which we 
explored in Chapter VIII. At this point we only claim to 
have indicated enough of this theory to show that the rela-
tionship of presupposing is one that is not unheralded in Col-
lingwood's philosophy of mind, nor does it defy the demand 
that thought be regarded as "criteriological"--so long as the 
definition of "criteriology" be wide enough to include the 
double aspect of truth as the truthful expression of meaning 
and falsity as the corruption of consciousness. 
But is we can congratulate ourselves for having cleared 
11 the main difficulty of our fourth obstacle, can we say that 
we have resolved all our problems about anti-metaphysics? Not 
quite. The psychologizing in which Collingwood engages in this 
portion of the Essay on Metaphysics remains for us an unre-
solved embarrassment, but one which should not obstruct our 
wood's view of metaphysics as a science of absolute presup-
positions, and to mount a scalding attack on Donagan for treat-
ing Collingwood as "a very third rate thinker, struggling 
without success under a burden of ineptitude that would be a 
source of concern in a not very promising undergraduate" 
(ibid., 332). Rynin's own estimate of Collingwood is consid-
erably higher. 
reverse 
tinue: 
tion of 
11we are approaching the obstacles from Section 3 in 
order, for reasons that will become obvious as we con-
the main reason is that we wish to reserve the ques-
ontology until last. 
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passage toward the positive aspects of his reformed metaphy-
sics. As universal as were Collingwood's interests, we can-
not expect him to have accurately evaluated every major sci-
entific development of the last century, and his failure to 
appreciate the true worth and benefits of behavioral sciences 
should not deter us from recognizing in his own work an equal-
ly important observation: that historical thinking can con-
tribute an essential dimension to the self-understanding of 
man. From this point of view his warnings to us about the pre-
tensions to wisdom of some who look to behavioral science as 
a "guide to life" are only a counsel to beware of such a one-
sided prejudice about the nature of thought. It is a warning 
that he first issued in Religion and Philosophy and is re-
peated in no less than six of his other mature works. And 
while Collingwood seems less concerned about the ill effects 
of logical positivism (he did not seem to be convinced that 
they would be taken with much seriousness by the scientific 
community), the danger here is that in attacking metaphysics 
the positivists would unwittingly contribute to the attack on 
reason in the contemporary world, because an attack on the 
doctrine that thought has presuppositions is an attack on the 
foundations of science, and an attack on science is an attack 
on rationality and therefore on civilization. Collingwood's 
fear is that we would fall victim to a kind of belief about 
our own abilities to think that would paralyze us by convinc-
ing us that we are not able to think for ourselves, to judge 
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if the products of our own thought are well or ill done, and 
to behave in general as if our thinking would not make any 
difference to what we are trying to achieve. A belief about 
our own minds is one that is reflected in the way we behave, 
and therefore if we believe that we are a conglomerate of 
feelings, we shall surrender the imperative to know ourselves 
by giving up the effort that consciousness must put forward 
to achieve continuity in experience. In Collingwood's esti-
mation this is tantamount to giving up on rationality and on 
civilization altogether. Considering what was happening in 
Europe at the time he was writing, he did not care if he was 
regarded as a cackling goose. 
(b) Metaphysics as an Historical Science.--If we can 
say that an absolute presupposition as an ~ priori concept of 
imagination is a kind of thought (but not propositional 
thought), we can also say that it is minimally eligible for 
being a subject matter for historical re-enactment. But there 
is much that we still do not know about it. We are not yet 
in a position to overcome our third obstacle, the unlikely 
match of a science traditionally oriented towards universal 
and timeless truths, and a kind of research concerned only 
with particular and spatia-temporally localized matters of 
fact. This is the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphysics 
with its thesis that metaphysics is an historical science. 
In fact it appears to be doubly paradoxical, because it is 
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puzzling when approached from either direction. For if the 
methods of history are designed to "get at the facts" by the 
interpretation of observable evidence, why should a science of 
absolute presuppositions, for which there can be no directly 
observable evidence (not being propositional, and therefore 
neither verifiable or falsifiable), be interested in adopting 
the methods of history? What sort of a fact is an a priori 
concept? And contrariwise, if historical truth is always ad 
hoc and is therefore only true for a particular time and place, 
of what interest is it to an historian to deal with matters 
that are~ priori and conceptual? What light is thrown on the 
relationship of presupposing by saying that it is brought into 
awareness by a kind of analysis which is drawn from the sci-
ence of history? 
To begin with we must first find out why Collingwood 
believes that absolute presuppositions constitute an appropri-
ate subject matter for historical thought. Then we must ap-
proach the other side of the question by asking why the pre-
suppositions, questions, propositions, problems and methods 
of metaphysics are the same as those of history. Now we have 
already suggested that absolute presuppositions are thoughts, 
but on the criteria offered in The Idea of History, this is 
not enough. In Chapter IX we found Collingwood telling us 
that to be a proper subject matter for history, an act must 
not only be an act of thought but of reflective thought, where 
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reflective thought means an act done in the consciousness 
that it is being done (IH, 307-08). While it is possible for 
a concept to be the object of an act that is "conscious of 
.. ,"what is required for an act that is "conscious that 
" is a proposition. But then does this not imply that 
to be an object of history an absolute presupposition must be 
a propositional act of thought, and therefore that it can-
not be simply a concept? And does it not further imply that 
as an act of reflective thought an absolute presupposition 
cannot be unconsciously presupposed in any sense that is his-
torically relevant? 
These are difficult questions, and have wrecked the 
efforts of more than one of Collingwood's interpreters to sal-
vage sense from the Essay on Metaphysics. But if we are to 
test the strength of our reconstruction of Collingwood's cen-
tral "ring of thought," we must risk the same fate. In that 
reconstruction we noted that at the center of the object of 
historical interest is the resolution of an indeterminate si-
tuation by the act of an historical agent. This is an act 
made consciously, in the face of perceived alternatives, and 
having consequences beyond the act itself--consequences which 
the act brings about, but not with apodictic necessity. One 
phase of Collingwood's reform of metaphysics is carried out 
by drawing out the implications from the insight that the same 
sort of process is operative in the acts of thought that bring 
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science into being. In spite of what positivists and other 
formalists may believe, a science like physics does not spring 
like Athena fully armed from the head of Zeus; it grows in hu-
man fashion by the deliberate process of inquiry, the proces-
ses he informally described under the title of Q-A logic. It 
grows by putting questions in an orderly sequence and marshal-
ling intelligence at all levels of consciousness in the effort 
to answer them. The sequence of thoughts in a scientific in-
quiry therefore parallels the sequence of thoughts which con-
stitute the significant "inside" of historical events. And if 
one wishes to understand a scientific event, one must re-enact 
the sequence of thoughts which brought the scientist to draw 
the conclusions he did, just as one understands an historical 
event by re-enacting the thought processes involved in it. 
Such understanding is, like all thinking, an interpre-
tative process, and requires that the re-enactor be adept at 
forging questions which can overcome the discontinuities that 
he encounters. as an historian collingwood was aware that 
there are many of these--that scientific thinking is a discon-
tinuous process with interruptions, detours, inconsistencies, 
even revolutions; and that the manner in which these are re-
conciled is not the same for different subjects, different 
people, even different places and times. Therefore while 
the way rapprochement occurs is by achieving common under-
standing of shared meaning, Collingwood's historical experi-
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ence convinced him that true meaning is always individuated 
and concrete, and the way in which shared meaning is achieved 
is not the same for all inquiry situations. The kind of ans-
wer that will satisfy a physicist is not the sort of answer 
that will satisfy an artist or theologian; and the sort of 
answer that would satisfy a classical Greek physicist would 
not be the same as an answer that would satisfy his medieval, 
renaissance, or modern counterpart--not because the phenomena 
have changed, but because the expectations of what the phenom-
ena can mean have shifted, and this represents a change in the 
heuristic presuppositions which ground the questions. This is 
no less true at the personal level, for even within the con-
sciousness of a single individual the questions asked at one 
point in a person's lifetime will have a different basis than 
those asked after his thought has developed beyond that point. 
Therefore one cannot begin by assuming that there is 
an unchanging, generic sense of "knowing," and an equally uni-
vocal meaning for the answers, questions, and presuppositions 
of all inquiry per se. An inquiry about inquiry is an ad hoc 
affair, and one should not expect to find the common and un-
changing ground of all possible inquiries, semper, ubique, ab 
omnibus, for this would be the epistemological equivalent of 
a search for an unchanging substance. Like all efforts of 
rapprochement, the way in which continuity of meaning is es-
tablished in a given context is by showing how thought devel-
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ops in that context, i.e. by showing how particular meanings 
become progressively more inclusive, how the variable (know-
ing in this particular situation) modifies the generic essence 
(inquiry) and becomes identified with it. Rapprochement is 
complete when that development can be demonstrated as a scale 
of forms. In the case of science such a scale taks the form 
of a conceptual system, i.e. a nexus of meanings produced by 
the exercise of an act of real (or "concrete) abstraction by 
which a concept is located in a context of other concepts. 
But while these comments may help us to understand 
how an absolute presupposition can be cogently interpreted as 
an~ priori concept compatible with Collingwood's philosophy 
of mind, we do not seem to be much closer to an understanding 
of how it can be both a priori and factual, conceptual andre-
flective. For this we need to turn to the other aspect of the 
process of re-enactment, the thought of the historian. For 
just as in the process of discourse by which reconciliation 
is achieved between minds there are moments of listening but 
also moments of questioning, so also in historical thinking 
there is a kind of discourse in which the historian reaches 
beyond being a passive listener and takes charge of his sub-
ject matter by cross-examining it. In re-enacting the se-
quence of thoughts which form the body of some piece of sci-
entific inquiry the historian may well ask questions that the 
scientists never asked. He may thus ask why the initial sci-
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entific question arose--a questions which (if the historian 
does not want to distort the nature of thinking itself) is 
directed at the objective or logical (rather than subjective 
or psychological) basis from which the question arose, i.e. 
its relation to meanings already established and unquestioned. 
It seeks to uncover what the scientist is assuming that al-
lowed him to ask the question he did. In pressing this pro-
cess or cross-examination to its conclusion the historian rea-
ches a point where he recognizes that all the questions of a 
given systematic inquiry on a particular occasion presuppose 
a meaning or set of meanings not given as a result of any pri-
or and similar questions in the inquiry, but forming the ne-
cessary condition for all questions to arise within that in-
quiry. But in stating what those absolute presuppositions 
are, the re-enactor of the inquiry sequence is doing something 
that the original agent, the scientist, may never have done, 
i.e. to express an a priori concept in the form of a state-
ment. 
Only someone who expects history to be a scissors-and-
paste affair, a mere reportage, would be put off by this ex-
pansion of the historian's role. For Collingwood it was of 
the essence of scientific history that it be autonomous, which 
means that the active processes of the historian's thought are 
always involved. Such is the active nature of historical re-
enactment that it is not bound by the requirement that only 
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what occurred in an historical sequence is what can re-appear 
in the continuity of past events, of reconciling himself or 
his thought to the thinking of the scientist, he may put ques-
tions that may never have occurred to his protagonist, and he 
does so on his own initiative, because he is the only one who 
can know what he expects to find out, or when he has achieved 
that rapprochement that his narrative seeks to achieve. But 
in this autonomous placement of questions we begin to get the 
sense of how Collingwood sees a way to overcome what appears 
to be a fundamental and irreconcilable difference between two 
traditional ways to approach factuality--the diachronic narra-
tive approach of the historian and the synchronic logical ap-
proach of the metaphysician. If the scientific inquirer had 
to think some thoughts (absolute presuppositions) in order to 
think others (the questions and answers that form the body of 
his inquiry), and if the first thoughts are concepts embedded 
in the meaning of all the questions of the inquiry itself, 
then they can be said to be thoughts which occurred simultane-
ously (synchronically) with that inquiry. But this does not 
mean that they suddenly drop out of historical interest and 
become the province of the metaphysician-as-logician. It is 
what is involved in understanding the scientific event itself. 
In re-enacting that event historical thinking brings a latent 
thought (an a priori concept) into explicit consciousness (an 
act of propositional thought) in the form of an absolute pre-
supposition, something that is therefore both found and made 
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by the act of historical understanding. 
It is in this sense that absolute presuppositions are 
factual, and can be both the result of a question (the active 
question of the historian rather than those he receives from 
the historian in his inquiry) while yet remaining, as defini-
tions of a priori concepts, pre-varificationally truth-neutral. 
Where such thoughts do not necessarily form a temporal sequence, 
the historian puts them into such a sequence (diachronically) 
through his narrative reasoning. He is expressing a ground-
consequent relationship in narrative form. Nevertheless this 
is not mere invention on his part, on pain of ceasing to think 
historically: it must be rooted in evidence, such evidence 
being, of course, the documentary materials of the scientific 
inquiry articulated in language--with all that that implies. 
We cannot claim to have accounted for all the problems 
that we have raised concerning the historical re-enactment of 
absolute presuppositions. Some of these issues shall be dealt 
with further in subsequent sections; others are obscured by 
shadows we have never succeeded in penetrating with light--the 
nature of historical inference, the relationship between Q-A 
logic and formal structures in language and thought; and still 
others seem both to retain striking echoes from his early re-
conciliational philosophy, and to suggest further thought 
which never had the opportunity to take place. What we are 
left with is a very general argument for reconciling history 
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and metaphysics--an argument that shows how it is possible to 
employ the methods (the interpretation of evidence by the ac-
tive and systematic process of questioning), the presupposi-
tions (that thought is capable of being re-enacted due to the 
invariance of meaning in different contexts), and the proposi-
tions (the ad hoc nature of inquiry about inquiry, the use of 
evidence, etc.) of history to do the work of metaphysical an-
alysis (bringing to consciousness, or expressing in statements, 
~ priori concepts, in the form of absolute presuppositions, 
incorporated in acts of scientific inquiry). 
But this sort of argument employs rapprochement only 
at the level that it had reached in the earliest phases of 
Collingwood's development: the identification of metaphysics 
and history is an abstract rapprochement identity of the sort 
that we originally encountered in Religion and Philosophy. 
Obviously not all of history is metaphysics, because not all 
of history is concerned with the absolute presuppositions of 
scientific inquiry; and it would appear that not all of meta-
physics is history, because the logical analysis in which a 
given constellation of metaphysical presuppositions is shown 
to display incompatibilities is not part of the usual business 
of construction of coherent narrative, or at least not to the 
extent that it is not a thing of the past. The next step in 
the reconciliational process would be to show the way in which 
history and metaphysics are defined by a scale of forms. In 
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The Essay on Metaphysics we find not the slightest gesture in 
this direction. 
(c) The Absoluteness of Presupposing.--So far we have 
argued that by making use of our reconstructed "ring of 
thought'' in our approach to the major obstacles to Colling-
wood's reformed metaphysics, it is possible to make limited 
sense of The Essay on Metaphysics. We may summarize this ar-
gument thus far as follows. (1) As an application of~­
prochement philosophy, metaphysics seeks to overcome failures 
in the continuity of scientific inquiry by establishing the 
unified ground of shared meaning upon which systematic inquiry 
is based. (2) The way this is done is by applying the inter-
pretative methodology of Q-A logic to concrete examples of 
scientific thinking, not in the forward idrection of the in-
quiry itself, but in the retrogressive direction--i.e. towards 
the presuppositions of the inquiry's questions. (3) When this 
retrogressive inquiry is pushed to the limit, what is un-
covered are the ~ priori concepts which form the logically 
connected system (or constellation) on the basis of which all 
the questions of the inquiry are possible (i.e. make unified 
sense), and from which they all arise. (4) Metaphysical re-
conciliation is complete when the system of such concepts is 
made explicit (or is brought into consciousness) and articula-
ted in the form of a conceptual framework (a constellation of 
absolute presuppositions) having the structure of a philosoph-
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ical scale of forms. (5) Such a system of concepts linked by 
intensionally more inclusive meanings becomes expressed by 
acts of interpretative thought which bring absolutely presup-
posed concepts into consciousness in the form of definitions. 
(6) Such interpretative acts are historical insofar as his-
tory is the sequence of past acts of reflective thought, re-
enacted in the context of present thought by the intelligent 
cross-examination of evidence--the evidence in this case be-
ing concrete instances of scientific inquiry. (7) In such a 
re-enactment historical thinking affects its objects (~ pri-
ori concepts) by locating them in a context of other concepts, 
i.e. by putting them in propositional form. 
We are thus now in a position to understand how some-
one could mistake an absolute presupposition for a proposi-
tion. While an absolute presupposition is an act of ~ priori 
imagination at the conceptual level of thought, it is ex-
pressed in a form that appears like a proposition: it is ex-
pressed in a sentence, having the apparent unity of a judg-
ment, and therefore posing as a candidate for that level of 
consciousness. But it is only in the retrogressive, metaphysi-
cal inquiry that it takes such a form, and we now understand 
that it is actually put there by the active process of his-
torical thinking, and as a result of deliberate interpretative 
questioning. 
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But this glosses over difficulties to which we must 
now attend, not the least of which is the problem of the dis-
tinction between absolute and relative presuppositions. We 
recall that this distinction is made on the basis of the fact 
that there are some presuppositions which are not themselves 
the answer to any higher-order question in the progressive 
systematic inquiry. On our present line of thinking this is 
no longer a tenable distinction; it must be the answer to a 
question in some inquiry or it cannot be said to be a thought, 
or at least not a reflective thought (which it must be to be 
of interest to the historian)--i.e. one made in the conscious-
ness that it is being made. And if it is the answer to a 
question in the retrogressive metaphysical inquiry, how are 
we to understand the way in which such a question arises? For 
to say that it "arises," on Collingwood's view of the matter, 
is to say that it has a logical connection with our previous 
thought and does not arise by capricious curiosity. But that 
would mean that it arises due to the causal efficacy of an-
other presupposition, in which case it is no longer absolute 
but relative. 
How can our "ring of thought" get us out of this maze? 
Surely the very concept of rapprochement presupposes that 
there is something to be reconciled, i.e. two thoughts which 
do not share the continuity typical of self-consciousenss. 
The kind of consciousness employed to achieve the first stage 
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of reconciliation is questioning--that expression of the ac-
knowledged incompleteness of an act of propositional conscious-
ness which anticipates its re1uisite completion in a~ act of 
assertion. Where the discontinuity occurs in a systematic sci-
entific inquiry, which represents the articulation of a single 
question or set of related questions, it indicates a failure 
to grasp a prior step in the inquiry, waich leads to a regres-
sive type of question and reverses the direction of the primary 
inquiry. Such a reversal and its resultant ques~ions are the 
result of a higher stage of consciousness which Colling~ood 
described as "reason" in The New Leviathan, namely "thinking 
one thing, ~' because you think another thing, y; where y is 
your 'reason' or, as it is sometimes called, your 'ground' for 
thinking~" (NL, 14.1). It is a kind of thinking that arises 
as a "practical act of trying to alleviate the distress caused 
me by the untrustworthiness of my knowledge" (NL, 14.3), and 
never loses this practical aspect. In the case of a scienti-
fic inquiry the "distress" is due to the discontinuity in the 
inquiry, and the historical, retrogressive question is an ex-
ercise of the rationality of the historian, the absolute pre-
supposition being the "ground" or "reason" which will reassure 
him of the trustworthiness of a certain line of questioning. 
Now such a reflective reversal may be part of the in-
quiry process itself (regression to an hypothesis--e.g. one 
which requires further definition) or it may be one which 
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arises when the entire inquiry itself is called into question. 
Once again in the latter case this may occur in the process of 
normal scientific inquiry (as in the early stages of scienti-
fic revolution), or it may occur due to failure in the process 
of trying to re-enact a piece of science. In the latter case 
the historian may actually invent the question for the purpose 
of eliciting from the inquiry its presupposed concepts, or its 
conceptual framework. But these two cases seem to be very 
different: if the historian, in exercising his autonomy in 
raising questions on his own initiative, is free to invent a 
metaphysical question, it is clear he is creating the discon-
tinuity that the absolute presupposition is meant to repair; 
but the scientist in a period of scientific crisis perceives 
or feels the discontinuity in the experience of his own sci-
entific consciousness, and therefore does not create it but 
finds it. Once again we find ourselves confronting the ideal-
istic dimension of Collingwood's philosophy, and uneasy about 
what to make of it. If we define the "idealistic turn" as 
that point at which a philosopher decides that meaning is 
something not found but made, then there can be little doubt 
that Collingwood made that turn early in his career, and never 
went back on it. But we have repeatedly witnessed Colling-
wood arguing that meaning is something both found and made: 
this is the celebrated "unity of act and fact" of Gentile and 
the Italian idealists, and the basis of Collingwood's later 
re-interpretation of the act-object distinction. 
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The distinction between relative and absolute presup-
positions is our present case in point, and we wish to under-
stand if an absolute presupposition is something found or made 
or both. Clearly Collingwood wants to say both, but can he 
do so consistently? For if it is both, then the absoluteness 
of presuppositions threatens to vanish altogether: as some-
thing found its reality is affirmed, but only as contingent 
to an act of historical interpretation which establishes its 
factuality; and as something made its independence is surren-
dered to that which is responsible for its creation. In 
either case it turns out that an absolute presupposition is 
something that is always dependent on something else, and is 
therefore only relatively absolute--a paradoxical conclusion 
to be sure. 
The relativization of absolute presuppositions also 
bears down on us form a different direction, for we are forced 
to recognize that in calling absolute presuppositions a priori 
concepts we have vastly oversimplified the logic of presuppos-
ing. The deciding factor in considering whether a thought is 
a concept, a proposition, or an inference is not the form that 
one or the other takes when it is expressed in words, but the 
way it functions in the process of thinking. Thus one and the 
same linguistic entity--the indicative sentence--may express 
a concept in the form of a definition, or may predicate one 
concept of another in the form of a proposition, or may re-
821 
late one concept to another as ground and consequent in the 
form of an inference. While we have argued that a presupposed 
concept may appear in indicative sentential form because we 
typically express ourselves in sentences in order to communi-
cate a complete thought, this does not tell the whole story. 
For in much of what Collingwood says about it, presupposing is 
treated as a complex realtionship rather than as a simple ling-
uistic or formally logical entity. He would say, for example, 
that one form of experience presupposes another (as science 
presupposes religion in Speculum Mentis, where "science" and 
"religion" are concepts representing whole regions of experi-
ence)--indicating that the relationship was one of logical de-
pendency but not of deductive entailment. Such a usage is 
virtually repeated when he writes in the Essay on Metaphysics 
that contemporary science is "monotheistic" in that it presup-
poses that God exists. And again in the "retrospect" chapter 
of The New Leviathan he writes that each of the levels of con-
sciousness presupposes its predecessor as that out of which it 
develops, while the successor is not rendered necessary by the 
form of consciousenss which preceeded it (NL, 9.43). In fact 
it is this section of The New Leviathan that comes closest to 
defining the relationship of presupposing than any other place 
in his published works, since it is set in the context of a 
description of development which he defines as "a logical pro-
cess in which B 'presupposes' A, C 'presupposes' B, and D 'pre-
supposes' C" without the earlier terms necessitating the later 
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ones (NL, 9.47-9.48). 
This clarifies the relationship at the same time that 
it complicates and relativizes it. For if the scale of forms 
of consciousness is such that any point on the scale not only 
summarizes and completes the terms below it but also presup-
poses them, then in what sense can we say that absolute pre-
suppositions are confined to the conceptual level (or should 
we say "located" at the conceptual level?) of consciousness? 
We are at a loss to say what the criterion is for the absolute-
ness of presuppositions. While it would appear that the mini-
mum determination of meaning is at the conceptual level of 
thought, that would seem to leave us with as many absolute 
presuppostions as there are conceptual meanings, a situation 
which achieves ultimacy at the expense of complete dissipation. 
What we seem to be left with is a glimpse into an epis-
ternological concept of remarkable complexity--one which has 
yet to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner by anyone with 
h h . h . f .1. 12 w k h c 11. d w orne t ~s aut or ~s am~ ~ar. e now t at o ~ngwoo un-
derstood an absolute presupposition to be pre-propositional 
and also pre-interrogative (both in the logical rather than 
temporal sense), and that it has efficacy in causing questions 
12However the issue of conceptual change in constel-
lations of presuppositions has been recognized and discussed 
with considerable ;insight by Stephen Toulrnin, who acknowledges 
his debt to Collingwood on this subject. See his Human Under-
standing: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Prince-
ton, 1972), pp. 52-85. 
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to arise--these being epistemic functions. We also know that 
it has certain logical properties which tend to apply to pre-
suppositions regardless of their semantic content--that a pre-
supposition acts as a unifier in a systematic inquiry; that 
its relationship to questions and propositions resembles in-
ference, but yet is not deductively or inductively related to 
questions and answers in the P-Q-A complex; that it has re-
lations of consupponibility with other presuppostions, and 
with these others forms a constellation or synthesis which, 
like a deductive system, is subject to conflicts or strains 
due to inconsistencies. But yet it has some of the properties 
of religious belief: it has the character of a decision with 
practical consequences; it is held with an attitude of un-
questioning acceptance or natural piety; it can be embraced 
or abandoned, but never verified or falsified; and it is 
sometimes surrounded by a kind of "numinous terror" ordinarily 
evoked by sacred objects. And finally Collingwood called at-
tention to its historical dimension: the establishment of 
its factuality by cross-examination and interpretation of evi-
dence, its development to full consciousness by rational ac~s 
of metaphysical analysis which shares the premise of histori-
cal understanding that acts of thought are capable of re-
enactment without essential loss of universal meaning. 
Even a cursory examination of this set of properties 
could well keep us busy for several more chapters, raising as 
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they do questions which touch not only on epistemology, but 
also on logic and the philosophy of religion. At this point 
we can only admit that it does not seem possible to maintain 
the unconditional distinction between absolute and relative 
presuppositions, where that distinction pertains to all pos-
sible inquiries. but in any given inquiry such a distinction 
is not only possible, it is essential: for without the pre-
suppositions that ground the entire set of questions, no sci-
entific inquiry can achieve its objectives--i.e. to fulfill 
the intention to answer the questions that arise only due to 
the causal efficacy of these presuppositions, and ultimately 
to be grounded in these presuppositions as their rational jus-
tification. It is not a complete disaster for rapprochement 
philosophy, therefore, to argue that absolute presuppositions 
are inquiry-dependent meanings and therefore only relatively 
absolute. They are at least inquiry-constant within that in-
quiry, and this suffices for Collingwood's purposes, since it 
is consistent with the ad hoc character of all historical in-
terpretation. 
Our disappointment at Collingwood's failure to satisfy 
us on the nature of the relationship of presupposing should 
not prevent us from acknowledging our debt to him for what he 
did achieve in this area. In marking out the realm of abso-
lute presuppositions he pointed the way beyond the empiricis-
tic and positivistic attempts to eliminate general metaphysics. 
825 
Like Caesar, he crossed the river even if he did not totally 
succeed in subduing the territory on the other side. He 
showed us a way in which a science of metaphysics is possible, 
without actually accomplishing the construction of that sci-
ence. Others who have followed him--men like Errol Harris 
and Stephen Toulmin--have since taken the banner to higher 
ground. It is still a territory left largely unexplored. 
(d) Ontology and Reformed Metaphysics.--We come now 
to the final obstacle, Collingwood's rejection of ontology as 
a fitting subject-matter for metaphysical analysis. Of all 
our obstacles, this is the most difficult for us to surmount, 
not only because Collingwood was so perfunctory and uncompro-
mising about it, and not only because it represents an unhis-
torical and unscholarly dismissal of a subject matter of great 
antiquity and coeval with philosophy itself, but also because 
it runs contrary to attitudes that he espoused from an early 
date, and defended for many years. For while the rejection of 
a science of abstract being is a recurrent theme, so also is 
the requirement that the object of philosophy is no mere ens 
rationis, but one which has ontological reference (EPM, 125); 
"philosophy is the theory of existence; not of existence in 
the abstract, but of existence in the concrete; the theory of 
all that exists" (RP, 16; FR, 54). Such is also the signifi-
cance of Anselm's ontological argument, which is defended in 
works from all stages in his philosophical career (RP, 66; 
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EPM, 124-25; EM, 189-90), and such is the essential nature of 
all philosophical judgment: it is always both universal and 
categorical, stating what is both common and essential in that 
which exists (EPM, 127, 136). To abandon this requirement is 
not merely to reject one erroneous form of metaphysics, it is 
to strip philosophy of its distinguishing feature. To fail to 
overcome this obstacle is therefore to fail to defend the role 
of philosophy as Collingwood had defined it in the Essay on 
Philosophical Method, which the Autobiography singled out as 
his best and "only" book. 
Is there any way that our reconstructed "ring of 
thought" can aid us in adopting a viewpoint that will allow 
us to see our way beyond this final obstacle? After provid-
ing us with a means to understand how metaphysics is possible 
as a science of absolute presuppositions re-enacted by a form 
of thought using the methods of historical interpretation, can 
we now find a way to re-establish the continuity between re-
formed and traditional metaphysics, between scientific history 
and Aristotle's metaphysics? For rapprochement philosophy, 
what is the meaning shared by a science of absolute presuppo-
sitions and a science of being as being? To reconcile ontology 
and reformed historical metaphysics would require redefining 
ontology in a way which would allow for a non-abstract concept 
of being, one which does not arise at the limit of the abstrac-
tive process by leaving out determining characteristics, but 
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rather takes such individuating marks as essential to it. 
This would be a science of "concrete being"--a reformed on-
tology that would be a part of reformed metaphysics. 
Collingwood himself leaves open the possibility that 
rejecting one sense of "ontology" leaves other senses of the 
term untouched by the criticism (EM, 16). But our concern 
is less with his rejection of the title than it is with his 
rejection of the concept which the title represents. For in 
spite of his claims about what philosophy should be, in most 
of what he writes he refuses to entertain any questions con-
cerning ontological reference in the sense of a science which 
says something directly about reality rather than something 
about knowledge of that reality. In Speculum Mentis this re-
fusal takes the form of a denial that metaphysics can ever an-
alyze real being, being as it is in itself untainted by 
thought (SM, 274); and in the theory of perception offered 
in The New Leviathan it is expressed in the denial that feel-
ings have objects as well as modes (NL, 5.39). In such places 
as these it has been hard for us to defend Collingwood against 
the charge of radical subjective idealism. But in other pas-
sages in his works it is possible to see a different thought 
process at work, a process which allows him (for example in 
his correspondence with Ryle) to recognize the metaphysical 
legitimacy of such statements as "mind exists," "matter ex-
ists," and "God exists"--statements which are both categorical 
828 
(or referential) and universal. can we leap to the conclu-
sion that such statements of ontological commitment form the 
body of absolute presuppositions that we have found so elusive 
throughout this chapter? They certainly appear to be ultimate 
and primitive enough to present themselves as candidates for 
inclusion in reformed metaphysics, and the only sort of ques-
tion to which they could be the answer would be equally prim-
itive, viz. what exists? But then why is it not legitimate 
for reason to press this retrogressive inquiry one step fur-
ther by asking for reassurance for these assertions? Why 
should reason be prevented from asking the ontological ques-
tion, "why is there something rather than nothing?" 
Perhaps we are once again asking more of the Essay on 
Metaphysics than it was intended to achieve. it is nonethe-
less not unreasonable to put such questions to Collingwood, 
since metaphysics is one branch of the science of thought (EM, 
101), and therefore seeks meaning just as all science and all 
thought does; and if it is an absolute presupposition of sci-
ence not only that reality is intelligible or conforms to law, 
but also that there is a reality to investigate (EM, 213, 222-
27), then it seems that on either view of metaphysics--Colling-
wood's or Aristotle's--the examination of the meaning of being 
is a legitimate enterprise. Surely we must assume that Col-
lingwood's intention was not primarily to write a treatise on 
Aristotle or his metaphysics, but to write an essay or series 
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of essays showing how a conception of metaphysics on the mind-
mind model is still possible, and in doing so he found suffi-
cient basis in Aristotle for making the points he had to make 
to the audience he presumed he had. Collingwood's rejection 
of Aristotle's ontology is not so much an attempt to re-write 
Aristotle as it is an attempt to show that he was in basic 
agreement with those critics of Aristotle who rejected a sci-
ence of pure being, and to indicate that such a fruitless in-
quiry had its roots in some of the ideas put forward in the 
treatises on metaphysics attributed to Aristotle. Presumably 
his readership included some of the same critics who found 
A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic of some interest, and 
at the beginning of an essay which by its title threatened to 
raise again the metaphysical spectre he was anxious to show 
this audience that he was not about to revive this long-dead 
topic. But for such a presumed, postivistically influenced 
audience he was equally anxious to show that in rejecting one 
meaning of metaphysics one has not demonstrated the impossi-
bility of metaphysics in any sense whatever, and metaphysics 
as a science of first principles also has its pedigree in Ar-
istotle's treatises. 
But having said this there is the additional problem 
that Collingwood is sidestepping a discussion of what we have 
demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt to be one of the most 
important issues in his own philosophy--its basic opposition 
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to realism. Even if "pure being" is the metaphysical counter-
part of an object unaffected by the knowing of it, it is also 
the generic concept of a scale of forms of being that Colling-
wood could hardly refuse to investigate as one of the absolute 
presuppositions of science. For on his own grounds, he not 
only accepted in his philosophy of mind the precepts that the 
esse of mind is de hac re cogitare (RP, 100; FR, 172), and in 
his theory ofperception that the esse of a sensum is sentiri 
(PA, 198), but also in cosmology that the modern conception of 
nature presupposes that being is becoming. "For an evolution-
ary science of nature, the esse of anything in nature is its 
fieri," which requires that the old conception of substance 
that grounded mechanistic physics (and before that the animis-
tic physics of the Greeks) is resolved into the concept of 
function (IN, 15-16). With these clues in mind, can anything 
be legitimately said about the meaning of being that would be 
acceptable to Collingwood in his role as metaphysical reformer? 
Surely Collingwood would continue to argue that there 
can be no science of something as lacking in distinction as 
pure abstract being. But at the lowest level of consciousness 
something present but indeterminate must survive and be per-
petuated long enough for sensation to occur at all (PA, 212-13). 
The first specification of the generic essence of being is 
therefore minimally the indeterminate presence of something to 
sensation. As this is perpetuated and domesticated in con-
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sciousness the meaning of being of the object is refined and 
modified: from being an indeterminate presence it becomes a 
sustained object for perception, an imagined whole, a coherent 
imagined whole, a referred-to imagined whole, etc.--in accord-
ance with the progressively higher activities of conscious-
ness. At each stage the meaning of the object's being is de-
termined by the form of consciousness, and the unique stage of 
the demand for meaning made by that form of consciousness on 
the object. 
Is there anything that lies at the summit of this 
scale? Is there an object so rich in meaning, so determinate 
in its being, that it utterly satisfies the highest demands of 
the mind for significance? We have very little to build upon 
in the published writings to reconstruct an answer to this 
question, since the entire question of concrete ontology is 
left unresolved in the Essay on Metaphysics. What we are 
lacking is any adequate idea of Collingwood's cosmology--
something he lectured on repeatedly, and which he declared to 
be one of the most pressing needs in contemporary philosophy. 
There is some indication in The Idea of Nature that Colling-
wood supported Hegel's division of reality into the realms of 
matter, life, and mind, where each is in the process of turn-
ing into the next higher form, and each is a more perfect em-
bodiment of the Absolute Idea (IN, 159). But he is also cri-
tical of the residue of mechanism and logicism in Hegel's 
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philosophy of nature (IN, 121-32). The modern idea of nature, 
Collingwood argues, recognizes not only that there is no na-
ture at an instant (as Whitehead phrases it), but also that a 
thing is what it does, so that there is no distinction between 
motion and that which moves: "modern physical theory regards 
matter as possessing its own characteristics, whether chemical 
or physical, only because it moves; time is therefore a factor 
in its very being, and that being is fundamentally motion: 
(IN, 151-52). Furthermore the older conceptions of space and 
time--postulated as infinite extension and succession--"seem 
to be nothing but abstractions from the idea of movement" on 
the one hand, or logical presuppositions of that idea on the 
other. But then one encounters this remarkable passage: 
This at any rate seems clear: that since modern science 
is now committed to a view of the physical universe as 
finite, certainly in space and probably in time, the ac-
tivity which this same science identifies with matter 
cannot be a self-created or ultimately self-dependent 
activity. The world of nature or physical world as a 
whole, on any such view, must ultimately depend for its 
existence on something other than itself .... (M)odern 
science, after an experiment with materialism, has come 
back into line with the main tradition of European 
thought, which has always ascribed to nature an essen-
tially derivative or dependent status in the general 
scheme of things. It is true that the most varied proofs 
have been offered as to why nature must be dependent, and 
the most varied theories as to what it depended on; but 
in general, with strikingly few exceptions, scientists 
and philosophers have agreed that the world of nature 
forms only one part or aspect of all being, and that in 
this total realm its place is a secondary one, one of de-
pendence on something prior to itself. (IN, 155). 
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But while Collingwood points out that many contemporary cos-
mologists argue, as did their classical and medieval prede-
cessors, that what nature depends upon is God, Collingwood 
comes up with a less traditional solution: 
Throughout the long tradition of European thought it has 
been said ... that nature, though it is a thing that 
really exists, is not a thing that exists in itself or in 
its own right, but a thing which depends for its exist-
ence upon something else. I take this to imply that na-
tural science ... is not, as the positivists imagined, 
the only department or form of human thought . . . and is 
not even a self-contained or self-sufficient form of 
thought, but depends for its very existence upon some 
other form of thought which is different from it and can-
not be reduced to it . . . . What is this other form of 
thought? I answer, "History." (IH, 175-76). 
What can this mean? What sense of "History" (with a 
capital "H") can he have in mind? This brings us face to face 
once again with the central paradox of the Essay on Metaphy-
sics, for while Collingwood has made a fairly convincing case 
in The Idea of Nature that the modern idea of nature is model-
led on evolution, and evolution is modelled on the idea of 
history (IN, 9, 132), at precisely the point where we expect 
him to complete the argument on the ontological side he ap-
pears to swap horses and ride out on an epistemological charg-
er, a kind of eguus ex machina. If natural science is depend-
ent upon something else because nature is dependent on some-
thing else, then by force of the same analogy if what natural 
science depends upon is history (in the sense of a kind of 
knowledge), what nature depends upon is the ontological refer-
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ent of historical knowledge. What can this be? Certainly 
not the deeds of men done in the past. Is "History" (with a 
capital "H") to be taken in the sense of cosmic development, 
in spite of the fact that there is nothing in the development 
of Collingwood's thought to prepare us for this sudden ex-
pansion of the idea of history, and everything to indicate 
that it was moving in just the opposite direction? 
Or is there some reality that grounds both nature and 
history? Such would seem to be the sense of those early pas-
sages in his writings such as that in Speculum Mentis in which 
Descartes' cogito ergo sum is interpreted to mean that "the 
concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present aware-
ness, ((is)) the root of science," and consequently that "Sci-
ence presupposes history and can never go behind history" (SM, 
202). Such is the idealistic strand in Collingwood's braided 
ring of thought. But opposed to this is the realistic counter-
tendency: 
modern thought is disentangling itself from the cobwebs of 
subjective idealism .... Kant would suggest a very dif-
ferent conclusion: namely that if nature bears on its 
face the marks of dependency for its existence on some-
thing else, that something is the human mind .... This 
is bad philosophy . . . . The most rigorous thought of 
our own time, scientific and philosophic alike, has turned 
resolutely away from these subjectivist or phenomenalist 
doctrines, and agrees that whatever nature depends upon it 
does not depend on the human mind. (IN, 156). 
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What is left? Could Collingwood, whose respect for religious 
consciousness remained unquestioned throughout all his pub-
lished writings, fail to see that a mind unreconciled to the 
mind of God has failed in its primary metaphysical obligation? 
It would not seem so, judging solely from the following pas-
sage from Chapter XXI of the Essay on Metaphysics, "Quicunque 
Vult," which may well be taken as Collingwood's final offer-
ing of rapprochement philosophy: 
If metaphysics is our name for the statement of absolute 
presuppositions, and if metaphysics and theology are the 
same, there are three ways in which the existence of a 
world of nature might be made to figure among the doctrines 
of theology. 1. It might be a proposition in metaphysics, 
as it is for Spinoza, that God and nature are the same. 
But this would entail the consequence that natural science 
is the same thing as metaphysics: which cannot be right if 
the business of metaphysics is to state the absolute pre-
suppositions of natural science. 2. It might be a propo-
sition in metaphysics that the world of nature exists, but 
this proposition might be left wholly unrelated to the 
proposition that God exists. But then it would not be a 
proposition in theology; and therefore, if theology and 
metaphysics are the same, not a proposition in metaphysics. 
And what about the presupposition of which it was the 
statement? The act by which we hold such presuppositions, 
I have said elsewhere, is religious faith; and God is 
that in which we believe by faith; therefore all our abso-
lute presuppositions must be presuppositions in holding 
which we believe something about God. 3. It might be a 
proposition in which the existence of the world of nature 
was stated in the form of an attribute or activity of God; 
and this seems the only possible alternative. (EM, 215-
16). 
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